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 Abstract 
 
Before the crisis Catalonia and the rest of Spain received high volumes of immigration – of which 
much was “illegal”. This was despite formally strict controls – EU policy – and different 
governments in Madrid claiming to operate a legal model of migration – leading to identification 
of a “policy paradox”. In the same period immigration became problematized, which in Catalonia 
allowed xenophobic politics to gain popular support – despite being a territory proactive at 
integrating newcomers. This research aimed to identify the undercurrents of these contradictions 
and respond to questions on the relative impact of business, state, national and electoral factors. 
It surveys literature on migration paradoxes and theories, develops an original conceptual 
framework by critically assessing a range of radical writing, performs quantitative and secondary 
study of the Catalan, Spanish and European economic and policy contexts (in general and 
regarding immigration), and analyses findings from interviews with privileged “insiders” and 
observers (employers, union leaders, migrant activists and policy advisors). Policy contradictions 
and the problematization of immigration were identified as rooted firstly in the inherent 
contradictions of the capitalist state. States must ensure availability of new reserves of labour to 
guarantee accumulation and make savings by not having to “socially reproduce” “imported” 
labour power. Yet their abstract national and bounded character propels constant nationcraft – a 
process best performed invisibly and negatively by symbolically and practically excluding 
migrants from territory, rights and citizenship. Dynamics are further driven by the desire to be 
seen to preserve the “rule of law” and guarantee the exclusivity of national “social contracts”. 
Nation-building in policymaking was detected by uncovering the national-linguistic considerations 
behind the controversial drive to devolve immigration powers to Catalonia. Mushrooming 
irregularity was a result of migrant agency and the restrictive tendencies of the Aznar 
administration and EU. Despite the Popular Party (and EU) being notably pro-business, tensions 
emerged with employers who lobbied alongside unions to bring about the liberalisations 
introduced by the Zapatero government (2004-2011). Employers benefit from the (continued) 
institutional conditioning of migrant labour and irregular hiring has been tolerated – aided by a 
relatively informal and insecure labour market. Yet it is a mistake to see high levels irregularity 
simply as labour policy. The unequal and instrumental nature of European integration meant the 
Spanish State played a border policing role that threatened its labour needs before the crisis. 
This led to political “fudge” based on varying models of irregularity-amnesty-irregularity, and 
reinforced pro-European and Hispanist migrant recruitment tendencies. Changes in government 
have reshaped policymaking (and increased or decreased related tensions) but less-democratic 
influences were identified in interviews and a clear political economy of immigration can be 
identified. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and research design 
 
1.1 Centrality of immigration and main research question 
 
Immigration is one of the key political issues of our time. In 2015 a major crisis for the 
European Union (EU) began with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees – mainly 
fleeing wars in the Middle East. In response, some countries re-established national border 
controls removed under the Schengen agreement on free circulation of citizens within EU 
borders, and discussion began about the possibility of the continental project unravelling – 
such is the importance of Schengen to the EU (Barker, Byrne & Vasagar, 2015). At the same 
time, migration arguably has become a defining feature of domestic politics in many 
developed countries where far-right parties and leaders have gained mass electoral support 
and in several cases entered governments (Burchianti & Zapata-Barrero, 2012: 6; 
Sevastopulo, 2015). In Britain a defence of greater migratory restrictions played a major part 
in the June 2016 EU referendum, and Donald Trump won the US Republican nomination 
after raising the ideas of building a wall between Mexico and the USA, deporting all 
undocumented migrants and their children, and temporarily banning entry to the USA to all 
Muslims. 
An exhaustive 2013 study identified the political polarisation taking place over 
migration as follows: 
 
In Europe, loud and contradictory claims are made for and against immigration; 
according to some, immigrants are rejuvenators of ageing populations, motors of 
economic growth, and saviours of the European welfare state; to others they are to 
blame for native unemployment, wage depression and welfare costs, not to mention 
social and cultural disintegration. The debate is barely less polarized in North 
America and Oceania, despite their longer historical experience of large-scale 
immigration and their self-identification as nations of immigrants. … It is clear that 
across the rich liberal democracies, immigration is an issue freighted with a lot of 
political baggage. (Hampshire, 2013: 1). 
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Where there are hostile attitudes to immigration, this does not appear to correlate simply 
with high levels of immigration locally. Indeed anti-immigrant voting can be weaker in areas 
with larger proportions of foreign residents (such as London, where approximately a third of 
the city’s population were born outside Britain, and anti-immigrant parties have had electoral 
success limited to very localised areas). This suggests that it is not immigration per se that is 
problematic but perceptions of it – as refracted through politics and the media. Similar 
distortions can be identified in Spain where “immigration” has consistently ranked high in 
monthly opinion polls identifying “Spain’s main problem”, but when those polled are asked 
about “the problem personally affecting you the most” migration obtains a much lower 
ranking1.  
 Such a view is reinforced by the observation that opinions on migration often are 
fluctuating and inconsistent. In the summer of 2015, after a period in which EU immigration 
and asylum regimes were probed and criticised – reaching a climax after the publication of 
the image of young Aylan Kurdi drowned on a Mediterranean beach – surveys found that 
half of the British population wanted the country to accept more refugees and opposition to 
immigration as a whole fell significantly (Comres, 2015). Large protests showing solidarity 
with refugees took place in several European cities – including a demonstration of a hundred 
thousand people in London. (AFP, 2015; Khomami & Johnston, 2015). Yet support for 
awarding asylum in Europe fell after the November 2015 Paris atrocities and January 2016 
Cologne sexual attacks – even though the direct links between the two events with forced 
migration were tiny2 (Richards, 2015; Dearden, 2016). Inconsistencies in opinion – shared 
by the institutions, political parties and the media – exist regarding the idea of who is and 
who is not a “migrant” or “immigrant”. Such terms are rarely used, for example, to describe 
the North-American visa over-stayer, the African Premier-League footballer, the foreign 
businessperson, or “the Brit abroad” (usually described as an “expat”), yet all these groups 
migrated and settled abroad. 
The above examples – and others that could be provided – show that despite the 
large volume of discussion taking place on the immigration issue, the level of genuine 
understanding of the matter has its limits. This can be identified among people that have 
very different strong opinions on the subject. Both conservatives and progressives tend to 
underestimate the practical difficulties for governments – including those formally in favour of 
reducing migration – to be able to greatly limit migration (even if those same governments do 
apply some strict controls, and make life more unpleasant, precarious and dangerous for 
many foreigners). Conservatives increasingly have chosen to support far-right political 
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alternatives. The pro-migrant left has sometimes over-predicted mass expulsions of migrants 
under governments discursively hostile to migration. In both cases political action is treated 
as commensurable with political discourse, and seemingly the structural role of migration to 
national economies (including state finances) is ignored. British progressives that have 
understood anti-immigrant attitudes in the post-War period mainly in terms of race relations 
express their surprise that a bifurcation has developed between public attitudes towards race 
– generally more open or anti-racist – and towards foreign residence, which is frequently 
treated with alarm.  
A re-visiting of the immigration question is required which deals adequately with its 
specificities (as well as its partial autonomy from racism). There is some political urgency in 
developing a better understanding of the deeper dynamics of the immigration question, and 
for scholars to contribute to such a process. A good – however ambitious – starting point 
would be to attempt to better comprehend the major contradictions in immigration policy and 
politics, as both logically and in the initial literature consulted these are frequently linked to 
political controversies and tensions. Such paradoxes are an international phenomenon but 
would include the failure by the Conservative government of David Cameron (2010-2016) to 
achieve its promised reduction of migrant numbers despite many criticisms from the right-
wing British media and politicians.  
Such incongruities are particularly strong in the country (Spain 3 ) and sub-state 
(Catalonia) subject of this study. Between the late 1990s and the crisis period right-wing and 
centre-left governments in Madrid claimed to be applying policies that channelled inward 
migration through limited legal routes, but in practice migration and particularly irregular 
migration increased massively (as is examined and re-examined in section 1.3 and Chapters 
Four, Five and Seven). A further paradox is that the “regional” territory with the greatest 
expressions of public hostility towards immigration – in the form of xenophobic street 
protests and the electoral successes of openly anti-immigrant parties (an advance 
unparalleled in the rest of Spain) – is that in which the more local authorities have best 
attempted to promote the integration of newcomers. This territory is Catalonia. 
The main aim of this research is therefore to identify the deeper drives shaping 
immigration policy – both stated and applied, policymaking and politics, in order to gain a 
logical appreciation of why the subject is so frequently and sharply contested, as well as 
treated as a problem. This goal is pursued by asking the question of what the underlying 
political and economic dynamics are behind disparities between policies and outcomes 
across the whole of Spain and in Catalonia in particular. This was the central problem 
 
 
 
 
4 
around which the research has been designed, performed and presented. It is a “big” and 
inherently multi-disciplinary question to which the answer would inescapably be limited to 
being an approximation rather than final verdict. To aid such a complex task the enquiry was 
broken down into more specific sub-questions, which shall be presented in this introduction 
(in 1.4). However, before outlining these it is convenient to provide background to the study 
in order to facilitate comprehension of many of the assumptions that informed the different 
research interrogations. 
 
 
1.2 Engagement with recent historical developments in Spain  
 
Three recent historical developments taken place in Spain have been crucial to the 
configuration of this study. The first of these processes or set of interrelated events was the 
2000 race riots and migrant strikes in El Ejido (Andalusia) and the reform of the Aliens’ Law 
carried out that year by the conservative Aznar administration. The second development was 
the growth of the public perception of immigration as “a problem” developing between 2000 
and 2006. In the latter year, under the Socialist administration of Zapatero, and coinciding 
with “the Canarian boat crisis”, immigration became identified as Spain’s biggest problem in 
polls, overtaking issues such as unemployment or terrorism. Such rejection was followed by 
public debates among progressives about whether immigration should be restricted (or even 
whether the undocumented should be deported) in the interests of working-class Spaniards. 
A third related transformation, this time focused territorially on Catalonia, was the emergence 
in the same period of xenophobic and Islamophobic institutional decisions, political 
discourse, street movements and political parties. 
 I had some personal engagement with each of the sets of events. Between 1993 and 
2005 I lived in Barcelona and Madrid and participated in demonstrations, meetings and 
occupations by undocumented migrants and supporters. The most dramatic of these protest 
activities were in response to the 2000 Reform. In 2008 I participated in a debate in the 
theoretical magazine Viejo Topo in response to a “report” by Communist writers that was 
extremely hostile to immigration. I developed my ideas further to produce an academic-
journal article (‘Borders, Labour Impacts and Union Responses: Case of Spain’) published 
by Refuge (Stobart, 2010). Understanding the growth of the new xenophobic and racist 
politics in Catalonia became of particular interest to me when I returned temporarily to live in 
Barcelona in 2011 and became a local activist in the anti-racist movement Unitat contra el 
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Feixisme i el Racisme. This experience inspired me to write the journal publication ‘The Re-
Emergence of the Spanish Far Right: Why in Catalonia?’ (Stobart, 2013) 
As well as the above events (and related intellectual activity) having played an 
important role in developing the present research focus, they also made a large impression 
on political, academic and media analyses in Catalonia and Spain. Consequently they were 
referred to regularly in the practical research performed here, normally being raised without 
prompting by participants. For the sake of comprehension each development is described in 
some detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
1.2.1 The El Ejido conflicts and government and migrant responses 
 
Spanish society transformed from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Previously Spain had 
been a country of emigration – including by millions that fled the Franco dictatorship; now it 
was becoming one of immigration – spurred by relatively high levels of job creation and 
demographic decline4. Foreign residents – most of whom originated from poorer continents 
or sub-continents - increased from 1.5 per cent of the total population in 1996 to 
approximately 12 per cent in 2006 (Cornelius, 2004: 388; Bolaños, 2009). Large-scale entry 
of migrants took place in the workforce – of nearly three million workers in the same period – 
and irregular settlement was commonplace (Bolaños, 2009). By the end of the 1990s it was 
clear that Catalonia and Spain’s racially homogenous society was diversifying.  
In the late 1990s violent anti-immigrant backlashes occurred in Spain’s north-African 
enclave Ceuta (led by police) and a poor neighbourhood in Terrassa, Catalonia5  (Rius-Sant, 
2007; Cornelius, 2004: 418). A bigger racist riot took place in February 2000 in the small 
agricultural town of El Ejido (Almeria) after a young woman was stabbed to death by a 
mentally-ill Moroccan. The incident occurred in an area employing tens of thousands of 
migrants in intensive farming, and had been the site of rising hostility towards migrants – 
including by the local authorities and media (Calavita, 2005: 70; Rius-Sant, 2007: 208). For 
days following the killing local residents formed mobs and engaged in “moor hunting” – 
physically attacking North Africans and setting fire to their homes. After the violence 374 
immigrants reported having been attacked and 221 having lost their homes, making the 
event one of the worst cases of racist violence in Europe in decades (Rius-Sant, 2007: 203; 
SOS Racismo, 2001). 
While the media condemned the violence, El Ejido was often presented by Spanish 
media and politicians as demonstrating the dangers of large-scale immigration (rather than 
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xenophobia or racism). Right-wing Prime Minister José María Aznar refused to denounce the 
mob violence, claiming that “one had to be there”6 to hold an opinion (SOS Racismo, 2001: 
74). Migrant farm labourers, who made up 90 per cent of the local immigrant population, 
reacted militantly – holding an eight-day “wildcat” strike coinciding with the harvesting 
season and costing employers millions of Euros (SOS Racismo, 2001: 105; Rius-Sant, 2007: 
205). After negotiations between unions, NGOs, public authorities and farmers’ associations, 
local North Africans were provided with emergency shelter, public transport, compensation 
for damages, and improvements in working conditions 7  (Rius-Sant, 2007: 205). In the 
following months migrant farmworkers in Catalonia also struck.   
Subsequent media, activist and academic attention revealed that the conditions 
underlying the El Ejido violence were those of social inequality and segregation between 
migrants and non-migrants, and that these had been underpinned by low-wage and 
precarious hiring in local farms. Work was in high-temperature plastic greenhouses using 
high doses of harmful pesticides 8 . 70 per cent of the foreigners employed were 
undocumented, and most employment was “off the books” (Calavita, 2005: 71; Cornelius, 
2004: 399; SOS Racismo, 2001: 31). The agricultural and labour model proved lucrative for 
local farming: helping the area transform from being among the poorest in Europe to being 
one of the richest (Rodríguez, 2008: 64 & 65). Yet migrants often lived in shacks or ruins 
away from the town areas. This was Town Hall residential policy, as was infamously 
explained by the local mayor - a member of the People’s Party (PP): “[i]mmigrants are good 
for the municipality while they are working, but they must take the bus and leave at seven in 
the evening” (Rius-Sant, 2007: 202).  
 
Problems that emerged from the 2000 reform of the Aliens’ Law  
 
A relatively progressive Aliens Law had been passed months before the El Ejido events 
against the wishes of the PP minority government (and backed by the Catalan and Basque 
nationalist parties that had previously given the government parliamentary support; see 
5.2.2.1). The Law provided for a programme of regularisations. During the March 2000 
general-election campaign the PP promised to radically reform the Law – blaming it for the 
riots (ibid; Rius-Sant, 2007). The People’s Party won an absolute majority for the first time, 
and local candidates that had campaigned over immigration gained good results (ibid). The 
new government acted rapidly to reform the 2000/4 Law, arguing that greater restrictions 
were necessary to avoid xenophobic backlashes (Cornelius, 2004: 137; see 5.2.2.1). The 
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reformed Law (2000/8) increased controls by easing expulsions, making it harder for 
migrants to obtain permits and settle their families with them. It also removed the right for 
undocumented workers to protest, strike and join unions (5.2.2.1). Very many “sin papeles” 
no doubt had their hopes of legalisation raised by the 4/2000 Law and the amnesty it 
initiated, but few would benefit (ibid; 5.2.2.2).  
 Attitudes towards immigration hardened further among the government (which after 
S11 treated illegal immigration as a threat comparable to “terrorism”9). The public mood also 
transformed. Regular surveys in the 1990s had found Spaniards’ attitudes to immigration to 
be “benign” or “sympathetic” (Cornelius, 2004: 419), and an academic study performed at 
this time identified increasingly favourable attitudes to immigration in Spain (Pérez-Díaz, 
Álvarez-Miranda & González-Enríquez. 2001: 34). However, by late 2000 this was changing. 
In one year surveys showed that the proportion of people that believed there was too much 
immigration tripled (reaching a total of 27 per cent in 2000, Calavita, 2004: 126). A 2002 
survey found one in four persons identified migrants as “a danger to our culture and identity” 
– compared to little more than one in ten in 1999; and one in three respondents felt migrants 
were “a threat to public safety and security” – a rise from one in six in 1999 (Calavita, 2005: 
126 & 127). One researcher linked the polarisation of public opinion with government 
intervention on immigration, indicating,  
“the hyperbole surrounding Aznar’s campaign to reform the immigration law is widely 
thought to account for the abrupt shift in Spaniards’ attitudes about immigration from 
1999 to 2000 and beyond” (Calavita, 2005: 137) 
Other possible explanations for the change in attitudes have been given, including growing 
regular, irregular and non-EU foreign settlement (see 5.3.1). Immigration was given greater 
and more negative media coverage (Nash, 2005; Cornelius, 2004: 421). Various researchers 
identified that the media frequently made associations between immigration and criminality, 
and described even small arrivals of people with exaggerated and alarmist terms such as 
“avalanches”, “invasions” and “floods” 10  (Nash, 2005: 48; Calavita, 2015: 138). Such 
language could be found in respected broadsheet newspapers (including the progressive El 
País) and even a serious academic study labelled immigration a “foreign invasion” (Pérez-
Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda & González-Enríquez, 2001: 20). For Calavita the use of such 
language encourages seeing immigration as irrational, uncontrollable and dangerous (2005, 
138). 
In January 2001, when the new law came into effect, undocumented migrants in 
Barcelona reacted by holding church sit-ins and hunger strikes. The sit-ins spread across 
 
 
 
 
8 
Spain to include a total of seven hundred such protests in the Barcelona area, two hundred 
in Murcia, a hundred in Melilla, and fifty in Madrid (ibid: 103). Hundreds of thousands 
demonstrated in support of the migrants and Barcelona neighbourhood associations 
collected blankets. Migrants in eight churches continued their protest for forty-nine days – 
after which they were given residence permits and jobs (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda & 
González-Enríquez, 2001: 103; Rius-Sant, 2007: 109 & 121). Conflicts over “papers” and in 
response to further government restrictions would continue over the following years 
(Calavita, 2005: 118). 
It was not just relations between government and migrants that declined over 
migratory policy. The August 2000 reform began years of divergence between government 
and opposition - including the large centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and 
pro-Catalan “regional” parties (ibid: 419; Rius-Sant, 2007). Intra-governmental tensions also 
emerged. Before the elections the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Manuel Pimentel, 
resigned from his post, becoming one of the most vocal critics of the immigration politics of 
the Aznar government. Pimentel denounced that the legislation passed in this period was 
“pushing [migrants] de facto into illegal routes” (2002). He later said, “I did sums and I 
realised that we needed a lot more immigrants than this two per cent that there were, but we 
didn’t have an entry route. Research told us that there was a need for more than two-
hundred thousand a year, but we only wanted to authorise twenty or thirty thousand” (Rius-
Sant, 2011: 40). For the ex-minister policy was being led by the Interior Ministry and its 
obsession with “security”, which did not suit “the interests of the Spanish job market” (ibid: 
40 & 43).  
The 2000-2001 experiences, and related conversations I had with organisers of the 
El Ejido strikes and other protests, led me to make several deductions. First, it was evident 
that irregular labour played an important role in some sectors of the economy, and that its 
legal precariousness allowed for high rates of exploitation that laid the material foundation 
for social divisions and conflicts11. Second, it was increasingly clear that the government 
was producing “illegality” through its legislation – despite claiming to be doing the 
opposite 12 . Despite Pimentel’s diagnosis that policy collided with labour interests, the 
measure in the 2000/8 Reform to remove civil rights from the undocumented implied 
acceptance of irregular migrants being resident and employed. The modified law acted 
mainly against the agency of the irregular-migrant workers. This logic was defended by the 
conservative-appointed President of the Social Forum for the Integration of Immigrants 
(FSII), for whom the change of legislation was necessary to prevent workplace and political 
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struggle by migrants, which he equated with “social destabilisation” (see 5.2.2.1). These 
indications together raised the question of whether irregularity was a deliberate labour policy 
to benefit certain groups of employers – the view of many activists in migrants’ solidarity 
activities. The El Ejido strikes and 2001 sit-ins indicated that even undocumented migrants 
could shape employment and institutional processes – an observation I later discover as 
lacking in many scholarly, activist and NGO accounts on the same period13. However the 
government response suggested that immigration policy is a mechanism through which 
migrant subjectivity can be undermined14. The conclusion that irregularity had benefits for 
employers and that the government seemed less interested in preventing such hiring than 
workplace organising raised the question of the functionality of borders, which fed into my 
future research (including my sub-question 1, 1.4).    
 
 
1.2.2 Debates on immigration as a “problem”  
 
The development of more negative public attitudes towards immigration that coincided with 
the mentioned conflicts and hardening of policy and discourse suggested two things. Firstly 
openness towards migration was not fixed and could vary rapidly. Secondly it could be 
identified as being influenced by legislation, policy management and public discourse - 
rather than being a mechanical response to higher or lower levels of immigration. These 
observations were useful to comprehend the further growth in public rejection of migration 
that emerged over the following years. 
A year after the PSOE came to office under the premiership of José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero in the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings, an “amnesty” was performed in which 
hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants gained residence permits or 
regularisation (see 5.2.2.2). The process was criticised by Popular Party and European 
leaders – claiming it was likely to have a “pull effect” on future immigration (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 156). While the economy continued to grow, legal routes of entry were 
expanded to fill labour vacancies, and the PSOE and associated media presented the 
“economic case for migration” (or defence of such based on its “usefulness”; Burchianti & 
Zapata-Barrero, 2012: 4).  
As part of this advocacy, Zapatero’s Economic Office published the estimation that 
52 per cent of total economic expansion in the period 2001-2005 – a period of relatively high 
growth – had been provided by migrant-labour inputs and social-security contributions (De 
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la Dehesa, 2007). Liberal economists also contributed arguments – sometimes based on 
how profitable immigration is for employers: “[i]mmigration helps … control wages” and 
encourages “flexibilisation of the labour market” (ibid). The PSOE government pointed to 
support for its approach among employers, yet it is difficult to see how reducing wages and 
job security would have appealed to working Spaniards.  
 Furthermore, the economic defence of migration was countered by negative 
discourse from the conservative opposition and the media – particularly of the right-wing 
variety; and the effects of increased controls on Spain’s southern border meant the 
migration topic rarely left the news. In collaboration with EU agencies, Spain had developed 
advanced-technological surveillance and patrolling of its Mediterranean border, and 
agreements were reached with North African states to prevent migrants from leaving to 
Europe. This encouraged trafficking routes to move further south – now departing from 
west-African states to travel to Spain’s Canary Islands west of the Sahara (Chrisafis & 
Soares, 2006). This Atlantic route was perilous for the small boats used and both rescues 
and deaths peaked. According to European Union figures, 10,000 people lost their lives 
crossing to the Canaries in the five years before 2007 (SOS Racismo, 2008: 49; Padrón-
Fumero, 2008). Media images of the Canarian boat crisis, including of regular arrivals at the 
small Spanish islands, fed perceptions of mass migration and an association between 
migration and human disaster.   
 It was coinciding with these events that in the monthly household surveys performed 
by the Spanish state’s Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) “immigration” became 
identified as “Spain’s main problem” (CIS, 2006). International media analyses had 
celebrated Spanish “tolerance” of first-time large-scale immigration – a view partly based on 
the lack of Spain-wide anti-immigrant parties – but in Spain the conversation was 
increasingly about immigration being a “problem”. A study of yearly CIS survey results found 
that the proportion of Spaniards whose attitude towards immigration can be classified as 
“tolerant” was surpassed by those with both an “ambiguous” or “intolerant” approach 
between 2005 and 200715 (Cea-D’Ancona, 2010). In other words it was now a minority view. 
The PP included immigration at the centre of its March 2008 general-election 
campaign: proposing limiting use of Islamic headscarves and for migrants to sign an 
“integration contract” requiring them “to comply with the law, respect Spaniards customs, 
learn the language, pay their taxes, work actively to integrate into Spanish society and 
return to their country if they cannot find work for some time”16 (Bárbulo & Garriga, 2008). 
This failed as a strategy to regain office (possibly even undermining its overall campaign as 
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critics were able to associate these ideas with right-wing reaction). Yet Zapatero chose to 
include in his second government a Minister of Labour and Immigration who had a 
reputation (as mayor of the Catalan city of L’Hospitalet) for being hard on immigration. The 
new Minister restricted legal entry and introduced financial incentives for unemployed 
migrants to return to their countries of origin (see 5.2.2.1) 
The above context was that in which arguments in favour of restricting migration 
were made publicly by sections of the “alternative left” (to the left of the PSOE) and the 
leaderships of the large trade unions (Stobart, 2010). Jorge Verstrynge, a Communist with a 
history of hard-right membership, co-authored the Viejo Topo “report on immigration”, 
arguing that immigration was for “elites” and against the interests of the Spanish popular 
classes (Verstrynge, Sánchez-Medero & Sánchez-Medero, 2007). The study advocated 
policies of zero immigration and the forcible expulsion of (around a million) undocumented 
migrants from Spain (Ibid). 
The in-depth discussion on this report in subsequent magazine editions, which 
involved economists, a trade union leader and myself, encouraged me to research more 
deeply the impact of immigration on employment, wages, precariousness and welfare 
provision (Cañadell, 2007; Torres-López & Gálvez-Muñoz, 2007; Stobart, 2008). My 
subsequent Refuge journal article on Spanish literature related to “labour impacts” revealed 
that large-scale migrant recruitment probably had had a negligible effect on formal 
employment conditions in two of the sectors hiring most migrants: construction, and hotel 
and catering17.  
However, in employment divisions where migrant workers tended to remain irregular 
and/or faced other legal disadvantages – as was the case for many migrant women working 
in domestic service – there had been a general reduction in earnings and working 
conditions – including domestic employment becoming predominantly “live-in”18. My broad 
conclusion therefore was that the material basis for divisions between migrant and non-
migrant workers was largely created by borders – including less-visible ones existing inside 
states – rather than being a product of immigration in itself (Mezzadra, 2004).  
Like liberals defending the economics of contemporary migration, protectionist 
detractors from both left and right make a similar reduction when evaluating migration: they 
equate free circulation with its problematically conditioned form in contemporary society 
(Oglietti, 2006; De la Dehesa, 2007; Recio, 2008; Verstrynge, Sánchez-Medero & Sánchez-
Medero, 2007). Thus they neglect the impact of legal compulsions on migrants when 
attempting to demonstrate the regressive implications of immigration. This is a highly 
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problematic oversight bearing in mind that their normative conclusions often include greater 
regulation of mobility.  
 
 
1.2.3 Role of Spanish nationalism and regionalism in the rise of racist politics 
in Catalonia 
 
My published research on the rise of anti-immigrant politics in Catalonia was directly 
motivated by a series of observable differences in the territory’s immigration politics. 
Catalonia was the only “autonomous community” (region) in Spain where a neo-fascist party 
– Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) – had made a considerable electoral breakthrough in the 
democratic period (Stobart, 2013). PxC won 67 local seats in the May 2011 municipal 
elections on a platform calling for preferential treatment towards non-migrants19 (Hernández-
Carr, 2011: 3 & 24). Furthermore the Catalan branch of the People’s Party (PPC) had 
adopted a notably more anti-immigrant stance than the party Spain-wide: in the 2010 
Catalan election campaign the leader of the PPC proposed repatriating long-term 
unemployed migrants; and a Popular Party mayor was taken to court for including the words 
“we don’t want Romanians” on an election leaflet (Piñol, 2010; Rius-Sant, 2011: 204 & 214). 
Both of the parties described would be best described as pro-Spanish rather than Catalan 
nationalist – despite PxC’s nationally ambiguous discourse and celebration of its regional 
identity, so the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment cannot be reduced to the strength of 
local nationalism. Yet anti-immigrant politics has been advocated by leading members of 
pro-Catalan parties. For example, in the early 2000s historic representatives of local 
nationalism in the centre-right Convergence and Union (CiU) and centre-left Republican Left 
of Catalonia (ERC) made alarmist statements about non-European migrants – particularly 
Muslims – being an existential threat to Catalan identity20 (Santamaría, 2003; Stobart, 2013).  
 In different Catalan localities in the 2000s there had been social conflicts in response 
to the building of mosques, “immigrant crime”, and by migrants over discrimination in 
policing21 (Garcés-Mascareñas, Franco-Guillén & Sánchez-Montijano, 2012: 269). In 2010 
and 2011 several developments took place in which different parties engaged in anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim behaviour that attracted “huge public and media attention and 
created important controversies” (Burchianti & Zapata-Barrero, 2012: 2 & 7). These included 
the vote by the Town Hall of Vic to exclude undocumented migrants from the municipal 
register and services and therefore deny them and their families the right to public provision 
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(including healthcare and schooling) – a measure proposed by PxC but backed by the CiU 
mayor. It also included the banning from public buildings of the wearing of the Niqab in 
several Catalan cities and towns – most of which were run by the Socialists (PSC), and a 
May 2011 election campaign that in many Catalan municipalities became focused on 
immigration and its alleged associations with criminality or anti-social behaviour22 (ibid: 2, 3 
& 11; Garcés-Mascareñas, Franco-Guillén & Sánchez-Montijano, 2012). Such expressions 
stood out because there were few comparable cases in other autonomous communities 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, Franco-Guillén & Sánchez-Montijano, 2012: 284).  
These events took many Catalans by surprise, for which several reasons were cited. 
Firstly the territory has traditionally been characterised as being in the vanguard of liberal, 
progressive and radical politics (including a strong anarchist current in the early Twentieth 
Century). More significantly the main varieties of “Catalanism” (Catalan nationalism) that has 
been politically hegemonic in the Catalan territory since the 1970s have adopted an inclusive 
rather than exclusive attitude towards the very many non-Catalans that have settled in the 
territory – an approach embodied in the local preference for the term “catalanisme” over 
“Catalan nationalism” (4.2.1). For example the centre-right Catalan president Jordi Pujol 
between 1980 and 2003 famously treated a Catalan as anyone “who lives and works in 
Catalonia and wants to be it” rather than being of a particular descent (see 5.3.2). This 
attitude, as well as local-institutional policies encouraging knowledge and use of the Catalan 
language and culture, has been a factor in the relatively successful incorporation of migrants 
and particularly their children within the Catalan-national identity (see 5.3.2 & 4.2.1 for more 
details). Catalonia’s capital Barcelona stands out as applying a policy of mixing non-EU 
migrant pupils beyond their usual catchment areas to avoid “ghettoization”. 
A further surprise regarding the new xenophobia was that many of the “native” 
population opposing migrants were people who themselves had moved to Catalonia in the 
past – from other Spanish territories – and may have suffered the kind of social 
marginalisation and discrimination now faced by non-European migrants. In other words, 
divisions were being detected between previous migrants and those one Catalan writer has 
termed “new immigrants” (Rius-Sant, 2011). The lack of historical memory this implied 
added to a notable unease and confusion among more progressive Catalans about the roots 
of this reactionary politics.   
 My study reached the initial conclusion that there were local party-political factors 
driving the growing xenophobia. These included the peculiar existence in Spain of a 
significant neo-fascist party (PxC), which benefited from fostering an image that was both 
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“respectable” and Catalan regionalist – in both cases helping avoid association with Franco’s 
hyper-centralist regime and its symbols (including the Spanish flag). This strategy proved to 
be more successful than the more traditional and identifiable approaches of extreme-right 
organisations in Spain and other ACs (Stobart, 2013). Secondly it appears that the Popular 
Party of Catalonia could use discourses promoting the political and social exclusion of 
migrants to encourage identification with Spain and the PP (ibid, 2013; section 3). In Cetti’s 
words, Spanish nationalism was “derived negatively” through such a process (2014: 131). A 
further factor was that the PPC’s limited electoral appeal among centre voters in Catalonia 
meant that it was willing to risk applying a hard-right discourse in Catalonia, as it had not 
done in monolingual Spain (Carmona, García & Sánchez, 2012).  
The examples given demonstrate how Spanish, regionalist and sometimes 
“Catalanist” politics promoted exclusionary dynamics, probably exacerbated by electoral 
competition between different right-wing and other parties. This raised the question of the 
exact relationship between nationalism (both of existing nation states and potential ones) 
and the inclusion and exclusion of foreigners – an aspect also explored in the present 
research.  
 
 
1.3 Spanish (and Catalan) policy paradoxes  
 
The findings from both my previous studies and observations from the 2000-2001 events 
strongly suggested that party-political influences were only one element in the controversies 
associated with immigration. Xenophobic or racist conflicts and the negative perception of 
immigration had developed across Spain – not only in Catalonia – and the initial evidence 
suggested that high levels of illegalisation of migration resulting from restrictive yet 
permeable border control contributed to these developments. This link had been identified by 
two writers on Spain: US migration-scholar Wayne Cornelius and Catalan writer Xavier Rius 
Sant (Cornelius, 2004; Rius-Sant, 2007 & 2011). In 2004 Cornelius linked growing 
irregularity to “[x]enophobic public backlashes”, describing how government practice 
produced “illegality”:  
 
Land and maritime borders remain remarkably porous despite sharp increases in 
spending on border enforcement. Workplace enforcement is of only symbolic import. 
Regularized immigrants fall into illegality and fail to gain permanent legal resident 
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status because a dysfunctional bureaucracy makes it impossible for them to string 
together enough periods of (legal) temporary employment. Apprehended illegal 
immigrants under deportation orders reach the legal limit of forty days of confinement 
and are released to the streets, without possibility of legal employment. Disappointed 
asylum seekers also remain mostly at large, because there is no administrative 
capacity (nor will) to round them up and expel them. Meanwhile, the supply of 
foreign-born labor expands by 20 percent or more per annum and the economy 
booms (Cornelius, 2004: 390 & 424) 
 
By the beginning of the crisis (2008) irregularity had grown. The Zapatero government 
(2004-2011) appeared to be acting on its promise of limiting migration to legal channels – 
including by reinforcing control of Spain’s Mediterranean border. Yet despite the legalisation 
of large numbers of migrants in in 2005 and the expansion of individual authorisation of 
permits, irregular migration continued rising. In 2008 the Minister for Labour and Immigration 
acknowledged that 700,000 migrants resided “illegally” in Spain – a figure that the 
conservative opposition raised to 1.6 million (Abellán & De Barrón, 2008)23. Furthermore, 
irregular residence was long-term: a CIS study from a few years previously found 40 per 
cent of irregular migrants had been living in the country from six to ten years (Rius-Sant, 
2007: 184). This was a high figure considering that immigration was a new phenomenon.  
 Further gaps in border implementation can be identified. Many migrants detained at 
the border – including around the Canaries, Ceuta or Spain’s second north-African enclave 
Melilla – were later released on the Spanish mainland being placed under “unenforceable 
expulsion orders” (Rius-Sant, 2007: 129 & 279). This occurred, for example, with 5,473 of 
the 9,756 Africans detained in the Canary Islands in 2002 (ibid: 280). According to the anti-
racist organisation SOS Racismo, the vast majority of immigration took place through 
airports (80 per cent of the total in 2007) and visa overstaying was widespread (ibid: 15). 
This was no doubt facilitated by Spain being one of the biggest holiday destinations in the 
world and the associated limits to the government’s inclination and capacity to obstruct 
activities that provide economic opportunities and revenues for the state (Baldwin-Edwards, 
1998). As well as irregularity creating legal disadvantages for migrants and therefore 
encouraging social divisions, it is also strongly stigmatised by the political consensus. 
Because of the prevalence of irregularity in Spain this would have reinforced rejection of 
immigration in general24. 
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 Rius-Sant characterises policy as featuring both “strictness” and “laxity”, describing 
the combination as a “paradox” (2007: 117 & 118). Cornelius and Takeyuki Tsuda use the 
term “policy gaps” for what they identified in several developed countries as the “gap 
between attempts to control immigration [which had increased] and ‘unintended’ outcomes”, 
which were also growing (2004: 4, 5 & 9). This view connects with the concept of “unwanted 
immigration” debated by various scholars (Joppke, 1998a & 1998b; Freeman, 1998).  
Studies offer different explanations for the identified policy gaps or immigration 
paradoxes – terms that will be used interchangeably throughout the present thesis (or 
merged as “immigration policy paradoxes”; Acosta-Arcarazo & Feline-Freier, 2014). Some 
writers root the gaps in administrative “inefficiencies” or bureaucratic excesses, presenting 
irregularity as emerging against political aims (Cornelius, 2004: 423; Baldwin-Edwards, 
1998: 13). Baldwin-Edwards links high levels of irregularity to “policy deficits” in 
Mediterranean states in the 1980s (1998: 4). Relatedly, Rius-Sant identified the irregularity 
paradox as having stemmed from the combination of a lack of government planning in the 
1990s and restrictive policies in the 2000s – particularly under the Aznar administration 
(2011: 285). Another view is that gaps result from different policy aims at different territorial 
levels (with contrasting economic and institutional priorities). A concrete example given is 
that restrictive EU border policy collided, particularly in the pre-crisis period, with a desire by 
member states desire to reverse demographic decline through immigration (Rius-Sant, 2007: 
117 & 118).  
A study on several Mediterranean states identifies “a serious inconsistency between 
the severity of immigration control and the laxity of labour market regulation”, concluding that 
“the most important factor” attracting immigration “is the attraction of large underground 
economies capable of supporting – even requiring – the employment of immigrant labour” 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 1998: 3 & 10). This could be interpreted as suggesting there is a 
contradiction between structural requirements for labour migration and the political desire to 
manage and restrict mobility. It could also be deduced that large underground labour 
markets make the illegalisation of migration structurally inconsequential or even beneficial, 
suggesting that illegality may be intentional. A study focused on employment in Almerían 
agriculture pointed to how “illegality” played a functional role for employers by curtailing 
migrants’ ability to resist exploitation (Calavita, 2005).  
Studies on Spain agree that prior to the crisis Spanish firms required accessing new 
reserves of labour – a factor mediating against enforcing European restrictions. However the 
restrictive tendencies of states and/or the EU are given less attention. Where the dynamics 
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of state restriction are discussed these are usually associated with “voter influence” - as if 
state behaviour were a mechanical reflex of public opinion – an assumption questioned in 
Chapter Two (Cornelius, 2004). Similar limitations also exist in the general migration 
literature on policy gaps or “unwanted immigration” – meaning that an Iberian case study 
could potentially provide insights of universal relevance. 
 
 
1.4 Research sub-questions 
 
The background introduced in 1.2 and 1.3 both illustrates how I arrived at the design of the 
research presented in this dissertation and provides a basic introduction to the politics of 
immigration in Spain (and particularly Catalonia) that can facilitate comprehension of the 
research objectives. Concretely it has provided an indication of the size and political 
implications of the main immigration policy paradox in Spain (irregularity) and identified its 
likely impact on the rise of negative attitudes towards immigration. The brief look at the more 
localised paradox of xenophobic and racist party politics developing in a territory with a 
relatively inclusive policy approach towards migration suggests that a significant ingredient in 
the dynamics of the immigration issue is nationalist politics. Lastly it has raised some 
contrasting explanations of irregularity in the literature on Spain, which shall be assessed in 
the conclusion to this dissertation.  
To help unpack the dynamics behind disparities between policies and outcomes, a 
series of sub-questions were developed at the beginning of the research process. All of 
these assume that immigration politics has a rational kernel, a supposition that shall be 
revisited in the concluding chapter. 
 
1) How do different economic interests shape immigration policies and outcomes? Are there 
limits to such determination? 
 
Here it was assumed that economic interest in migration varies greatly between different 
social and political “actors”. Firstly the economic attraction of migration should vary between 
what Harvey describes as “fractions of capital”: sectorial or regional employers that require 
new or vulnerable sources of labour, on the one hand, and the rest of the employers, on the 
other (2006). Secondly variance in interest was expected between capital and state as the 
former desires “surplus population” to provide available labour at times of cyclical or 
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seasonal expansion or to contain wage increases in periods of low unemployment, and the 
state wishes to limit population growth that may require greater institutional planning and 
resources without making a positive economic contribution to state finances. Finally it was 
understood that economic motivations vis-à-vis immigration might vary between employers 
wishing to hire migrants and labour (non-migrant and earlier migrant), as such workers gain 
no direct financial advantage from migration and in specific instances may find themselves in 
competition with foreign labour. The disjuncture in economic motivations described was 
hypothesised as being an underlying source of contradiction in policies or between 
procedures and their implementation.  
 However, a sub-hypothesis advanced was that there would be limits to any attempt 
at causally reducing immigration policy paradoxes to mechanics of a purely economic 
nature. As well as policy and outcomes having an economic “base” – to use Marx’s term, it 
was expected that they also would be shaped by what Marx termed the “superstructure”: the 
legal, bureaucratic and political institutions of the state and sub-state, in other words the 
institutional-political and administrative spheres.  
 
2) To what extent and how do nation-states and nationalisms shape the contours of 
immigration policies and politics? 
 
This secondary question is founded on a series of ideas regarding the dynamics of the 
modern state and politics, which shall be outlined as follows. To begin with, public 
institutions govern through a combination of coercion, including the threat and sometimes 
exercise of violence through juridical, police and military bodies, and “hegemony” – or 
political leadership, with hegemony making it easier to apply force and vice versa (Gramsci, 
2007). Coercive management dominates the state’s relationship with those from outside the 
state’s borders, as exemplified in migrant detention centres and high-technology fences and 
patrols on Europe’s southern borders.  
The second form of rule was understood to play a more dominant role in the state-
population relationship within state borders (particularly in liberal democracies). The popular 
legitimacy required by the state to exercise “sovereignty” – including enjoying the monopoly 
of violence – is gained through several routes – both material and immaterial. These include 
the state or sub-state providing a degree of political and sometimes social rights for subject-
citizens and – crucially for the purposes of this study – denying the same rights to “outsiders” 
(Soguk, 1999). This is linked to an idea of citizenship, which itself is linked to the idea of 
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belonging to (or being excluded from) a national community – something itself aided by the 
production of national mythologies and the Othering of foreigners contained in them.  
The self-conception of being a national-citizen has emerged organically from the 
social relations that have developed around trading and production networks, which require 
unified administrative and linguistic systems, and spread through inter-state conflict 
(including colonialism). However such consciousness has also been promoted by ruling 
classes as an abstract communitarian identification politically preferable to that which could 
emerge around social class or other identities. This is performed through dividing the 
population between citizens, who are included within the nation-state, and foreigners, who 
are ineludibly excluded. Immigrants too must suffer exclusion, particularly because they 
normally are the most visible representatives of foreigners. Because they are inside state 
territory and often have contact with non-migrant citizens, their exclusion requires at least a 
degree of misrepresentation and even demonization of migrants – as is performed by the 
state, politicians and the media.  
It is expected to find that the permanent process of national construction (or 
reconstruction) by existing states such as Spain (and the more complicated process of 
forging a common European identify) encourages state (or EU) restriction of immigration, 
leading to collisions with the interests of capital and feeding contradictory policies and/or 
gaps between policies and implementation. At the same time, because there is an 
underlying unity between the drives of the nation-state/sub-states and capital, stimulated by 
their mutual reliance and global competition, it can be anticipated that paradoxes will remain 
within certain bounds unless they directly benefit the accumulation drive.  
The importance of national construction through related processes of citizen-
inclusion and migrant-exclusion is envisaged to be relatively strong for the Spanish state due 
to the historic weakness of its centralised national project and the existence of strong 
alternative national identities in Catalonia and other territories (see 4.1.2; Pastor, 2012). It is 
also anticipated that because of Catalonia’s combination of statelessness, relatively 
significant institutional autonomy, and generally civic local nationalism, its government and 
municipal authorities will give greater emphasis to policies that incorporate migrants into the 
national identity (including learning the Catalan language), and that such concerns may 
override developing policy mainly in relation to labour-market interests (4.1). 
 
3) Are immigration policy processes shaped by electoral politics in substantial way (as 
opposed to being mainly determined by political economy – including of states)? 
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My previous research indicated that there were not strong material reasons for the majority 
of Spaniards to oppose immigration (1.2.2). Furthermore the 2000-2001 events suggested 
that elites promote anti-immigrant attitudes in society, as opposed to just responding to them 
(1.2.1). Together these observations undermine any thesis that sees policy contradictions as 
simply being forged by the conflict between capital interests and voter preferences. However 
this idea leaves unanswered the question of how much party politics influences dynamics 
and what is the relationship between party politics and political economy.  
 
4) Is multi-level policymaking a factor in policy gaps and political tensions? To what extent is 
this so? 
 
It was hypothesised that disparities between policies and outcomes would, as Rius-Sant 
suggests, also be shaped by policy being designed and implemented at different overlapping 
territorial levels: those of Europe, Spain and Catalonia (1.3). Each territory has different 
economic, labour and political dynamics and therefore logically different immigration 
requirements. For instance, before the crisis most European states preferred a policy of 
“zero economic migration”, as demand for extra sources of labour seem to have been met 
through mobility within the Schengen area, family regroupment around earlier migration 
networks, and/or skilled foreign-hiring schemes. In the same period Spain required 
substantial “volumes” of labour from new sources to work in certain employment sectors 
(see 4.2 for more details). Therefore the question arises as to whether Spain’s inability to 
implement most migratory controls was a deliberate solution to the contradiction created by 
its European obligations.  
Secondly it is expected that tensions over immigration policy between Catalan and 
Spanish policymakers will exist because of diverse labour and political requirements across 
their respective territories. This, it was deduced, would be intensified because of growing 
political conflict between Barcelona and Madrid. Because it was expected that paradoxes 
could be explained in terms of domestic (intra-state) political economy, it was not clear when 
embarking on this study whether inconsistencies linked to multi-level policymaking would 
play a central role in the emergence of policy gaps. 
 
5) How is policy created in practice? Who are the main actors in its design and 
implementation? What alliances are formed to influence policy? 
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The expectation was that, alongside government, employers would play a major role in 
policy processes – as a result of their normally dominant role social relations. Sectorial 
lobbying by employers would influence policy processes, but within an overall political-
economy framework that cannot easily be over-determined by such. It was assumed that the 
state could not be as reduced to being the elected government and that top civil servants of 
different varieties would significantly shape policymaking and its practical implementation. 
Migrants are active subjects shaping processes, however their agency is undermined by 
juridical, political and financial limitations. Only through social mobilisation would unions, 
migrants and NGOs have a substantial effect on dynamics. Alliances would be expected 
between the latter organisations and could occur between employers in certain sectors and 
governments and politicians (at different territorial levels).  
 
6) How have tensions and paradoxes been influenced by the economic crisis? 
 
It was predicted that migratory-political processes would transform from the period of 
economic expansion (1995-2007) to the crisis (2007 onwards). There would be more 
consensus about the attraction – or lack of attraction – of immigration between employers, 
government and society. Some employment sectors may continue to require flexible, low-
wage and/or precarious labour, and therefore continue to be attracted to migrant labour. In 
other economic branches demand for migrant hiring might stop completely. It was expected 
that “autochthonous” workers and unions might be more likely to equate migration with 
competition for jobs and services – particularly after the introduction of austerity measures 
(beginning in Spring 2010). 
 
The study centres on Catalonia but also Spain, as it was clear from early on in the study that 
the immigration issue in the former territory can only be understood in relation to the latter. 
The time frame chosen begins with the Spanish state’s first comprehensive immigration law 
in 1985 and the year in which I performed a series of interviews for this research. The 
mentioned period includes the whole time in which large-scale immigration from poorer world 
regions became a reality in Catalonia and Spain, and in which immigration policy was 
created and developed, as well as being one of a great fluctuation in the economy and 
labour markets. It is a time frame in which the Catalan institutions were used by Catalanist 
politicians to promote the Catalan language and identity within the Spanish state structures, 
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but is prior to the attempt by the same institutions to develop state structures in response to 
mass street protests demanding full independence, which properly began in 2012. Therefore 
this study is not looking at immigration politics in a period of state formation. 
 
 
1.5 Research design and methodology 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical considerations and general method 
 
With regard to research methodology, I adopt what Marsh and Stoker would categorise (in 
broad terms) as a (critical) “realist” perspective – meaning that I hold that a social reality 
exists separable from people’s interpretations but that the observation of this reality is 
mediated by the views of those observing and those observed – an approach contrasting 
with the positivist approach that maintains that social scientists can and must remain “value 
free” (Marsh & Stoker, 2002; Furlong & Marsh, 2002). Such an ontological and 
epistemological perspective encourages openness regarding whether to use quantitative or 
qualitative methods or some combination of both25.  
There are several reasons why I chose to use qualitative methods – interviews – as 
the main way to access information. Firstly, quantitative methods have a practical limitation 
in relation to studying the immigration field. Research on related policy in Britain has pointed 
out the weaknesses of immigration statistics – describing these as being “fragile” with “many 
aspects” that are “considered inadequate” (Somervile, 2007: 6). My previous research, which 
looked at the phenomenon of illegalisation of migration in Spain included secondary 
examination of studies using statistical databases, led me to be aware of the pronounced 
difficulties with obtaining data related to the questions posed for this study. Available official 
Spanish and (even more limited) Catalan figures would be limited and I did not have 
available the resources to do large-sample quantitative surveying – even assuming this 
would be the most effective route to gaining the knowledge I was interested in. This view 
was confirmed by the literature review performed for this research which revealed big 
discrepancies regarding figures and patterns of migration from one institution to another (see 
4.3.1). This was influenced by the difficulty in monitoring real levels of residence due to 
widespread irregularity.  
 Qualitative methods and more specifically semi-structured interviews were chosen as 
the main route to knowledge of the study presented here. There were several reasons 
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behind this choice. Firstly by looking at immigration policy gaps such as related to irregularity 
I was investigating the distance between formal claims and procedures and their outcomes, 
which requires going beyond official facts and figures to the unofficial. This encouraged me 
to choose to talk to key people in and around policymaking processes and trying to “tease 
out” awkward facts.  
 “Insiders” and well-placed “outsiders” also can provide their own analyses of how 
and why processes happen, which is a central goal of this research. They provide relevant 
subjective appreciations on the role of their organisations and others in policymaking (aiding 
clarifying the alliances and balances of power that exist between stakeholders beyond formal 
appearances). Also, as Garcés-Mascareñas writes regarding a similar method of questioning 
“key stakeholders”, this allows, “capturing nuances in policy outcomes and effects unusually 
lost in the written documents” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). By mixing relatively open 
interviewing (using relatively open questions) with a selection of interviewees based on the 
critera of these being it was aimed to obtain holistic views of processes (in which attitudes 
and behaviour identified as taking place in a particular context) for a study aiming at helping 
generate holistic theory. These considerations made the methods chosen more attractive 
than positivistic forms of inquiry that tend to lead to over-simplistic and fragmentary analyses 
(even if – on the positive side – guaranteeing a degree of reliability and replicability; 2012).  
 I chose semi-structured interviews instead of more-controlled alternative qualitative 
methods such as using questionnaires because, first, I was aware (from my experience of 
living in Spain) that some of the main topics I planned to discuss (“illegal” immigration, policy 
tensions, xenophobic politics and the Catalan national question) are sensitive or 
controversial or both and I wished for both myself and interviewees to have a degree of 
flexibility in how to manage the research conversation. 
Furthermore, the question addressed in this research is broad and no doubt would 
require me learning a great deal on domestic policy processes and policy – because my 
scholarly background in this area was limited. I consequently opted for a freer (and not 
highly structured) methodology that would enable to research to be exploratory. Achieving 
this objective also would be facilitated by the interview format because it allows being able to 
check details with participants (Devine, 2002).  
The form of practical investigation I chose – which Lofland and Lofland describe as 
“guided conversations” – had the final associated advantages of being a well-known 
technique that likely would be familiar for the people I interviewed as well as a method that 
should facilitate openess as it is closer to professional conversation than other sub-methods 
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(1995). I also calculated (correctly – it proved in practise) that it would make it relatively easy 
to carry out with key policymaking participants with busy schedules.  
I was aware that the chosen procedure also has shortcomings. It is based on small 
samples and has an interpretative leaning that in both cases undermine reliability of findings. 
It tends to be better at activating short-term memories, and can be “hijacked” by interviewees 
wishing to dominate the discussion agenda. It was decided to bear these limitations in mind, 
complement the spoken accounts with both a thorough examination of the literature, and to 
compare findings with statistical data (from CIS, the National Research Institute, and various 
official reports) and primary policy sources (Hansard – BOE – or Spanish legislation). This 
meant – following Read and Marsh’s useful guidance – rejecting the “false dichotomy” 
between quantitative and qualitative ontology and epistemology (2010). 
  
     
1.5.2 Interview planning 
 
In Spring 2010, a year before carrying out the interviews, I took trips to Barcelona to 
participate in an immigration workshop and individually meet specialists on migration, policy 
and labour markets, with whom I was able to discuss my initial research ideas. Later I would 
interview two of those for my final research – including a scholar that had performed 
research on Spanish policy and irregular migration and who shared valuable insights on the 
practicalities of researching these areas. In the informal meeting I was given 
recommendations and contact details for key insiders I could interview.   
I lived in Barcelona in the nine months before carrying out the interviews, and during 
that time I presented my more developed plans in a seminar of the Interdisciplinary 
Research Group on Immigration (GRITIM) at the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF). I gained 
new and valuable perspectives on Catalan immigration politics talking informally but 
regularly with representatives of North African, Latin American, Roma and Catalan 
organisations in the UCFR anti-racist and anti-fascist network; and attending several 
migration-related conferences and seminars in Barcelona. (Practical details of the meetings 
described are provided in Appendix 9.2.1) 
 From the discussions I had at these events and meetings (and others with 
supervisors) I decided to attempt a case study of Catalonia. I considered doing a 
comparative study between the territory and Andalusia – as well as Catalonia – due to the 
two ACs being contrasting in terms of wealth and national politics. To examine this possibility 
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further I attended the I International Congress on Migrations in Andalusia in Granada in 
January 2011. However, this experience (and previous discussions with migration 
specialists) convinced me that it would be more useful to do empirical investigation in Madrid 
– where most Spanish policy design and consultation takes place – and the idea of 
performing a comparative study of two regions was discarded.  
 To choose the sample for the interviews I adopted a “purposive” approach. My 
priority was to gain rich material in order to develop an initial appreciation of the mechanisms 
that produced policy paradoxes. Therefore my main concern was to gain access to those in 
a privileged position to elucidate processes, rather than seek to obtain “random” or 
“representative” samples. I felt it was important to talk to people involved in policy design or 
consulting processes, and also to those observing such process from the “outside”: 
researchers on policy and policymaking and migrants’ rights activists whose political activity 
is normally extra-parliamentary. I was interested in knowing the roles and views of the 
unions and employers’ associations. I was also interested in finding out the more minority 
(and possibly more critical) views of other organisations involved in policy processes. My 
pre-interview ‘prospections’ identified that a Spain-wide Economic and Social Council (CES) 
had played a role in developing migrant labour policy under different governments and I 
ended up interviewing several members of the Council from different social groups and 
organisation.  
 I chose not to try and interview those at the top of the policy hierarchy: ministers or 
Immigration secretaries. This was partly because I expected that due to their official 
positions, they would be less likely to be open about policy inconsistencies and related 
matters26. Priority was given to obtaining in-depth and (if necessary) long interviews. With 
regards to number of interview sessions, I followed Kvale’s guidance of interviewing “as 
many subjects as necessary to find out what you need to know” (2007: 43). (I also asked 
myself the question whether interviewing a bigger but manageable sampler would have 
increased the reliability of research results and concluded that this would not be the case). 
Before contacting anyone I used the ideas I had developed from the literature, preliminary 
enquiries and my own involvement in the immigration topic to identify the themes around 
which to structure the interviews. This helped me develop interview guides (including main 
questions and probes) for different sub-groups of interviewee: a basic script for employers, 
another for policy advisors, etc.  
I identified approximately ten potential “privileged insiders” who I thought might 
respond positively. These were of very different sectors and normally representatives of 
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organisations. Half lived and worked in Barcelona; the others in Madrid – easing comparison 
of ideas between Catalonia and Spain. I noted that many were of a progressive (particularly 
social-democratic) viewpoint and chose to take this into account in interpreting results. 
 In the email I briefly and somewhat blandly explained the purposes of the study and 
why I had approached that particular person. Most people responded quickly and 
affirmatively by email. In a minority of cases, a follow-up call was necessary. Where I sensed 
the slightest hesitancy about accepting the request, I offered to send the requested 
interviewee a copy of the questions (and sent these in several cases). In a couple of cases I 
mentioned that interviewees could see the transcripts if they wished – although none 
accepted the offer.  
 I chose to approach some well-placed persons whom I knew personally, assuming 
that this would facilitate frank discussion. This assumption proved only partially accurate: an 
old friend that had become a senior advisor for President Zapatero was notably defensive 
and “político” (meaning propaganda-like) in her responses (for example claiming that cutting 
funding to integration was “not a change in policy, but to the money allocated”27). A migrant-
rights activist who I knew from participation in migrants’ mobilisations provided an overly 
informal and conversational interview that contained very useful observations for the 
purposes of the study but included much rambling – complicating transcription. 
After reflecting on the findings in the first interviews in both Madrid and Barcelona, I 
selected and contacted a second sample of people. A choice made at this stage was to try 
and hear the views of those not involved in official processes, because participants from very 
different organisations involved in policy processes shared a lot of consensus on policy and 
it seemed possible that their participation in institutional frameworks had shaped their 
individual views. (For further practical details on the interviews see Appendix 9.2.1) 
 
 
1.5.3 Interviews 
 
I performed long interviews with fourteen people between 24 May and 5 August. All 
meetings were in the Spanish language. In ten cases the interviews lasted an hour or more. 
To prepare for them I developed a template guide structured around my research sub-
questions. This was adapted for different typologies of interviewee (employer, advisor, etc.) 
but also “fine-tuning” were performed for each individual interviewed – bearing in mind the 
knowledge I had of her/him and her/his organisation. Considerable adjustments also were 
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made based on previous interview experience. I did several things to facilitate a flowing 
exchange. First, I travelled to the interviewees’ place of work, which I did during two trips to 
Madrid, and in alternating sets of interviews in Barcelona. Additionally at the beginning of the 
interviews I explained that the anonymity of the interviewees would be respected and asked 
for permission to record interviews28.  
Third, following the procedure suggest by Nigel King, I systematically began the 
conversations with non-threatening factual questions – on the interviewee’s role in relation to 
policy processes and on immigration flows (2004: 17). Views on more sensitive topics were 
planned for the second half of the interviews but more frequently were elicited when I 
perceived they would be a “natural” progression in exchanges. Sometimes the interviews 
became near-conversational – a development I chose to allow because my evaluation after 
the first two recorded meetings was that this had been conducive to normally producing 
frank, revealing and informative interviews. Two full transcriptions of interviews that I believe 
have these qualities are included in Appendix 9.3 (and I believe illustrate my general 
research technique). The interviews involved firstly eliciting details about policy and 
policymaking dynamics and personal assessments on related agreements and tensions, 
high levels of irregularity, the impact of competing national projects in Catalonia and Spain, 
and other areas relevant to the research aims. 
 With regards to researcher “positionality”, at the beginning of the empirical process I 
was concerned that rapport might be inhibited because of my “outsider” status (as a 
foreigner, as a non-policymaker), and this was a factor leading me to choose to adopt a 
notably empathic (and generally non-conflictive) attitude in all of the interviews. The openess 
of most of the exchanges I think confirm Corbin Dwyer and Buckle’s methodological finding 
that being an outsider can be managed in ways by which it becomes an advantage (or at 
least not a disadvantage29; 2009). My questions were basic – partly for linguistic reasons but 
also because of limits to my knowledge of policymaking processes and institutional politics. 
While carrying out frequent reflecting on my interview technique I deduced that this simplicity 
may have helped interviewees feel that they were in a comparatively “safe space” to 
candidly expressing views that they may have been more cautious in sharing if I were a 
Spanish peer or aligneable with a sector involved in Spanish migration policymaking. The 
interview reproduced in Appendix 9.3.1 is an example where I think this occurred. 
Throughout the empirical (investigation, transcription and processing) procedure I sought to 
be mindful regarding the following aspects to my positionality: a) I was a foreigner from a 
richer country (and therefore not seen as a migrant  – even though I had been a foreign 
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worker in Spain for many years); b) that interviewees may have been aware of my leftist 
(and pro-migrant) views from my (Spanish and English-language) public and academic 
writing on Spain – including high-profile opinion pieces for the Guardian and Spanish-
language writing; c) my previous academic, activist and personal contact with several of the 
interviewees.  
 Notwithstanding the limited ethical implications of the research, I did take steps to 
ensure adequate practise in this regard – as well as informed consent. These included 
gaining approval for my research plan from the ethics board at my university, guaranteeing 
anonymity of names, as well as the mentioned offer of participants being able to review 
transcriptions.  
  
 
1.5.4 Employers 
 
There was one notable exception to the harmonious experience of organising and carrying 
out the interviews: my experience with employers. A major service-sector firm famous for its 
large migrant workforce declined my request for an interview. Even more disappointingly I 
did not manage to get access to the two largest employers’ associations (the Spanish 
Federation of Employers’ Associations, CEOE ,and the Spanish Confederation of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises, CEpyME) despite several emails, phone calls and visiting the 
building shared by both. Because I understood that “empresarios” were a key shaper of 
processes I continued contacting business representatives but now concentrating on 
sectoral associations. I ended up doing interviews with the Coordinating Committee for 
Agricultural and Livestock Farmers’ Associations (the COAG farmers’ union), the National 
Confederation of Construction (CNC), and the Spanish Business Confederation of Social 
Economy (CEPES) – the association incorporating Spain’s relatively large cooperative 
sector.  
The pre-interview and interview processes with the CNC representative was strained 
and uncomfortable. In the first email from the association I was asked for a list of questions, 
and was informed by the relevant office that I could not ask several questions that were 
considered to be “political”. Before the actual interview I had a long wait in the reception of 
the CNC headquarters; and my request to electronically record the interview was declined. 
Accordingly I had to record the contents of the meeting (with a representative of the CNC 
international-relations team) on a note-pad, which complicated my ability to guide the 
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meeting. The interview was tense at most stages but particularly when I asked whether there 
had been disagreements between employers and other organisations during negotiations 
over a reformed Aliens’ Law. The CNC leader responded “I couldn’t say. The regulations 
were passed in 2009 and are included in Hansard on 30th April 2011”. I asked for clarification 
of what was meant by “I couldn’t say” (“no puedo decir”) and the interviewee responded 
quickly and with notable annoyance “I mean no comment … The content of negotiations 
shall remain at the table”. This response and others (cited in 7.2.3) contrasted greatly with 
the friendly and open atmosphere of the other interviews. These observations have been 
borne in mind when interpreting the findings from that interview (also in 7.2.3). 
 
 
1.5.5 Interpreting the interview material 
 
The post-interview process was not separate from the interview process. I began 
transcribing my early interviews as soon as they were completed. This was to help reflect on 
the success of my pre-prepared guide (questions) and general interview performance and 
develop my interview technique. This method led to me dropping more-abstract questions 
that elicited little reaction – such as on whether public spending in welfare provision was a 
factor in restrictive policies. I also decided to request more clarification of details – using 
more “closed” questions. I did this despite concern that I would be channeling the discussion 
overly – as some of the methods literature warns regarding using such question, but found 
they did not obstruct the flow or openness of interviews and that interviewees adding a great 
many points that were not asked about (King, 2004: 16). 
 Transcription takes place “from an oral language to a written language” and I 
approached it by employing skills learned as a professional interpreter and translator (Kvale, 
2007: 93). I transcribed translating directly into English, adopting the criteria of being 
purposeful – excluding repetitions or “noise” that did not add to meanings – and preserving 
the sense being communicated in Spanish, which I did by imagining what exactly the 
speaker would have said had she been speaking in English. I gave each interviewee a 
coded name to preserve her/his anonymity (“Mr. M”, “Ms. T”, etc.) – in line with my ethical 
approach. After transcribing the interviews I identified sixteen repeated conversation themes 
that were relevant to the research objectives. I then included these as organising categories 
(column headings) in an Excel document and listed any information related to them 
underneath. After entering all of the relevant ideas and quotes in the columns, I looked at 
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whether I could group together themes for chapter sub-sections (which I did with “national 
politics”, “irregularity”, “policy actors” and “electoral politics”) and structured a first draft of the 
findings accordingly. In order to not separate statements on the different topics from 
observations I made on individual actors and their organisations and their relationship within 
and general attitude towards policymaking, I chose to listen to and make observations on all 
of the interviews. I did this after writing the first draft of my thesis, including of the European, 
Spanish and Catalan policy literature and theory on migration and related paradoxes, 
meaning I could reassess the participant descriptions, interpretations and assessments of 
policy with greater ability at noticing details and critically assessing findings. Revisiting the 
interviews also was necessary because many were of substantial depth and richness – 
reflecting the privileged knowledge and expertise of many participants, and benefited from a 
second thorough listening. (An example is the transcribed interview in Appendix 9.3.2). On 
the many occasions in which I felt the background to the interviewee was essential to 
interpreting her/his words, I include a reference to it when citing them in the dissertation. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
 
As outlined, the thesis is based on three parts: a theoretical assessment, a study of 
secondary research and literature, and reporting on and analysing the findings from the 
interviews. At the end the different results are compared in a concluding chapter. The 
notional examination begins in Chapter Two by analysing attempts by diverse international 
scholars from neo-institutionalist, embedded liberalist, rational-choice “client politics”, “new-
wave structuralist”, Marxist, “thid-way” and other backgrounds to analyse policy gaps or 
contradictions – whether this was their stated main goal or a secondary and even 
unintentional purpose of their writing. Much of this scholarship is framed in terms of tackling 
the political failure to control borders (from a variety of normative positions).  
In the subsequent chapter (Three) I develop some of the conclusions from the 
previous review to produce a new initial holistic framework on the underpinnings of 
immigration paradoxes. This is performed by looking historically and generally at the 
economics – and is based on a critical reading of a range of literature – mainly although not 
exclusively by Marxian authors – on the immigration question in general and in history. 
Because of the way the literature is sub-divided according to academic speciality, the 
examination is organised (at some risk) by artificially separating economic considerations 
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(for example regarding the evolution of labour mobility and its theorised impact on the 
conditions of local workforces, or the positive and negative ways by which immigration is 
perceived from the perspective of generationally and daily reproduction of labour power) 
from political understandings (such as regarding the emergence and development of the 
nation-state and related ideologies and their impact on borders, control and immigration or 
the possible impact of immigration on states’ role of regenerating social relations).  
After presenting this first – mainly abstract – response to the stated research 
question(s), the thesis progresses more concretely and empirically. A detailed background to 
the case study is presented in Chapters Four and Five. Because, as will be posited, the 
contradictions in immigration policy and politics are based on what could be described as 
“big” questions related to society, power and ideas, it is necessary to seek to contextualise 
this case study carefully. Chapter Four therefore provides an outline of the general politics 
and economics of Spain and Catalonia in the (post-1977) democratic period, paying special 
attention to national considerations. Then the evolution of the “new immigration” is analysed 
using demographic and other quantitative data on the residence, legal status, regional origin, 
sectors of employment, and other features of the “new immigration”. This is to be able help 
evaluate policy outcomes and their motivations. Much separate data on both Catalonia and 
Spain is presented here in order to be able to make comparisons in later sections. 
 Chapter Five on immigration policymaking and policy builds on the secondary 
findings presented thus far. As well as providing key context to the research by identifying 
how the ways of designing policy and its formal results have evolved at three territorial levels 
(EU, Spanish and Catalan), and how multi-level policy interrelates and sometimes collides. 
This analysis allows developing some initial conclusions about the (complicated) relationship 
between the EU and member states with regards to migratory questions. The advances and 
frustrations of Catalan policymaking with regards to immigration is analysed, and the 
territory’s focus on integration is outlined in some detail. These tasks are carried out to help 
develop interpretations made later as to why some tensions have emerged over immigration 
between Madrid and Barcelona and what these might reveal about states attitudes to 
migration in general. 
In the whole chapter I take advantage of the very many direct observations and 
meditated ideas offered by interviewees on the policy processes they are involved with or 
relate to. The result is a hybrid chapter including both contextualisation and presentation of 
findings. It must be highlighted that the participant views on policies and processes included 
in this chapter are mostly limited to official procedures and formal outcomes – although an 
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examination  of what different statistics and migration studies say about irregular entry and 
residence in Iberia is included here.  
 Sections Six and Seven present interviewees’ insights related to underlying political 
dynamics and policy in practice in order to develop a more multi-faceted and sophisiticated 
view of immigration policy and politics. Chapter Six presents the views of interviewees 
regarding the real relations between the EU, Spanish and Catalan institutions, dissecting 
some surprising findings on the exact form by which Europe guarantees management of its 
Iberian border, and how the PSOE government have responded to this. Findings on the 
irregularity paradox and its causes and regarding policymaking tensions related to national-
cultural considerations for Catalan and Spanish policymakers are analysed. Whereas the 
migration literature on Spain analysed in Chapter Five was richer on the Aznar period of 
government, the interviews centre more on the later era of Socialist government (2004-2011) 
–perhaps also encouraged by the tendency in qualitative research for participants to focus 
on more recent experiences. They provided an account – included in Chapter Seven – of 
how larges-scale regularisation developed in new ways that maintained problematic migrant 
dependencies.   
As the dissertation progresses the different statistical and qualitative findings are 
analysed in relation to the previous theoretical and contextual conclusions. This allows 
progressively answering the sub-questions outlined in 1.4. This process is completed in the 
final chapter (Conclusion – Chapter Eight), which provides a straightforward answer to the 
main research question on the dynamics behind immigration paradoxes such as in relation to 
the high levels of irregularity in Spain in the 2000s, and suggests possible lines of related 
research.
                                                        
1
 These polls (“barometers”) are performed by the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS). In 
December 2006, coinciding with a peak in arrivals of clandestine migrants in the Canaries, the CES 
found “immigration” was identified as the top problem by 17 per cent of those surveyed. Yet when 
asked about problems “personally affecting you” the proportion that gave the same answer fell to 5 
per cent (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2006: 5). 
2
 Sections of the media linked both attacks with refugees arriving in Europe from the Middle East. 
3
 The term ‘Spain is used throughout this study with reservations. Because of the plurinational nature 
of the territory and the political drive since 2012 for Catalonia to gain independence, many Catalans 
and others prefer to use the term ‘Spanish state’. However, because of the attention given in this 
study to state structures as actors the use of the latter term can lead to confusion for a reader less 
familiar with Iberian politics, and “the Spanish state” is used only occasionally in this dissertation. 
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4
 According to the National Institute of Statistics, Spain had the lowest birth rate in the world in 1998: 
1.07 children per woman of fertile age (Cañas, 1999). By 2003 it had risen to 10.5 and continued 
rising afterwards. Some of this recovery has been linked to higher birth-rates among immigrant 
women. 
5
 In the 1990s racist murders of migrants by far-right supporters also had taken place (Rius-Sant, 
2007: 107-8) 
6
 “Presidente” can also be translated as President. 
7
 Later employers managed to undo some of the concessions migrants gained by replacing North 
Africans with other nationalities (see 6.2.3.4).  
8
 A survey found it was common for farmers to rotate employers after a period of months. This was 
partly to reduce the risk of legal responsibilities related to the pesticides used (Martínez-Veiga, 2004: 
127). Due to Almería’s normally high temperatures, greenhouses could reach 113 degrees Fahrenheit 
(Calavita, 2005: 71). 
9
 Aznar, for instance, claimed, “[i]mmigration and terrorism not properly dealt with have generated 
radicalism” (Calavita, 2005: 137). 
10
 “Flood” is the translation used for “oleada”, which could also be translated as “surge”. An extreme 
example of this inappropriate language is an El Mundo headline (published on 19 August 1996) for a 
story on 23 people attempting to cross the Straits of Gibraltar to Spain, which described the tiny group 
as a “flood of Moroccans” (Nash, 2005: 50).  
11
 The breadth of the role in labour markets of irregulars was summed up in a call and response chant 
by migrants on a demonstration I attended in which the leader asked who performed a series of 
labour functions (“who picks the lettuce?”, “who cleans the houses?”, “who washes the dishes?”, 
…).On each occasion the answer shouted in unison was “sin papeles, sin papeles” (“the 
undocumented”). 
12
 In this dissertation I use speech marks around the terms “legal”, “illegal” and other derivatives when 
referring to unauthorised immigration. This choice is motivated by it not being clear that unauthorised 
migration is a criminal offence in itself as opposed to being an administrative fault – however much 
irregularity is treated politically as if it were a crime. It is also encouraged by the desire to avoid using 
loaded vocabulary referring to migrants – as commonly occurs in media, political and (occasionally) 
academic treatments.     
13
 The clearest exception to this is Calavita (2005). 
14
 The Spanish Constitutional Court later ruled the measures anti-constitutional and overturned them 
(5.2.2.1). 
15
 The study also confirmed that resistance to immigration grew progressively from 2000 to 2007 but 
particularly between 2000 and 2002 – the period of legislative reform and conflict identified in 1.2.1 
(Cea-D’Ancona, 2010). 
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16
 The contract proposed was similar that introduced by French President Sarkozy in 2004 (Garriga & 
Bárbulo, 2008). 
17
 While performing the research presented in this dissertation I encountered strong evidence of high 
levels of irregular employment in the construction sector that possibly would have had a significantly 
greater disciplinary effect on wages and conditions than envisaged in the 2010 study (see 4.3.1.2 & 
7.2.3) 
18
 There were other influences: the emergence of a new middle-class employer market for domestic 
services, which exercised a downwards pressure on wages, and low levels of unionisation (Stobart, 
2010). At the same time, these factors could themselves have been encouraged by the precarious 
legal position of migrant domestic workers. 
19
 The party’s leader at the time, Josep Anglada, gave speeches calling for the expulsion of all North 
Africans from Catalonia and has used extreme racist descriptions of Africans (Rius-Sant: 271, 144 & 
145). 
20
 Marta Ferrusola – wife of Catalan president Jordi Pujol – predicted that in the future “[traditional 
Catalan] Romanesque churches will not be of use but mosques will” (Santamaría, 2003). 
21
 In 2010-2011 in Salt (Girona) the following took place: North Africans demonstrated against being 
criminalised, non-migrants did a Town Hall protest opposing “migrant delinquency”, and migrants 
rioted after a young Moroccan died in a police chase (Garcés-Mascareñas, Franco-Guillén & 
Sánchez-Montijano, 2012: 269; Rius-Sant, 2011: 156-163) 
22
 The Niqab is the Islamic headdress covering much of the face. The cities and towns applying bans 
included Lleida, Tarragona, Reus, El Vendrell, L’Hospitalet and Barcelona (Burchianti & Zapata-
Barrero, 2012: 11) 
23
 In this thesis the term “amnesty” is usually presented in speech marks due to the same rationale 
applied for words deriving from the word “legal” when applied to immigration: to avoid suggesting that 
irregular residence is always a criminal offence.  
24
 Anderson and Ruhs provide a useful discussion on the need to reject seeing irregularity purely as a 
negative phenomenon (2010.) 
25
 Whereas a positivist worldview lends most easily to using statistical methods, and an interpretist 
approach tends to limit itself to qualitative techniques (Marsh & Stoker, 2002). 
26
 This decision was reinforced by the expectation that there would be much greater difficulties in 
gaining access to elite interviewees such as these. 
27
 Her reactions may have been encouraged by the two of us having exchanged differences over 
PSOE immigration policy in the past. 
28
 These two aspects are also standard research procedure in my University. Unfortunately there 
were difficulties with recording at the beginning of two interviews and some interviewer comments 
made had to be jotted down from memory after the interview ended. 
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 Alternatively it could be maintained that on some levels I was an “insider”. My fluent Spanish, which 
has allowed me to work as a professional interpreter, suggests that I have lived in Spain for many 
years. Furthermore, like myself many interviewees had studied migration and none were foreigners 
from poorer regions. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Migration literature on policy gaps; general theories 
 
This chapter examines the scholarship either directly on immigration paradoxes or on 
migration politics more broadly conceived where contradictory dynamics and outcomes are 
tackled. Correspondingly, it is divided into two parts: firstly, a discussion of the migration-
studies literature on “why states accept unwanted immigration” and secondly, an 
examination of different immigration-politics models. In the first half (2.1), the analysis begins 
by critically assessing the literature that identifies irregularity as originating from organised 
“interest groups”, which are said to distort democratic political decisions. Literature that 
treats irregularity as an outcome of the clash between voters’ and employers’ attitudes 
towards immigration is also considered. The study then moves on to theories that see policy 
paradoxes as a consequence of the liberalness of either states (in particular their 
constitutional, legal and bureaucratic frameworks) or the global agreements and institutional 
frameworks that emerged as the twentieth century progressed. In order to better understand 
the psychology behind states wishing to counter the liberal tendencies in modern states and 
international institutions, some (politically conservative) normative writing is briefly evaluated. 
The second half of the chapter (2.2) is sub-divided into assessments of two general 
analyses of the politics of migration by liberal (or liberal-Foucaultian) scholars: James 
Hampshire and Christina Boswell. More structurally inclined studies are then reviewed. 
These begin with those that locate irregularity and other “gaps” in relation to the conflict 
between a contemporary process of globalisation and an older state system, or treat them as 
being functional – even deliberate – attempts at legally conditioning the large-scale migration 
that manages to overcome borders and controls. Lastly, David Harvey and Gareth Dale’s 
linked but differing attempts at a materialist analysis of the immigration issue are critically 
assessed.  
 
 
2.1 The debate on “unwanted immigration” 
 
2.1.1  Assessing the “client politics” approach   
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Like many other migration scholars, Gary Freeman believes that liberal democracies are 
“broadly expansionist and inclusive” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 27). Yet by adopting a 
“rational choice” approach, Freeman maintains that liberalisation depends on the degree to 
which liberal political frameworks are “captured” by organised “interests” (sometimes 
described as “civil society” associations, Freeman, 1998). In particular these include 
“powerful economic interests” that 
 
press for ready access to cheap and plentiful labour and support policies that fuel 
population expansion, real estate development, and consumer growth. (ibid: 103). 
 
Wilson describes how seizure by civil society is possible: 
 
the exigencies of collective action favour the organized recipients of concentrated 
benefits over the non-organized bearers of diffuse costs. Not the uniformed, non-
mobilized, and tendentially reductionist public, but the expansionist ‘organized public’ 
of employers, ethnic groups, and civil rights advocates comes to shape immigration 
policy in liberal states. (Joppke, 1998a: 16.) 
 
Freeman summarises this position as costs being diffuse and intangible but benefits, 
concentrated and tangible (1998). Such a process is encouraged by policy-making taking 
place in “remote bureaucratic arenas” with “little outside interference” (Joppke, 1998a: 16). 
The result is “expansionist” and “anti-populist” policies that create a “persistent gap between 
the policies of government and the preference of mass publics” (ibid; Freeman, 1998: 88). 
His theory could be summarised as saying that immigration is imposed on society by 
powerful lobbies such as corporations. Research on European policy-making reinforces such 
an idea. One study found that increasingly it has been employers that “provide the data and 
arguments that Western European governments base their economic migration policy design 
on” (leading to migrants being “welcome as long as they promise to contribute to the 
prerogatives of a business-friendly national economic strategy”, (Menz, 2009b; Menz, 2009a: 
4). There appear to be limits to this, however. It is unlikely that firms would have instigated 
the substantial immigration “flows” through family reunification, because it  would offer little 
short-term gain (Hampshire, 2013: 46 & 47).   
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 Other studies on Spain, France and Italy and the United States identify other social 
groups as having driven policy alongside or in place of firms – including migrant and related 
ethnic-minority organisations (Watts, 2002; Wong, 2006). Watts maintains that in response 
to “globalisation” unions have abandoned support for entry and settlement restrictions, as 
well as employer sanctions on irregular hiring, and have joined with employers to ensure 
greater regularisation and the extension of family and benefit rights to migrants (2002: 1 & 
2.) In the case of the three European states, “labor unions have been the driving force 
behind efforts to change immigration policy”, although “policy outcomes are often compatible 
with employers’ interests”, leading the author to talk of “a tacit alliance” (ibid: 99). For the 
same author the labour movement’s general approach towards immigration has “changed 
indelibly”, spurred fundamentally by the declining sovereignty of nation states (see 
2.2.3.1??) and the associated calculation that removing legal barriers to social rights was 
required to avoid the emergence of a secondary precarious labour market that could expand 
into the remaining employment segment (ibid, 2002: 1, 2 & 101.) This was specifically 
important in Spain (and Italy) because of their strong underground economies (ibid: 9).   
From research on the US, Wong concludes that only pressure by churches and pro-
migrant social groups (including Asian and Latin American associations) can account for the 
preservation of “liberal family-based policies” (Wong, 2006: chapter 5).  However, by also 
acknowledging that large numbers of Mexican American voters in certain constituencies had 
an impact on political decisions, she somewhat weakens the case for direct lobbying playing 
the key role in shaping processes (ibid: chapter 6). Sassen points out, however, that political 
pressure from such groups is weaker outside the US (1996: 12). 
Other migration scholars reject Freeman’s model. For instance, Brubaker and 
Pelmutter reject Freeman’s “client” model as being too generic and fitting much better the 
English-speaking settler countries than most European states (with the exception of Spain 
and Italy, according to Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004). In Europe, pro-immigrant lobbies have 
been weak and anti-immigrant parties have encouraged governments to be “chronically 
populist” (Joppke in Hampshire, 2013: 42-44; Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004: 11 & 12; Joppke, 
1998a: 16-20). In France the growth of anti-immigrant politics has influenced employer and 
even union policy (Watts, 2002: 10, 82, 112 & 113.) 
The impact of electoral politics will be returned to, but for now it suffices to say that 
Freeman’s model proves in practice to be one-sided and territorially limited. Boswell 
theorises as its central weakness the model of politics it assumes. In particular, 
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[m]issing entirely are the state actors who actually make policy – legislators, civil 
servants, government advisors, etc. The state appears merely as a conduit or broker 
between conflicting interests – a passive mechanism. (Boswell, 2007) 
 
Analyses of the state are incorporated fully into the present discussion in 3.2 and Boswell’s 
alternative political approach to immigration assessed in 2.2.2, but we can anticipate here 
that she critiques client politics by arguing that a core imperative of “liberal states” is to 
“secure the conditions of capital accumulation” – in the current context making “immigration 
policy … part of a much wider competitiveness agenda”. Therefore, lobbying, if we apply this 
approach, would play a secondary role in reinforcing the harmony between states and the 
accumulation process, rather than be the fundamental shaper of processes.  
 A related problem is why capital as a whole would allow policy making to be affected 
and even effectively “hijacked” by minority “fractions” of civil society. Claiming that the costs 
of immigration are diffuse and intangible suggests that institutions with a broad functional 
purpose (such as governments, employers’ organisations, political parties and political “think 
tanks”) cannot and do not produce quantitative or qualitative research to ascertain such 
effects – at least to an operative degree. This is a supposition that is difficult to defend. Anti-
migration “think tanks” have gained prominence in Britain and the USA in recent years. 
Freeman also alludes to the non-quantifiability of the costs of immigration – such as 
when describing the difficulty in measuring the impact of immigration on neighbourhoods, yet 
there are also substantive immaterial benefits of immigration that are equally hard or harder 
to measure (such as migrants’ artistic, culinary, linguistic, political and moral contributions to 
the “host” society; their prominent role in technological and business innovation; and 
contribution to eroding provincial attitudes and prejudices; Legrain, 2006b.) Nonetheless, a 
strength of the specific “rational-choice” model advocated by Freeman is that it incorporates 
agency into processes and treats political economy as dynamic and living. Employers have 
always combined with other employers and sections of “civil society” to encourage policy-
making that strengthens their own competitiveness, and such processes are a factor in 
policy making (even if subsidiary). But the crucial alliances also involve state managers and 
politicians, who are not passively instrumentalised but active agents themselves. Therefore, 
agency cannot be located purely in the sphere of civil society (Harman, 2009: 109; see 
2.2.3.3).  
 
Related views on voters as drivers of restriction  
 
 
 
 
5 
 
A common rationalization for the irregularity paradox is that firms’ interest in cross-border 
mobility collides with the wellbeing or perception of wellbeing of the majority of the “host” 
population. This clash is “resolved” by allowing gaps to arise between formal and real or 
applied policy (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004.) This idea is fed by the assumption that the general 
population are naturally more hostile to immigration than elites. A relatively sophisticated 
multi-dimensional model of immigration politics (Hampshire’s as discussed more fully in 
2.2.1) recognises the role of media and political elites in forming public opinion1 – in other 
words that the relationship between official attitudes and public opinion is bi-directional. 
However, Hampshire repeatedly presents the democratic process as driving restriction, and 
treats public opinion fundamentally as more of a an independent, rather than dependent, 
variable – as does other literature (2013; Joppke, 1998a). One of Hampshire’s more 
balanced observations holds that, 
 
in representative democracies, public opinion matters. What the voters of a given 
country think about immigration influences the kinds of policies candidates for office 
will propose, as well as the tone of discourse and atmosphere in which immigration is 
debated. Though political parties do not simply ape public opinion – since they try to 
shape it to some extent as well – they certainly cannot ignore it. (Hampshire, 2013: 5, 
6).  
 
This view seems incontrovertible. Governments have been shown to be led by voter opinion 
on migration. An example is the decision by Cameron’s Conservative government to call the 
2016 referendum over remaining in the European Union in response to competition from the 
anti-immigrant UKIP, and whose result at the time of writing is threatening to lead to the 
introduction of restrictions of European migration to the UK. State policy is not only shaped 
by economic and governance decisions but by politics at many different levels.  
Hampshire on this occasion offers a nuanced attitude, yet elsewhere he is simplistic 
and even alarmist, maintaining that only liberal constitutional regimes can defend migrant 
rights from the “tyranny of the majority” (ibid: 45). There is a danger in over-simplifying the 
relationship between electorates and both governments and (particularly) states. In the first 
place, there are many examples of governments patently ignoring strongly held public 
opinion. These include the preparations for and final decision to launch the 2003 Iraq war or 
– more specific to Spain – the Rajoy government ignoring the 80-90 per cent of the 
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population backing the demands of the PAH housing movement to radically reform mortgage 
law and stop widespread evictions (Colau & Alemany, 2013: 9, 39 & 40.) Such cases raise 
the question as to why governments are sensitive to popular opinion on some matters more 
than others.  
What increasingly is described in British political and media circles as “listening to 
voter concerns about migration” may be a pretext for the political encouragement of anti-
immigrant sentiment and may or may not reflect voter sentiment. There have been many 
cases of politicians expressing non-respectable xenophobic or racist ideas by claiming to 
represent the views of their constituents. A notorious example was when shadow British 
cabinet minister Enoch Powell attempted to link his extreme 1968 “rivers of blood” speech – 
a wild prediction of the likely consequences of continued Commonwealth immigration into 
Britain – with what “thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking” 
(Seymour, 2010.) Powell’s popularity after he was sacked from the shadow cabinet, 
evidenced in strikes against the immigration he denounced, suggests that some sympathy 
towards his ideas existed (Hampshire, 2013: 18). However, there were no strikes before his 
speech and it has been recognised that anti-migrant attitudes were given a great boost after 
the episode.  
It is likely that the formation of ideas over migration is more influenced by elites than 
by the majority. Spanish and international authors have identified both empirically and 
theoretically how institutional politics and the media influence general attitudes (Sivanandan, 
2008: 66-79; Martínez-Veiga, 2011: chapters 1 & 2; Rius-Sant, 2007, 2011). The 
background to this research, outlined in 1.2, suggested that between 2000 and 2004 the 
Spanish government helped shape negative public opinion towards migrants. Furthermore, a 
study by Nash of Spanish media discourse discovered that an overly negative view of 
migrants was provided in newspaper coverage (63 per cent of which was negative in 2000 
and 14 per cent positive, 2005: 153). She discovered that this fed the idea of immigration 
being an issue of exaggerated proportions, 
 
“constantly trickling images, together with their inclusion in news headlines represent 
a powerful mechanism of belief transmission that distorted in the 1990s any 
assessment regarding the volume of immigrants in Spain” (ibid: 48.) 
 
Hampshire’s emphasis on treating voter attitudes to immigration as being the independent 
variable in the government-governed relationship is undermined by statistical analysis the 
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author himself cites. This concludes that popular opposition to immigration is “sociotropic” – 
based on perceptions of the economic and cultural impact on society in general – as 
opposed to “egocentric” – voters’ immediate interests. This suggests that motivations are 
based less on lived experience than interpretations of this mediated by society’s institutions 
– such as the media. If immigration is generally perceived as a “problem” this is at least 
partly because media, political and other elites have encouraged this view. 
 
 
2.1.2 Contradictory liberalism 
 
Client-politics and voter-versus-capital focuses treat the state as acting passively vis-à-vis 
civil society (in the broadest sense of the word). Such an approach was critiqued by 
Hollifield, who made the much-repeated injunction for immigration scholars to “bring the 
state back in” (2000: 147, 148, 156 & 157)2. Similar ideas were voiced by Zolberg, Massey – 
denouncing the “short thrift” given to “the nation-state as an agent influencing the volume 
and composition of international migration”, and Portes, who critiques studies on immigration 
legislation that ignore both “the internal dynamics of the legislative and administrative bodies 
dealing with immigration” and external pressures on states (ibid: 147 & 148; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 17). Joppke indicates, “[t]here seems to be no significant migration 
episode, past or present, in which states have not had an active, rather than reactive, hand” 
– including recruiting, organising and shaping the working lives of migrants – and warns 
against the common academic focus which sees immigration as being a “challenge” (or an 
“externally motivated event, with states as passive receivers being forced to respond”, 
1998a: 5 & 6).  
 From the 1990s on, a series of studies were conducted that examined state 
preferences in relation to immigration policies. Yet in 2013 an assessment concluded that 
the task posed by Hollifield had been “inadequately realised” (Hampshire, 2013: 2 & 3). In 
the remaining sections of the present chapter, some efforts made to incorporate the 
institutions into conceptualising immigration are evaluated. Inspired by Hampshire’s 
insistence that “immigration cannot be understood without probing into the complexities of 
modern liberal statehood”, such an analysis shall be completed by looking, in the following 
chapter, at endeavours to theorise the modern state itself (ibid). 
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2.1.2.1 “Liberal constraints” on states 
 
While Hampshire cites law – domestic and international – as a major element promoting 
openness to immigration and “protection” of migrants in policy (ibid), other scholars make it 
the central component.  “The legal system, not civil society, is the key protective institution 
for immigrants” argues Joppke; “rights” are the key explanatory element in the persistence of 
immigration in modern-democratic states (Joppke, 1998a: 18; Hollifield, 2000: 164.)  
 There appear to be two components to such an approach, – described herein as 
“neo-institutionalist”. Firstly the modern state is assumed here to have a constitutional 
framework, which shapes and limits government action, spells out citizens’ rights and 
provides judicial review of government decisions. (Boswell, 2007: 75-79; Hampshire, 2013). 
Because law was and is founded upon liberal principles it has a universalistic and egalitarian 
bent that benefits immigrants as an “unintended consequence” (Joppke, 1998a). As an 
example, all “Western” national constitutions recognise elementary human rights regardless 
of citizenship. (ibid: 18). For such writers, therefore, rights guaranteed in national legal, 
administrative and political frameworks form a “liberal constraint” on government. 
 Secondly, neo-institutionalist writers assume a large degree of impartiality among 
judges and civil servants in order to act as a counter-weight to illiberal governments and 
politicians. For Offe, those that administer the law are removed from the political conflict and 
have different interests to governments and politicians. An alternative view is that practical 
resistance derives from “bureaucracies” wishing to “standardize operations” and courts 
wanting to “seek coherence in the application of legal principles” (or be efficient and non-
discriminatory; Guiraundon in Boswell, 2007: 83). A sharp distinction is thus made between 
officials and those involved in political activity.  
 Joppke asserts that it is not that the combination of professionalism and formal 
constraints that would prevent all coercion against immigrants but “rather that the institutions 
and ideals of liberal constitutionalism can be contested and sometimes delimited” (in 
Hampshire, 2013: 8). Furthermore, any guarantees attained are hard to roll back – or are 
“sticky” – and benefit from the “gradual expansion over the last three decades of civil and 
social rights to marginal populations, whether women, ethnic minorities, or immigrants and 
refugees” (the progressive extension from civil rights to human rights; Sassen, 1996: 11; 
Hollifield, 2000: 150; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 26 & 27; Boswell, 2007: 79, 80 & 83). 
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Joppke concludes that “accepting unwanted immigration is inherent in the liberalness of 
liberal states” (in Hampshire, 2013: 292). 
 
Global rights versus national restrictions 
 
An alternative but related view is that the ability to limit exercising sovereignty over 
immigration originates not from progressive tendencies within institutional frameworks but 
from international legal regimes. According to this view, liberalness attains formal practical 
expression through global conventions, treaties, laws and declarations, which provide 
universal rights benefiting both citizens and non-citizens – including refugees. This has been 
described as a “de facto regime” (Sassen, 1996: 11). Openness also advances “informally” 
within domestic frameworks owing to the international hegemony of liberal states (Boswell, 
2007: 85). This international dimension has been conceptualised as “embedded liberalism” 
(by Hollifield), a (global) “human rights regime” (by Soysal and Sassen), or as “ideologies 
grounded in a transnational community” (by Soysal in Boswell, 2007: 86; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 26). A shortcoming of such an approach is that there are not global 
mechanisms to guarantee compliance with the rights conferred. However, the existence of 
legal and political protections do allow NGOs and individuals to make concrete claims 
through the justice system (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 26). The robustness of early 
examples of international law, such as in defence of international asylum, is offered as 
practical evidence of the power of embedded liberalism (Hollifield in Boswell, 2007: 86). 
Some writers, such as Soysal and Jacobson, argued that “post-national citizenship” would 
develop over time and that – in the case of Bauböck – this would be an inevitable 
consequence of economic globalisation. This prediction contrasts greatly with political 
developments since (Hollifield, 2000: 157).  
 
 
2.1.2.2 Assessing the liberal-constraint theses 
 
Boswell celebrates that the neo-institutional approach outlined above avoids being 
dominated by subjectivity and instrumentality (unlike client-politics scholarship). However, 
she identifies some shortcomings. Firstly Boswell questions the assumption that legal 
practitioners are shielded from political pressures and have objectives substantially different 
to those of other administrative bodies (or the dominant politics of the day; Boswell, 2007: 
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XX). Additionally she points out that Guiraudon’s “organisational sociology” does not account 
for “the origins of organizational capacity to resist the interests of politics” (ibid). More 
fundamentally she critiques institutionalism for attempting to incorporate societal interests 
and institutional constraints without providing an adequate theorisation of the state and its 
“functional imperatives” (ibid).  
Regarding the global liberalism theses, for Joppke international norms have 
“explanatory power” only when they coincide with the interests, rules and institutions within 
nation-states. Summarising Zolberg’s historical findings, Freeman concludes that refugee 
policies have been “often blatantly tied to foreign policy objectives” (1998: 90). The resilience 
of international asylum law in the post-war period cannot be separated from the Cold War 
interests of the US and other Western states, whereby they could demonstrate their greater 
“liberties” than Communism by encouraging defection from the Eastern block (Boswell, 
2007: 86 & 87.) According to the same logic, after the Cold War ended Eastern “defectors” 
were turned into “economic migrants” (Shelley, 2007: 18). Despite Soysal’s belief in an 
evolving global rights regime (2.1.2.1), the same author recognises that 
 
post-national rights remain organized at the national level … The exercise of 
universalistic rights is tied to specific states and their institutions. (Hollifield, 2000: 
157) 
 
Human rights frameworks assume citizenship and rely on nation-states for enforcement. 
They thus can do little in defence of the “illegalised” (Anderson, Sharma & Wright, 2009: 8) 
The existence of the United Nations statement for the international protection of the 
rights of all migrant workers and their families – resolution 45/158 – contrasts with the 
frequency of rights abuses denounced by Amnesty International and other rights 
organisations (for Spanish examples, see Amnesty International, 2005 and 2006). Sassen 
denounces the lack of consistency between the (limited) international “regime” for refugees 
and the lack of an equivalent for immigration in general, yet the globalisation specialist offers 
no adequate explanation for this inconsistency (1996: 10). Moreover, the human-rights 
regime approach (accurately) attributes the relative progressiveness of international legal 
and political frameworks to the hegemony of liberal states. However, if such states – 
particularly the dominant power of the US – can play such a determinant role internationally, 
they  also likely have some capacity to overrule or at least not apply global regulation 
(Boswell, 2007: 86). Indeed there is evidence that “the letter” of global agreements is not 
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being applied in practice (2007). Such observations led Boswell to argue, “the liberal 
constraint is what states make of it” (Ibid: 96.) 
At the same time, there are national examples of courts using international law to 
overturn national legislation in favour of migrants, and Joppke’s observation regarding the 
possibilities of law appears to have some grounds (Sassen, 1996: 12; Garcés-Mascareñas, 
119). It could be added here that political and public opinion is also shaped by liberalism.  
“Common sense” acceptance of certain abstract liberal principles (such as human rights and 
rights to asylum and mobility) has been identified as a factor in opposition to application of 
immigration law (Hampshire, 2013: 50). Such resistance includes growing numbers of local 
anti-deportation campaigns or refusals by public-sector employees to perform controls of 
immigration status at work, both of which have taken place even in countries with a strong 
far-right xenophobic vote such as France or the Netherlands (ibid). Governments and media 
have found it necessary to encourage the idea that many asylum-seekers are “bogus” (or 
simply “economic migrants”) in order to be able to undermine support for refugees, reject 
their applications or reduce their entitlements (Anderson, Sharma & Wright, 2009). 
Governments justify patrolling borders and arresting migrants by presenting such measures 
as acting against “human trafficking” (or “modern slavery”). In other words they present the 
denial of the right to movement – often from conflict and persecution – as a supposed 
“defence of human rights”, resulting in a cynical exercise in neutralising rights through 
superimposing others. Of course in this case the smuggler would not exist without the border 
in the first place.  
 Clearly the formal rights incorporated into liberal political frameworks can clash with 
governmental strategies and feed immigration paradoxes. National constitutions and global 
agreements contain formal guarantees that may be used to counter states’ restrictive 
tendencies. Liberal ideology can also be a factor – for instance in popular resistance to 
immigration measures. However, there also are indications that formal equalities and rights 
are acted on selectively by states, and indeed possibly only exist in advanced political form 
when this has been in the political interest of states – suggesting that state realism underlies 
formalities. In line with Boswell, it should not be assumed that judges or other leading 
members of “public” institutions would mechanically implement rights independently of 
government and institutional prerogatives. Beginning in 2.2.3.3 it shall be examined how 
social relationships determined by wealth and power underlie and frequently subvert formal 
political and legal formalities, a process affecting the development, interpretation and 
application of law. 
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2.1.3 Culturalism and state borders 
 
If liberal constraint theory focuses on existing political factors promoting openness, the 
question must be raised as to what drives states to want to restrict immigration. It should be 
noted here that despite the prominence of debates over migratory control in media and 
political spheres, theorising their essential dynamics is given relatively little attention in the 
academic literature – a deficiency that shall be returned to later in this dissertation. In cases 
where state restriction is incorporated in general analyses of immigration politics, little in-
depth examination is provided. For instance, Joppke discusses how nations represent the 
basic units (“communal vehicle”) through which “scarcities” of resources should be 
distributed, and how this leads states to not spread “rights … too thinly” (1998a: 7). Mark 
Miller lists the “maintenance of public order” as one of “a host of valued goals and 
objectives” encouraging the regulation of international migration (Marfleet, 2006: 10). 
Curiously, it is basically only normative studies centred on making a case for more restrictive 
and selective policies (sometimes articulated around opposing a rights-based approach to 
migration) that lay out in depth the political logic behind migration constraints3. 
 Authors such as Peter Meilaender, David Miller, Peter Brimelow and Samuel 
Huntington treat “the nation” as a single “political community” and the prime (if not exclusive) 
subject of their concerns (Meilaender, 2001: 8; Miller, 2007: 210; Legrain 2009a; Huntington, 
2005). Brimelow maintains that the nation “intrinsically implies a link by blood” – meaning 
that any form of multi-ethnic immigration “risks making America an alien nation” (in Legrain, 
2009a: 204). The other writers provide more cultural (or culturalist) arguments – even if 
sometimes these thinly conceal a less-respectable ethnic or racial bias. For Miller, the nation 
is based on “free association” between people of a specific territory (2007: 210-213) and 
involves “real continuity between generations” (in Meilaender, 2001: 84). According to this 
view, the identified “historical community” has ownership of the geographical space in 
question by having “transformed” it and “enhanced [its] value” (as “embodied in cultivated 
fields, buildings, roads, waterways, and all the rest”, Miller: 2007: 218).  
Such a view exaggerates the national impact of people’s life investments, which are 
normally very localised. It also ignores the role in developing the states likely to receive 
immigration played by the labour by people living beyond the state’s borders (for example in 
ex-colonies or people that have emigrated abroad, Legrain, 2009a: 205). Culturalists treat 
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the division of the contemporary world into nation states as “natural” or “perennial”, even 
though such a framework is a relatively recent development in history (see 3.1.2). Their 
worldview, however, leads them to argue that the nation has a right to apply selective 
“cultural” criteria when deciding over people’s entry and settlement – based on the notion of 
states being able to determine their “future shape” (Miller, 2007: 213-217). As a 
consequence, there is no “unconditional right to immigrate on the basis of the (genuine) 
human rights of the would-be-migrant, whether freedom of movement, freedom of 
association, or the right to exit” (ibid). According to this strict framework, potential migrants 
can only hope they are deemed “needy” enough to be accepted temporarily or permanently 
by “host” states (ibid.) 
Similarly Meilaender argues that because not everyone can be persuaded to 
embrace the identity and visions of a specific political community, states have the right and 
duty to control their borders and are even “entitled to craft immigration policies that reflect 
their own particular national identities and conceptions of politics.” (2001.) Revealingly he 
cites positively the following defence by an Australian immigration minister of his country’s 
racist “White Australia” entry policy introduced in 1901: 
 
We seek to create a homogenous nation. … Is not this the elementary right of every 
government, to decide the composition of the nation? It is the same prerogative as 
the head of a family exercises as to who is to live in his own house (Ibid: 23).  
 
He also favourably cites the opposition by US president Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) to 
the settlement of persons not of English heritage, who, 
 
will bring with them the principles of the governments they leave, imbibed in their 
early youth; or, if able to throw them off; … an unbounded licentiousness … These 
principles, with their language, they will transmit to their children. In proportion to their 
numbers, they will share with us the legislation. They will infuse into it their spirit, 
warp and bias its direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted 
mass. (Meilaender, 1998: 82 & 83.) 
 
Huntington uses comparable arguments in his contemporary appeal to halt the supposed 
threat to the “Anglo-Protestant” culture of the USA represented by growing “Hispanization” 
and “multi-culturalism”. He focuses on Mexican immigration due to its large volume and for 
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allegedly threatening “the demographic reconquista of areas Americans took from Mexico by 
force in the 1830s and 1840s” – by which Huntington imagines a fusing of migratory 
movements with state conflict. His view thus can be seen as a domestic complement to his 
infamous “clash of civilisations” thesis on the incompatibility of the “Islamic” and “Christian” 
worlds (Huntington, 2005: 224 & 225; Legrain, 2009a: chapter 12).  
Huntington’s subjectivity and prejudices are exposed by excepting from his concern 
about Hispanisation post-revolutionary migration of “largely middle- and upper-class” 
Cubans, which he celebrates for having benefitted US state interests and turning Miami into 
“an international economic dynamo” (Huntington, 2005: 251 & 252). He compares this 
(large) population movement with more recent migration from Cuba which he laments as 
involving people that are “generally poorer, less-well educated, younger, and more likely to 
be black than earlier”4 (ibid). He similarly complains about Mexican immigration being “poor, 
unskilled, and not well educated”, (ibid: 256). In short, his approach is to use border policy to 
instrumentally shape American society according to perceived geostrategic interests and 
class, linguistic and racial considerations. It is impossible to see anything “natural” in what he 
is advocating. 
Huntington and Meilaender’s extreme views are framed as an alternative to present 
policy on migration. Nevertheless, they can claim significant continuity with attitudes that 
have determined developed states’ immigration policies until recently. The White Australia 
policy continued for many decades and was only abandoned in 1973. The 1981 British 
Nationality Act limited citizenship only to those born in Britain or their children or 
grandparents, a measure that disadvantaged non-white (and non-English-speaking) 
migration in a period in which this was increasingly questioned by politicians and media  
(Natarajan, 2013). Today, migration from mainly white Anglophone states such as North 
America and Australasia rarely receives negative political publicity of the kind frequently 
devoted to immigration from elsewhere in the world5. Such a selective approach has not 
been restricted to Britain and its ex-colonies: in the post-war period Germany made it very 
difficult for foreign residents and their children to become citizens while awarding “blood-
based” citizenship to “ethnic Germans” – including the very many people fleeing the GDR 
before and during reunification in 1990 (Dale, 1999a: 118-121; see 2.2.1). 
Hence the culturalist logics discussed should probably be best perceived as 
reflecting a tendency within state approaches to migration – even if one that has become 
less fashionable over recent decades. Put differently, their assumptions are likely to be 
similar to those that led and – to a degree – continue to lead states to control their borders. 
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Reinforcing this interpretation is the fact that economic liberals have used overlapping 
reasoning on the rare occasions they have tried to justify making international labour 
markets an exception in their normally rigid defence of free markets6. For example, chief 
Financial Times economist Martin Wolf criticised liberal border policy, writing,  
 
[a] country is not just a set of institutions but also a home. People have a right to 
decide who enters their [collective] home. (2007).  
 
A further example by Hampshire is provided in 2.2.1. A question that the above conclusion 
might arouse is whether the lack of visibility of cultural bias in immigration policy is due to 
“political correctness” or whether other interpretations of this can be offered.  
 
  
2.2 General frameworks featuring paradoxes 
 
Several scholars have attempted a general theory of immigration politics (or a political 
economy of the question) that includes – normally as a secondary or incidental objective – 
accounting for the contradictory drives affecting policy and outcomes or theorising the 
prevalence of irregularity in today’s society. Below the ideas of some of these identified as 
interesting and/or useful to study are outlined and constructively critiqued. Authors come 
from liberal, new structuralist and more classical Marxist backgrounds, and include James 
Hampshire, Christina Boswell, Sue Ferguson, David McNally, David Harvey and Gareth 
Dale.  
 
 
2.2.1 Hampshire’s liberal-paradox model 
 
James Hampshire identifies four generic features of the “liberal state” that he believes shape 
the “profound tension” over immigration or “combine to produce dynamics of openness and 
closure across immigration, citizenship and integration policymaking” (2013: 3). The four 
characteristics are (1) “nationhood” (previous sub-section), 2) “representative democracy” 
(2.1.1), 3) “constitutionalism”, and 4) “capitalism”. Both 1) and 2) promote restriction, while 3) 
and 4) encourage liberalisation. Overrall Hampshire maintains,  
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mobilization through majoritarian democratic institutions, often based on claims about 
the protection of national identity and values, generates pressure for more restrictive 
immigration and integration policies; whereas employer demand for migrant labour 
and appeals to universal rights both generate pressure for more open, inclusive 
policies. (Hampshire, 2013: 3.) 
 
The consequence of this is,  
 
governments of liberal states are pulled in different directions because core activities 
that they are expected to undertake to secure their legitimacy generate contradictory 
imperatives for immigration policy. (ibid.) 
  
Whereas for Freeman the practise of “client politics” collides with the interests of government 
and the state and causes the “preferences” of the “host population” to be “frequently 
ignored”, here the suggestion is that government plays an active as well as reactive role in 
nationalist agendas that guarantee state legitimacy (Freeman, 1998: 102 & 103; 2.1.1). The 
underlying clash is conceived as being between “liberal universalism” and liberal states’ 
“commitment to the construction and the maintenance of a particular national identity” 
(Hampshire, 2013: 9). It is explicitly acknowledged that liberal (and illiberal) states are “not 
… impartial bystanders in the emergence and maintenance of national identity” and that the 
state “unavoidably promotes certain [ethnic and national] cultural identities, and therefore 
disadvantages others” (ibid: 9 & 10). This encouragement takes place, Hampshire signals, 
through Billig’s “banal nationalism” – the everyday and arguably subliminal promotion of the 
nation through symbols and representation (ibid: 10).  
Hampshire adds to the discussion developed thus far in this chapter that the 
“contradictory pushes” described have the effect of making governments “muddle thru”, 
providing different messages and unsatisfying concessions to different constituencies, and 
passing “paradoxical, even contradictory policies” (ibid: 25-27 & 51). This, he diagnoses, 
creates the conditions in which far-right electoral politics can grow (ibid: 25-27.) 
Because Hampshire assumes that states have a requirement to reflect national 
identity and nationalism as well as promote them – however reluctantly, he accepts that 
immigration is always going to be seen as a threat. He then squares this pessimistic view 
with the acknowledgement that states shall continue to need migrant labour by reclaiming 
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and generalising the post-war “guestworker” (Gastarbeiter) model of immigration applied in 
West Germany and other European countries in the post-war period7 (ibid: 18-20; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 25). This was based on the notion that migrants and their families would 
not become citizens but would “return” to their countries of origin (Hampshire, 2013: 18-20). 
The concretisation of this approach was that Gastarbeiter recruits (from Mediterranean 
countries) were denied the freedoms incorporated in the Constitution (Dale, 1999a: 129-
133). Until the system was reformed in the late 1990s, foreigners that joined strikes were 
threatened with deportation, naturalisation was a notably slow process, and migrants’ 
children had to register as “young foreigners” (ibid). Resultingly first and second generation 
“migrants” suffered more precarious residence, employment and lives than “citizens” (ibid.)  
 Hampshire repeatedly praises the much-criticised migration regime for treating 
immigration as a “technocratic administrative” issue rather than political one (ibid; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012). He claims – providing no concrete proof to support his viewpoint – that 
Gastarbeiter hiring gained consensus approval from elites and “generated little populist 
opposition based on ethnic or cultural change”, contrasting this with the immediate political 
problematization of immigration in post-war Britain (Hampshire, 2013: 18 & 19).  
 
Evaluation of Hampshire’s model 
 
Hampshire’s practical conclusion is highly problematic. Firstly the German migration regime 
he justifies was based on discrimination, which institutionalised social division and prejudice. 
Despite notable national shame regarding the holocaust, while the guestworker regime was 
in place fascist organisations re-emerged and achieved electoral successes (Dale, 1999a: 
135). Secondly the system was based on the “myth of return” – as Hampshire himself 
recognises and criticizes (2013: 19-20). The Gastarbeiter settled as a major component of 
the German society, brought their families, grew as a segment of the population, and 
gradually gained the rights enjoyed by citizens to become “de facto members of the state” 
(Dale, 1999a). In the 1990s hundreds of thousands of Gastarbeiter officially were given 
national citizenship (ibid). The regime therefore must be viewed as being a failure on two 
essential counts. 
With regards to the purposes of this study the key question is over whether the 
problems in Hampshire’s policy prescription stem from fundamental weaknesses in his 
liberal-paradox model. To this end, three issues might be signalled. First, the author treats 
acritically the requirement for governments and states to embrace nationalism, exaggerating 
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the extent by which ordinary citizens’ promote national identity and preference (rather than 
this being sometimes or even mainly led by state and institutions such as the media.) and 
ignoring the historic novelty of national consciousness and nationalism (an issue examined 
in 3.2).  
Relatedly Hampshire also treats nationalism and governments as being spheres 
external to “capitalism” and does not acknowledge a separate (or intermediary) role for the 
bureaucratic state. As well as the decoupling of nationalism and capitalism being historically 
questionable (see 3.2.2), he effectively treats political processes as taking place without 
relation to material ones (or detaches politics from economics). This idea clashes with the 
most obvious observations on immigration controversies. For instance, a major issue raised 
in debates on restrictions is the limited public resources – ultimately financial – that exist to 
respond population expansion through migration (see 3.1.4.2). Because in effect Hampshire 
treats politics as floating he gives excessive importance to the role of ideas in processes. His 
vision appears to suffer from a superficial social and political theory. 
Hampshire’s approach leads him to identify immigration paradoxes as a form of 
“liberal paradox” – using Hollifield’s description (Hampshire, 2013: 12 & 13). In other words, 
fundamentally they are not mainly structurally generated but politically (or ideologically) 
produced. This issue shall be developed in subsequent sub-sections and chapters, however 
it must be pointed from the beginning out that research on “illiberal” states found comparable 
dynamics regarding the formation of irregularity gaps. For instance Blanca Garcés-
Mascareñas’ comparative case study on policies and outcomes in “liberal” and 
“authoritarian” states (specifically Spain and Malaysia) found that both forced most migrants 
to choose to remain without authorisation for many years, despite having the contrasting 
formal rights regimes (Garcés-Mascareñas: 2012: chapters 3-5).  
Despite the criticisms towards Hampshire’s framework shared above, his 
examination does contain some positives. By providing a holistic conceptualisation of the 
“immigration problem” he makes it easier to develop alternative ones through comparison. 
Even more positively by signalling policy “muddles” as the response generally applied in 
response to immigration paradoxes he adds another dimension to the analysis thus far. It 
also is worth noting the association he makes between these muddles and the success of 
xenophobic populist politics. Dale uses a similar idea to point to how post-War German 
governments helped resuscitate far-right politics through promising and failing to deliver on 
rights-less immigration in the form of “guestwork”: 
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[I]n circumstances where the state faces structural constraints on its ability to deliver 
what it promises. … [t]he logic of this contradiction is to encourage the rise of parties 
which are consistently hostile to immigration and ethnic minorities (Dale, 1999a).  
 
Ironically, however, this example undermines Hampshire’s normative conclusions.  
 
 
2.2.2 Boswell and the contradictory functions of “states” 
 
In 2.1.2 Christina Boswell was cited as pointing to the failure by liberal-constraint theorists to 
weave the politics of the state into its analysis of immigration politics. Boswell then seeks to 
redress this imbalance by presenting an alternative view, which she describes as “Third 
Way”. Her point of departure is that government and institutions must perform and be seen 
to perform a series of functions in order to sustain their claim to govern. Concretely these 
roles consist of providing security, guaranteeing accumulation, acting fairly and maintaining 
institutional legitimacy – each of which shall be outlined below.  
To provide security for national citizens the state must address “diffuse concerns 
about the capacity of states to control their borders and to regulate the residence and 
employment of [sic] non-nationals” (Boswell, 2007: 89.) This state function may have been 
reinforced because of increasing associations made between immigration and different 
threats to security (including terrorism and organised crime). Accordingly immigration policy 
has become more “securitised” (ibid; Anderson, Sharma and Wright, 2009: 8; Fernández-
Bessa, 2008.)  
Continued economic growth is required if the state is to preserve popular support. 
When immigration is deemed to be contributing to this, it strengthens the legitimacy of the 
government; when it is seen as a “financial burden”, the opposite occurs (Boswell, 2007: 89 
& 90; Freeman in Hollifield, 2000: 147). Exercising fairness implies the perception that state 
resources are being accessed by those that contribute to the “community” (see 3.1.4.2), but 
also – in a dialectical twist – that the state applies “universalistic justice” even when this 
erodes national protectionism (Boswell, 2007: 90 & 91). Lastly maintaining popular consent 
towards the state (legitimacy) rests on the effective rule of law, separation of powers and 
conformity with the constitution (ibid: 91). The need to satisfy these four aspects is shared by 
both government and institutions. However, 
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migration impinges in a number of ways on these four conditions for legitimacy. This 
to a large extent explains why [it] has taken on such central importance in political 
debates. The point is not so much that migration affects societal interests; many 
phenomena do this … Rather, it raises key questions about the way in which the 
state is, or is not, fulfilling its ascribed functions. (Ibid.) 
 
Unlike liberal institutionalists, Boswell here assumes that government requires state 
institutions to have autonomy from it in order to be able to exercise its own functions. 
Specifically the government-institutions is required for the state to enjoy enough popular 
consent to perform its actions. In other words, the liberalness of states is not primarily an 
effect of international and domestic law but a necessary component in hegemonic rule.  
 As regards policy paradoxes, Boswell applies her framework to account for 
inconsistencies or “failures” in immigration politics (ibid: 93-95). She applies Offe’s general 
theory of the irreconcilability for states to guarantee accumulation while simultaneously 
maintain legitimacy, specifying that this conflict “seems to be particularly acute in [relation to] 
migration policy” (ibid: 92). She maintains that simultaneous processes of globalisation and 
politicisation of migration issues mean that the emergence of divergences between 
accumulation and legitimisation is inevitable. There are many ways by which states can 
react to such gaps. These include protectionist populism, which jeopardises the interests of 
domestic capital, and the “intentional fudging of policy” identified by Offe and Hampshire 
(ibid; 2.2.1). Hall maintains that the state has an interest in what Boswell summarises as the 
“persistence of contradictions and inefficiencies in policy” (Boswell, 2007: 93). He writes,  
 
A state faced with multiple tasks … may find it necessary to maintain a degree of 
deliberate malintegration among its various policy-making aims so that each can 
mobilize consent among its particular constituencies by pursuing policies, which even 
if never fully implemented, appear to address the needs of these groups. In many 
cases the pursuit of incompatible policies renders all of them ineffective. (Ibid: 92 & 
93.) 
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Boswell adds (echoing Hampshire here),  
 
in the case of migration policies, such malintegration usually takes the form of a gap 
between proclaimed, restrictive migration policy, and the de facto toleration or covert 
implementation of more liberal measures. (Ibid: 93.) 
 
Boswell’s is an interesting and theoretically sophisticated framework that makes a 
compelling logical case as to why immigration outcomes (or real policies) differ from formal 
plans. Its strength is that it identifies the pillars through which governments gain and 
maintain public consent and how immigration interrelates contradictorily or uneasily in 
relation to some of these. On the other hand, despite announcing, “we can best understand 
migration policy by adopting the perspective of the state” the model says little about the state 
itself beyond the point of separation of powers made (Boswell 2007). What the state wishes 
to do with its legitimacy remains unidentified and capital accumulation is relegated to being a 
way by which political hegemony is maintained (ibid: 89 & 90). Also, like Hampshire, 
Boswell’s model treats pro-restrictive public opinion as a factor external to – rather than 
partly shaped by – government/state imperatives. As a result the theory is insightful but 
incomplete and (similarly to that of Hampshire) points to the need to incorporate stronger 
theorisation of the nature of the state and its relationship with both capital and immigration. 
  
 
2.2.3 Structuralist analyses  
 
Many general analyses of immigration politics adopt a more structural-materialist angle than 
Hampshire and Boswell (and the other writers already surveyed in this chapter). Such 
approaches tend to be of the critical variant and often Marxian. In this sub-section they are 
further divided into, first, theories emerging from writing on “globalisation” (together 
categorised by Joppke and Boswell as “second wave” migration theory) – in 2.2.3.1; then 
radical appraisals regarding the benefits for employers of irregular-migrant employment  – in 
2.2.3.2; and, last but not least, more abstract-natured classical Marxist writing dealing with 
political contradictions related to immigration  – 2.2.3.3. 
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2.2.3.1 Globalisation and decline of sovereignty 
 
Many writers, most remarkably Saskia Sassen, affirm that irregularity is a product of both 
processes of globalisation and a concomitant decline of state sovereignty (1990,1996; 
Watts, 2002). Specifically for Watts this “gap between policies and outcomes” is due to 
“pressures emanating from outside the state” such as greater emigration from the South due 
the “social and economic imbalances” emerging from neoliberal deregulation internationally 
(Watts, 2002: 59 & 60). It also is encouraged by the lower economic and psychological costs 
of migrating associated with the “expansion of transnational migration networks aided by 
advances in communication and transportation technology” (ibid; Portes in Hollifield, 2000: 
156) 
 The 1970s recession spurred an epochal “recomposition of capital at a world level” in 
which there was a huge increase in cross-border flows of finance, investment and goods8 
(Sassen, 1990: 53). Foreign direct investment (FDI) grew exponentially – expanding by 1000 
per cent between 1950 and 1980 (ibid: 119). Large corporations offshored production and 
manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries. Sassen sees immigration as being “deeply 
embedded” within these broad processes of “economic globalization” (1996). In cities such 
as New York and Los Angeles deregulation led to an expansion of “downgraded 
manufacture” and informal employment (Sassen, 1996: 168). A more competitive 
international environment encouraged employers in growing financial, services and other in 
situ employment sectors to contain costs and increasingly hire “politically disciplined” 
migrants rather than locals with “middle-class aspirations” (ibid: 187 & 188). The American 
cities mentioned became “global cities” (ibid: 186; Hollifield, 2000: 158). In the US as a 
whole “Third World” immigration replaced the mainly skilled and European migration of the 
1950s and early 1960s (Sassen, 1990: 83 & 84). Women increasingly came – taking 
advantage of migratory routes to escape from oppressive family situations (ibid: 120; 
Mezzadra, 2004: 270).  
Sassen directly links migratory movements into the core with the growth of outward 
capital investment in deregulated markets (1990: 119 & 120). She points to the coincidence 
between US investment in commodity production for export in South East Asia and the 
Caribbean basin and the increase in emigration to North America from these regions 
(including a 400 per cent growth from South Korea and 125 per cent from the Philippines 
from the 1970s to 1980s, ibid). Several studies make a similar case comparing “flows” of 
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emigration from Mexico to the USA and Canada with American FDI travelling the opposite 
route  (Hollifield, 2000: 151; Ferguson & McNally, 2015).  
A recent examination by the Canadian Marxist authors Sue Ferguson and David 
McNally focuses specifically on how this pattern emerged – in particular through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 6). During NAFTA’s 
first decade a large growth in northern agribusiness imports to Mexico led to a million people 
abandoning living from small farming (Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 4 & 5). Women and men 
migrated from rural areas to work in the maquila export manufacturing zone near the US 
border or further north to join a huge Mexican community in the US (which formed 28 per 
cent of the foreign-born US population in 2000; ibid; Legrain, 2006a: 230). The writers 
describe the NAFTA-inspired process as one of “on-going … primitive accumulation that 
displaced rural producers from the land and drove them into markets in wage-labour” leading 
to “the construction of a truly continental labour market” (Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 4 & 6). 
They coincide with Sassen that such processes are not geographically confined but are 
international – exemplified in the six million people that migrated north from Latin America 
between 2000-2008 (ibid: 10).  
As well as NAFTA, other regional or international institutional frameworks have 
emerged to exercise governance in relation to greater global economic interconnectedness. 
Internationally these include the “Bretton Woods” institutions, and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO, Helleiner, 2014). The European Union – a political as well as economic 
framework – has the powers to manage much immigration policy – including inter-state 
mobility and external immigration controls (see 5.1). For Sassen state sovereignty is being 
“redistributed” onto these “supranational” organisations as well as agreements on human 
rights and legal regimes for business transactions (1996: 9).  
Globalisation of capital and people, as a result, is destabilising “[e]xclusive 
territoriality” which it is maintained is “a marking feature of the modern state” (ibid). 
Correspondingly, Sassen concludes, the “partly unbundled … power and legitimacy we call 
[national] sovereignty” may still be able to “write the text of an immigration policy” but can 
“only partly address and regulate through immigration policy conventionally understood” 
leading to a decline in state autonomy vis-à-vis immigration (ibid; 1998; 1996: 15 & 16).  
As well as policy becoming more multi-level (most notably in the European Union), 
Sassen identifies a greater diversity of actors involved in immigration debates and 
policymaking in the core countries. In Europe in particular, 
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[t]he policy process for immigration is no longer confined to a narrow governmental 
arena of ministerial and administrative interaction. Public opinion and public political 
debate have become part of the arena wherein immigration policy is shaped. Whole 
parties position themselves politically in terms of their stand on immigration (Sassen, 
1996: 12.)  
 
Relatedly for Sassen, the “claimed power [of the state] often begins with a limited contest 
between the state and interested social forces”; ibid). Yet such a process is not wholly new 
and has always included “agribusiness, manufacturing, humanitarian groups, unions, ethnic 
organizations, and “zero population growth efforts”. (Sassen seems to partially converge with 
Freeman regarding the important relationship between government and interest groups; 
2.1.1).  
 The evolution of trade-union policies on migration reinforces the globalist thesis. In 
research carried out in 1996-7, policy shifts by unions were detected in the US, France, 
Spain and Italy. This means, in Watts’ words, 
 
[t]oday many labor leaders see immigration as an inevitable consequence of 
globalization and believe restrictive immigration policies cannot stop the flow of 
immigrant workers … As a result, most labor leaders today favour policies that 
promote, rather than restrict, immigration. (2002: 1 & 2) 
 
The practical consequence has been the forging of “an unlikely alliance” between workers’ 
organisations and employers aimed at opposing restrictionist laws and procedures (ibid). 
Finally Sassen indicates that it is not just interrelationships between state and civil society 
that have changed, suggesting, “hierarchies of power and influence within [author’s 
emphasis] the state are being reconfigured by the furthering of economic globalization … 
multiplying the room for conflicts within the state” (1996: 15 & 16).  
Therefore the Globalist approach could be summarised as believing that nation 
states a) have little power to manage immigration (beyond affecting the speed and efficiency 
of immigration “flows”), b) are more likely to be challenged and influenced by global legal 
regimes and organised civil society, and c) are being internally reorganised in ways that both 
reflect and promote greater disagreement on immigration (Hollifield, 2000: 158). All of these 
factors –particularly the strength of migration in relation to declining states – contribute to 
disparities between government discourse and immigration practice. 
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Appraising the globalist case 
 
Sassen’s analysis offers a framework to begin thinking through the relationship between 
European and Spanish policy, as well as giving a more materially grounded perspective to 
the issue of the external – continental or global – legal constraints on state restriction. Most 
importantly it attempts to provide a general framework for very real historical changes of an 
economic, political and social nature. This is of notable importance bearing in mind that 
immigration policy paradoxes are an occurrence that has increased in recent decades, a 
growth that requires explanation. Miles celebrates that Sassen’s (early) general thesis 
demonstrates “the complexity of the relationship between capitalist crisis, capital 
accumulation and international migration” (1993: 125).  
Yet Miles also suggests that the overall analysis is excessively “economic” (“even 
economistic”), as it fails to acknowledge that “many migrations are politically determined” 
and that even those “migrations determined by labour demand are necessarily mediated by 
the political institutions of nation and state” (Miles, 1993: 127; Hollifield, 2000: 158). This 
danger of economic reductionism is demonstrated by the recent wave of migration arriving in 
Europe that has been driven by war (Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and the Central African 
Republic, Crawley, 2015).  
There are several other limitations to Sassen’s analysis that can be signalled. 
Freeman challenges the “decline of sovereignty” thesis pointing to the important variation in 
effectiveness of controls: with Britain, Australia and Scandinavia as “successful” cases, and 
Spain, Greece, the US, Italy and Portugal as the opposite (1998: 94). Freeman fails to 
acknowledge that the first group of states are more geographically isolated than the latter 
group, but the effectiveness of border control has varied in time and place – for example 
being performed relatively efficiently after the First World War, in the 1930s slump and (very 
tragically) when Jews tried to flee Nazi Germany (Marfleet, 2006: 71 & 72; 128-130).  
As well as questions over the power of global rights guarantees to overturn decisions 
by states raised 2.1.2.2, it is doubtful whether even the most developed international 
institutions can routinely impose their will on states. The EU, for instance, has not been able 
to stop member states – particular in its core – from disregarding its legislation. An example 
is when the Sarkozy government in France deported ten thousand Romanians and 
Bulgarians of Roma origin – breaking EU anti-discrimination laws and agreements and 
directives on the free circulation of European citizens9. Similarly the Rajoy government in 
Spain has admitted carrying out summary deportations of migrants on its Moroccan border 
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despite such actions breaking a range of international treaties (and the Spanish constitution), 
without significant European repercussion 10 . Similarly the European institutions were 
relatively passive when in 2015 several EU states reintroduced national border controls in 
response to the “refugee crisis” (1.1). Furthermore, Freeman is probably correct in saying 
that European policy cooperation on migration is “essentially in the hands of nation states” 
(1998: 91 & 92; see 5.1). 
A second issue is whether the extent of international mobility of labour – or 
globalisation of people – can be compared with that of capital (finance and production). 
Deregulating international mobility has not taken place beyond European borders or globally 
and has not been a concern of the WTO and other global institutions and agreements 
(Shelley, 2007: 27; see 5.1). Figures suggest that immigration is a relatively weak example 
of cross-border tendencies. The percentage of the planetary population that live abroad is 
narrow: 3.2 per cent in 2013 – a small rise from the 2.9 per cent of foreign residents in 1990 
– and only half of them reside in the Global North (ibid: OECD, 2013: 1-3). These relative 
magnitudes are dwarfed by the proportion of capital invested abroad: 18 per cent of world 
output at the end of the 1990s (ibid). Such disparities have led Sutcliffe to sentence, 
“employment and residence are quantitatively less globalized than production or 
investment”, and Bhagwati to declare that international labour markets are “the most 
compelling exception to liberalism in the operation of the world economy” (Sutcliffe, 1998: 
326; Harris, 1995: 157). A rationale has been identified for these contrasts. For De Lucas 
migration has become globalisation’s “masthead” and “the shibboleth of the very culture of 
globalisation”11, but also one of the “bad flows” requiring controlling (alongside non-Western 
ways of life12, De Lucas, 2013: 23). Similarly Sassen identifies labour and capital mobility as 
being treated as two “epistemic communities” (1996: 15).  
With regards to the link made by Sassen and Ferguson and McNally between 
specific examples of international deregulation and people “flows”, several difficulties 
emerge. First, projects like the EU and NAFTA have a regional scope and attempts at 
institutionalising neoliberal policies and creating integrated labour markets globally have 
been considerably more restricted. Therefore the capital-labour “circuits” within NAFTA 
should not be assumed as generalisable globally – as the mentioned authors do.  
Sassen impressively links broader hyperglobalisation ideas of the kind defended by 
Strange, Hardt and Negri and others, to transformations in the field of immigration and policy 
(Strange, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2001). It aids accounting for the convergence of domestic 
immigration policies, among other aspects (Sassen, 1996: 10). Nevertheless, it rests on an 
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over-simplistic view of economic development and an undervaluation of the role in society of 
states – particularly those of North America and northern Europe (including through their 
dominance of international institutions; Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Weiss, 1997). Financial 
services and multi-national production still have strong logistical and other links to specific 
national states – as demonstrated when different states rescued major banks during the 
recent financial crisis. Moreover international investment has tended to take place within the 
“Triad” of East Asia, North America and Europe, and has bypassed many countries entirely 
(Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Weiss, 1997). “Supranational” European integration is best seen 
as primordially a process of state alliance in response to global economic, diplomatic and 
military competition. If such a process (and that of NAFTA and other trade blocs) are treated 
as regionalist, Sassen and Ferguson and McNally’s observations regarding international 
dynamics and immigration can be revealing and useful. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Economic interests in illegality 
 
Some radical scholarship inside and outside the globalist category rejects that irregular 
migration should be understood as “unwanted” or being an accidental consequence of 
political-economic contradictions. Rather they see it as economically motivated. Trujillo-
Pagán argues that irregularity is promoted by an “immigration industrial complex” led by the 
private firms hired to detain and deport migrants (and therefore profiting from illegalisation) 
and supported by associated politicians (2013). Such a view may be part-influenced by the 
real tendency in recent decades to increase the participation of private firms in enforcing 
migration controls. British and Dutch governments have outsourced management of 
detention facilities for failed asylum applicants to the subsidiaries of large security firms, and 
the EU has hired defence and security companies for border policing and surveillance (as 
described in 5.1.3; Menz, 2009b: 322).  
 Trujillo-Pagán and many other authors identify a wider layer of employers (and even 
whole national economies) as benefitting from the impact of state coercion on migrant labour 
(Ferguson & McNally, 2015; Calavita, 2005; Akers-Chacón, 2006). Some of these deduce 
from this that immigration controls are a “policy” or “means to control labor” (Akers-Chacón, 
2006: 174; Ferguson & McNally, 2015). For Trujillo-Pagán the law aims “not to physically 
exclude [migrants] but instead, to socially include them under imposed conditions of 
enforced or protracted vulnerability” (2013: 4). It is a view echoed by many progressive 
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institutions. For instance the International Labour Organisation writes “numerous 
governments informally tolerate irregular migration while they officially reinforce controls 
against ‘illegal’ migrant workers”, a combination that helps “meet labour needs in certain 
sectors of the market” and thus “constitutes a de facto employment policy” (in Shelley, 2007: 
30). 
Differing from Sassen and “Second Wave” predictions that liberalism in institutional 
processes substantially undermines state control of migration, Ferguson and McNally 
highlight that NAFTA adopted a contrasting approach to capital and labour “flows”: “one 
liberalized and the other punitively policed” (ibid: 6). In 1995 – the year after the agreement 
was introduced – 1.3 million migrants were apprehended at the US border; the next year 
new legislation was introduced to speed up removing aliens and “phoney” refugees; fences 
were militarised and reinforced; in the following years half a million migrants per annum had 
to enter Canada as precarious “guestworkers”13 (Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 6 & 7; Marfleet, 
2006: 171).  
Yet if the North American agreement prevented free emigration, it did not end 
migratory movements. It has been estimated statistically that for each of the 1.3 million 
detained in 1995 nearly two and a half others managed to enter the United States (Marfleet, 
2006: 171). As had occurred for decades, migrants entered through “back door loopholes 
and side doors” (years after which many would be regularised through “front-door 
amnesties”, ibid: 168 & 169). Federal policy remained (in Joppke´s words) “lax, with 
intermittent shows of toughness” (ibid: 170). Legal proceedings were applied to a very small 
minority of those detained (3.2 per cent of those apprehended in 1998, ibid: 173). By 2001 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had ceased to look for irregular residents 
(ibid: 173). In a period of promises and increased public expenditure to curb unauthorised 
migration, irregularity has grown – especially of Mexicans. Whereas in the 1980s only a 
quarter of Mexican arrivals in the US were “illegal”; by the last decade the proportion had 
risen to over four out of five. (Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 5 & 6). It has been estimated that 
in 2006 half of the twelve million US residents born in Mexico were undocumented (ibid). 
Irregular migration is also essential to the economy. Using population surveys, Passel 
calculated that the undocumented made up 24 per cent of all US farmworkers, 17 per cent of 
cleaners, 14 per cent of construction workers, and 12 per cent of food-industry workers – all 
revealing statistics (Shelley, 2007: 23). 
Business benefits from such outcomes. This firstly is because employers can be  
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“confident that the [undocumented migrant´s] vulnerability will allow evasion of social 
security charges, taxes and overtime pay, reducing costs by a sum which could be 
up to two-thirds of the wage bill” (Marfleet, 2006: 171) 
 
Similarly, inspired by the writings of De Genova, Ferguson and McNally maintain that the 
purpose of restrictions “is not principally to deport undocumented workers, but to deepen 
their condition of deportability” leading them to become “a vulnerable and hyper-precarious 
section of the working class whose insecurity contributes to the lowering of general levels of 
real wages and job and social protections.” (Ibid: 5 & 6). This, they add, makes migrants “the 
ideal precarious labourer of the neoliberal era” (ibid: 1). 
Additionally, Marfleet points out, an irregularly increased population helps avoid 
declining land and house prices, and avoid deflation due to the rising wages associated with 
labour shortages 14  (Marfleet, 2006: 171 & 172). In 2001 the Cato Institute think tank 
estimated the financial benefit of irregularity to the US economy at $30 billion annually – 
describing irregularity as “the lubricant to our capitalistic economy” and providing it with a 
“competitive advantage” over Europe (ibid: 173). Neoliberal defences of immigration of this 
variety encourage some radical writers to treat “illegality” as “deliberate social policy” 
(Ferguson & McNally, 2015; Calavita, 2005; Akers-Chacón, 2006: 174 & 175).  
Less economistic critical writing identifies in a more nuanced way relationships 
between borders and positive outcomes for elites. Marfleet writes “crackdowns” on border 
crossings have pushed migration through more dangerous routes (leading to several 
hundred deaths yearly by 200015) but “have not aimed to stop irregulars” – instead being 
“mainly of symbolic value to politicians with populist agendas” (Marfleet, 2006: 172 & 173). 
For Andreas these suppressions have “more to do with managing the image of the border” 
(Trujillo-Pagán, 2003: 3). This led the scholar to describe the relationship between the US 
state and irregular networks (including the Mexican-US “coyotes”) to be “conflictive but in 
many ways symbiotic” (ibid: 174). This idea is reinforced by the federal de-criminalisation of 
illegal employment introduced in the post-war period, and the examples of politicians that 
have campaigned for greater controls but also sponsored legislation to prevent workplace 
raids (Trujillo-Pagán, 2013: 8; Marfleet, 2006: 170).  
Marfleet indicates that Europe does not follow closely the North American model 
indicated but that some similarities exist (2006: 169). In the post-war period in France 
ministers openly defended the benefit of clandestine migration into the country, and in 
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several Mediterranean countries there has been high and growing levels of irregular entry 
and settlement (ibid: 69, 174 & 175; Baldwin-Edwards, 1998; Calavita, 2005). 
Countries such as France, the US, Greece & Spain have seen repeated “amnesties” 
being performed – sometimes affecting very large numbers of people (such as the 2.6 million 
migrants regularised by the Reagan government in 1986, Marfleet, 2006: 69). Repetition 
occurs because, as Pinkerton identifies, amnesties tend to be followed by further large-scale 
entry – perhaps encouraged by the hope of future regularisation processes (ibid). The 
combination of “illegal” and “legal” aspects to immigration processes leads Marfleet to 
describe policy practice as follows,  
 
“immigration control erects only notional barriers to entry or operates on the basis of 
informal ‘rules of the game’, whereby officials, employers and migration agents share 
an understanding that clandestine activity is part of the routine of migratory 
movements” (ibid: 170). 
 
According to this view irregularity is less an unwanted contradiction than a functional, 
structural and even desired one.  
 
Structural irregularity 
 
The writing analysed above in 2.2.3.2 shares the advantage with Sassen’s scholarship of 
looking at how immigration policy has developed concretely in the recent period of neoliberal 
globalisation – rather than resting on static models. Compelling evidence and arguments are 
provided to show that political “fudges” dominate policy in countries such as the United 
States. The description of American irregularity connects considerably with the background 
already outlined on Spain in 1.2 (and developed further in 5.2). Even if its degree varies 
across countries, irregularity clearly has become a fixed feature of society across the 
developed world.  
Yet the question remains as to whether existing practice is intended. Trujillo-Pagán’s 
notion that illegalisation is driven by a “crimmigration system” featuring private firms profiting 
from controls is particularly unconvincing. Firstly rather than the increased cooperation 
between private firms and governments in migration issues expressing simply their 
increased influence over governments – as is implied, sometimes the relation appears to 
operate in the opposite direction. Public purchase of tickets for transporting returned 
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migrants can be lucrative (earning British Airways a total of 4.3 million pounds in 2006), but 
airlines also suffer inconveniences by performing this role (Menz, 2009b: 319-21). Since the 
1980s airlines based in the Schengen area have paid tens of millions of euros in fines and 
additional repatriation costs for transporting person without valid visas, as well as 
undermining their corporate image by aiding expulsions (Menz, 2009b: 319-21; see 5.1.2). 
Lorry drivers have protested against being fined for carrying migrants from French ferry ports 
to Britain (Menz, 2009b: 321 & 312). 
Secondly and more crucially, employers profiting from migrant hiring is a minority 
fraction of capital as a whole, and those benefiting from illegal hiring even smaller. Logically 
governments may want to accommodate the interests of firms hiring migrants if this 
contributes to national growth but irregularity reduces public revenue (from employers and 
taxes on earnings), weakens the ability of governments to manage their population, and can 
– if migration takes place on a large scale – put pressures on public infrastructure and 
services. None of these outcomes are in the interests of state and capital. Therefore it 
seems too simplistic and mechanical to assume that the benefits of reduced legal rights for 
some employers would be enough to encourage a “lax” approach by the state. Moreover, the 
US and Spanish states are examples of the liberal “variety of capitalism” and patterns in 
them may not necessarily be applicable to more statist regimes, such as in Europe. 
A final issue is whether irregularity adds to paradoxes and tensions because it 
contributes to material and other differences between foreign residents and “natives” – 
encouraging perceptions of competition and rivalry between the two groups. Even though 
findings on labour and social impacts from studies in North America and Europe (including 
my own) are of impacts of migration on “native” wages and conditions clustering around 
being “small” or “slight”, sometimes there is evidence of temporary or longer-term depressive 
effects on the wages of the very poorest. Such effects, as my own research showed, are 
likely to be more produced with higher levels of undocumented immigration (Legrain, 2006a: 
134-139, 340 & 341; Stobart, 2010). 
 
 
2.2.3.3 Contradictory tendencies in capitalism  
 
Some Marxist writers provide an analysis of the relationship between migrant labour and 
both capital and states that suggest more structural and less-strategic rationale for 
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immigration contradictions. In this sub-section the work of David Harvey and Gareth Dale, 
who developed Harvey’s analysis, is examined and critiqued.  
 
Harvey’s labour mobility versus immobility 
 
David Harvey is recognised by many as the writer that has contributed most to 
understanding territorial or spatial processes, performing such through careful study of 
Marx’s writing on capital. In his early classic the Limits to Capital the writer treated labour 
mobility as a key ingredient in the accumulation process because of the need for capital to 
be “fluid” and able to “adopt new labour processes”, as well as “take advantage of superior 
locations” (in Dale, 1999: 291). However, Harvey also identified how capitalist production 
encourages two “countervailing influences over the geographical mobility of labour power 
[capacity to do work]”, which are described below (Harvey, 2006: 412).  
This “freeing” of workers when capitalism emerged historically had a “double sense” 
according to Marx (1990: 272). Firstly “as a free individual [the worker] can dispose of his 
labour-power as his own commodity” and stopped being tied to one owner of the means of 
production – unlike the serf in relation to the feudal lord (ibid). At the same time the labourer 
became “free of all the objects needed for the realization … of his labour-power”, forcing 
them to have to work for at least one member of the capitalist class (ibid). This was brought 
about initially (in England) through capitalist landowners expropriating the land – including 
the “common land” shared by the peasantry – and in the process producing “the requisite 
supplies of masterless proletarians” (Marx in Marfleet, 2006: 57).  
The proletariat’s capacity to work (labour power) became one more commodity to be 
bought and sold in the expanding markets for products. As this became treated as “nothing 
but variable capital” – “an aspect of capital itself” – and therefore having movement that is 
“embedded” within the laws “that regulate the mobility of capital in general”, “the absolute 
freedom of the labourer to move must be strictly circumscribed” (Harvey, 2006: 380-382). 
Perhaps it is this logic that leads the Marxist geographer to treat “in situ” increases in labour 
– for example through international migration – as increasing in attractiveness (as one of two 
“spatial fixes”) when capital is suffering economic crisis or great financial pressure, even if 
recent experience suggests that migrant labour is more likely to be subject to greater control 
in times of recession and slump (see 5.2.2.1 on Spain; Dale, 1999: 304). 
The Limits to Capital offers a second economic reasoning for the mobility-immobility 
contradiction, based (according to Dale’s interpretation) on the idea that “the circulation of 
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labour power cannot be understood separately from its production and reproduction” (Dale, 
1999: 295). Harvey identifies how – in general – employers benefit from “a stable, reliable 
workforce and captive labour supplies” (Harvey in Dale, 1999: ibid). Dale adds that once 
workers enter the production process, their immobility, not mobility, becomes the employers’ 
object (Dale, 1999: 296). Yet crucially some employment sectors “may prioritize the need for 
secure conditions of production and reproduction” while others, “freedom of circulation, 
which leads to varying policy orientations” (ibid: 292). 
“Fixity” is particularly important for sectors relying on “social reproduction processes” 
– meaning the daily and generation reproduction of labour power – “for labour powers of 
certain qualities” – including those that require state investments in training and education 
(Harvey, 2006: 384; Dale, 1999: 296). This has the added bonus of keeping “labour markets 
segmented as a means of social control” (Harvey, 2006: 384). The practical consequence is 
that “the management of social reproduction” through welfare and other state provision 
“invariably entails the transgression of … the free mobility of labour” (Dale, 1999: 296 & 
297).  
Harvey deduces that the requirement of “fixing” labour means that individual 
capitalists and “fractions of capital” may, in pursuing their own self-interest, curb the 
aggregate mobility of labour power in ways that may be inimical to the reproduction of the 
capitalist system as a whole.” (ibid: 412). The Marxist geographer refers to Marx’ example of 
the Lancashire textile manufacturers who successfully applied pressure on the national 
government to prevent the emigration of unemployed cotton workers in the 1860s (to avoid 
losing “the mental and trained power which cannot be replaced for a generation” – as 
described by one public lobbyist16, Marx, 1990: 720-722). There was also the example of 
how until as late as 1815 the emigration of mechanics employed in machine-making was 
forbidden “on pain of severe punishment” (ibid: 719.) A further instance provided by Dale 
was when “state-capitalist” East Germany built the Berlin Wall to prevent its workers 
defecting to the West (1999: 296).  
In all, immobility and mobility form “contradictory impulses, which derive from the 
internal contradictions of capitalism in general” (Ibid: 412). Because capital’s interest in 
labour mobility is thereby undermined, capital mobility becomes the preferred spatial fix: 
 
The unrestrained mobility of capital is therefore more appropriate to accumulation 
than the unrestrained mobility of labour – which may account for the twentieth 
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century trend to restrict the mobility of labour power relative to that of capital. 
(Harvey, 2006: 412.) 
 
The “clashing imperatives” described have political and ideological implications relevant to 
the purposes of this study, as each “find reflection in the twin poles of bourgeois political 
thought: liberalism, with its emphasis on free mobility, equality of opportunity and universal 
rights, and conservative currents whose chief sympathies lie with institutions of social 
stability and control” (1999: 296 & 297). 
The analysis mainly developed by Harvey plausibly accounts for observable policies 
that discourage mobility in capitalist development. For instance the provision of social 
subsidies normally requires the fixed residence of beneficiaries – managed through the 
requirement of regular attendance at benefit offices. As a result, non-employed reproduced 
labour power – including (crucially) the skilled variety – remains accessible to local or at 
least national employers. However, Harvey and to a degree Dale extend the analysis to 
account for immigration policy. This is far less convincing. In the contemporary world – or at 
least its developed part – it is not outward mobility that is restricted – even though emigration 
is of a considerable magnitude for some countries (including Spain and Britain). The 
example of the Berlin Wall is in many respects an anomaly that would require an analysis of 
the specific labour and rights regimes of bureaucratic Communist governments – a task 
beyond the remit of the present study. The examples of emigration control cited by Harvey 
and Marx corresponded with the period up to – but not beyond – early industrial capitalism, 
when welfare provision was limited. Over time, welfare administration appears to have taken 
over from coercion as the main mechanism through which to encourage the fixity of labour. 
Therefore we can conclude that his model offers a useful systemic view of capital’s 
contradictory interest around the spatiality of labour in the general sense, but not a 
convincing view of the political rationale behind immigration controls. 
 
State versus capital as the key to the irregularity paradox 
 
Some Marxian writers, including Harvey in his later works, have suggested that tensions and 
policy gaps such as undocumented migration are the product of a disjuncture between the 
state and capital (or fractions of capital). Cohen does this by equating the state with 
(national) capital as a whole – repeating Marx’s oft-repeated line that the state is “a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Cohen, 1987: 145). 
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For Cohen thus, “the state is charged with the responsibility of enforcing or relaxing border 
controls in the interests of the dominant classes as a whole” (ibid: 175). With regards to the 
immigration field this leads to disputes with employers, policy u-turns, or a failure to enforce. 
Specifically he reasons that the fact,  
  
“sectoral interests of many employers do not correspond with the hegemonic and 
collective interests of their class … leads to constant wars of attrition between state 
and sectional employer interests over the question of illegal immigration. Now a blind 
eye is cast in the direction of agribusiness, now a threatening gesture to fine 
employers of illegal workers is made” (ibid: 175). 
 
He describes the conflict between the state (or dominant classes as a whole) and 
agribusiness – an example of a sector requiring cheap coerced labour – in Gramscian terms 
as a “subdued war of position” which “illegal workers” can take advantage of “with the 
effective connivance of employers” to prevent enforcement of controls (ibid: 175 & 176).  
 The description of the state-fraction dynamics is recognisable (particularly in relation 
to events concerning Spain’s agricultural sector – see 1.2.1 and 5.2.2.1), and it has the 
advantage of incorporating into the equation migrant subjectivity – an issue developed 
further at the end of this chapter. However, Cohen’s concept of the state is an unsatisfactory 
simplification. Marx used the bourgeois “committee” description of the state specifically to 
polemicize in his pamphlet against those that argued that the state expresses everyone’s 
interests (Harvey, 2007: 290). His more developed ideas on the capitalist state treated it as 
being an alienated form of (capitalist) social relations that had the specific task of managing 
and arbitrating between competing capitals and individuals. The state also carries out a 
series of functions necessary “for capitalism to reproduce itself as a dynamic system”, which 
the socially produced competitive mind-set of individual capitalists would prevent this group 
from performing (ibid).  
To achieve its purposes the state exercises a “monopoly of the legitimate forms of 
violence”, legal and monetary sovereignty, the power to tax and redistribute resources, acts 
as regulatory authority over institutions and private property, and performs governance and 
administration that “at the very minimum address the collective needs of both capital and, 
more diffusely, the state’s citizens” (2014: 155). To act in such a way the capitalist state is 
necessarily relatively autonomous from large property owners and thus able to be a major 
social actor in its own right – a feature not the case for states in previous societies not 
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fundamentally shaped by productive competition. (See 3.2 for a full examination.) Therefore 
the conceptualisation of the state applied by Cohen (and some other Marxist writers) can be 
interpreted as being shaped by an economically reductionist reading of Marx (Cohen, 1987: 
145). 
 This critique would no doubt be shared by Harvey, who developed a useful more-
sophisticated analysis of the capitalist state in 2001 – aspects of which are incorporated in 
an analysis of the topic in 3.2 (2007: 290-298). In more recent writing Harvey has suggested 
that “[t]he logic that attaches to the territoriality of state power is very different from the logic 
of capital” clarifying that “[t]he state is, among other things, interested in the accumulation of 
wealth and power on a territorial basis” (2014: 156 & 157; 2003). He identifies the clash 
between “fixity (the state) and motion (capital)” as one of “the seventeen contradictions of 
capitalism” and as having created discomfort and conflict in immigration policies (ibid: 155). 
He firstly contrasts the (historically delimited) mobility of both capital and labour with the 
state as “a bounded territorial entity formed under conditions that had little to do with capital” 
– referring to states in earlier class societies (Harvey, 2007; 2014: 155). “[The territoriality of 
state power” means for Harvey, “the interests of the capitalist state are not the same as 
those of capital” (2014: 156). 
Secondly the state is treated as sub-divided into different public institutions and as 
subject to different societal pressures (Harvey, 2014: 155 & 156). “Capital is not the only 
interest to which the state must respond and the pressures upon it come from a variety of 
interests” (ibid: 156). The state,  
 
broadly follows pro-business policies, albeit tempered by ruling ideologies and the 
innumerable and divergent social pressure mobilised through the organisation of its 
citizens. But it also seeks to rationalise and use the forces of capital to support its 
own powers of governmentality over potentially restive populations, all the while 
enhancing its own wealth, power and standing within a highly competitive interstate 
system. This rationality contrasts with that of capital, which is primarily concerned 
with the private appropriation of accumulation of social wealth. The constructed 
loyalty of citizens to their states conflicts in principle with capital’s singular loyalty to 
making money and nothing else (Harvey, 2014). 
 
In this dense description Harvey implies that governance relies on states obtaining loyalty 
from their respective population – an idea overlapping with Boswell’s theorisation (2.2.2). 
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Such an objective is satisfied through granting civil improvements or “constructed” through 
notions of national belonging (as “citizens”). In order for citizenship to have (perceived) 
meaning, non-citizens must be identified and excluded. He reasons,  
 
Among [the nation state´s] sovereign powers perhaps the most important is defining 
and conferring the rights of citizenship under the law under its inhabitants and 
thereby introducing the category of illegal alien or ‘sans papiers’ into the equation. 
This creates a separate population vulnerable to unthinkable and unrestricted 
exploitation by capital (ibid: 155 & 156) 
 
He adds that the fact, “[t]he two spatialities of state and capital sit awkwardly with and 
frequently contradict each other … is very clear in the case … of migration policies” (155 & 
156). 
Harvey here approaches the state as a living breathing three-dimensional organism, 
introducing many of its multiple functions and avoiding economism. In this regard arguably 
his later writing develops greatly his earlier analysis of the spatial nature of immigration 
paradoxes. By incorporating a variety of Marx’s observations on the state, Harvey provides a 
useful starting point to overcome any tendency to analyse the politics of immigration purely 
as a mechanical reflex of its economic dimensions, while avoiding the opposite error of 
making dematerialised or formalistic political analyses. He identifies the influence of social, 
political and ideological pressures on states, helping avoid “dead” political economy. 
Nevertheless, there are several limitations to his analysis. Firstly his view that the 
formation of the contemporary state has pre-capitalist roots is problematic. While the 
contemporary state was often built using structures developed before the generalisation of 
competitive industrial production or manufacture, its (imperfect) autonomy from the 
propertied classes represents a break from earlier state formations (including in the 
“modern” era). Its “political” or thoroughly legal nature was forged only through terminating 
the absolutist state through revolution or reform from above (3.2). Arguably if certain features 
of the capitalist state existed in the previous Absolutist period of history this was because 
mercantilism was already reshaping society towards commodity production, creating social 
and political impacts that began to transform the state (ibid). 
A second problem is exaggerating the contrast between “fixed” state and “mobile” 
capital dynamics. Firstly, states are not necessarily mobile. When capitalism was mostly 
limited to the European continent, its states were very proactive in annexing or colonising 
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territories in what is now known as the Global South. If the dominant states have ceased to 
play such a role it is likely mainly due to the globalisation of the competitive state system. In 
other words, it is not that states choose to be fixed, but that other states contain their 
mobility. In the last century there have been many changes to borders due to internal or 
external state conflict. Likewise, much activity by firms is relatively immobile, including in the 
sectors of services, transportation, construction, heavy industry and high-tech production. 
Indeed to a large degree labour migration continues to be important to developed countries 
because the fixity of much economic activity prevents any outwards (capital) spatial fix. 
 
Dale’s alternative development 
 
Despite Harvey’s influence on his writing, Dale develops a theorisation of the relationship 
between capitalism and migrant labour that rejects attempts at contrasting the (universalising 
and internationalising) logic of capitalist civil society (and human-rights regimes) and the 
(static and particularist) drive of the nation state (1999). Within this endeavour he – 
sometimes tacitly – offers a rationale for migratory paradoxes – despite this not being a 
stated objective of his study.  
 Dale treats the state and capital as sharing “an underlying unity” (Meillassoux in 
Dale, 1999: 287), with states being “less the antagonists of capital relations than forces vital 
to their emergence and continuity”. As well as playing a crucial part in the foundation and 
internationalisation of generalised commodity production (through expropriating land from 
the English peasantry to colonising the South), states had to protect very uneven property 
rights (Dale, 1999: 285 & 286). This necessitated exercising coercion and management of 
society, which led to the development of the state as “unitary authority” (Kay & Mott in Dale, 
1999: 284): 
 
[A]bove all the constitution and arbitration of contracts and the enforcement of 
exclusion (right), require a segment of society to be ‘separated out to act as the 
universal force that objectifies all particular rights.’ (ibid: 283 & 284.) 
 
It is thus understood that the differing societal roles of states and private capital could be 
understood to be no more than a division of labour (and costs, Dale, 1999: 287). Specifically 
States’ act as “farmers of surplus extraction”, which requires states “to intervene in, 
consolidate, and perpetually remould social relations in the interests of capitalist 
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development” – in other words being a central actor in economic development (ibid: 288). 
Dale warns of the mistake of contrasting political and economic institutions in relation to 
labour management, maintaining, “both states and capitals … stand against wage labour ‘as 
the alienated from of its own powers’” (ibid). 
 Rather than the internationalisation of the capitalist mode of production being a 
process that has weakened the nation state, it is a process that has developed parallel to the 
globalisation of the state system. International economic flows have been made possible 
precisely due to the international spread of “the political state” and associated “all-
encompassing” legal and bureaucratic systems for capital investments (ibid: 305 & 306). “To 
command and exploit productive labour (and natural resources) located under the 
jurisdiction of another state” would have been “unthinkable under feudalism” (Rosenberg in 
Dale, 1999: 306). States are willing to provide this support because they depend on 
international economic flows and must transgress their own borders (Dale, 1999: 306 & 
307). This would account for both international financial and productive investments and 
migrant labour “flows”. 
 Yet a contradiction emerges. The state is also a nation-state developed with 
mercantile and productive capitalism from the late 18th Century onwards as an ideal vehicle 
for managing and controlling capitalist society. In order to carry out its many functions it 
imposed “a unitary fiscal, monetary, judicial, legislative, military and cultural system on its 
citizens”, requiring attaining legitimacy from the national population – conceived as the 
state’s “citizens” (Tilly in Dale, 1999: 305). This is achieved by a related combination of 
conferring people with (full) legal and (limited) social rights, and through the imagining of 
belonging to a national “community” (Dale, 1999: 303). In all cases inclusion was clearly 
circumscribed to those the state recognised as “national citizens”, (ibid: 305). Sometimes 
citizens’ rights could be enjoyed and deepened by individuals and workers’ organisations 
(ibid: 300). On the other hand, they serve the capitalist state as “the juridical clothing of the 
very relations of exploitation and domination that suppress and deny workers’ real 
subjectivity” (ibid). In particular abstract freedoms and equalities could be subverted by 
concrete social inequalities and other realities (ibid). In this regard, according to Barker, 
citizenship and civil rights could be seen “not as universal goods but in practice the property 
of states” (in Dale, 1999: 302). Relatedly “territory” became “spatial property; thus, like the 
fences around private property state boundaries are jealously guarded ‘and maintained by 
force and the threat of force’ (Barker in Dale, 1999: 284). Therefore “[f]rontier posts, 
immigration officials, passports, import regulations, tariffs and so forth are all manifest 
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aspects of private property – and of the processes of exclusion which Marx examined at their 
most fundamental level in his consideration of the ´commodity form’” (ibid: 285). 
 Dale acknowledges how restriction of immigration was used by states to encourage 
“drawing lines of demarcation” among workers and thus discouraging alternative (class) 
forms of identification to that of the nation (Dale, 1999: 309).  As an example, widespread 
controls were introduced in Britain in response to the New Unionism of the turn of the 19th-
20th Century, a movement that united Irish labourers with their British counterparts (ibid: 
304). Furthermore, with the erosion of the “social contract” in the neoliberal period, symbolic 
exclusion and inclusion in “the nation” is emphasised more (ibid: 308). Yet he insists that 
“[t]he soil in which modern prejudice and institutional discrimination grow is deeper” than 
Machiavellian “divide and rule”, and that it is “produced by the dynamics of capitalism 
considered as a totality” (ibid: 309). 
 Critically for the purposes of this study Dale suggests that the desire for cultural 
uniformity required by the nation state collides with the latter’s need to economically break 
through its borders – including by “importing” labour, a disjuncture that may have intensified 
due to greater competition in labour markets in recent decades (ibid: 308). Such a 
contradiction points (timidly) to an alternative reading of the immigration “problem”: one in 
which the root of conflict is internal to the political state itself rather than between state and 
capital – as Harvey and others maintain. This is a plausible advance, yet there are aspects 
in the associated analysis that require development or revision. Although Barker’s 
comparison between the inclusions and exclusions of commodity production and human 
mobility seem valid, can state territory be reduced to being seen as “private property”? If so 
who controls the state and therefore the national space? Does this change with a change of 
government? Is civil society – including the private owners of capital – excluded? … These 
questions require further enquiry into the nature of the nation state and its interrelationship to 
immigration – a task performed in 3.2. 
 
Migrant agency as a source of paradox 
 
Harvey and Dale did not just treat migrant labour as being mere labour power – in other 
words a factor of production. Both writers approached it as a “creative subject” in itself 
(Harvey, 2006: 380). Harvey implies that this may be a further source of tension and 
contradiction within processes. Concretely workers, 
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perpetually roam the world … shunning the worst aspects of exploitation, always 
struggling, often with some success, to better their lot. Capital must necessarily 
accommodate to this process, and to the extent that this is so labourers fashion both 
the history and geography of capitalism (ibid: 380 & 381). 
 
Elsewhere he identifies how the “rights to move” of both capital and labour leads to “curious 
patterns of struggle and compromise over the geographical mobility of labour” (ibid: 385) 
 Dale shares several further precisions regarding migrant-labour subjectivity. First, 
labour power (in general) is a peculiar commodity. In Shortall’s words,  
 
whereas all other commodities appear as objects that are not only alienable but also 
separable from their owners, labour-power, although it is alienable … is inseparable 
from the subjective being of its bearer – the worker (in Dale, 1999: 297). 
 
Dale adds, 
 
“[t]he attributes of energy, cooperation and imagination that are indispensable use 
values to their hirers are simultaneously use values to themselves, even enabling 
them to organize collectively against – or for – any or all aspects of the social order. 
(1999: 297) 
 
Second, such capacity for subjective creativity means they can (and do) both resist 
exploitation in situ and move to escape from bad examples of such (“depradations”, ibid: 
298). Indeed the migratory act itself “tends to reflect and reinforce an upward drift of workers’ 
needs and aspirations” (Harvey in Dale, 1999: 298). Yet a third feature identified is that 
population movement can also be “sticky” because of the financial and psychological costs 
of migration. “Networks of solidarity” (for example kinship and friendship networks) can 
discourage fixity even when this is not economically rational, but also encourage “chain 
migration” (sometimes unwanted by states, Dale, 1999: 298). Lastly because of disjuncture 
between migrant desires and immigration and employment restrictions, migrants can choose 
to act “illegally” (ibid). 
 Once again, Marx’s ideas as revised by Harvey and developed by Dale offer a useful 
basis for understanding the contested nature of immigration. However, their inferences and 
conclusions require “following through”. Moreover, to fully understand state and capital’s 
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attitudes towards immigration, it is necessary to approach the latter not just as a labour 
phenomenon: much immigration is driven by war or political persecution, and many of the 
controversies over immigration are in relation to asylum seekers and other migrants that are 
understood to “not be contributing to the economy” – regardless of whether they are subject 
to impediments from doing so and even whether such an idea is true. 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The review of literature related to immigration contradictions presented has travelled some 
distance in answering the research sub-questions presented in 1.4. The attempts to account 
for policy gaps or tensions through analyses focusing on (or even limited to) economic and 
labour-market dynamics clearly have limitations (sub-question 1). In his early (but still often 
cited) analysis on capital’s interest in both mobility and immobility Harvey fails to account for 
state restriction of immigration. Scholarship by Ferguson & McNally and others that 
fundamentally interprets controls to be a mainly policy to condition labour processes in the 
interests of employers offers little explanation for inconsistencies: evidence of employer 
support for regularisation processes; reduced governance and state revenues; limits to the 
relative weight of the informal economy in national economies; and variance in irregular 
employment and tolerance of such in terms of country and historical period. This means that 
the position that employers’ benefitting from coerced foreign labour is the fundamental 
driving force of policy gaps probably can be rejected, even if there is a strong case that 
irregularity is politically tolerated for the same reason. Before concluding decisively that 
paradoxes cannot be conceived purely in terms of economic processes, we must factor in 
the economics of the state – carried out in 3.1.4.  
General analyses of the migration issue and its contradictions that incorporate 
political dynamics as well as economic are generally more successful – although some more 
than others. Boswell’s account of the contrasting ways by which states seek to maintain 
legitimacy in relation to immigration offers interesting insights but is weakened by not 
explaining why (and for what) states require having legitimacy (or exercising hegemony – to 
use the Gramscian term), nor how exactly they achieve this through immigration policy. The 
latter aspect will be examined in 3.2.  
Those emphasising how liberal migratory tendencies emerge from existing 
constitutional, institutional, bureaucratic and ideological frameworks can point to real 
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examples in which these are employed against restrictive measures (2.1.2). However, critics 
rightly point out that this is not automatic, and that state bureaucracies cannot be assumed 
to be neutral in conflicts (2.1.2.2). Furthermore, too often it is assumed that exclusionary 
tendencies are driven by voters’ influence over the state, rather than a more complex and 
frequently top-to-bottom political process (in which the state can play a formative role). This 
warns against over-determining electoral politics to elite interests (political economy) – a 
partial response to sub-question three of the thesis (1.4). On the other hand, Harvey more 
convincingly posits that the state is influenced by “civil” and “social” organisation (interpreted 
as meaning parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity”) – an issue returned to in the 
empirical Chapters Six and Seven.  
With regards to the second sub-question, Hampshire and Dale give importance to 
nationalism as a shaper of immigration processes – concretely acting against capital’s 
interest in labour mobility. Yet the former scholar is unconvincing when treating nationalism 
as having separate dynamics from “capitalism” (something that overlaps with Harvey’s more 
nuanced later writing on the territorial and capital logics that collide of migration). Dale treats 
it as having a role in maintaining the long-term stability of capitalism, including through 
dividing “native” workers from Others and reducing common class identifications. 
Accordingly he locates the underlying paradox shaping immigration politics as being in the 
state itself – rather than in any particular institutional and political form of such (for instance 
the liberal state, as Hampshire and other authors suggest). Concretely Dale maintains that 
states must simultaneously break through their borders and enforce them: to ensure fixity of 
the existing labour force, preserve uniform national culture, and reinforce a sense of citizen’s 
privilege. This offers a useful starting point that shall be developed in the following chapter. 
His and Harvey’s functional but abstract accounts will be developed and extended by means 
of historical and general political analysis in Chapter 3.  
A fourth question posed was regarding the impact of multi-level policymaking on 
paradoxes. The review of the globalist and global-rights regime literature suggests that 
international or regional agreements and bodies can act (or be used in the domestic sphere) 
against national-protectionist state tendencies. However, the examination suggests that 
globalisation (or regionalisation) has been much more limited in promoting liberalising 
human mobility than capital mobility. Consequently the clash between international and 
national policy and law is of limited explanatory power in relation to migratory paradoxes. 
Even in the most advanced case of inter-state alliance and institutionalisation – the 
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European Union – states still play a key role in articulating, enforcing and blocking 
continental policy and law. This issue shall be developed more carefully in 5.1. 
 
                                                        
1
 “It is through the cut and thrust of democratic politics that public perceptions of immigration are 
shaped, party strategies forged and government policies made.” Mass media act as form “in which the 
political agenda is set and policy issues framed” (Hampshire, 2013: 6) 
2
 Hollifield’s petition was in fact foreshadowed by Miles in 1993 (see 5.4.2). 
3
 Economic logics are examined in 4.1 and 4.2. 
4
 He adds (equally disgracefully) that “Castro also included [among those emigrated to the US] some 
criminals and mentally retarded people” (Huntington, 2005: 251-252) 
5
 Earlier immigration procedures were frequently racialised, and not only in the obvious countries and 
ways. An example is the US´s Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and Immigration Act of 1924, which 
attempted “to preserve the ideal of US homogeneity” (http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-
1936/immigration-act) 
6
 It has been said that Milton Friedman – the best-known of such (neo-classical) economists – gave 
the advice “about immigration the less said the better” which, if true, would further reinforce the main 
argument made here (in Sutcliffe, 1998: 327). 
7
 The guestworker system had was first introduced operated in Germany prior to this: from  1870-1 to 
politically manage the large-scale recruitment of Slavic labourers in the new pan-German state 
(Reich) in 1870-1, applied “blood-based” citizenship to “ethnic Germans” (including those living 
abroad, such as the East Germans that migrated west en-masse before and during reunification) and 
tight employer-state-management of all other immigration as temporary and unworthy of settlement. , 
(Dale, 1999a: 118-121, 131.)  
8
 A comparable internationalisation of the economy took place in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 Centuries 
before a process of reversal – beginning in the First World War (Helleiner, 2014: 174 & 175) 
9
 Accessed 30 April 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11027288 
10
 Accessed 30 April 2015, http://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/Intentar-hacer-legal-
ilegal_0_370963254.html 
11
 De Lucas uses the term “santo y seña”, which, as well as “shibboleth”, can be translated as 
“watchword”. Similar to him, Anderson describes “anxiety over immigration” in contemporary Britain as 
“standing for … many other things” including “globalisation” (Anderson, 2015). 
12 This is in contrast to “good flows” for which borders are dismantled (including, he cites, capital – 
particularly speculative, intellectual property, skilled or “niche” workers, and Western cultural values, 
De Lucas, 2013: 213 
13
 This was part of a “Temporary Foreign Worker Program” (Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 6 & 7) 
14
 At the same time it also may reduce pressures on wages to rise by increasing labour supply, which 
can have a depressive effect on general prices.  
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15
 Deaths were due to crossing desert or fast-flowing rivers, as well as possibly due to shootings by 
US troops (Marfleet, 2006: 172) 
16
 The ex-president of a local Chamber of Commerce (Marx, 1990: 720) 
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Chapter Three 
 
The immigration “problem”: an alternative framework 
 
Dale’s reflection – outlined in the previous chapter, on how immigration is viewed according 
to the contradictory internationalising and nationalising tendencies of states shall be 
developed further in this chapter. This will be done by taking an in-depth look firstly at the 
economics of immigration: on the rise of and limits to labour mobility under modernity, its 
exact relationship with what Marx identified as the “reserve army of labour”, and the ways 
migration is perceived from the perspective of “social reproduction” – concretely the systemic 
requirement for the generational and daily reproduction of labour power and the economics 
of the welfare state.  
Secondly, it shall attempt to develop the examination into the relationship between 
immigration and the complexities of modern statehood begun in 2.1.2 by providing a 
theoretically informed historical perspective to the politics of migration. The second sub-
section briefly charts the changing relation between the state, territoriality and population 
from the late Middle Ages – partly aimed at clarifying whether the contemporary state acts 
according to a territorial logic that predates capitalism and collides with its logic (as Harvey, 
Joppke and others claim). This looks at the way the notions of subject/citizen and foreigner 
developed – particularly after the French and industrial revolutions. It does not aim to be an 
exhaustive historical narrative but provide an extra analytical dimension to develop more 
robust theory. The chapter ends with an examination of the relevance of Marx, Gramsci and 
Miliband’s writings on the state and institutional politics to help ground the migration issue in 
its material and immaterial frameworks.  
 There are two observations to be made about the whole chapter. First, its strong 
historical component is of benefit because, as Bridget Anderson advocates,  
 
“[t]hinking historically encourages us to link migration to other social and economic 
processes –to the extent that we often stop thinking of it as ‘migration’ at all. 
(Anderson, 2013: 12.) 
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The broadening of perspective she describes is useful as it facilitates looking at processes 
with a certain distance and helping avoid the highly charged nature of much discussion on 
the topic.  
 Second, the chapter relies to a considerable degree on Marxist writing (both in 
relation to immigration and states, nation and nationalism). It does this critically and in the 
spirit of Marxist feminist Cinzia Arruzza´s ontological proposal: 
 
to consider capitalism not as a set of purely economic laws, but rather as a complex 
and articulated social order, an order that at its core consists of relations of 
exploitation, domination, and alienation. (2014.)  
 
She clarifies that this means treating the economic workings of capitalism as being the 
“driving force or motor of capitalism” but not, 
 
everything that needs to be said about capitalism; this would be analogous to 
thinking that the explanation of the anatomy of the heart and its functions would 
suffice to explain the whole anatomy of the human body. (Ibid.) 
  
At the same time she recognises that “understanding what its heart is and how it works is a 
fundamental analytic necessity”. (Ibid.)  
 In accordance with such an approach – and encouraged by academic specialisation 
that produces separate economic and political studies on migration –this chapter begins by 
looking at the economic dynamics behind immigration paradoxes but then broadens the 
investigation to incorporate political aspects – centring on the relationship between the state 
problematisation (and regulation) of immigration and the modern state system (particularly in 
its capitalist phase). Most importantly the concluding section of this chapter (3.3) integrates 
findings from both to produce an initial holistic framework that can be tested.  
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3.1 The economics of the immigration issue 
 
3.1.1 Territorial freeing of labour in the age of revolution and capital 
 
Before the French Republic was created in 1789 nowhere were the poor deemed as having 
ownership of their own person. For example, in medieval England and Wales the majority of 
the population were treated as “tied to the land” and therefore to the landowning lord. Anti-
vagrancy legislation introduced in the Fourteenth Century and hardened in the Tudor Period 
(1485-1603) meant that travellers without “master testimonials” were treated as “runaways” 
and punishable (even by death until 1597; Anderson, 2013: 13-27). “Draconian” poor laws 
forced displaced farmers and artisans into workhouses and poorhouses (Castles & Miller, 
2003: 56). From the late Sixteenth Century the “unsettled” poor also were excluded from 
relief in the parishes – partly to deny them access to local “common land”. Being considered 
“settled” required marriage, a certain length of residency or seasonal work, or satisfying 
other conditions – requirements that are somewhat similar to those applied in modern 
residence and naturalisation processes (ibid; Harman, 2009: 39, 175). Geographical 
displacement was thus equated with social disorder – as also occurs today. 
Despite these similarities, there were important differences too. Generally legal and 
administrative distinctions were not made between the “subjects” and “aliens” of a country 
(with the partial exception of property law) and international migration was not problematized 
like it is today (Castles & Miller, 2003: chapter 3). It was only later (in the early twentieth 
century) that usage of passports became generalised along with immigration controls (ibid; 
Anderson, 2013: 21, 22 & 29).  
With the birth of capitalist society in Europe local fetters on the mobility of the poor 
were dismantled. The new liberal framework, as paraphrased by Harvey, would be of,  
 
the freedom of the labourer to sell his or her labour power whenever, wherever, for 
whatever purpose and to whomsoever he or she pleases (Harvey, 2006: 380 & 1; 
2.2.3.3). 
 
Enlightenment political economists such as Adam Smith maintained that the new capitalist 
production system both was more efficient and freed humanity from the despotism of 
serfdom and slavery (Smith, 2010). It was this that led to Marx’s view that (fundamentally 
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speaking) labour had only become as free as “variable capital” (because it had no means by 
which to renounce labouring for the whole class of capitalists; 2.2.3.3).  
The freeing of labour from land and property was led by the state. It held mass 
clearances of common land after the English Revolution (1649-1660). These “enclosures”,  
 
cleared the ground for capitalist agriculture, made the land part and parcel of capital, 
while providing the needs of urban industry and the requisite supplies of masterless 
proletarians. (Marx in Marfleet, 2006: 57.) 
  
In practical terms, by the late 18th Century many rural communities had become landless 
and immiserated and were compelled to migrate to work in the towns and cities. The working 
class was formed as “great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means 
of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour-market as free, unprotected and unattached 
proletarians” (Marx in Cohen, 2006: 13.) Indeed the peaking of the industrialisation process 
(1750-1815) coincided with the highest rates of enclosures (1760-1832, Thompson in 
Harman, 2002: 318-9).  
 Yet the process to arrive at industrialisation was gradual: first passing through stages 
of craft production and then manufacture. Migration was stimulated by the “specialisation of 
territories” that developed under manufacturing (and that created a “cleavage” between town 
and countryside; De Gaudemar, 1979: chapter 5). It was also stimulated by the constant 
reconfiguration of production – destroying firms and whole trades and creating new ones in 
their place – and by a general tendency to produce unemployment even in periods of 
growth:    
 
“it is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in 
direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working 
population, i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital’s average requirements 
for its own valorization”.  (Marx, 1990: 782).  
 
Marx adds here that the role of labour in the “accumulation of capital and the means by 
which it is itself made relatively surplus” indicates a “law of population peculiar to the 
capitalist mode of production” (ibid: 783 & 784). 
Even after the consolidation of manufacture (but before the introduction of modern 
industry), enterprises had “yet to monopolise all of the labour supply” and were “forced by 
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workers’ constant immigration and emigration to pick up its headquarters from one country 
and put them in another.”1 (Marx in De Gaudemar, 1979: 162.) This stands in contrast with 
the period since the generalisation of plant-based heavy industry, in which labour shortfall 
has been met by labour mobility of different kinds: hiring people from other regions nationally 
or abroad, or multinational firms relocating their own employees. Increased need for mobility 
was further encouraged by the related creation of “shift-work” (temporal mobility) and 
introduction of more skilled work (requiring better educated workers). Together these factors 
led to a greater urbanisation of society, rather than a dispersion of production and population 
in the countryside (De Guademar, 1979: 165).  
Similarly in the rest of Europe a consensus was forged for what was considered 
“surplus population … to be torn away from their roots and … migrate to the towns where 
their muscles were increasingly needed” (Hobsbawm in Marfleet, 2006: 57-8). Land reforms 
of the kind described had spread across western and northern Europe by the early 19th 
Century. In another thirty years they would extend across eastern and southern Europe. 
Related but more extreme forms of land dispossession and legal discriminations too place in 
the colonies of European states (Miles & Brown, 2003: chapter 5) 
As a result of these transformations, many millions of people had to seek new lives in 
the cities. Alongside the economic turbulence accompanying the historically novel mode of 
production, it was a factor that encouraged further millions (including a quarter of the 
European population) to migrate to the “settler” countries of the Americas and Australasia – 
helping generate new dynamic poles of industrial development (most notably in North 
America; Marfleet, 2006: 58 & 66; Hobsbawm, 1975: 228 & 236). The result transformed the 
world. 
The processes described in the previous paragraphs can be summarised differently. 
The transformation of production acted centripetally to concentrate settlement around it. 
However the volatility of markets due a rapidly changing economy and society – encouraged 
later by the internationalisation of production and consumption – also led to the widespread 
destruction of specific craft-making, manufacturing and industrial activities. This then set in 
motion centrifugal population movements – including of unemployed workers that emigrated 
to the “new territories” (De Gaudemar, 1979: 176). The combined result was one of historical 
levels of population displacement.  
In short, the historical examination so far confirms Harvey’s observation that capitalist 
development and labour mobility have developed in tandem – shaping each together and 
our modern geographies. De Guademar and Miles go further. The former writer sees labour 
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mobility as a defining feature of the age of capital; and the latter describes it as “a 
constitutive force within and of” capitalism (De Gaudemar, 1979: chapter 5; Miles, 1993: 
112). 
 
 
3.1.2 Coerced labour from periphery to core 
 
In 2.3.2 attempts to understand the irregularity paradox in terms of deliberate attempts to 
create categories of coerced labour were assessed and qualified – leading to the conclusion 
that irregularity is a structural feature of contemporary society. This therefore undermines the 
notion of labour mobility as a constituent feature of industrial (or “post-industrial”) society. 
For Robin Cohen irregular-migrant labour in the core countries proves that in the modern 
world labour has remained both in “free” and “coerced” forms. In the colonies “forms of 
coerced or involuntary labour” were a key component of labour systems: including 
indentured, “mita”2 and penal labour, as well as serfdom, debt bondage, military conscription 
and the punishment of “absenteeism” by ex-slave apprentices (Cohen, 2006: 16-25).  
Cohen notes that although Marx wrote “the capitalist form presupposes from the outset the 
free wage labourer who sells his labour power to capital” he recognised that capitalist labour 
relations were diverse (ibid: 14). For example, the first stage of – primitive – capitalist 
accumulation depended on the labour of the non-free – concretely indigenous and African 
people in the “New World” (ibid). 7.2 million people being transported across the Atlantic 
between 1725 to 18253, and the particularly barbaric social relations of Atlantic slavery were 
driven by the emergence of a competitive global market in trade (ibid: 15 & 16; Banaji, 
2016). Today many millions of workers (mainly in the Global South) are estimated to remain 
enslaved (a total of twenty seven million according to a 2004 study, Shelley, 2007: 7). For 
Cohen, capitalist societies rely on employing modern-day “Helots” – the group in Ancient 
Greece who were not slaves but were compelled to toil by being denied social and political 
rights (Cohen, 1987: chapter 1). They “do not require free labour or, for that matter, unfree 
labour, but work best through a judicious mix of labour of different statuses”, to which Cohen 
adds, 
  
If we see this from the prism of ‘the logic of capital’, the systematic requirements are 
for a constant new flow of subordinate labour – slave, followed or paralleled by 
indentured, forced, non-citizen, illegal, colonial, ‘Third World’ and former state 
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socialist. As one cohort of helots is exhausted, another is found to take its place. 
(2006: 60.) 
 
The author recognises that “clearly there is a relative concentration of free worker in the 
metropole and unfree workers in the colonial areas”. Yet he denounces as rigid Wallerstein’s 
demarcation between the labour systems of “the centre” – skilled and free – and “periphery” 
– coerced: a division based on the uneven world systems that have continued after 
decolonisation4 (ibid: 17, 25 & 38). According to Cohen, migrant labour is just one of several 
examples of coercion in the advanced states: post-slavery practices of “debt peonage; 
convict and contract labour” in the US; camp labour in the USA; “child slavery”; forced 
migration of Irish labour in Britain; employment of “servants”; and “very localised” forced 
regimes in 19th Century Britain (ibid: 27-9; 1987: chapter 1).  
These are real cases and it is evidently the case that capitalist labour relations can 
include coerced labour. This would be no departure from Marx’s ideas on labour as he 
argued that “free” workers were ultimately forced to work for the capitalist class due to their 
lack of property – a form of compulsion. Yet it appears that the legal subjugation of 
significant sections of migrant labour is the one substantial example of legally conditioned 
employment that has persisted in the developed world over the many decades. Moreover 
many of the instances of core coercion provided by Cohen are historically limited to the early 
industrial period. Modern forms of forced labour – also including camp labour in “Socialist” 
regimes and trafficking of sex workers – tend to be in some way associated to the 
underdevelopment that frequently overlaps with cartographies of colonialism (2006: 35-7). 
Therefore it is most likely that Cohen is over-stating his case against Wallerstein. The 
interesting question that remains is why immigration is an exception to unfettered mobility. 
 
 
3.1.3 Uses and abuses of characterising migrants as a modern “reserve army 
of labour”  
 
As well as capital’s requirement to fill existing or future labour shortages being a factor 
encouraging labour mobility and migration, it is also motivated by mobilising labour that can 
help contain business costs. Many Marxist writers explain how immigration plays this role by 
equating it to Marx’s concept – established in Volume I of Capital – of the “reserve army of 
labour” – or “surplus reserve army” (meaning available excess labour power; Castles & 
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Kosack, 1972; Dale, 1999: 293; Harvey, 2006: 381 & 382; Farris, 2012: 1895; Sivanandan, 
2008: 70; Ferguson & McNally, 2015: 9; Hardy, 2009: 136, 381 & 382). In Spain the 
comparison between migrant labour and reserve army has been made by the big union 
federations and a broad range of migration researchers (Solé & Parella, 2001: 32; Martínez-
Veiga, 2004: 161; Recio, 2008: 59; 4.2.1). In the present sub-section Marx’s original 
approach is outlined, then assessed theoretically and practically using findings from 
international research and that of the present author (1.2.2).  
Karl Marx originally applied the “reserve army” concept to non-employed labour 
available to capital: fundamentally the urban poor that had fled from rural poverty and 
landlessness, or previously had been ejected from manufacturing or industrial employment 
due to the volatility in production outlined in 3.1.1. Marx identified that this “surplus 
population” could act as a “lever on production” in two ways (Marx, 1990: 784). Firstly it 
serves to – in the words of his collaborator Engels – “produce the masses of goods required 
by the market in the liveliest months” and allows expanded hiring in response to cyclical 
economic growth (Castles & Kosack, 1972: 3). Secondly “surplus labour” could be used as 
competitors in the job market and potentially replace workers, which encourages those 
already employed “to submit to over-work” and subject them “to the dictates of capital” 
(Marx, 1990: 789). 
It is this second – disciplining – role of the industrial reserve that normally is 
associated with migrant labour in most contemporary Marxian writing – exceptions being 
Harvey (2006) and Hardy (2006: 381 & 382). Cohen echoes the more dominant trend in the 
literature by affirming that migrant labour acts “as a classical ‘reserve army’” allowing 
existing workers to be “disciplined” and possibly “replaced” (Cohen, 2006: 60). A more 
elaborate example is found in the influential writings of Castles and Kosack in the early 
1970s. Their influential scholarship urged keeping in mind “the capitalist strategy behind 
labour migration” (1972: 21; 1973), which in the period of writing was most concerned with 
the inflationary effect of full-employment policies (if “the reserve army contracts, workers are 
in a better position to demand higher wages. When this happens, profits and capital 
accumulation diminish”, Castles & Kosack, 1972: 4). The writers even suggested that 
industrial cycles were produced mainly because of the size of the immigration-produced 
labour reserve (1972: 4).  
 
Applying the “reserve” concept adequately 
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There are several ways by which Marx’s concept is being employed problematically here. 
Firstly when associating the industrial cycle with immigration Castles and Kosack downplay 
the fact that available surplus labour has other sources such as women not yet integrated 
into the labour market6. Most crucially the reserve army concept is applied in a way that 
crudely ignores the specificity of contexts for which Marx uses his term. The German writer 
referred to “a mass of human material always ready for exploitation by capital” (Marx, 1990: 
784; author’s emphasis). It is possible to find examples of such a process today but limited 
to displacement within state boundaries: such as the case of the 278 million Chinese 
persons that have internally migrated (mainly from rural to urban areas7) to provide continual 
cheap labour8.  
 Yet there are differences with international migration. Writing in 1973, Marshall 
indicates, 
 
the immigration of the workforce to advanced countries has a special character 
especially as it does not play the typical role of the latent reserve of labour; today, 
most if not all immigrants from underdeveloped countries … are incorporated straight 
into work and do not join unemployed native workers (especially since restrictions to 
immigration have been imposed) (in Martínez-Veiga, 2004: 709). 
  
Formal and informal migration in response to employment opportunities may help “exert 
pressure on wage growth” – or more exactly discourage increases associated with low 
unemployment (Marshall in Martínez-Veiga, 2004: 70 & 71). But arguably there is less 
likelihood that it would act to lower wages – making it different from the urban poor in large 
urban conglomerations in the Global South. This is because immigration is less likely to take 
place – particularly if unauthorised – if possible economic opportunities cannot be 
ascertained by the person considering migrating. (Even much forced migration – where 
“push” factors likely predominate over “pull” factors when deciding to migrate – aims at 
settling in economically and politically secure countries.) Edwards maintains that migration 
generates “highly visible pools of surplus labour” but this is certainly not the generally picture 
and not of a comparable level to Nineteenth Century Britain or contemporary China (Scott, 
2013: 6). People also demonstrate a resistance to leave their home and kinship networks 
(Hayter, 2004: 153. This has meant that displacement between countries has sometimes 
been relatively limited between countries with very divergent socio-economic levels in the 
few cases in which citizens’ have a right to circulate between them (for example in the 
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Schengen area of Europe or between the US and several Caribbean countries in the post-
war period10; ibid; Sutcliffe, 1998). 
 In short, the labour reserve idea is often used as if there were no system of state 
restrictions on mobility being applied in practice and people did not resist having to leave 
their country for another. This means that the comparison between migrants and the surplus 
reserve requires substantial qualification and simple equating of the two should be rejected. 
It can be agreed that there is some significant or sometimes substantial overlap between 
migrants and the reserve army but they are not commensurable. In Marx’s writing, there 
were frequent references to Irish migrants, who made up a considerable section of the urban 
poor in mid 19h Century Britain but Marx did not confuse the two11. One possible reason for 
this may have been that – like many migrants today – much of the Irish were brought over to 
be incorporated directly into work – becoming “regular army of labour” as opposed to 
“surplus”. The above discussion signals the need to treat migrant labour as being its own 
category of labour which is received according to specific considerations that go beyond 
those of the reserve army. 
 
 
3.1.4 Migrant labour from the viewpoint of social reproduction  
 
Until now the economic analysis has centred on the relationship between migrants and 
production (whether material and immaterial). However, as Harvey introduced into the 
discussion in 2.2.3.3, the functioning of the productive system rests on a diverse array of 
human activities being able to reproduce labour power (or “the aggregate of those mental 
and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he 
produces a use-value of any description”, Barrett in Vogel, 2014: 143). Practically speaking, 
as Marxist feminists have analysed, this involves “the maintenance and reproduction of life, 
at the daily or generational level” and takes place mainly through unpaid labour in the home 
and sometimes through private and public hiring (Arruzza, 2014). This sub-section looks at 
how the how immigration is inserted in relation to social-reproduction processes. 
 
 
3.1.4.1 Free or cheaper social reproduction 
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A first consideration is that the state (and those that pay taxes to the state) normally invest 
heavily in the generational reproduction of labour power (as well as the wider administration 
of “its” population. Indeed, as Harvey and Dale identify, this a major role of the capitalist 
state (2.2.3.3). Yet migrants are most frequently able-bodied adults whose reproduction 
(birth, subsistence, healthcare and education) was provided in their state of origin (through 
state provision as well as unpaid labour in the home and workplace labour paid by local 
employers; Vogel, 2014). This means that migrant labour allows recipient societies to 
“externalise the renewal costs of labour” (Hardy et al., 2014: 6). The state gains additional 
benefits if migrants arrive with work experience and/or training skills – as is frequently the 
case. 
Consequently, writing in 1970s Britain, Ambalavaner Sivanandan described the 
migrant thus, 
 
“He himself had cost the country nothing. He had been paid for by the country of his 
origin, reared and raised, as capitalist under-development had willed it, for the labour 
markets of Europe. If anything he represented a saving for Britain of all the expense 
involved in feeding and clothing and housing him til he had come of working age.” 
(2008: 67 & 68) 
 
In purely economic terms accessing labour power from abroad is very advantageous to a 
state. A calculation by Gorz in the same period found each worker had saved the state 
thousands of pounds (ibid: 68). Immigration also reduces states’ organisational 
responsibilities during many years of the migrant workers’ life. Altogether this means that 
states gain direct benefits greatly from immigration (and firms and taxpayers indirectly 
benefit also). 
Ferguson and McNally suggest that migration itself can further encourage the 
reproduction-migration process and benefits for developed states. Concretely the authors 
cite Mexican emigration in Canada and the US as encouraging future processes by which 
the richer two states’ can gain direct access to additional reserves of generationally 
reproduced labour. This is made possible by the remittances adult migrants send back to 
family members remaining in their country of origin, helping reproduce a generation that 
often follows family members to join their kin working in the North: thereby providing new 
sources of reproduced labour power12. 
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 A second aspect is that migrants are increasingly playing a role in social-reproduction 
markets – sometimes organised through international recruitment channels. This work 
includes for non-migrant families as part of a process of “marketization of so-called 
reproductive labour, which is done mainly by migrant women” – the latter group forming 
more than half of all migrants in EU member states13 (World Bank figures in Farris, 2012: 
184 & 189). The importance of the link between migration tendencies and paid 
“reproductive” work is has been identified by Lutz, Sassen and Farris (“[t]he demand for 
labor in this sector has grown so much over the past ten years that it is now regarded as the 
main reason for the feminization of migration”, ibid: 190; Sassen, 1990). Reasons for the link 
between migration and paid “reproductive” work include the willingness to be spatially and 
temporally mobile among new migrants – particularly the undocumented – to perform 
unsociable hours, travel long distances to work, and even work “live in”; and the growth of 
cheap sometimes-residential work due to the large-scale incorporation of women in 
employment (1.2.2). Farris suggests that ethnic-minority or poorer nationality migrant women 
have been seen as the obvious choice to work in this sector for the following reasons: 
 
On the one hand, it follows the rules of gender and the “sexual contract” within the 
household, which establishes that women are still in charge of reproduction and care. 
Further, it follows the rules of the “racial contract,” according to which ethnic 
minorities and people of color perform the least desirable and valued tasks in a 
society. (Farris, 2012: 194). 
 
The same approach is extended to women from countries perceived as having lower status 
(for instance employment of Eastern European domestic labour by German households; 
ibid).  
 By immigration helping lower the time and money spent by “native” families on 
housework and the care of children and the elderly, it has helped allow both parents to work, 
which itself helps reduce inflationary pressures on wages and potentially increases 
competitiveness of firms and the state 14  (Pajares, 2007). Migrants also make up an 
increasing part of the workforce performing care-work in public and private health and care 
centres (Hardy et al., 2014). 
 The competitive drive between states as well as between firms and even individuals 
means that the desire to cheapen or obtain for free the generational and daily reproduction 
of labour power is arguably as much a systemic financial consideration as lowering capital 
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costs in production. This is particularly the case in an era of neoliberal “competition states” 
(Menz, 2009b: 316-318; see 5.1.3). Arguably states are the main objective beneficiaries of 
migration in relation to social reproduction (although local employers and the rest of civil 
society also benefit). In this area at least it suggests states have an interest in allowing 
migration to take place – particularly if it remains low paid. It is a further reason to reject 
treating immigration paradoxes as a consequence of the clash between state logics and 
capital logics. 
 
 
3.1.4.2 Migration and the welfare contract 
 
Yet there is another way by which the state’s interest in migration becomes qualified. The 
material reproduction and organisational management of capitalist civil society is largely 
carried out by the state – requiring huge economic outputs and inputs – raised mainly 
through taxation of “its” population (representing around 90 per cent of state revenue in 
Spain15). Notwithstanding decades of neoliberal privatisation and outsourcing the state still 
receives revenues of a greater volume than those received by domestic private entities in 
the form of profits, interest and rent (Harman, 2009: 112). This often-ignored economic 
consideration logically would mean states (and less-directly taxpayers) have a objective 
interest in restricting the non-economically active population within the country. In other 
words, there is an economic rationale for states to seek to restrict immigration beyond that of 
labour demand, bearing in mind that access to basic social provision is often or normally 
available to undocumented migrants due to the existence of legally guaranteed and 
popularly imagined human rights (2.1.2).  
 This may partly help illustrate why normative defences of migration controls often 
centre on an appeal to prevent a supposed drain on the welfare state caused by “excess” 
population or – in a more incendiary version – “welfare tourism” by migrants16 (Becker in 
Sutcliffe, 1998: 327). It may also give indications as to why the “economic case for migration” 
tends to wish to reduce migration to labour migration – ignoring relocation by “dependent” 
migrant family members (and refugees). Frequently such entreaties are posed in terms of 
defending the rights of “ordinary taxpayers” (ignoring the fact that it is the wealthiest 
taxpayers that would be most affected by increases in tax liabilities due to broadly 
redistributive nature of tax systems17). An extreme example is the argument by the influential 
migration scholar Borjas that “[w]elfare programs” produce a “strong magnetic effect”, which 
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“combined with an ineffective border control policy, can literally break the bank” (Legrain, 
2006a: 142). He suggests that in the US and other receiver countries this combination could 
lead to “native citizens … subsidizing hundreds of millions of ‘the huddled masses’”.18 (Ibid.) 
 As well the volume of potential migration being discussed here being an 
“exaggeration for effect” (as immigration levels are at far lower levels “even with our current 
leaky borders” – as reminded by Legrain), Borjas admits that despite welfare being “the 
magnetic effect that comes up most often in the immigration debate, it is also the one for 
which there is no empirical support” (ibid: 142 & 143). On the contrary, a range of research 
shows that migrants, who tend to be working-age, make net contributions to the state 
(substantially so in Germany, Australia and the UK 19 ) and have less access to social 
provision than non-migrants – particularly in the US (ibid: 144-148).  
Furthermore, it is very unlikely that the migratory journey is initiated with the purpose 
of ending it as low-income unemployed, particularly as much migration is by individual family 
members aiming to provide financial support for families remaining at home20 (Hayter, 2004: 
153). Lastly there is no reason to assume that migrants are culturally and pyschologically 
attracted to welfare states. Legrain indicates that migrants normally originate from countries 
with minimal welfare systems and are not predisposed to use welfare provision (or have 
what the author describes as “dependency culture”, 2006a; 2006b). The same cannot be 
said for many immigrants from richer countries (including the very many retirees from 
northern European countries living on the Mediterranean coastline) – yet they usually are 
excluded from debates on immigration and policy (including in relation to public services)21. 
Migrants have often travelled long routes overcoming many barriers and thus tend to be self-
reliant and self-motivated individuals (including the entrepreneurially-minded; ibid; Legrain, 
2006b).  
Evidence from Spain suggests a similar pattern. In 2008 prime-minister Zapatero’s 
economic bureau found that immigrants benefitted from 5.4 per cent of public expenditure 
despite being a substantially higher percentage (8.8 per cent) of the total population22. 
Furthermore, due to their very large social-security contributions they provided a net transfer 
to the treasury of 9000 million euros23.  
Recent research had showed that non-EC migrants had an economic “activity rate” 
23 per cent higher than the national average, and were three times less likely to be aged fifty 
or over (Pajares, 2007: 28 & 33). Migrants’ financial contribution may have been a lot larger 
if so many of them had not been compelled to work “illegally” (an irony seemingly overlooked 
by those opposing liberal borders according to the premise of defending the state’s fiscal 
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balance). Yet despite these above realities claims regarding the “burden” of immigration on 
the state was a central plank of the opposition’s general-election campaign that same year, 
which included the claim by a leading PP candidate that casualty departments were being 
“brought to a standstill because immigrants have discovered the wonders of the national 
health system”24.  
The above discussion shows that the objective validity of the view of migration as a 
threat to public provision – common in politics and conservative scholarship internationally – 
is problematic – even highly so. The deduction that immigration over a certain “volume” 
would create material pressures on the state cannot be rejected completely as a factor 
promoting state restriction (and contradicting the institutions’ opposing interest in gaining 
access to new socially-reproduced labour). However, two further conclusions must be 
signalled. First, the evidence suggests that it is the state and the wealthier layers of society 
that have the greater objective motivation to avoid fiscal deterioration due to high 
demographic growth – not the bulk of citizens. This requires further rethinking of the idea 
that electorates naturally would push restrictive agendas on elites. 
Second, the limited material basis for welfare spending helping discourage 
liberalisation of migration is predicated on the idea that any additional immigration would be 
unauthorised – as Borjas reveals by assuming that his hypothesised increase in migration 
would take place through “ineffective” borders. But it is precisely when people are compelled 
to reside and work clandestinely that fiscal revenues and governance declines. This means 
that in practice greater restriction of migration likely would be self-defeating – although it 
cannot be assumed that in this regard policymakers and their advisors are guided mainly by 
economic rationality. As Dale helped identify (in 2.2.3.3), “protecting” the welfare state 
against the “unentitled” is also a defence of the national social and legal contract and 
imagined community. At this point it is necessary to turn back to politics.  
 
 
3.2 The politics of immigration 
 
In order to pinpoint the exact relationship between capitalism and the problematisation of 
immigration it is useful to examine both the changing attitudes of states to territory, 
population and Others (particularly those crossing state borders) as capitalism was 
introduced and developed, as well as incorporate a more grounded theory of the state and 
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political craft into the analysis developed thus far. These are the tasks attempted in the rest 
of the present chapter.  
 
 
3.2.1 Early Modern imagining and making of a people 
 
In the Middle Ages there was little interrelationship between central authorities and the 
monarch’s “subjects”. The modern “nation” assumed to be such a natural feature of human 
identity did not exist as it does today. As Chris Harman describes, 
 
“The monarchies of medieval Europe … were hodgepodge territories which cut 
across linguistic divisions between peoples … There could be a wholesale movement 
of state boundaries, as marriages and inheritance gave kings sovereignty over 
distant lands or war robbed them of local territories. There was rarely a single, 
uniform administrative structure within a state. Usually it would be made up of 
principalities, duchies, baronies and independent boroughs, with their own rulers, 
their own courts, their own local laws, their own tax structure, their own customs 
posts and their own armed men – so that the allegiance each owed to the monarch 
was often only nominal and could be forgotten if a rival monarch made a better offer. 
Monarchs often did not speak the languages of the people they ruled, and official 
documents and legal statutes were rarely in the tongue of the subjects of their laws.” 
(2002: 173.) 
 
Although the mobility of the poor was increasingly curtailed and punished, the immigration 
“problem” as we know it today has not been identified as existing. In England and Wales as 
late as the Tudor period (ending in the early seventeenth century) no distinction was made 
between “subjects” and “aliens” – as would happen later (Anderson, 2013). 
Much of this reality transformed significantly in the period historians describe as 
“Early Modern”, beginning with the Iberian conquest of the Americas. The venture was 
funded by the Catholic Kings of Castille and Aragon (present-day Spain), allowing them to 
develop an empire that could withstand competition from the Islamic Empire they had 
defeated militarily on the peninsula. It initiated a new world trade in commodities – including 
slaves (eventually centred around the commercial “triangle” of slaves-cotton-manufactures 
between Africa, the Americas and north-western Europe, Marfleet, 2006: 60). States 
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collaborated actively in this activity, in many regards leading the process – for example by 
colonising territories (Marfleet, 2006: 60). This “mercantilist” approach as applied by the 
English state was described by the empire’s leading theoretician Walter Raleigh as: 
“[w]hoever rules the waves rules commerce; whoever rules commerce rules the wealth of 
the world, and consequently the world itself” (ibid). In other words, state action in the form of 
military competition had primacy in shaping economic success. 
 Mercantilism had an impact on Europe also. Spanish, French and English monarchs 
adopted “absolutist” rule to balance the political power of landowners with the emergent 
social muscle of merchants, as well as compete with rivals (Harman, 2002: 174). Relatedly 
Western European states became more centralised, bureaucratised and militarised 
(Marfleet, 2006: 100 & 101; Davidson, 2007). Centuries of inter-state conflict followed: 
including in Europe the Thirty Years war (in the Holy Roman Empire) – ending with the 
signing of the Westphalia peace treaties in 1648 (Harman, 1999).  
  Mercantilism could be described as an intermediary stage in the transition from 
feudal to capitalist mode of production. Even if the associated political transformations were 
more limited – a disjuncture only overcome after the 1789 French revolution. Yet 
transformations in the relationship between state and population were taking place. Firstly 
people’s territorial consciousness transformed. In the Middle Ages people identified with 
“religiously imagined communities” (as happened in class societies previously or elsewhere) 
in which a “cosmic order” was centralised terrestrially through the papacy, clerisy and sacred 
Latin language. This made social organisation “centripetal and hierarchical, rather than 
boundary-orientated and horizontal” – as would occur in the nation-state later (Anderson, 
2000: 13-16). Miscegenation was accepted between “civilised” and “barbarians” – for 
example in the Spanish Americas – and celebrated when bringing royal houses together 
(ibid: 13-14). 
 While global exploration, the Enlightenment, Protestantism and the English and 
Dutch revolutions helped undermine the legitimacy of the “sacral monarchy” in the 17th 
Century it left people with a psychological gap – due to the loss of the comforts offered by 
religious spirituality (Anderson, 2000). This was to be filled with the idea of the “nation”. The 
nation was – using Anderson’s celebrated term – an “imagined community” because “the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(ibid). Like religious belief, nationalism provided “certain meaning to the everyday fatalities of 
existence (above all death, loss, and servitude) … offering, in various ways, redemption from 
 
 
64 
 
them” (ibid). This was because nations “always loom out of an immemorial past, and still 
more important, glide into a limitless future” (ibid). Philosophically and politically they offered 
a “new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together” (ibid). 
 There were several reasons why it had become possible to “think” of the nation (ibid: 
22). As well as the trade networks created in the Early Modern period, and protestant 
movements against inter-territorial Catholic rule, the increased state bureaucracy required 
using a local language as common – later becoming “national” languages (ibid: 39-41; 
Davidson, 2007). Anderson maintains that the introduction and generalisation of novels and 
newspapers encouraged an idea of simultaneity-along-time – something he perhaps 
exaggeratedly treats as “essential to the genesis of nationalism” (Anderson, 2000: 24-34; 
Davidson, 2007). Likely more important was the process of increased state administration of 
the population under absolutism and mercantilism – a process Anderson identifies but others 
develop more fully (see Soguk, 1999: 68). The existence of such administrative social 
relations (and probably the role within these of local middle classes) probably best explains 
how the continental project of Bolívar and other “Libertadores”’ quickly fragmented into the 
states that have formed modern South America (Anderson, 2000: 49-57).  
Transformations in attitudes to the state and territoriality inevitably accompanied the 
rise of the national idea:  
 
“In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over 
each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory. But in the older imagining, 
where states were defined by centres, borders were porous and indistinct, and 
sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another” (Anderson: 19) 
 
The idea that states – as well as monarchs – were sovereign became enshrined in inter-
state agreements, such as the Westphalia treaties that ended the Thirty Years’ War. (Soguk, 
1999: 73).  
 
Proto-nationalist expulsions 
 
Two forced migrations took place in the Early Modern period that illustrate transformations 
as well as continuities in the relation between states and peoples. These were the   
expulsions of the “Moors” from the Iberian Peninsula between 1492 and 1609, and the 
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expulsion of the French Calvinist (Hughenot) minority from Catholic France in 1685 (Flesler, 
2008: 6-8; Soguk, 1999: 66-71). Both are briefly outlined and compared here below. 
The area – now Spain – united through the marriage of Isabelle (Castile) and 
Ferdinand (Aragon) and the military conquest of Granada in 1492 had been under Islamic 
rule for centuries after the eighth century – lasting until 1492 in the case of the Emirate of 
Granada. There had been a high degree of conversion and cultural emulation by the local 
population, and large numbers of Jews settled – attracted by a regime of tolerance towards 
religious minorities (Flesler, 2006: 7, 65 & 66). Under the new Catholic rule, however, 
Muslims and Jews were forced to convert. Many tens of thousands of Jews left the 
peninsula, and the very large numbers of converts (“moriscos” in the case of ex-Muslims) 
were treated with mistrust – leading to uprisings and rebellions (ibid: 6 & 7). Eventually the 
moriscos – meaning “little moors” – were expelled from areas such as the Valencian 
countryside – decimating the local population and leading to economic collapse (ibid: 8). 
According to Flesler, “proof” of Moorish identity “increasingly became located in genealogy 
and ‘purity of blood’” (ibid: 7 & 9).  
The French absolutist state of in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been 
identified as having created the most developed centralised administrative, legal and police 
systems of its time. Foucault describes these as performing “biopolitical control” and Soguk 
that they for the first time approached the population as a political and economic problem 
(Soguk, 1999: 68). This was the context in which the state inspired sectarian attacks 
(“dragonnades”) against the Hughenots and then expelled two-hundred thousand from the 
country25 (ibid: 70; Marfleet, 2006: 103). The whole process was meant to consolidate and 
strengthen French “sovereignty” and (in Zolberg’s words) “perfect the most powerful state in 
Europe” (Soguk, 1999: 70). The result was to recreate its territory as “a bounded 
exclusionary space” (ibid: 72).  
 The two cases described could be understood as continuations of the episodes of 
religious cleansing that occurred in the Middle Ages. However, they also represent 
significant departures from these. In both cases a homogenised religious identity was 
imposed on society. In the Iberian case, by the beginning of the seventeenth century this 
was framed in terms of innate (even ethnic) difference – even if there were limits to this26 
(Balibar, 2002: 52 & 53). Jacobson describes the worldview exposed by the Hughenot affair 
as “protonationalist” and this description could be extended to Spain in its Imperial phase 
(Soguk, 1999: 70 & 73).  
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 Yet the Early Modern period retained many medieval attitudes towards territoriality 
and population. Rather than being treated as a “problem” (or even “immigration”) inwardly 
displaced people still were seen as assets27 (ibid: 63). In the sixteenth century southern 
European craftsmen were encouraged by northern states to resettle in the latter (ibid). 
100,000 Hughenots were given asylum in the British Isles because of their trading, craft-
making and military backgrounds (ibid: 104; Soguk, 1999: 64, 70 & 103). As well as aiding 
English military adventures and development – including its slave trade, taking in the 
refugees weakened France – then England’s geopolitical competitor (Marfleet, 2006: 104). 
Another consideration was that their Protestantism would be beneficial to the construction of 
England’s own homogenous state, ibid: 103). 
 In conclusion, ideas of territorial belonging and non-belonging were developing and 
starting to influence the behaviour of rulers leading to the emergence of proto-racist 
cleansing. Yet the phenomenon of “immigration” was yet to be problematised per sé. 
 
 
3.2.2 Creation of the nation-state, citizens and “foreigners” 
 
When in history national consciousness arose is an open question but it was not only hoisted 
on society from above. Indeed the national idea was a strong feature of the manifestos of 
both the English and French revolutions. Such programmes assumed that the rights 
demanded would be defined within the state (Marfleet, 2006: 100 & 101). However, it was 
only through the 1789 French uprisings (a revolution by both the popular and middle classes 
that ended up mainly benefiting the latter social group) that the nation state meaningfully 
came into existence. Indeed the revolution can be seen as a pinnacle in processes of 
national construction (Soguk, 1999: 80 & 81). The revolution ended aristocratic privilege and 
the “divine right” of monarchic rule, creating a new legal and political framework brotherhood 
based on formal abstract equality and freedom – even if both were formal and abstract 
rather than real (Harman, 2002: part six chapter two; 2.2.3.3). Its long-term impacts include 
the ending of internal customs posts, the creation of a uniform national administration, and 
“above all, the determination of government policy in the light of bourgeois goals rather than 
dynastic or aristocratic ones” (Harman, 2002: 300).  
However, the new system of governance was based on a state-nation-citizen 
hierarchy and (in Brubaker’s words) “[b]y inventing … the legally homogenous national 
citizenry, the revolution simultaneously invented “the foreigner” or at least gave the term a 
 
 
67 
 
psychological charge that it previously lacked (and not only because it became associated 
with the deposed elites leading the attempts at counter-revolution from abroad; ibid: 280; 
Soguk, 1999: 75-77). The issue of whom “the people” included was one of the most divisive 
among revolutionaries (Davidson, 2007). Before 1794 the insurrectionary process involved 
masses of the poorest, and its politics were “cosmopolitan” and inclusive: for instance when 
the Jacobin-dominated national convention abolished slavery in response to the Saint 
Domingue (Haitian) slave insurrection (Harman, 2002: 311). However, in a context of 
counter-revolutionary activity and internal conflict in the revolutionary camp, the state 
became more authoritarian, centralised and violent (culminating in the dictatorship of 
Napoleon Bonaparte; ibid: 282-300). Alongside this grew a generalised suspicion towards 
the intentions of foreigners. The new nationalism was expressed in the words of 
revolutionary leader Saint Just: “whatever was outside the sovereign was an enemy” (Soguk, 
1999: 78). From 1792, foreign residents, such as Irish traders, were harassed and 
persecuted and much pressure would come to bear on linguistic minorities. When conflicts 
arose with other states, this sometimes led to exclusions from the territory (ibid: 79; Marfleet, 
2006: 101). 
Both the nation state and its exclusive attitude to those deemed “outsiders” spread 
internationally over the following century. Emulation of French modernisation was 
encouraged by the many military successes of Napoleon’s armies (“organised and motivated 
in ways established during the revolution”, Harman, 2002: 300). Over the following historical 
period the modern nation-state would be adopted “with varying degrees of self-
consciousness” and “to a variety of social terrains” (Davidson, 2007).  
After 1789, the creation of a bounded French state rapidly was mirrored in Britain. 
The latter territory had already undergone its own revolution (in 1642-1651), helping 
introduce capitalist farming and weakening aristocratic rule, and for a century the British 
state had been France’s military rival (Harman, 2002: 233). In such a context, Britain 
responded to the creation of the French Republic by introducing its first Aliens Acts, to which 
further laws were added during the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815; Marfleet, 2006: 101 & 
102). These laws were revoked after the two countries agreed peace in the 1820s (ibid). As 
well as these developments suggesting emulation of the new France’s tendencies towards 
foreigners, the notable link between immigration restrictions and geopolitical competition 
suggests a connection between the competitive state system and the problematizing of 
people’s movement.  
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Over the following century modern nation-states developed across Europe and 
beyond, sometimes through active rebellion – as in the case of the American Civil War, in 
other cases through elite-led modernisation (Harman, 2002: chapter 10). The aim was 
increasingly to build urban industrial societies, which required – as described by Ellen 
Meiksins-Wood – a “legal and political order” that could “enable capital accumulation, and … 
preserve social stability” (Callinicos, 2009: 78). Such an order was “inconceivable without 
clear territorial demarcations and sharply defined jurisdictions” (Meiksins-Wood in ibid). Civil 
rights – including equality of individuals before the law and the growing right of suffrage – 
were a component in the new political state system. However until the twentieth century 
“human rights” would not appear in legal statutes, declarations and treaties, and rights were 
granted only by nation-states to “their” citizens (Marfleet, 2006: 102).  
Because urbanisation and commodity production were built on antagonistic social 
relations, ruling groups required neutralising and derailing challenges to their power (a 
conflict heightened by geopolitical rivalry between state elites). A prominent ideological and 
political tool for such purposes was nationalism – “an identification with traditions said to 
define the qualities of [“one´s”] nation-state as against Others” (ibid: 101).  For Davidson, the 
historical context favoured this ideology:  
 
“Industrialisation and urbanisation produced the changes in human consciousness 
that made nationalism possible (for the subordinate classes), as well as creating 
societies that made nationalism necessary (for the dominant class”; 2007) 
 
Nationalism, racism and the first immigration controls 
 
Before the mid-nineteenth century nationalism tended to be a “rallying cry for those fighting 
for liberation” against Napoleon’s expansionism and the old order that, after France’s 
defeats, regained control in Europe. After 1848 “[a] different sort of nationalism arose 
alongside and in opposition to this old variant, propagated from above both by old 
monarchies and by newer capitalist rulers” (Harman, 2002: 389). This developed alongside 
and in response to growing attempts to gain suffrage and improved social conditions among 
a rising industrial working class. It received further encouragement from a growth in 
international competition between states (and national monopolies and cartels), which during 
the Long Depression (187-1896) led to a “Scramble” between the powers to colonise Africa.   
 and the first big economic crises of the capitalist period.  
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In Britain, Germany, Russia and France  
 
“[g]overnments, newspapers [now enjoying mass circulation], industrialists and 
financiers threw their weight behind the propagation of such nationalism, proclaiming 
the common identity of the ruling and exploited classes of each country – insisting 
they were ‘kith’ and ‘kin’ even while one lived in luxury and the other sweated or even 
starved.” (Ibid: 390.) 
 
In the British Isles the combination of such discourse with racism towards the Irish and other 
groups and exclusive Orange Protestantism in Northern Ireland and Scotland was used to 
divide social struggle and help channel the new electoral politics in ways that did not 
threaten elite hegemony (ibid: 388).  
An adequate examination of the issue of “race” is beyond the scope of this research. 
However, it must be mentioned that imagined nations developed “hand in hand” with the 
imagining of “races”. Indeed when nations were created the notion of being of the “English” 
or “Spanish race” (etc.) contributed “to constituting [political community] by producing the 
fictive ethnicity around which it is organised” (Goldberg, 2002: 48 & 49; Balibar, 2002: 42).  
For Goldberg, race,  
 
is integral to the emergence, development and transformations (conceptually, 
philosophically and materially) of modern nation-state. Race marks and orders the 
modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual 
and institutional emergence. (Goldberg, 2002: 4). 
 
Pseudo-scientific racism was a central ideological tool for the modern state to be able to 
continue organising and benefiting from slavery and the colonisation of territories outside 
Europe28 (Miles & Brown, 2003: 31). The secular fatalism of racial ideology could add a 
further intensity to nationalism: allowing it to develop in extreme directions. As Benedict 
Anderson describes, 
 
[t]he view that a nation was … was a body of people related in blood, with a common 
history and common destiny was a powerful means of mobilising the masses in times 
of war (Anderson, 1987: 15).  
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Facilitating gaining support for and participation in wars in defence of the “fatherland” 
became increasingly sought due to the greater tendency for conflict arising from a more 
competitive international panorama. As well as states being founded with “racially conceived 
sets of powers”, Goldberg describes them as evolving within “the crucible of whiteness – 
even when also incorporating a degree of multiculturalism (2002). This view seems logical 
and overlaps with other historical appreciations (Balibar, 2002; Miles & Brown, 2003).  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the more economically 
“backward” Balkans and Middle East a destructive combination of nation-state construction, 
ethnic categorisation of populations, and inter-state conflict were factors in many episodes of 
mass forced migration and “cleansing” of minorities. War between Russia and the declining 
Ottoman Empire led both sides to carry out annexations, as well as dispersions, expulsions 
and massacres (Chatty, 2010: 89, 283 & 291). Following a long period of rule characterised 
by considerable religious “cosmopolitanism”, the Turkish Empire slaughtered a million 
Armenians and forced many more to leave the country (ibid). Both the demise of that empire 
and the Austro-Hungarian led to nationalist wars and the mass displacement of peoples 
(Romanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Turks – seven million of whom settled in Turkey or 
other Middle Eastern states between 1875 and 1925; ibid: 87 & 289). The political objective 
was to “make real the imagined homogenous nation-state” by matching political borders with 
“ethnic” ones (ibid: 21, 89 & 90). Such a process was not confined to this region: more 
generally – as Miles identified, “[t]he formation and reproduction of the nation state is … 
often secured at the cost of stimulating emigration” through either expulsion or exodus or a 
combination of both (1993: 114). 
Until the 1880s international migration was unregulated (Castles & Miller, 2013: 57). 
Then, selective restrictions were introduced aimed at Jews (in Europe) and Asians in the 
“settler” states (the United States, Canada and Australia). These often followed nationalist 
and racist agitation. (Ibid: 57 & 58; Marfleet, 2006: 71, 114-121). Yet overall migration 
continued growing and in the first decade of the twentieth Century eleven million 
international migrants resided in Europe and North America (Marfleet, 2006: 71). Indeed 
between 1800 and 1930 a total of forty million Europeans migrated permanently overseas, 
and very large migratory movements took place between European countries and of 
indentured Asians to the Caribbean, Americas and Africa (Castles & Miller, 2003: 55-62). In 
the words of the migration historian Zolberg, “the uprooted originated from every corner of 
the globe and migrated wherever land or work might be available” (Marfleet, 2006: 71).  
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Such mass movement ended after the First World War and (particularly) world 
economic slump that began in the late 1920s. This was not just because there were less 
jobs to attract migrants. Public hostility to “aliens” grew and states erected greater barriers to 
immigration (ibid: 71-72; Castles & Miller, 2013: 63). Asylum emerged as a distinct process 
but this too was restricted – notably in the United States to where many Jews tried to flee 
from Nazi Germany (Castles & Miller, 2003: ibid). In response to the Depression states 
closely regulated immigration as they did their currencies, interest rates and investment. In 
the US mass expulsion of Mexicans took place (Marfleet, 2006: 85). International migration 
fell to be a fraction of what it had been decades before (ibid: 73). Substantial levels of 
immigration did not return to core countries until world expansion began again after the 
Second World War, when global economic growth meant a shortage of labour in core 
economies and a need for states to stimulate and manage bringing migrants from their ex-
colonies (ibid: 76-80). Global recession in the 1970s and neoliberal structural adjustment 
programmes became “push” factors propelling emigration from poorer world regions, which 
was met by renewed state controls on immigration (ibid: 82-85). 
 
The “nationness” and liberalness of states and the drive for immobility 
 
The account provided of the rise of modern states and their territorial management of 
population suggests that the immigration “problem” emerged as a corollary of the emergence 
and international reproduction of the nation-state. Christian Joppke therefore offers a crucial 
observation that “[t]he principle of sedentariness” driving its problematisation  “is not only 
grounded in the stateness, but also in the nationness of modern nation-states” (Joppke, 
1998a: 7). He concludes that the French revolutionary process “revalued the membership of 
modern states as democratic citizenship, while providing a potent justification for the 
exclusiveness of states” (ibid). Such an idea overlaps with Marfleet’s observation regarding 
the same early-modern epoch:  
 
“[t]he higher the profile of the nation state, the higher was the profile of the migrant. 
The more that there was of rights, the more there was also a focus upon those who 
derived their right elsewhere – upon ‘aliens’” (2006: 102). 
 
In other words, nationness and Othering are not mere legitimatory props for states 
(particularly, Joppke adds, in those that have adopted redistributive welfare systems, 1998a: 
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7). Indeed the scholar goes as far as concluding that in “liberal states” rejection of 
immigration is “inherently popular” – leading to a “confounding” of “the established left-vs.-
right perspective” (ibid). 
 Joppke’s summary and the historical overview provided in this sub-section have the 
virtue of not reducing nationalist Othering as simply being a “Machiavellian” strategy hoisted 
on society by elites (and therefore abide by Dale’s warning in 2.2.3.3). Furthermore, the view 
differs from Boswell (and to a lesser degree Dale) by seeing the attitude of states to 
immigration primordially in terms of states’ self-legitimisation (or hegemonisation). In so 
doing the analysis aids comprehending the frequent receptiveness of non-state actors – 
including the subaltern classes – to anti-immigrant discourse and practice, and the many 
episodes in which civil society has driven greater restriction of mobility (including the 
agitation by American unions against Chinese labour in the late nineteenth Century; the 
“nativist” campaigns against southern and eastern European immigration that won more 
exclusive quotas in the 1920s; and the “anti-Dago” riots in Australia that were followed by 
new restrictions on foreign employment and land ownership a decade later; Castles & Miller, 
2003: 63; Marfleet, 2006: 107 & 115).  
At the same time, Joppke overstates his case by treating popular anti-immigrant 
sentiment as “inherent” to liberal states. Feelings of attachment to a particular “nation” are 
mediated and sometimes weakened by sociological experiences and identities including 
those related to religious belief, gender, class, race, and cosmopolitanism. Because vertical 
social relations always potentially undermines belief in membership of a “horizontal” 
community logically speaking, nationals will tend to only partially see themselves as being 
defined by nation and can prioritise other non-territorial identifications (see 3.2.3 for more 
discussion). 
Moreover, hostility by civil society towards immigrants – and the larger “racial” 
minorities associated with particular migrant groups – has not been a constant variable. The 
appeal of opposition to migration and multi-culturalism have varied over the decades and 
centuries. There have also been historical moments defined by solidarity with refugees and 
other migrants. As well as the recent cases of solidarity with refugees and migrants in Spain 
and Europe cited in 1.2.1, white British have joined Irish, Jewish, Caribbean and Asian 
migrants and their children in mass mobilisations against racism or for social justice on 
several occasions29. This suggests that anti-migrant attitudes are much more contingent 
than is assumed by Joppke and other liberal political scientists (2.1.2; 2.2.1).  
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The exaggerated quality of the scholar’s observations also may be linked to his lack 
of qualification regarding modern states’ “nationness” (and implied assumptions that 
democracy, citizens rights and the social contract are fully developed and meaningful in the 
modern world). In practice as well as legal rights being abstract and their application being 
strongly mediated by structural interests (as discussed in 2.2.3.3); democracy is limited to 
parliamentary elections – excluding key social spheres such as the workplace – and 
exercised sparingly (every four or five years); and redistribution of society’s resources 
through the welfare state is limited – possibly being more characterised by horizontality (the 
active sections of the working majority to the non-active sections) than vertically (from high 
to low earners30, 3.1.4.2). The high degree of democratic citizenship reached in the early 
years of the French revolution can be seen as a temporally very limited historical example 
that began collapsing once the different socio-economic interests of the different classes 
(and related wings of revolutionaries) began to express themselves in differing political 
objectives and strategies.  
A final problem is that exclusive nationalistic attitudes towards foreigners can be 
found in non-democratic states (2.2.1). A clear example is the Nazi regime in Germany; 
contemporary instances include attitudes to Sub-Saharan Africans in North African states 
(including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, see 5.1.2). It can therefore be concluded that 
while the liberal and/or social-democratic political framework can relatively easily provide a 
foundation for political opposition to immigration, which can conflict with national labour and 
demographic needs, the substantially limited content of this frame also means that 
immigration politics is unpredictable and can evolve in welcoming (as well as exclusionary) 
directions. 
The shortcomings and oversights described are related to the influence of formal-
political rather than deeper political and economic analysis. An exception is Joppke’s 
conclusion that exclusionary political tendencies are rooted in the “nationness” of states, 
which shall be examined further in the following sub-section.     
 
 
3.2.3 State, nation and Othering 
 
For Ralph Miliband the theory of the state is also a theory of society and the distribution of 
power within it (1973: 4). This shall be the approach applied below. Engel provides a useful 
starting part in his study of the state (and the family) in different class societies. For him, 
 
 
74 
 
rather than states being neutral bodies representing the whole of the territorial “community” 
they were dominated by the dominant social layers. For Marx’s close collaborator, the state 
arose “out of society” but became a power above society, “alienating itself more and more 
from it” (Engels, 1973: 327). Studies coincide that the first states emerged after humans first 
developed the agricultural and craft-making capacities to produce a surplus that could be 
appropriated by a minority – allowing classes to emerge (and encouraging armed conflict 
between between tribes and states; Harman, 2002: part one). Engels consequently 
describes the emergence of states as being the,  
 
“admission that … society had become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with 
itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. 
… [I]n order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic 
interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became 
necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate 
the conflict and keep it within the bounds of ‘order’” (Engels, 1973: 326 & 327) 
 
In modern (liberal) states the repressive role described can be detected relatively easily in 
relation to immigration “management” (concretely the policing, detention, deportation and 
occasionally killing of migrants – see 5.1.2 for Spanish examples). Yet the relationship 
between such states and “their” civil society can appear more harmonious, even (as has 
been seen) with states being viewed as a crystallisation of the aspirations of civil society. 
Marx and writers inspired by his writing have developed put forward an opposite view of the 
state-civil society relationship (as well as accounting for its perceived inversion). This shall 
be outlined in the rest of this sub-section. 
As well as “generalised commodity production” determining the emergence of labour 
mobility (3.1.2), this activity (by “atomized interdependent producers”, “governed thru 
competition” and requiring “’free and equal’ exchange”) forms the basis of modern 
institutional frameworks and related ideologies (Dale, 1999: 283). Consequently for Marx 
states (and sub-states) must ensure the following: recognition of individuals or companies as 
“legal subjects” able to freely perform interactions; enforcement of property rights so that 
individuals only can control “use values” through ownership or exchange; regulation of a 
common criteria of “exchange value” – objectified in money – to guarantee that exchange is 
of equivalents; satisfaction of the conditions and means for production and exchange to take 
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place (Harvey, 2007: 290 & 291). A working system of taxation and redistribution also is 
required (Barker, 1978). 
These kinds of, 
  
“tasks, above all the constitution and arbitration of contracts and the enforcement of 
exclusion (right), require a segment of society to be ‘separated out to act as the 
universal force that objectifies all particular rights’ (Kay & Mott …). In practice, such 
unitary authorities take the form of states.” (Dale, 1999: 284) 
 
This has two implications. First, generalised exchange necessitates running society at least 
to some extent according to the “bourgeois” notions of “equality”, “freedom”, “justice” and 
“rights”. (Harvey maintains that such ideas therefore cannot be seen only as ideological 
“tools” but must be taken as genuine “bricks” in the edifice of the capitalist state, 2007: 291). 
Second, while the feudal state was built on system of state corporatisation of “estates” and 
governed directly by aristocrats and landowners, the contemporary state must be separated 
from capital (Joppke, 1998a: 23; Miliband, 1973: 55). For this reason it often has been 
governed by people of middle-class or upper-middle-class origins (even if this has varied 
over time and country and if sections of the state apparatus have a more direct relationship 
with business, Miliband, 1973: 53-58; Pashukanis in Barker, 1978). In his polemic with 
Hegel, Marx described this state detachment (and the related separation between “politics” 
and “economics”, and “public” and “private”) as a direct corollary of the “estrangement of 
individuals” arisen in the new republics (Colletti, 1992: 33 & 34; Marx, 1992). In other words 
the form and workings of the state was determined by social relations in civil society; not the 
other way round – as Hegel affirmed (Marx, 1992). 
The (partial) separation of powers between the government, administrative 
bureaucracy, judiciary, military, police and sub-state administrations further reinforces the 
distance between state and civil society by preventing the state from being monopolised by 
one fraction of capital (Harvey, 2007: 294; Miliband, 1973: 49). The state’s appearance of 
neutrality from particular societal interests is a key factor allowing modern states to be 
imagined as nation-states and representing the “common interest” and even the 
“universality” of society – as Hegel maintained (Marx, 1992). However, national, 
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“unity or community has to be abstract … because in the real, fragmented society a 
common or genuine interest can only arise by disassociation from all the contending 
private interests” (Colletti, 1992: 35). 
 
This means that the real divisions in society must be denied “value and significance” (ibid).  
 At the same time, Marx also acknowledged reasons for Hegel’s (and others’) 
“fetishisation” of the state: maintaining, as paraphrased by Colletti, “it is not simply the 
theories of Hegel …which are upside down, but reality itself”31 (Colletti, 1992: 37 & 38). In 
other words, there is a logic to state fetishisation – even if one based on an inversion of 
reality, encouraging its propagation in society. Gramsci takes this further by pointing out that, 
once created by bourgeois civil society, the modern state acts back on social and productive 
relations, becoming their prime organiser (helped by “enwrapping around it”, 
interpenetrating, coordinating and directing religious organisations, media, charitable 
organisations, union leaderships and other “civil-society” groups, Thomas, 2009: 30 & 31; 
Gramsci, 2007). His and (particularly) Marx’ observations provide extra understanding as to 
the degree of attachment people have to nation-states – whether existing (as in the Spanish 
case) or aspired to (as in the case of Catalonia for many of its inhabitants).  
 
The democratic state as capitalist state 
 
It is self evident that the actuality of the state is opposed to its inverted reality. This means 
that the “basis and content” of the state “inevitably remains civil society with all its economic 
divisions” and that “beneath the abstract society (the state), real estrangement and 
unsociability persist.” (Colletti, 1992: 35.) Because society is structured according to greatly 
uneven private ownership of property and associated class antagonisms “[t]he capitalist 
state cannot be more than an instrument of class domination”, acting to coerce and manage 
the subaltern classes (ibid: 37; Harvey, 2007: 292; Dale, 1999: 283 & 284). Harvey adds, “[i] 
f it were otherwise, capitalism would not sustain itself for long” (2007: 292).  
Regarding the nature and dynamics of “democratic” states, several observations can 
be made. First, states’ behaviour is conditioned by the domestic drive to accumulate capital. 
In (limited) financial terms this is because, “the capacity of the state to finance itself through 
taxation or borrowing depends on the state of the [national] economy.” (Block in Callinicos, 
2009: 85.) States cooperate with “their” capital to compete internationally with other states-
capitals (particularly since business concentration and expansion led to the emergence of 
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monopoly and combined business ventures closely linked to states; Bukharin, 2003). Such a 
role helps condition both government policies (including in the areas of fiscal affairs, social 
order, welfare, labour, diplomacy and defence) and the attitude of the state towards civil 
society and social-relationship between state managers/government and their employees.  
This leads Block to characterise the state-capital separation as being articulated 
around a “division of labour” between “those who accumulate capital and those who manage 
the state apparatus … to reproduce the social order as a whole” – a view similar to Dale’s 
(2.2.3.3; Callinicos, 2009: 85). The viewpoint dovetails with observations from a study by 
Ralph Miliband on the people that run the modern (British) state apparatus (1973). 
Concretely the Marxist political scientist identified the upper layers of the bureaucracy 
(judges, military commanders, senior civil servants and directors of state finance) as sharing 
social origins and (elite-private) schooling with industrialists and financiers (Miliband, 1973: 
47 & 48). He identified their class background and connections as influencing advisory and 
administrative processes within the institutions, which are “always political as well as 
executive” (ibid). He added elected representatives often came from similar backgrounds 
and developed some shared political culture through cooperating in assemblies and 
commissions (ibid: 50, 60 & 61).  
A third point is that the working classes generally preferred political option – social 
democracy – is highly compatible with satisfying the formal demands of capitalist production 
(even, Harvey suggests, being “well equipped” to do so because of its relative defence of 
public provision that benefits the short- and long-term reproduction of labour power, 2007: 
294; 3.1.4). Added to this, the dominant social class may accede to making other 
concessions that are not in its short-term interest “[i]n order to conserve its hegemony in the 
political sphere”, but, as Gramsci states, whenever “said sacrifices and such commitment do 
not effect the essential” (ibid: 295).  
Lastly cooperative relationships have developed between fractions of employers and 
politicians, as they have between different firms. This has led to the emergence of “industrial 
complexes” that facilitate developing infrastructure, obtaining financing and bringing together 
factors of production, and also can exert political influence through lobbying (including in 
“policy networks”) or through members of normally only two government options (Harman, 
2009: 109; Miliband, 1973: 5). This can lead to the autonomy of the institutions being 
significantly compromised. However, lobbying is not the main cause of the “tendency for the 
state to act in the interests of capital” but serves “merely to reinforce this tendency” 
(Callinicos, 2009: 86).  
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Permanent nation-statecraft and the problematisation of migrants 
 
The analysis developed above in 3.2.3 provides an insight into why people are open to 
seeing themselves as part of a national community. However, if it is further developed, and 
Foucaultian research on “statecraft” and migration incorporated, the exclusionary dynamics 
associated with such communities can more easily be comprehended. This shall be 
performed below.  
 As well as the idea of the national community requiring “neglecting or transcending 
genuine [individual or class] interests”, it serves to oppose the exertion of such interests. 
Specifically for the young Marx “the ‘general interest’ of the community at large … sanctifies 
and legitimizes its disunity” – by undermining majoritarian class identification (Colletti, 1992: 
36 & 37). The unchanging contradiction between the abstract-national and genuine interests 
leads the state to have to work permanently to maintain their nation-ness and reproduce the 
hierarchy between state, nation and citizen – a process that Soguk describes as “statecraft” 
(although could more accurately be labelled “nation-statecraft”; 1999: 39). 
 Using Foucault and Appadurai, Soguk provides a compelling account of how the 
“bounded [national] citizen” is formed through a process of “people production” (1999: 39). 
This involves everyday statised governance combined with pedagogy and narrative (Soguk, 
1999: 40). Popular and institutional discourses of “problems” and “dangers” are statised (or 
sub-statised) and “regimented” as problems for the nation (ibid). In such a way borders such 
as between the USA and Mexico or Spain and Morocco have the function of “carefully 
orchestrat[ing] the representation of difference to affirm the state”  – as do whole national 
asylum regimes (ibid: 40 & 41). Relatedly and with less complexity, Miles affirms, 
 
“[t]he reproduction of the nation as an imagined community is effected by a policing 
by the state of its spatial and cultural boundary in order to determine who belongs 
and who does not.” (1993: 114).  
 
This may be done in a way that seeks to achieve “perceived linguistic, religious, ethnic and 
cultural homogeneity” (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 23 & 24) – a reason why Hollifield 
believes immigration “policy and politics …. are driven in no small measure by attitudes and 
beliefs shaped by national cultures and histories” (2000: 172). 
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As well as through governance, nation-statecraft is produced through discourse, 
which is informed and legitimised by state narratives including mythologies on the historical 
trajectory of both the nation and specific groups of Others to which the people is (positively) 
compared (Soguk, 1999: 40 & 41).  
 Bounded people production requires reinforcing or even creating “banal nationalism” 
in society (2.2.1). It must be a “silent” process because the state “community” cannot 
acknowledge it is permanently self-constructing (or re-constructing) without undermining its 
claim to represent a “natural” people and thereby challenge its “reason for being” (Soguk, 
1999: 39 & 40). Othering can help overcome this foundational problem. This is because it is 
a negative and thus inherently less distinguishable vehicle through which to imagine the 
contours of the nation (Ashley in Soguk, 1999: 40). Yet if it offers the shortest route to short-
term resolution it is also Sisyphean – as the contradiction between the abstract nature of the 
national community and social reality means it has to be continually re-travelled. Such an 
analysis offers a theoretical account of why immigration is repeatedly problematized by the 
contemporary integral state. It reveals the capitalist roots of the political drive to restrict and 
discoursively oppose immigration – even if that leads to contradictions with the material 
(labour and demographic) requirement for immigration. 
 A final point is that the general view of statecraft used by Soguk can be seen to 
overlap with Louis Althusser’s alternative view of social reproduction to that examined in 
3.1.4. For the French structuralist, the future continuation of capitalist production requires the 
state to not only regenerate “the productive forces” (as socialist feminists identify) but also 
“the existing relations of production” (Althusser, 1971). In other words, for the author social 
reproduction is immaterial – cultural and ideological – as well as material, and fundamentally 
rests on obtaining “a reproduction of [labour power’s] submission to the rules of the 
established order” (ibid). It has already been advanced that a key mechanism for gaining 
consent among the majority is the perception of meaningful citizenship, which benefits from 
a degree of “social contract” (3.1.4.2; 3.2.2). However limited the “distributive justice” 
involved in this, Walzer maintains it still  
 
“presupposes a bounded world within which distributions take place: a group of 
people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all 
among themselves” (in Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 23) 
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Authors both hostile and sympathetic to immigration identify immigration as undermining 
such a “contract”. Sandro Mezzadra describes contemporary migration as creating a crisis 
for the “inclusive and integrative model of social citizenship that has been asserted in the 
‘Occident’ after the World Wars” (2004: 273). While complaining about the financial impact of 
immigration on welfare-state societies, Borjas added that it also undermined “the political 
legitimacy of the social contract that created and sustains the welfare state” (in Legrain, 
2006: 142). Belief in the “rule of law” is also an ingredient in maintaining the existing social 
order, and this can be undermined by mass unauthorised migration (Rosberg in Cohen, 
1987: 174).  
If Soguk’s ideas are combined with these last observations it can be concluded that 
excluding migrants from core activities in society (such as welfare provision or voting) is 
about the necessarily constant need to reaffirm national identity and bounded citizenship, 
particularly when this can been done in ways that reinforce national mythologies. A final 
point is that way by which immigration currently is configured can further enhance 
problematisation of its protagonists. Philip Marfleet points out that the features of immigration 
that make it attractive economically – for example being by people from poorer regions that 
are more willing to work for low wages – are the same that make it deemed unsuitable for 
incorporation into the nation (2006: 116). This issue shall be returned to in the Chapter Five. 
 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
The review of literature related to immigration paradoxes in Chapter Two began to answer 
some of the research sub-questions. The historical and political analysis in the present 
chapter has travelled further to suggest a general theoretical basis for immigration 
paradoxes. It clearly suggests that the root of these is not liberalism or a state system that 
operates according to a different logic from capitalism, but stems from a contradiction within 
capitalist states themselves. States require successful accumulation by “their” firms and this 
operates most efficiently with non-employed labour having the freedom to move but 
employed workers being encouraged to stay settled. The intrinsic volatility and increasing 
competitiveness of the capitalist economy compels firms to access reserves of labour from 
outside states and avoid wage rises associated with labour shortages. Therefore for labour 
to be able to cross political borders is a permanent requirement for capital and state, which 
(as Dale implied in 2.2.3.3) must both act according to international as well as national 
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logics. It also provides large financial savings for the state (and the recipient society) by 
providing “generationally reproduced labour power”, and because migrant women are 
playing an increasing role in the daily replenishing of labour power through domestic-labour 
markets.  
 Yet because capitalism also relies on an institutional framework that can only gain 
and maintain its legitimacy through the ideology of “national community”, and such an 
abstraction is permanently contested due to the existence and assertion of real social 
interests, the nationness of the state must be continually recrafted. Its boundedness is 
reproduced through borders and border control. Its internal cohesion is sought positively 
firstly through promoting and reflecting nationalist ideas, narratives and mythologies; and 
secondly by providing legal and social rights to “citizens”. It is promoted negatively by 
presenting and treating foreigners in general and specific national groups in particular as 
incompatible with such a “community”. Because labour mobility – including across state 
frontiers – is an economically necessity and aided by associated liberal ideas in law, politics 
and society, exclusion can only be partial and can be contested. As social (and even legal 
rights) increasingly have been diluted in the neo-liberal period, governments and politicians 
are attracted to using migrants as a pretext to negatively reinforce public identification with 
states and sub-states. Because such a process is occurring simultaneously with a 
weakening of the social contract, the question remains as to whether it can be undermined 
by a reassertion of genuine interests by the subaltern classes.  
 The framework outlined suggests with regards to the research sub-questions that 
national politics is as important in shaping immigration processes as economic factors but 
that the two should not be seen as unrelated. Rather states act in what they believe are their 
and domestic capital’s long-term interests, whereas firms lobby and plan according to more 
short-term competitive-driven considerations. The framework does give importance to the 
role of electoral politics but only within certain bounds. Its systemic yet crafted nature 
suggests that it is more elite-driven than public-led. However, it also recognises that there is 
a material basis for national consciousness – including its most exclusive variety – implying 
that anti-immigrant ideas can be well-received if not actively challenged. Davidson’s view 
that industrialisation and urbanisation produced the changes in consciousness that made 
nationalism necessary for the dominant class, but also possible for the subordinate classes 
could be applied to the desire to restrict immigration (which states must adopt and civil 
society can support).  
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The above analysis contradicts the idea that irregularity is fundamentally a labour 
strategy practised by states in collusion with specific business interests. However it does not 
preclude employers benefiting from and policymakers tolerating the curtailed liberties linked 
to illegal residence and discussed in 2.2.3.2. Irregularity even could be seen as a way to 
“resolve” opposed long-term (state) and short-term (employer) capitalist interests. However, 
this only would be a logical policy if the dimensions of illegality were kept within bounds that 
would not prevent the state from exercising hegemony and maintaining order. Furthermore, 
it was identified in relation to Catalonia that “gaps” between political promises and delivery 
can be a fertile ground from which can emerge parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
opposition to immigration (1.2.3; Hollifield, 2000: 174).  
  
 
 
  
                                                        
1
 “obligadas por las constantes inmigraciones y emigraciones de obreros a levantar su sede de un 
país para fijarla en otro” 
2
 “Mita” was draft labour in Peru. 
3
 Approximate figure: Accessed 2 September 2015, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_history_of_american_slavery/2015/06/animated_interactive_of_t
he_history_of_the_atlantic_slave_trade.html  
4
 Wallerstein: “Free labour is the form of labour control used for skilled work in core countries, 
whereas coerced labour is used for less skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is 
the essence of capitalism.” (Cohen, 2006: 17.) 
5
 This author limits application of the term to the male migrant workforce, however. Women workers –
equated with domestic labour – are categorised as “a regular army of extremely cheap labour” – partly 
because they have less incidence on the conditions of the rest of the labour force (Farris, 2012: 193). 
6
 Also, the authors ignore other ways by which economic expansion undermines business profits: 
such as increased costs of other inputs – in particular raw materials and machinery – when demand 
for these grows at a faster rate than supply due to the (same) overall expansion.  
7
 The figure is for persons that worked outside their hometown for over six months in 2014 (Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics figure in Wildau, 2015). 
8
 This demographic transformation – it has been reported –  has underpinned “fast growth, rising 
inequality, high savings and investment, big trade surpluses” (ibid). 
9
 Quote is translated by autor from Spanish. 
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10
 Intra-EU migration in Spain accounts for a minority of foreign settlement in Spain – despite 
substantial seasonal residence by northern European. 
11
 Engels, however, did make such a comparison in ‘The Condition of the Working Class in England’, 
describing Irish immigration as a “cause of abasement to which the English worker is exposed, a 
cause permanently active in forcing the whole class downwards” (Castles & Kosack, 1972: 6).  
12
 In 2005 remittances to Mexico represented (a high) 161 per cent of net foreign direct investment to 
the country. For Ferguson and McNally, some of this helps reproduce the “two-tier” continental labour 
market and therefore increases capital accumulation on both sides of the North-South border (2015: 
14 & 15). 
13
 Although “the image of the immigrant as male Gastarbeiter …. that was diffused in the 1950s … 
has not been replaced by the figure of the migrant as female maid” (Farris, 2012: 184). 
14
 This is because, as the Feminist Marxist Lisa Vogel indicates in an in-depth polemic on women’s 
unpaid labour in the home, “a proportion of the direct producer’s labour may also be devoted to 
securing the reproduction of other members of the exploited class” where “children, the elderly, or a 
wife do not themselves enter into surplus-production as direct producers” (2013: 149). 
15
 Exactly 90 per cent in 2005 (Taifa, 2005: 10) 
16
 This argument has been used by neo-classical economists such as Milton Friedman to argue that 
publicly funded welfare states act as “distorting mechanisms” preventing extending their normally 
inflexible programme of free-market liberalisition to international labour markets – an approach that (if 
taken at face value) conveniently allows arguing for more of the welfare privatisation  they support 
(Legrain, 2006a: 141). 
17
 There are some small qualifications that could be applied in the case of the Spanish state. Firstly 
there are high levels of tax fraud among the most privileged elites, and fiscal policy has become more 
regressive in recent years (relative increase in non-redistributive consumption taxes, lowering of tax 
for large corporations, “tax breaks” for investments and charitable expenses (Taifa, 2005: 8-17). 
Additionally a very large segment of revenue originates from through employees’ social-security 
contributions and these are taken at fixed non-progressive percentages (ibid). Yet most taxation is 
“direct” and a large segment of this is through paying income tax, which is relatively progressive 
(IRPF; Taifa, 2005: 8-16). 
18
 The idea of controls being necessary to prevent “outsiders” travelling to take “common goods” at 
the expense of the local population – including the poorest – is not new. In late Medieval and early 
modern Britain “vagabonds” (domestic migrants) were treated as the biggest social threat (Anderson, 
2013: 13-24). They were denied receiving monasterial, social or parish relief and, after 1575, denied 
access to “common land” (ibid: 24). Transgressors would be returned or suffer severe punishment 
(3.1.1). Parish records on the removal of vagabonds often featured the description “likely to prove a 
charge to the parish”, and mobile paupers generally were deemed a “drain” (Anderson, 2013: 23 & 
24). Similarly immigration policy in the US (and Britain) in the early 20
th
 Century sought to exclude 
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those “liable to become a public charge” (Legrain, 2009: 142.) These historic examples show notable 
similarities between attitudes towards the right to social assistance for the mobile poor in late-
medieval and modern times. 
19
 According to Home Office figures, in 1999-2000 the foreign-born population in Britain paid 10 per 
cent more in tax than it received in spending (a 2.5 billion gain). In 2003-4 the gain was even greater. 
(Legrain, 2006a: 150.). The vast majority of migrant workers are aged 18-34 years (82 per cent in 
2008) and had no dependents with them when they registered for work (93 per cent; ibid: 10). 
20
 This affirmation is part-based on Teresa Hayter’s view regarding people’s migratory expectations: 
“[o]n the whole most people do not want to uproot themselves, abandon their families, and suffer the 
hardships and risks of migration to a strange and possibly hostile place in order to do the dirty work of 
natives” (2004: 153). 
21
 An exception to this is Parella (2006). 
22
 ‘Los inmigrantes salvan el Estado de bienestar’ El País. 16 June 2008, pp.31-32 
23
 ‘Los inmigrantes pagan 900.000 pensiones’ El País. 29 February 2008, p.16 
24
 ‘Arias Cañete: “Las urgencias están colapsadas por los inmigrantes”’ El País. 8 February 2008. 
Accessed 31 July 2015, http://elpais.com/diario/2008/02/08/espana/1202425202_850215.html  
25
 The origins of term “refugee” have been traced to Hughenots (Marfleet, 2006). 
26
 These include the fact that very young ‘moriscos’ were adopted by Christian families when their 
own families were forced out of Valencia (Flesler, 2006:8).  
27
 This was partly because the displaced often had knowledge and resources that could strengthen a 
state’s ability to develop and compete commercially and militarily (Marfleet, 2006: 61). Migrants were 
often urbanites – including merchants and artisans – and sometimes were from privileged 
backgrounds (ibid: 63 & 64). 
28
 Racial ideology also transformed previous oppressions such as anti-Semitism – to become an 
opposition to “Jewishness” and not “Judaism” (Arendt in Miles & Brown, 2003: 31). 
29
 Such protests include the New Unionism beginning at the end of the 19th Century, the Cable Street 
demonstration against Oswald Mosley’s blackshirts in 1936, and similar mass anti-racist protests in 
the 1970s and 1990s. 
30
 Mostly political and social rights have also been gained through mass social mobilisation which 
tends to be stronger when the subaltern classes are less divided by national or racial considerations – 
suggesting that defending and extending such rights is not helped by opposition to and restrictions on 
immigration (Harman, 2002). 
31
 The idea can be seen as the precursor to Marx’s theory on the “fetichisation of commodities” – 
particularly money – produced by the apparent invertion of the causal relationship between 
commodity exchange and production by “men” (Marx, 1990). 
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Chapter Four 
 
Catalonia and Spain´s new immigration: characteristics; 
political and economic context 
 
Having advanced an initial abstract theory on the contradictory ways by which state (and sub-
state) institutions view immigration it is necessary to test this concretely and empirically – as 
is performed hereafter in relation to Catalonia and Spain in this dissertation. As has been 
revealed by the theoretical, historical and international-comparative study thus far, 
institutional approaches and actions regarding immigration take place in relation to very broad 
economic and political processes (including ‘globalisation’, nation-building and general labour 
strategies). Therefore any “national” case study must take into account the broad state/sub-
state economic and political context in which the post-mid-1990s wave of immigration takes 
place and related policy is formulated and implemented. This is the purpose of the first two 
sections of this chapter. The third also provides necessary context to aid developing an 
understanding of the economics and politics of the immigration problem in Catalonia and 
Spain. However, simultaneously it also forms the beginning of the empirical examination – as 
it presents and analyses statistical data on the patterns of migrant settlement and 
employment that have taken place in order to incorporate into the overall analysis the role of 
subjective decisions by migrants and the impact on these of government policies and other 
factors.  
More precisely the general contextualisation begins (in 4.1) with the general 
constitutional-institutional and political frameworks of contemporary Spain and Catalonia –  
paying particular attention to Catalan-Spanish national relations in the period of relatively 
decentralised “regional autonomy”. Subsequently, in order to aid identification of the specific 
role of migrants within the local economy, in 4.2 there is an analysis of the development of the 
Spanish economy and labour relations in the period preceding and coinciding with substantial 
immigration. This sub-chapter focuses on Spain’s pronounced economic cycles, model of 
development, underground economy, “dual labour market”, and the impact of the crisis. 
Where relevant, migrants’ specific roles and experiences are incorporated into the analysis. 
The third and final section – 4.3 – draws on available official and research statistics to 
provide a survey of the nature of immigration in recent decades: its size, degree of regularity, 
origins, employment sector and evolution, and other characteristics. Although the study 
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focuses more on the political and administrative management of immigration and less on 
immigration per se, the information presented – much in graph form – helps to confidently 
identify the evolution of policy outcomes over time – aiding isolating the factors influencing 
policy gaps. Some patterns in Catalonia are presented separately from those of Spain. 
However, where “regional” differences were not notable, Catalan patterns are assumed within 
the wider Spanish ones presented, with necessary qualifications signposted. 
 
 
4.1 Catalan and Spanish politics 1977-2011  
 
Preliminary notes on the Autonomous Community of Catalonia 
 
Catalonia (“Catalunya”) is an official territory (autonomous community, AC) of the north east 
of Spain1 - consisting of four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona). Its 7.6 
million inhabitants (in 20122) make up a substantial proportion of the Spanish population (17 
per cent of 47 million3) and are mainly concentrated in and around the Catalan capital 
Barcelona (a province of 5.6 million inhabitants in 20124). Catalonia is among the richer 
Spanish “regions”5, producing a GDP representing 18.5 per cent of the Spanish total –a 
slightly higher proportion than its relative population (also in 20126). The vast majority of 
residents understand Catalan (95 per cent in 1996) and most speak the language (75 per 
cent in the same year; McRoberts, 2001: 8). As Castilian (Spanish) and Catalan are both 
derivatives of Latin, it is relatively easy for speakers of either to learn the other language for 
comprehension at least. It is therefore normally unproblematic to live in the AC speaking only 
Castilian or Catalan. Non-Catalan speakers include large numbers of people that migrated to 
the large urban conurbations from less developed Spanish regions before the mid-1970s, as 
well as very many foreign migrants (see 4.3). Catalan is an official language alongside 
Castilian. 
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4.1.1 The general politics of post-dictatorship Spain  
 
The political culture established in the transition period 
 
Spaniards suffered the extreme-right dictatorship of Franco for four decades after 1939. In 
1976, with the regime undermined by mass workers’ and democratic movements, a 
“reformist” president, Adolfo Suárez, was appointed, who negotiated a political “transition” 
with the Socialist, Communist and regional-nationalist opposition (Ysàs, 2006). Together 
Francoist, opposition leaders and “social agents” – workers and employers´ representatives- 
created a new democratic institutional framework, including the 1978 Constitution, thus 
beginning a practice of consultation and multilateralism in policymaking that became a feature 
of politics in much of the following decades (Encarnación, 2008: 2). This has been described 
in political circles as “the culture of the Transition” (Rodríguez-López, 2015). 
Although much scholarly and political analysis of the “Transition” has treated it as a 
model of peaceful resolution of conflicts –even being described as “the paradigmatic case for 
the study of democratic consolidation” (Encarnación, 2008: 4), a variety of historical studies 
have treated the accords as “asymmetrical” (Pastor, 2012: 131) and allowing the continued 
dominance of traditional elites in the democratic period (Balfour, 1989; Rodríguez-López, 
2015; Köhler, 1995; Prieto del Campo, 2005). As described by Köhler, the powerful 
grassroots  labour movement “Comisiones Obreras” (CC.OO.) was treated by its Communist 
(PCE) leadership as “a bargaining chip” in the political “horse trading between reform and 
continuity” (1995: 111), and accepted “social peace” in return for promises of social reforms in 
the 1978 Moncloa Accords (Ibid: 122). This process combined with a period of recession and 
redundancies – increasing the unemployment rate from 5 to 16 per cent7 – to weaken the 
newly legalised trade unions: membership fell from 26 to 10 per cent of the workforce by 1985 
(Prieto del Campo, 2005: 53). The CC.OO. and the other big union federation the Socialist-
led UGT (General Workers’ Union) would became relatively incorporated into the state-
institutional framework – a process further encouraged by state funding of the unions. Mass 
joining of the new parties did not take place and party membership remained below the 
European average (Heywood, 2005: 52).  
 
Party politics 1982-2011  
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Felipe González’ PSOE came to office in 1982. It expanded Spain’s weak social provision 
(Magone, 2008: 19) but also embraced much of the economic model established by Margaret 
Thatcher in Britain  carried out many privatisations and “restructuring) removing state support 
for much of Spain’s heavy industry (Prieto del Campo, 2005: 53 & 54; Marín, 2001: 400-404). 
In general “Felipism” consolidated and extended the political practices of the Transition – a 
method described by Encarnación as “corporatist” (2008:2). Prieto del Campo described the 
government’s “formula” as,  
 
reducing all social problems to questions of consensus: a pre-defined consensus 
favouring the big Spanish capital interests created by the modernising fractions of the 
Francoist elites. (2005: 51).  
 
However, the Ministries of the Economy and Industry introduced a unilateral major 
restructuring of the productive sector –leading even the Socialist UGT to back a general strike 
in 1988 (Marín, 2001: 401, 404 & 411).  
With regards to Spain’s foreign orientation, in January 1986 Spain joined the 
European Community (EC). This required implementing “modernisation” reforms that 
transformed the Spanish economy and society (see 4.2). Because in the following years 
Spain received much foreign investment 8 and large “structural funds” aimed at “greater 
cohesion (economically and socially)9, as well as helping cement the new democracy and 
undermine attempts at political “regression” 10  integration was presented by the PSOE 
government as a major success11 (Marín, 2001: 370). In May 1986, it was decided in a (very 
contested) referendum to remain in NATO –thus continuing a pro-Atlantic strategy that was 
started by Franco during the Cold War12 (Marín, 2001: 387 & 388; and that was continued 
aggressively under the conservative PP administration of 2000-2004).  
Spain had traditionally had strong political and economic relationships with Central 
and South America, and these continued. In those regions the González government played 
a role in political transitions from dictatorships, debt negotiations, and oversaw much 
commercial investment in the region (Marín, 2001: 353-355). It also led setting up yearly 
Ibero-American summit meetings that have taken place since the early 1990s13 (Magone, 
2008: 19; Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, 2015). Since Franco regulated it in 
1958, 12th October - the day Columbus arrived in the Americas and Hispanic colonisation 
began- had been celebrated, but in 1987 the González government made it a “national public 
holiday”14 (Pastor, 2012: 145). The relationship with Spain’s North African neighbours was 
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more strictly economic – lacking the evident cultural component of some of the American-
orientated initiatives. Bilateral agreements were signed with Morocco in 1983 (on trade, 
militarisation and fishing rights) and 1988; and – after tensions over migratory policy and 
rights to fish in Moroccan waters – a further agreement between the two countries was 
reached in 1995 (Marín, 2001: 356 & 357).   
From 1984 the government progressively deregulated much of Spain’s relatively 
protected labour market - despite CC.OO. and UGT holding one-day general strikes (see 
4.2.1). It also created half a million state jobs and politically appointed tens of thousands of 
administrators. Arguably, a semi clientilist apparatus was created: by the 1990s 70 per cent of 
all PSOE members were functionaries or public office holders (Heywood, 2005: 52 & 53). In 
1996, after a series of scandals over corruption and the state funding of anti-ETA terror 
groups in the Basque Country (Heywood, 2005: 42-44), José María Aznar’s People’s Party 
(PP) won the general elections – but requiring outside support from the Catalan CiU and 
Basque PNV parties. The PP (originally under the name Alianza Popular) was set up by one 
of Franco’s ministers and had organic and cultural links with the dictatorship. This was 
demonstrated when after Aznar won an absolute majority in 2000, policymaking became 
more unilateral and there were “expressions of the persistence in the party of authoritarian 
and right-wing habits and mentalities” (Balfour, 2005: 164). From 2000 to 2004, there was a 
“cycle” of mobilisation by “new social movements” (including demonstrations of over three 
million people against Spanish involvement in the occupation of Iraq), although there was a 
consistently positive perception of economic performance among the population (Gramacho, 
2007: 211). 
The PSOE - now led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero- unexpectedly returned to 
office in March 2004 after voters perceived that the Aznar government had deliberately 
misinformed them regarding the police investigations into the Madrid bombings days before 
(attempting to attribute responsibility to the Basque ETA and avoid associations with Iraq)15. 
Arguably encouraged by the progressive social movements that had helped the PSOE regain 
office, the Zapatero administration introduced a series of progressive social and geo-political 
policies (including the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the right to marriage for LGBT persons, 
and the 2005 migrant regularisation process – see 5.2.2.1). The decision over Iraq increased 
the PSOE’s popularity to record levels 16 . But Catholic, Spanish-nationalist and other 
conservative forces held street protests against several socially progressive measures –
including liberalisation of abortion law and the (limited) attempt at a peace-process with ETA 
in the Basque Country. Some of the government’s policies were softened; and economic 
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strategy remained similar to that of its predecessor. This was the politically-volatile (but 
economically stable) context in which the PSOE introduced the liberal immigration policies 
outlined in 5.2.2.1.  
In 2008 the PSOE won a second term in office with 44 per cent of the vote. Zapatero’s 
initial response to the economic crisis was to favour infrastructure spending to reactivate the 
economy (and particularly its flailing large construction firms – see 4.2.3), promising he would 
“never make workers pay for the crisis”. Yet after pressure by the US and European 
governments, the PSOE did a turnaround and introduced strict austerity measures. These led 
to a general strike in autumn 2010 and mass square occupations (the “Indignados 
movement”) in May 2011 (the M-15 movement, Domènech-Sampere, 2011). Support for the 
PSOE fell rapidly, and the People’s Party – now led by Mariano Rajoy – returned to office in 
November. The other significant party in Spanish politics was the Communist-led United Left 
(IU), created after the anti-NATO mobilisations of the 1980s. Its share of the vote has 
remained small but substantial: reaching a peak of 11 per cent in the 1990s and a low of 4 
per cent in 2008.    
 
 
4.1.2 Catalan national politics under regional autonomy  
 
Using autonomy to dilute minority national aspirations 
 
In the last years of the dictatorship Catalonia’s national movement, which under the Catalan 
government (Generalitat) of Lluís Companys had declared the creation of a Republic in 
October 1934, re-emerged. In the Basque country a similar movement had developed an 
armed wing (ETA) that was responsible for hundreds of killings –mainly (but not exclusively) 
of state-security personnel17. Both national and social movements in the territory were subject 
to particularly fierce state repression18 (Prieto del Campo, 2005: 48 & 49). This latter territorial 
conflict likely reinforced the hostility of the Spanish right had towards minority national rights 
that went back to before the Civil War (as best illustrated by the attitude of a 1920s minister: 
“better a red Spain than a broken Spain”19, Pastor, 2012: 99). This meant that reintroducing 
Catalan and Basque self-government was a slower and more contested democratisation 
process than others. After the first elections in September 1977 a mass protest was held in 
favour of Catalan autonomy (Ysàs, 2001: 284 & 285). 
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Furthermore, the Spanish Right managed to negotiate a new constitution that 
prohibited independence (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007: 96 & 97): article two of the text affirmed 
“the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”20 and article eight that, “[t]he mission of the 
Armed Forces … is to … defend its territorial integrity”21. In the referendum to ratify the 
Constitution in December 1978 a minority of Basques and a narrow majority of Catalans 
approved the text. Finally the new centre-right government (1977-1982; Suárez’ UCD) and 
the PSOE opposition attempted to “depoliticise and bureaucratise the territorial question” by 
agreeing to create 17 “Autonomous Communities” (ACs) across Spain22 (Prieto del Campo, 
2005: 49; Magone, 2008: 18). The ACs included historic nations with a strong identity and 
territories lacking any differentiated identity - such as Madrid or Cantabria, and thereby 
“diluted the specificities of Catalonia, Euskadi23 and Galicia” (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007: 118). 
For Magone, the “state of autonomies framework” was “a concession to the Francoist elites, 
which were afraid of a disintegration of the unity of Spain”24 (2008: 17). All ACs were allowed 
to elect a president and legislative body and “regional statutes” were negotiated individually. 
 
Using autonomy to build the Catalan nation 
 
Whatever the intentions, the autonomous framework did not end the minority national 
aspirations inside “the Spanish state” - including the desire for independence among a great 
many Basques and (particularly later) Catalans25. Catalonia passed its Statute of Autonomy in 
1979, giving the Generalitat (Catalan government) jurisdiction over health, social-security, 
cultural and other policies26. However, unlike the two Basque ACs27, Catalonia was not 
allowed to have its own tax system, and in the coming decades relatively high net transfers of 
revenue were made to the Spanish Inland Revenue (Hacienda) –a motive for elites’ support 
for greater fiscal self-government 28 . Since 1980, regional elections in Catalonia (and 
Euskadi29) have normally produced centre-right nationalist governments (even if general 
elections have been more favourable to other forces, such as the Catalan Socialists - PSC). It 
appears that part of the success of CiU (and the PNV in the Basque Country) has been that it 
is seen as a strong defender of the interests of the minority nation vis-á-vis Madrid. 
CiU has engaged in “nation building without a state” using the devolved powers 
available (McRoberts, 2001). In particular under president Jordi Pujol Convergence and 
Union (CiU) government of 1980-2003 introduced laws and directives that greatly normalised 
the Catalan language in public life (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009: 76). Public Catalan-language TV 
channels were introduced (including the most popular channel TV3); in 1998 a Law of 
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Linguistic Politics established Catalan as the teaching language in schools and other public 
places (ibid: 77); in the 2000s a Catalan police force (the Mossos d’Esquadra30) was created. 
From 1993 to 1999, CiU gave parliamentary support to two minority central governments –
first PSOE and after PP – in exchange for reductions in tax transfers. This support and its 
right-wing social policies, which have included the introduction of private-financing initiatives 
in the health service, have been seen to contribute to CiU’s long-term decline. Yet one sign of 
its hegemony has been that an attack in Spain on Pujol or his successor Mas often has been 
successfully as an attack on Catalonia itself (Dowling, 2005: 111).  
 
Diverging national projects 1996-2001 
 
After Aznar reached office in 1996 the national tensions that had continued in the post-Franco 
period –particularly in the Basque Country- became a central political issue in Spain. In the 
process they revealed the rivalry between the minority nationalisms and the PP government’s 
“constitutional patriotism” 31  (Pastor, 2012: 156). While CiU and the PNV were giving 
parliamentary support to the first Aznar administration, they joined with the (centre-left) 
Galician Nationalist Block (BNG) to sign a declaration calling for a pluri-national Spanish state 
based on respect for national differences32 (Pastor, 2012: 126) This was rejected by the 
People’s Party government, as it saw Spain as being a single nation - a view that was spelt 
out very clearly by the Party’s 2008 Congress: 
 
Spain is every Spaniard’s only historical and political reality … Constitutional Spain … 
is a single nation whose sovereignty corresponds only and exclusively to the Spanish 
people33 (ibid: 134 & 135). 
 
This national chauvinism and its concomitant hostility towards “peripheral nationalisms” 
shaped the conduct of the PP in government - and set much of the pattern for the handling of 
territorial affairs by the subsequent Socialist administration. 
After the popular outrage in response to ETA’s assassination of kidnapped councillor 
Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997, the central government and courts criminalised the Basque 
independence movement. The central committee of the pro-independence Herri Batasuna 
was imprisoned. In 2003 after leadership and organisational changes of leaders, the party - 
renamed Batasuna—was illegalised; and newspapers were shut down (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009: 
58; Prieto del Campo, 2005: 58 & 59). Under Zapatero there was little change in relation to 
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Basque politics. More leaders were imprisoned, which included Arnaldo Otegi - recognised as 
having led the process that culminated in ETA’s definitive ceasefire in 2011. Officially these 
were legal responses to organisational links with ETA but this view is very problematic. In 
2010 the National Court overturned the closure of Egunkaria - the only fully Basque-language 
daily newspaper, denouncing “the narrow and erroneous view that everything to do with the 
Basque language and culture” had been assumed to be” promoted and/or controlled by ETA” 
(Audiencia Nacional, 2010). An international campaign supported by ex-presidents and Nobel 
Prize winners has called for the release of Otegi for his role as “leader of the peace 
process”34. 
Minority national demands by more moderate forces also have been met with 
authoritarian response by government and state. For example, a planned referendum over 
making the Basque AC a “community freely associated with the Spanish state” was 
successfully challenged by the Zapatero government in the Constitutional Court - Spain’s 
highest legal body- in 200835 (Pastor, 2012: 127 & 128). In the case of Catalan demands, it 
looked at first as if central government’s reaction was to be different. In 2003 a left-wing 
Tripartite alliance led by Socialist (PSC) Pasqual Maragall took over the Generalitat, 
announcing it would substantially reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy 36 . The new 
Spanish Socialist government the following March endorsed this reform (in ACs that wished 
for this), promising a “second transition” to transform the state’s territorial architecture (Balfour 
& Quiroga, 2007: 120). 
Yet the outcome of the Catalan reform was far from harmonious. The new Statute 
passed by the Catalan parliament in 2005 –and later ratified in referendum- included 
measures to compensate for previous fiscal transfers and the future handover of no more 
than 50 per cent of revenue from shared taxes, as well as powers to manage immigration 
(ibid: 12; 5.3.1). It immediately encountered a boycott of Catalan products in Madrid backed 
by a considerable proportion of the local population (Carmona, García & Sánchez, 2012: 
106). The Statute was then truncated first by the Spanish government and then Congress 
(Pastor, 2012: 159). The conservative opposition felt the modified text still included too many 
concessions to the Generalitat and made a challenge to the Constitutional Court. In 2010 the 
Court ruled that fourteen articles were unconstitutional and others required a restrictive 
interpretation; and it denied any juridical effect of identifying Catalonia as “a nation” 
(Carmona, García & Sánchez, 2012: 105).  
The evolution of the process was met by angry disappointment among many 
Catalans. In 2010 a million and a half demonstrated under the slogan “We are a nation. We 
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decide” (ibid). Zapatero spoke of having reached the “end of political decentralisation” and 
many Catalans coincided, embracing independence as an alternative. Figure 4.1 shows that 
the proportion of people in the AC preferring this option over other territorial arrangements 
doubled during the reform attempt to over one in four, while those whose preferred model 
was autonomy fell by approximately a quarter. Between 2009 and 2011 municipal 
referendums on independence were held in many localities. In 2011 support for 
independence rose further (Figure 4.1). This was likely encouraged by the political and 
institutional crisis that developed in response to the M-15 square occupations, which Spanish 
intellectuals have termed the "regime crisis” (Cano et al., 2014; Iglesias, 2015); and the 
growing popularity of the “economic case for independence” among people previously 
unmotivated by the idea of Catalan statehood37.  
 
Figure 4.1: Catalans’ relative preference for different territorial models  
(% of total options) 
  
Source: Barometers of the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (Catalan government’s polling centre; Bel, 
2013: 59) 
 
There also were indications that in the future a more centralised Spain was a possible 
outcome. In November 2010 the Spanish Supreme Court questioned the use of Catalan in 
the school system (Pastor, 2012: 163); and in conservative circles there was increasing talk 
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of the need to save public spending by reducing the territorial levels of public administration38. 
Because “the political project of Catalanism” had centred on the “extension and deepening of 
autonomous power” and the devolution process had reached a “dead end” even pragmatic 
and conservative pro-Catalan parties such as CiU have became alienated with central 
government and its decisions (Dowling, 2005: 111).   
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4.2 Pronounced business cycles, flexibility and migrants 
 
The macroeconomic and labour context in which the “new immigration” has taken place has 
been of relatively pronounced economic cycles, widespread insecurity in labour markets - 
precarious and underground, and low competitiveness. Before 1974 the Spanish economy 
had undergone two decades of industrialisation and growth (and urbanisation of society)39. 
Since, the Spanish economy has suffered three recessions (1974-1985, 1993-1995, and the 
post-2007 slump40); as well as growing at annual rates of between 2.9 and 5.3 per cent 
between 1995 and 2007 (Köhler, 1995: 75; Molinero & Ysàs, 2001: 305 & 306; Marín, 2001: 
438-441; Expansión, 2015). The attempt to overcome these difficulties has included the 
related strategies of European integration, labour reform and an economic “model” articulated 
to an increasing degree around construction and tourism (López & Rodríguez, 2011; Marín, 
2001: 439). 
The European strategy meant that before and after joining the EC the González 
government chose to privatise state “monopolies”, accelerate an existing process of 
“industrial restructuring” (including eliminating industrial subsidies), introduce VAT, and in the 
1990s reduce much of the social protections the PSOE had expanded earlier (Marín, 2001: 
366-368, 439). Economic interconnectedness grew between Spain and the EC. European 
imports grew from a third to two thirds of total Spanish imports between 1984 and 1992; while 
Spanish exports to the EC increased from just over half to nearly three quarters in 
approximately the same period41 (ibid: 368). In order to qualify for incorporation in the new 
common currency - complying with the criteria agreed by EC member states in Maastricht in 
1992- the PSOE government (and PP administration from 1996) agreed to control inflation, 
the public deficit and debt, and adopt a stable exchange rate through the European Monetary 
System (EMS, ibid: 438). Financial speculation on EMS currencies, added to problems of 
foreign capital flight and growing commercial deficit, led to a recession in 1993 (ibid: 369 & 
438). From this period there has been low social spending in Spain compared to other 
European countries42. 
 
 
4.2.1 Structural precariousness and migrant labour 
 
Major “labour reforms” were passed by the González government in 1984 and 1993 that 
greatly increased insecure “temporary” hiring – affecting over a third of all jobs by 2006 and 
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becoming “a fundamental structural factor in the Spanish labour market” 43 (Pajares, 2010: 71; 
Martínez-Veiga, 2004: 52 & 53; Marín, 2001: 441). The new “secondary” labour sector was 
characterised by “low skills, low wages and few chances of promotion” (Martínez-Veiga, 
2004: 50), as well as being associated with piecework, arbitrary discipline and low levels of 
unionisation (ibid: 34-39). Naturally this increased the relative strength of employers in the 
sector: enabling them to increase the rate of extraction of surplus value. The existence of a 
“dual” labour market can also be employed to undermine working conditions in the better 
protected segment (ibid: 59). Real wages in Spain have stagnated in recent decades –even 
during the period of economic expansion before 2007 –and it has been argued that the 
largescale flexibilisation of labour in Spain has been a major factor in this (Taifa, 2006). 
Flexibilisation has also contributed to maintaining a model of economic activity based on low 
capital investment and productivity. 
Despite labour reforms in 2001, 2006 and 2010 ostensibly being introduced to end 
what became widely acknowledged as a socially restricting employment relation, 
precariousness has persisted at high levels44. In Catalonia insecurity has been lower than the 
Spanish average and decreased substantially during the 1990s: from 20-27 per cent of total 
job contracts in the territory in the 1985-1993 period, to around 15 per cent in 1995-2003 
(Colectivo Ioé, 2008: 93).  
 
The relation between migrant and precarious labour  
 
When sizeable immigration began in the late 1990s (see 4.3.1) it became an ingredient in the 
strategy to extend insecure employment. Within a few years 65 per cent of non-EU migrant 
workers were employed precariously (Martínez-Veiga, 2004: 53) 45 . Migrants were often 
employed in what Piore described as “lower social status” employment” with “hard and 
unpleasant conditions” – including frequent rotation- and little chance of professional 
promotion, which the “native workforce rejects” (ibid: 42 & 43). Martínez-Veiga maintains that 
rather than being a separate market, precariousness “is constituted de facto as a unitary 
labour market” – as illustrated by the growth of temporary hiring in public-sector professions 
(ibid: 54 & 57). In Catalonia overlap between migrant and precarious hiring can be detected. 
For instance, in 2008 migrant workers in the territory averaged 27 months in jobs - as 
opposed to 113 months for non-migrants46 (Colectivo Ioé, 2008: 95). Employment sectors 
with a large proportion of long-term precarious hiring in the territory tend to also hire many 
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migrants (ibid: 95). Immigrants are three times more likely to work in more than one job than 
“autochthonous” workers (ibid: 96)  
At the same time, some observers – including scholars sympathetic to the plight of 
migrants- tend to commensurate migrant labour with precarious labour (Romero, 2010; 
Martínez-Veiga, 2004: chapter 1). A national report by the CC.OO. union federation, subtitled 
“Proposals for the Regulation of Migration Flows”, implied that migration is the key source of 
precarious labour in Spain,  
 
having an important reserve army ‘flexibilises’ the job market, thanks to immigrant 
working people’s reduced costs –[social security] contributions and wages, greater 
availability and less-demanding attitude towards legal compliance. (Comisiones 
Obreras, 2008: 174) 
 
These ideas overlap with some approaches to immigration by Spanish scholars. One equates 
migrant labour with the Marxian labour category of the “reserve army”, which acts “to 
suppress wage demands and discipline the working classes” and even replace “native” labour 
(Recío, 2008: 49; see 3.1.3 on Marx’s concept). The controversial Viejo Top analysis 
mentioned in 1.2.2 argued that immigration imported the wages of the poorest countries and 
had been responsible for the stagnation in average Spanish wages since 199747 (Verstrynge, 
Sánchez-Medero & Sánchez-Medero, 2007: 18). 
The cited accounts misrepresent the development of Spanish labour markets and 
migrant labour’s role in them. Fixed-term hiring – often taking the form of repeated contracting 
of the same employee- was a major feature of Spanish employment before the largescale 
incorporation of migrants into the workforce, and has involved much larger numbers of non-
migrant young people than migrants48 (Martínez-Veiga, 2004: 51). In the first quarter of 2007 
according to official figures nearly 32 per cent of all workers were precarious –a far higher 
percentage than the proportion of foreign workers (UGT, 2015: 4. Unofficial studies have 
calculated a much higher figure; Taifa, 2006: 27). Furthermore, according to Pajares, by the 
end of 2008 more foreign workers were employed on permanent contracts than fixed-term 
(2010: 72). The overall evidence suggests that migrant labour should be treated as a 
separate category to precarious labour – even if there is considerable overlap between the 
two groups. 
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4.2.2 Underground hiring  
 
A third and less-discussed labour market is that of the underground economy. An Inland 
Revenue study presented in 2014 found that the underground economy made up a quarter of 
Spanish GDP (€253bn); although at the beginning of the crisis the figure was 18 per cent 
(€193bn)49. World Bank estimates informality as representing 22 per cent of Spanish GDP 
between 1996 and 200750. The “black economy”, which includes illegal transactions by firms 
that act legally at other times, is therefore a considerable stable economic feature. At the 
same time, it has expanded and contracted according to the economic cycle, and the 
sharpness of turns in employment may have been accentuated by companies and self-
employed persons deciding to take operations “off the books” (see 4.2.3). It is an employment 
sector that can absorb irregular migrant workers as easily as non-migrant labour. This has led 
some scholars to affirm that the size of the underground economy in southern Europe is the 
central “pull” factor in migration flows (Baldwin-Edwards, 1998: 3). 
Research by Cornelius published in 2004 identified limited enforcement of penalties 
against illegal hiring and social-security infractions. He associated this passivity with the 
economic importance and cultural entrenchment of the underground economy. For a Spanish 
scholar he interviewed, 
 
a large proportion of illegal immigrants as well as native-born workers are employed in 
the underground economy. If it were seriously disrupted, much of the local population 
could be left without work. (2004: 409).  
 
Informal hiring has “a long tradition” in Spain (Recío, 2008: 61) and Cornelius identified this 
as taking place under the González and Aznar administrations due to a “well-entrenched” 
institutional culture of respecting employer autonomy (2004: 409). At the same time, 
governments have shown they partake in the tradition described: as demonstrated most 
dramatically in the “Bárcenas case” being processed in the courts at the time of writing. In this 
case there has emerged considerable evidence from the ex-treasurer of the PP that President 
Aznar, his successor as PP leader Mariano Rajoy, and other party employees received illegal 
bonuses from a slush fund together with party wages51 (Pérez, 2013). For the Colectivo Ioé, 
underground employment is a sub-category of the precarious labour market, but it is one that 
because of its illegal nature arguably has more in common with irregular immigration and the 
criminal activities that help it prosper (2008: 93).  
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4.2.3 Migrants in “boom” and “bust” 
 
Immigration arrived on a largescale in Spain in the midst of economic expansion (1995-2007). 
Relatively high growth rates and a big fall in unemployment – officially from 22 per cent in 
1996 to 7 per cent- meant that the country accounted for a large part of domestic demand 
and new employment in the Eurozone in the 2000-2005 period (Prieto del Campo, 2005: 56; 
Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 113). This led to talk of being a “miracle” economy and Aznar 
adopting the political slogan “España va bien” (“Spain is doing fine”52). Yet growth was shown 
to have been built on weak foundations. The high value of the Euro adopted in January 1999 
and the fiscal and other reforms performed that made Spain eligible to join the Eurozone 
helped make exports less competitive than imports from core EU states and elsewhere –an 
imbalance eventually expressed in a high current account deficit (reaching 10 per cent, 
Montes, 2009; Lapavitsas et al., 2012: 22-33; 4.2). European-inspired modernisation also 
encouraged a narrowing of economic activity (4.2; López & Rodríguez, 2011; Marín, 2001).   
A construction bubble was allowed to inflate - encouraged by cheap lending to home 
purchasers and new laws reducing planning restrictions (López & Rodríguez, 2011; Colau & 
Alemany, 2004). Purchasers included large numbers of wealthier Europeans buying holiday 
homes – adding significantly to foreign residence. Rapid house-price rises – of 12 per cent 
annually between 1997 and 2007 – meant Spaniards wished to buy a first or second property 
(Hugh, 2009). Banks gave a million new mortgages to the poorest sections of society 
between 2003 and 2007 – including very many non-EU migrants (López & Rodríguez, 2011). 
“The wealth effect of steadily rising property prices” fuelled “voracious consumption” and the 
“economy overheated way beyond capacity” (Hugh, 2009). Rising property prices also 
encouraged “frenzied urban-development speculation” – in the words of a UN envoy. By 2006 
there were more housing start-ups in Spain (900,000) than in Germany, France and Italy 
together, and one in five new Spanish jobs were in the housing sector (López & Rodríguez, 
2011). Encouraged by stagnated wages, families borrowed heavily during this period.  
The combination of the excesses described and the international banking crisis and 
recession were followed by the collapse of the construction sector, real estate firms and 
regional savings banks. Asset prices acted on the economy in “reverse, generating a severe 
poverty effect” (ibid). In two years unemployment rose to 17 per cent53 (reaching 26 per cent 
in 2012). A million homes remained unsold and in 2008 and 2009 a million construction 
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workers lost their jobs (López & Rodríguez, 2011; Pajares, 2010: 33). Very many of these 
were migrants, as the unemployment rate for migrant building workers became double that of 
the rest of workers in the sector (Pajares, 2010: 48). The negative social impact of the crisis 
was huge for almost everybody but particularly for migrants. Job losses among migrants in 
the service sector increased by over 200,000 in two years; and a quarter of all Ecuadorians 
lost their jobs in one year (Pajares, 2010: 50 & 156). By the end of 2009 almost a third of 
migrants were unemployed and by the first quarter of 2012 this had risen to 37 per cent 
(Carrasco-Carpio & García-Serrano, 2011; López-Sala & Ferrero-Turrión, 2009; Burchianti & 
Zapata-Barrero, 2012: 6). The activity rate of migrants fell from 68 per cent to 54 per cent 
between 2006 and 2009 (Burchianti & Zapata-Barrero, 2012: 6). At the time it compared to a 
reduction in little over one in five for non-migrants. This was the specific context in which the 
PSOE government adopted less favourable policies towards migrants – including “return 
policies” (see 5.2.2.1). At the same time, according to Pajares, the loss of jobs in the 
precarious employment sector was far bigger among non-migrants54 (2010: 72).   
 A wave of home evictions – part encouraged by the desire for banks to recover their 
losses – affected a great many migrants as well as non-migrants. Between 2007 and 2011 a 
total of 349,438 were carried out according to the Spanish judiciary (CGPJ); 65,670 evictions 
in Catalonia (Colau & Alemany, 2014: 206). A survey of victims performed by the large PAH 
housing movement found that 35 per cent were foreign nationals – of which many had lost 
their jobs in the recession (ibid: 212 & 214). Between 2010 and 2011 the central and Catalan 
government brought in strict austerity measures (including reducing public-sector employment 
and wages, as well as greatly reducing welfare-state provision). 
  
 
4.3 New immigration in Spain and Catalonia 
 
Spanish and Catalan migratory patterns changed greatly in the latter half of the Twentieth 
Century. Spain was a country of political and economic emigration from 1910 to 197055 (Rius-
Sant, 2007: 18). Partly in response to uneven processes of industrialisation from the 1950s to 
the mid-1970s largescale “internal” migration took place from poorer Spanish regions to cities 
such as Madrid, Bilbao, and Barcelona. A total of 1.4 million Andalusians, Murcians and 
Galicians emigrated to Catalonia (Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 111), and by 1970 those born 
outside Catalonia made up 38 per cent of the local population (McRoberts, 2001: 129 & 130). 
In Catalonia and the Basque Country newcomers were described as “immigrants” – a 
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terminology that was used until the 1990s when its meaning was transferred to refer to non-
European newcomers.  
At the time of the interviews for this research around one in five Catalan residents had 
been born in other Spanish ACs, and over one in six, born abroad (Arrighi-de-Casanova, 
2014: 111). Foreign settlement began mainly in the 1960s and has included people from the 
richer western Europe – many of whom retired and/or resident for part of the year in tourist 
destinations (Arroyo-Pérez et al., 2012: 56; Parella, 2006: 135). Members of this group are 
rarely treated as “immigrants” in political and popular discourse in Spain, although figures 
given in media and scholarly reports on the immigration phenomenon tend to treat as the 
same those of all “foreigners” with “immigrants” – a more objective approach. The result is to 
give inflated ideas as to the size and intensity of cultural and “ethnic” transformations in 
Spain. Exclusion of many Europeans from the “immigrant” category sometimes is justified in 
terms of their “EU citizenship”, but people from eastern EU states are frequently termed 
“inmigrantes”56 – an inclusion that suggests the term “immigrant” is associated with those of 
lower socio-economic conditions and status. Likewise, immigration often has been 
approached as reduced to labour migration. 
 
 
4.3.1 Patterns of the new immigration in Spain  
 
The “new immigration” from poorer countries began in the 1970s –including Moroccan 
migrants that settled in Catalonia after being blocked from emigrating to France (Rius-Sant, 
2011: 11-13). It became a major demographic feature in Spain in the second half of the 
1990s –raising steeply the total foreign-resident population (including those from richer 
European countries). This can be seen from Figure 4.2, which charts the long-term evolution 
of Interior Ministry statistics.  
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Figure 4.2: Long-term evolution of legal foreign residence in Spain 1975-2007  
 
 
Source: Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 113 & 114.  
*Note that the intervals vary from 2001. 
 
The figures show the size of immigration as presented and discussed publicly and give a 
broad idea of long-term developments. However, they only include regular migrants. 
Municipal register (“padrón”) statistics include very many irregular migrants and are a more 
accurate (if imperfect) measure of migrant residence. Figure 4.3 illustrates their evolution 
(expressed in the fainter line of the two) in the more recent 2001-2011 period: in which total 
foreign residence rose from 1,4 million to 5,3 million by 2008 – the first crisis year. Official 
residence reached 5.8 million in 2011 but the rate of immigration slowed – almost halting, 
likely demonstrating the impact of the crisis. The figures confirm the relationship between 
settlement levels and economic development. 
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Figure 4.3: Number of regular & registered foreign residents 2000-2011 
 
 
Source: Arroyo-Pérez et al., 2012: 77; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 113 & 114.  
 
The graph also compares the municipal-register data with that of the Interior Ministry (shown 
by the darker line). There are two related observations that can be made here. Firstly, the 
rise before the crisis –at least from 2000 onwards- was likely to have been even, rather than 
the upward curve suggested by government figures. Second, the evolution of the gap 
between the two curves provides an approximate idea of the size and trajectory of irregular 
residence.  Concretely it is shown that unauthorised residence grew during the second 
People’s Party administration (2000-2004) –reaching just above a million persons in 2003. It 
stayed around the same figure after the PSOE took office and initiated the much-debated 
2005 regularisation process (5.2.2.1). The sharp rise in the number of legal residents in 2007 
coincides with the incorporation of Romania and Bulgaria in the EU (Cea D’Ancona, 2010: 
56; Figure 4.6). The fact that the Interior figure for 2007 is higher than the “padrón” figure is 
examined in relation to the interview findings in 7.1.3.1, but in the meantime requires treating 
both the padrón figures and comparisons as approximate rather than exact.  
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4.3.1.1 Origins of foreign residents in Spain 
 
The growth in immigration since the 1990s is largely accountable by the increase in 
residents born in poorer countries –leading scholars to identify a process of “Third-
Worldisation” (“tercermundialización”) of immigration (Calavita, 2005: 27; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 112; Cornelius, 2004: 388). Such immigration was relatively pronounced 
in Spain, which by the mid 2000s had the largest share of net non-EU immigration in the 
Union (Eurostat figures in Consejo Económico y Social, 2004: 16). Foreign residents have a 
mix of regional origins. Based on figures from the INE and municipal records, the numbers 
and relative proportions of different groups in December 2011 are illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
Easily the largest group are Europeans (a total of 47 per cent for both EU and non-EU), 
followed by “Americans” (mainly South Americans and substantial numbers from Central 
America and the Caribbean) – 27 per cent of the total foreign population. The proportions of 
Africans and Asians are 19 per cent and 7 per cent respectively.  
 
Figure 4.4: Regional origin of foreign population in Spain 2012 
 
 
Source: municipal record, INE in Arroyo-Pérez et al., 2012: 28. 
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Identifying the evolution of immigrant origins over time is useful in that it provides indications 
of the effect of policies –as is introduced in Chapter Three. Figure 4.5 shows the variation in 
legal residence of migrants from the geographical areas used in Figure 4.4. EU migration 
grew steadily and slowly until the mid-2000s when it accelerated rapidly. Latin American and 
African residence both grew greatly after the mid 1990s, but the increase in the former was 
almost twice as pronounced  from 2001 to 2005.   
 
Figure 4.5: Evolution of foreign residence in Spain by regional origin 1975-2007  
 
 
Source: Interior Ministry figures in Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 113 & 114.  
* Both groups of Europeans were not included in 1990 due to changes in the measuring 
system.  
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**From 2001 the EU includes countries from the European Economic Area (EEA). (Note: the 
intervals change also). 
 
It can be assumed that if the figures included unauthorised migrants, there would be a 
smaller proportion of Europeans and the other groups would be more numerous. However, 
the importance and rapid expansion of European inmigration can be partly attributed to the 
expansion of the EU eastwards – as can the fall in non-EU European settlement after 2005). 
This can be seen from looking at the changes to the national  origins of migrants. According 
to “padrón” data, Romanians formed the biggest group of foreign residents in 2011 (865,707 
inhabitants), despite being a very small group at the beginning of the 2000s – see Figure 
4.6. It is clear from the residence figures that a very large number were already living in 
Spain before Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007. The Bulgarian and Polish populations 
have also grown. The other steady and increasing source of EU settlement is by the 
nationalities normally invisible in debates on immigration: the British, Germans, Italians, 
Portuguese and French – all of whose arrival has hardly slowed down during the crisis 
years.  
Moroccan settlement has continued –making this the second largest foreign 
nationality in the country (773,995). And there are six South American nationalities of over 
100,000 inhabitants. All of these grew considerably before 2006 but have mostly stopped 
growing since. The Ecuadorian and Argentinean collectives have shrunk during the crisis 
period and this may be because both groups came to Spain after major crises in their own 
countries57.   
 Some of the Eastern European migration is by persons of Roma origin, and such a 
group joins an already considerable Roma population of Spanish citizens. Roma persons as 
a whole make up 1.6 per cent of the Spanish population according to the European 
Commission (López, 2011). There is also a substantial Muslim population – of roughly a 
million and a half residents according to an estimate using “padrón” data (Cembrero & 
Álvarez, 2010. Half are of these are Moroccans and a third, Spanish citizens (ibid). Catalonia 
has significantly more Muslim residents – totalling roughly a third of a million – than any 
other AC (ibid). Both the Muslim and Roma populations have suffered, and continue to 
suffer, considerable prejudice and discrimination.  
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Figure 4.6: Evolution of foreign residence in Spain by nationality (20 largest) 
 
 
Source: municipal-record & INE data in Arroyo-Pérez et al., 2012: 85. 
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4.3.1.2 Migrants in the workforce  
 
Several ways by which migrants have played a crucial role in the Spanish labour market 
have already been cited in this thesis: resolving demographic deficits (1.2), providing new 
sources of precarious and underground labour (4.2.1), and filling major gaps in the job 
market –such as during the construction boom (4.2.3). In this sub-section statistical data is 
employed to show more precisely how this has developed in practice. It is necessary to add 
first, however, that there are two other ways in which migrants have fitted into Spain’s varied 
employment fabric. In the first place, it has been acknowledged that migrants are more likely 
to accept deskilling for different reasons (including legal, institutional and discriminatory 
impediments to them working in their previous professions).  
 Secondly, partly because migrants often arrive as individual adult women and men 
without families and are (initially) less rooted, they logically have greater flexibility regarding 
work shifts and hours, and the location in which they work and live. Consequently, in 2009 
foreign residents were three times more likely to change municipality of residence than 
Spaniards. (Pajares, 2010: 103 & 158). Employment sectors that benefit from this mobility 
include agriculture, agroindustry, and hospitality (including in tourist centres away from 
residential areas). Domestic employment has been transformed in the period of new 
immigration from a sector in which (in 1985) only 7 per cent of domestics lived in (when the 
service was mainly provided by “native” women from the countryside), to a mainly migrant 
employment sector including very many “live-in” domestic workers (84 per cent of the many 
Dominican women working in domestic service according to a 1994 study; Martínez-Veiga, 
2004: 146). This transformation has been encouraged by the incorporation of large numbers 
of Spanish women into employment creating a new market in “middle-earning” households. 
In such a market the low wages offered can be partially compensated by providing free 
accommodation, which some migrant women that are newly arrived (or hired at source) have 
been willing to accept58 (see 6.2 for more discussion). 
Table 4.1 shows the INE figures for migrant and non-migrant employment in 201059. 
It includes the proportions of both migrants – including EU residents- and non-migrants 
working in different employment sectors. By comparing the percentages of migrants and 
“native” workers, it can be seen in which sectors migrant labour is being hired or not. The 
most important observation is that nearly 400,000 migrants – 36 per cent of all migrant 
workers – are in “unskilled employment” (Pajares, 2010: 90). At the other end of the 
employment spectrum they are much less likely to be in public-administrative (half), technical 
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or professional posts (a third or less). They are half as likely to be managers, and it can be 
assumed that this proportion would be considerably lower if those running small businesses 
were not included in this category. The figure of 51,900 migrants in agriculture and fishing is 
very low and raises the question of the extent of the irregular labour in agriculture revealed 
after the El Ejido violence (1.2.1). 
Separate statistics showing employment only of non-EU migrants show that women in this 
group are even more  concentrated in “unskilled work” (52 per cent of the total: Pajares, 
2007: 64) and catering, domestic, social-services and retail services (30 per cent, ibid). Non-
EU males were employed in a greater variety of occupations: 36 per cent in skilled work in 
industry, construction and mining or craftwork; 31 per cent in unskilled work; 12 per cent in 
the above mentioned services; and 10 per cent as machine operators, fitters and assemblers 
(ibid).   
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Table 4.1 Sectors of employment of migrants and non-migrants 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pajares, 2010: 90 
 
A lot of deskilling of migrant labour takes place. Figures comparing educational levels 
between Spaniards and foreign residents vary (Pajares, 2007: 54; Consejo Económico y 
Social, 2004: 28-30). However, they point to Non-European migrants having broadly similar 
education levels to Spaniards (ibid). Yet migrants disproportionately perform unskilled and 
low-skilled work. Deskilling is promoted by legal and institutional impediments – for instance 
not recognising migrants’ qualifications – but also takes place due to ignorance. Research 
on African employment in the Girona area found that migrants were sometimes assumed to 
be suited to unskilled agricultural work even when having high education levels (as 
 
Foreign working 
population 
Spanish working 
population 
Total no. % Total no. % 
Total 2,547,200 100 16,098,700 100 
Private & public sector 
management 
111,800 4 1,381,800 9 
Scientific & intellectual 
technicians & professionals 
130,600 5 2,479,700 15 
Support technicians & 
professionals 
111,900 4 2,184,200 14 
Administrative staff 115,200 5 1,632,100 10 
Catering, domestic/personal, 
social-protection & retail-service 
workers 
540,200 21 2,652,700 17 
Skilled workers in agriculture & 
fishing 
51,900 2 420,500 3 
Skilled workers in industry, 
construction & mining; craftspeople 
397,100 16 2,100,700 13 
Systems & machinery operators; 
fitters & assemblers 
167,200 7 1,387,300 9 
Unskilled workers 914,600 36 1,764,600 11 
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happened with Moroccan migrants – despite 80 per cent having secondary-level schooling; 
Mendoza, 2003: 162, 227). 
Figure 4.7 uses micro-data from the Active Population Survey (EPA, a large-sample 
INE household survey60) to demonstrate how migrant employment has evolved by sector, 
using the figures for 2000 (when migration was arriving), 2007 (before the crisis started 
having an effect), and 2010 (close to the date of interviews performed). Several sectors saw 
a large jump in migrant employment: construction (reaching a total 655,000 foreigners in 
2007), hospitality (totalling 415,000 the same year), domestic service (405,000), business 
and repairs (380,000), and industry and processing (305,000). In 2000, each of these 
sectors employed as little as 60,000-90,000 migrants. Migrant employment fell significantly 
in the sectors mentioned after the crisis, but greatly so in construction –in which the amount 
of employment more than halved (to 306,000). There were small increases in employment in 
the domestic, agricultural, company services, transportation and health/social provision 
sectors, which – with the exception of health- were not matched by increases in “native jobs” 
in these sectors (Carrasco-Carpio & García-Serrano, 2011: 115). 
The decreases in occupational numbers are similar to those of non-migrant workers 
in the same years (2007 & 2010; Carrasco-Carpio & García-Serrano, 2011: 115) with the 
exception of native jobs in construction – that fell by a smaller third. Sometimes migrant 
employment has followed “niche” patterns (for example Africans working in agriculture, 
Filipino and Dominican women working in domestic service, Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 112-
3).   
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of foreign employment by sector (1000s of workers) 
 
Source: Carrasco-Carpio & García-Serrano, 2011: 115. 
 
 
4.3.2 New immigration patterns in Catalonia 
 
The immigration from outside Spain that began in the 1990s is treated by the Catalan 
institutions as fully accounting for one of Catalonia’s biggest demographic expansions for a 
century (Secretaria per a la Immigració, 2010: 2; Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2008: 2 & 
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3). The foreign population grew substantially each year from the late 1990s to the time of the 
crisis. Between 1999 and 2002 inter-annual growth was over 20 per cent – peaking at 49 per 
cent from 2000 to 200161 (Secretari per a la inmigració, 2010). Since then the rate of arrival 
has slowed: reaching 4 per cent in 2009 –suggesting the impact of the crisis on migration 
has been general (ibid). Migrant mothers account for a quarter of all births – partly due to 
having a significantly higher birth rate than non-migrant mothers (Statistical Institute of 
Catalonia, 2008: 10 & 11). A very high proportion of migrants in Catalonia are waged: 
according to one Catalan study 93 per cent – compared to 82 per cent of “autochthonous” 
people (Colectivo Ioé, 2008: 92). In the 1999-2007 period most of the new hiring of migrants 
was “blue collar” (nearly seven out of ten jobs, ibid).  
According to Generalitat statistics – based on Spanish ministry and OPI, figures- 
presented in Figure 4.8, the order of regional origins of foreign residents in the AC are 
“Europe” (34 per cent), Africa (29 per cent), Latin America (nearly 25 per cent62), and Asia 
(12 per cent)63. The total numbers from each are included in the chart. Comparison with the 
Spanish distribution must be performed with caution – as it is not clear from sources that 
municipal record data was included64 (4.3.1.1). However, some important relative appraisals 
can be made. The foreign population is broadly similar to that in Spain but it is more diverse 
– with larger percentages of Africans (29 per cent) and Asians (12 per cent)65. Most notably 
there is a much lower proportion of Europeans (a little over a third) compared to in Spain as 
a whole (just under a half; 4.3.1.1). Because the Spanish figures include municipal data, if 
the Catalan statistics were not based on the same, then a lower proportion of EU residents 
should be expected. In consequence, we can assume a smaller weight of EU residence and 
a more diverse cultural makeup.
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Figure 4.8: Regional origin of foreign population in Catalonia 2011 
 
 
Source: Statistics Institute of Catalonia (Idescat, 2012).  
 
Before the crisis, the proportion of immigrants from Latin America increased – from 20 to 36 
per cent of total immigrants between 2000 and 2008; while that of Africans decreased – from 
42 to 25 per cent in the same period66 (National Institute of Statistics, 2008: 8). However, as 
in Spain, the Latin American community stopped growing with the crisis – as can be seen 
from observing the sizes of foreign nationalities resident in Catalonia in 2011 (as illustrated 
in Figure 4.9).   
 The figures on foreign residence by nationality and its evolution are (again) not 
clearly based on census figures requiring comparisons with the appropriate Spanish findings 
(in Figure 4.6) to be treated as approximate (even though both sets of data are those used 
by the official statistics bodies of each territory). However, it is possible to conclude that 
within similar patterns of immigration, in Catalonia there has been a greater predominance of 
Moroccan immigration (the largest national group in 2006 and 2011: 239,410 people in 
2011) and smaller –albeit growing- Romanian population (116,141). Beyond that it has had a 
similar but more diverse settlement (including significant numbers for several Asian and sub-
Saharan African nationalities). The figures for the main European nationalities suggest there 
are marginally more immigrants from the west than the east67. 
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Figure 4.9: Evolution of foreign residence in Catalonia by nationality  
(largest 20) 
 
 
Source: Idescat: 2001, 2006 & 2011
68
. 
 
Division of the same data according to different Catalan provinces confirms concentration of 
residence in and around Barcelona (two thirds of all migrant residents). There are (limited) 
indications that settlement is shaped by national and maybe kinship networks (for example 
the concentration of Latin Americans, Asians and Europeans in Barcelona province, or of 
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Russians and Gambians in Girona69; Idescat, 2012). Foreign residence is not just important 
in the big cities and towns: approximately half of Africans and Europeans live in urban areas 
of less than 50,000 inhabitants (Statistics Institute of Catalonia, 2008: 16 & 17). 
 The foreign population tends to be of working age (peaking at between 25 to 29 
years for most regional groups) and is very rarely elderly (with the partial exception of some 
EU nationals, Statistics Institute of Catalonia, 2008: 5-7). With the exception of Latin 
Americans, and “non-EU Europeans”, foreign residents are more likely to be male 
(averaging 121 men for every 100 migrant women, ibid). They are more than twice as likely 
to be “at risk of poverty” (ibid: 20). 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion: 
 
The main function of this chapter has been to provide necessary background to the findings 
presented in subsequent sections – particularly the following on immigration policymaking 
and policies. Therefore the relevance of some of the findings presented will only fully become 
apparent later. At the same time, some observations from the present chapter can be made 
at this stage. A first is that in the period subject to this study Spain was a politically stable 
democracy that had been incorporated successfully into the European Union, and had a 
stable (if relatively corporatist) political framework shaped primordially by the Socialist PSOE. 
An exception to its stability were the national disputes that continued after the end of Franco’s 
dictatorship (most dramatically in the form of persistent violence and repression in the Basque 
Country but also between Catalonia and Madrid). “Regional” decentralisation was meant to 
dilute the aspirations of the minority nations but Catalan nation-building continued to develop 
within such a framework thanks to linguistic, communication, educational and other policies – 
all aided by nationalist political hegemony in the territory. The growing desire for greater 
territorial redistribution of powers (including over immigration) was blocked in the 2000s.  
 Volatility in national matters has been matched by the increasing sharpness of Spain’s 
business cycles. The Socialist government’s response to a series of recessions between the 
1970s and early 1990s was to raise company profits through introducing widespread insecure 
hiring. Migrants would become a late component of this precarious-labour strategy. On the 
other hand flexibilisation has involved far greater numbers of “native” workers and migrant 
hiring is not commensurate with temporary employment. By comparing figures from the 
“padrón” and ministry figures it can be seen that approximately a million irregular migrants 
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resided in Spain between 2000 and 2003 – a phenomenon that shall be returned to in the 
following chapter. The vast majority of migrants are wage earners and a considerable section 
work in a relatively developed “submerged” economy. It can be deduced, therefore, that 
irregularity fits comfortably with existing labour frameworks.  
Migrants are relatively likely to work in unskilled posts (often despite formal skills), 
become unemployed, suffer poverty, and be evicted from their homes. It has been shown that 
a higher proportion of migrants are male in all regional groups bar Latin Americans – a 
collective that traditionally has included a large number of domestic workers. These features 
suggest that in general migrants were incorporated into low-wage and low-status activity in 
the period of expansion and were the first to lose their job in the economic downturn – a shift 
dramatically illustrated by the trajectory of migrant hiring in the building sector. Effectively 
migrants have played one of the roles of the “reserve army”: that responding to the cyclical 
economic expansion of certain sectors (including construction, domestic and hotel and 
catering work). This helps contextualise the evolution of the problematisation of immigration in 
relation to the crisis (aiding answering sub-question six on the issue, 1.4). Some migrants 
were hired in some business sectors during the crisis – suggesting that employers’ interest in 
migrant labour does not vary mechanically with economic cycles, but this was limited and 
does little to undermine my 2010 research findings that there was not a general process of 
substitution of native workers. Therefore there is little evidence of migrant labour acting as a 
substantial lever to contain wages and further flexibilise labour – the other function of the 
reserve army identified in 3.1.3. This reinforces the need for caution regarding misuse of the 
reserve army concept shared in that same sub-section.  
 The quantitative findings on immigrant residence and employment in Spain and 
Catalonia confirm a relatively large volume of “invisible” migration from Western Europe. This 
residence seems little affected by fluctuations in job markets and “invisibles” can be assumed 
wealthier that other foreign groups. Other patterns were detected and possible influences can 
be advanced. Comparatively pronounced African settlement in Catalonia has decreased, with 
the exception of Moroccan immigration (possibly fed by established migratory networks). This 
proportional decrease may have resulted from increased controls on the Mediterranean 
border (1.2.2, 5.1 and 5.2). Latin American settlement increased in the pre-crisis period but 
appears to have decreased subsequently due to job losses and second migratory phases 
(return or to other EU countries). The sharp increase in Romanian residence in Catalonia and 
the rest of the Spanish State is very likely due to the incorporation of this country into the EU. 
The Europeanisation and Latin Americanisation of migration in Catalonia and Spain (as well 
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as the reverse tendency of de-Africanisation of immigration in Catalonia) shall be returned to 
in Chapters Five and Seven.  
                                                        
1
 Historic Catalonia (“Països Catalans”) extended further across the Mediterranean and would today 
include Valencia, the Balearic Isles and some non-Spanish territories. 
2
 The figure is from the Catalan government’s National Institute of Statistics department Idescat: 
http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=245 [Accessed 29 January 2016] 
3
2012 INE figures: http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_cifraspob.htm [Accessed 1 April 2012] 
4
 Idescat figures: http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=245 [Accessed 29 January 2016] 
5
 The term “region” is rejected by a great many Catalans that prefer to refer to the territory as a “nation” 
and Spain as a “state”. 
6
 2012 INE figures: http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_cifraspob.htm [Accessed 1 April 2012] 
7
 This was the increase within three years – from 1979 to 1982 (Prieto del Campo, 2005: 53). 
8
 80,000 million dollars between 1986 and 1991 (Marín, 2001: 396) 
9
 Spain joined Portugal, Ireland, Greece and (sometimes) Italy to successfully negotiate raising  this 
funding to a value of over a quarter of all EC spending (Marín, 2001: 370.) 
10
 In 1981 pro-Franco army generals attempted a coup, briefly taking Congress hostage. In Valencia 
tanks went onto the streets. Even though the attempt gained only minority support in the army (and 
failed to win the support of King Juan Carlos the Second), it did shape many political debates and 
decisions in the subsequent years.  
11
 This was also due to the previous Paris-led resistance to Spain joining the EC due to the competition 
Spanish agriculture would pose French farmers (Marin, 2001: 359-366).  
12
 According to Marín, the PSOE dropped its previous aversion to staying in NATO in exchange for 
German support for its EEC membership (200: 364).  
13
 These bring together the Iberian states with Spanish and Portuguese speaking nations (Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, 2015). 
14
 The centre-left government, however, preferred to call it the “national festival”. 
15
 Electoral debate became dominated by the PP’s handling of the investigation, transmission of 
information and its deeply unpopular decision to send troops to Iraq (Montero, Lago & Torcal, 2007: 
16). Even the PP recognised that the bombings had a “substantial influence” on the result of the 
elections. Several regression studies by Spanish sociologists found political appraisals were 
fundamental to the election outcome, imposing themselves over other considerations such as the 
growth of the economy (Fraile, 2007; Gramacho, 2007; Montero, Lago & Torcal, 2007). 
16
 According to a survey by the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) published soon after the 
elections, over half the population thought that policies carried out in Zapatero’s first months were 
“good” or “very good”, compared to only 6 per cent that thought these were “bad” or “very bad”. The 
removal of Spanish troops from Iraq was seen by 50 per cent as a “very good” step.  
17
 ETA also assassinated Franco’s prime minister Carrero Blanco. 
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18
 Three states of emergencies were declared between 1968 and 1970 (Prieto del Campo, 2005: 49).  
19
 The 1936-1939 Civil War was itself partly a continuation of the battle for and against Catalan 
autonomy (which even briefly led to the proclamation of a “Catalan Republic”. Franco often repeated 
that his “crusade” was against “reds, masons [liberal] and separatists”. 
20
 http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/normas/constitucion/index.html [Accessed 15 December 
2015] 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 The UCD’s reform was called the LOAPA reform; the González government that took office in 1982 
added ceilings to regional powers (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007: 118). 
23
 The name of the officially recognised Basque AC. 
24
 The policy was described in political circles as “coffee for everybody” (“café para todos”). 
25
 As an example the radical pro-independence Batasuna continued to be backed by 15 per cent of 
Basques until the 1990s, despite associations with ETA (Prieto del Campo, 2005) 
26
 http://web.gencat.cat/ca/generalitat/estatut/estatut1979/ [Accessed 1 December 2015] 
27
  Euskadi and Navarre. 
28
 Whether this is a case of “fiscal discrimination” or redistribution between richer and poorer ACs shall 
have to be examined elsewhere.  
29
 Euskadi is the three provinces officially recognised as forming the Basque Country. 
30
 The police force co-exists with other Spain-wide police forces.  
31
 The word “constitutional” was included to avoid associations between this Spanish nationalism and 
the widely-discredited “españolismo” of the Franco regime. “Constitutional patriotism” also has been 
employed by the PSOE and social-democratic media. 
32
 The Barcelona Declaration signed in April 1998. 
33
 The general use of the term “constitutional” was probably to avoid associations between this Spanish 
nationalism and Franco’s extreme version. It has been used by the PSOE and social-democratic media 
also.  
34
 The description was by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Desmond Tutu: http://freeotegi.com/declaration/ 
[Accessed 27 January 2016] 
35
 The initiative was promoted by centre-right PNV president Juan José Ibarretxe, who eventually 
abandoned the idea (and the presidency; Pastor, 2012: 127 & 128).  
36
 The other two parties in government were ERC (Catalan Republican Left) and ICV (the ex-
Communist led Initiative for Catalonia-Greens). 
37
 In 2013 the main motivation for supporting Catalan statehood was “the capacity and desire for 
economic self-management” (Bel, 2013: 45). 
Since the period object to this study a fully fledged independence process with mass active support 
has begun (Stobart, 2015b). 
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38
 Similar views have gained popularity among non-Catalan Spaniards. Research suggests that since 
2008 the overall preference for the autonomous territorial framework among Spanish citizens has 
halved at the expense of support for reducing or even abolishing decentralisation (Bel, 2013: 25). 
39
 Growth was of 8 per cent in the 1960s. The proportion of the population working in agriculture fell 
from 40 per cent in 1960 to 22 per cent in 1975 (Köhler, 1995: 75). 
40
 Several economic studies published in the 1990s coincided that underlying these turbulences was a 
long-term decline in Spanish rates of profit over investment (albeit halted temporarily during the late 
1980s; Cámara-Izquierdo, 2007: 547). Another factor may have been Spain’s incorporation into the 
EC, which encouraged trade imbalances, fast financial inflows and outflows and an overall economic 
dependency on housing and banking (Marín, 2001: 368 & 369). 
41
 52 per cent in 1984 to 71 per cent in 1992 
42
 In 2008 Spain was the fifth biggest economy in Europe but, according to Eurostat figures, it was 
twentieth in spending as a proportion of GDP (41 per cent; Eurostat figures in Ayllón, 2010).  
43
The 1993 reform introduced temporary-employment agencies and generalised labour contracts 
labelled as “rubbish contracts” by critics. The attempt to introduce insecurity was temporarily stalled by 
a strong general strike, which prevented the introduction of precarious apprenticeship contracts for 
young people  (Marín, 2001: 441-413). Spain ended up being the country with the highest proportion of 
insecure employment in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
44
 The social consequences of normally long periods of precarious employment include a relatively late 
emancipation of young adults from family homes and related low birth rates. According to a study by 
the Youth Council of Spain (CJE) in 2013, 7 per cent of 16-24 year olds and 44 per cent of 25-29 year 
olds live separately from their parents: http://www.cje.org/es/publicaciones/novedades/observatorio-de-
emancipacion/ [Accessed 28 January 2016]. Some of these figures are accountable to the impact of 
the crisis on youth employment and earnings but figures were relatively high during the period of 
economic expansion a decade earlier. 
45
 In 2006 34 per cent of all Spanish jobs were temporary. After the crisis led to a disproportionate loss 
of many insecure jobs, the figure fell to 25 per cent (Pajares, 2010: 71). 
46
 Also, the gap between the time that migrants and non-migrants worked on average in the same job 
increased between 1999 and 2007 (Colectivo Ioé, 2008: 95).  
47
 This argument was presented within an aggressive wider argument that immigration in Spain had 
been “unbearable … for the most disadvantaged classes” (2007: 24). 
48
 Two out of three young workers in 2006 were hired on temporary contracts (Taifa, 2006: 29). Older 
“native” women also have been hired in large numbers on such contracts: women are nearly twice as 
likely as men to be working precariously (ibid: 24).  
49
 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/30/spain-black-economy-gdp-growth [Accessed 10 
December 2015] 
50
 Estimations by the tax inspectors’ union and World Bank –for 1996-2007- in Roig, Berta. 2010.  
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51
 Financial accounts published by conservative as well as progressive newspapers: 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/01/31/inenglish/1359635492_820496.html [accessed 2 December 2015] 
and admissions by elected representatives: 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/01/31/actualidad/1359667322_987068.html [accessed 2 
December 2015] have helped make the “Bárcenas case” a major corruption scandal. See also: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e917eea4-ed6c-11e2-8d7c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3t5KTtEbJ 
[accessed 2 December 2015]. 
52
 This could also be translated as “Spain is going well”. 
53
 Financial Times. 15 August. 2009 
54
 At the end of 2005 a total of 9.7 million Spaniards were employed on permanent contracts, and 4.2 
million on fixed-term contracts. By the last quarter of 2009 a total of 10.3 million had “permanent” posts 
and 2.9 million, temporary. In the same period temporary employment of migrants decreased by a 
much smaller margin – from 1.2 million to 1 million jobs (Pajares, 2010: 72.) 
55
 In this period a tenth of the Spanish population emigrated abroad. 
56
 Immigrants. 
57
 Many of those with Italian passports also came from Argentina. 
58
 However, many migrant women transfer to other sectors after renewing their work permit (González-
Enríquez & Herranz-Andújar, 2008: 98). The sector suffers from lack of regulation, unionisation, and 
workers are often undocumented (Solé & Parella, 2001: 39-42; Martínez-Veiga, 145-159; Stobart, 
2009: 35 & 36).    
59
 The INE figures include those from the quarterly EPA results. 
60
 The EPA for the fourth quarter of 2015 used a sample of 65,000 families 
(http://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176918&menu=ul
tiDatos&idp=1254735976595)  
61
 Another study was reported as identifying an increase in the population between 2001 and 2006 of 
800,000 persons – of which 700,000 was accoutable to migration (Playà-Maset, Josep. 2007). 
62
 A very small number of those from the Americas are from the USA or Canada. 
63
 The very small numbers from English-speaking North America and Australasia shall be treated as 
negligible. 
64
 The OPI uses municipal-census data but not in all calculations. 
65
 Compared to 19 per cent (Africans) and 6 per cent (Asians) for the whole of Spain (4.3.1.1) 
66
 Because across the “national” territory the increase in Latin American residence stopped after the 
crisis, we can assume that the proportion of Latino migrants in Catalonia probably also has fallen since 
2008.  
67
 The “rest of Europe” category used to present the data includes Russians and Ukrainians –raising 
questions about the criteria being used to define “Europe”.  
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68
 2001: http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=272&t=2001&x=9&y=4 [Accessed 10 December 2015]; 
2006: http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=272&t=2006&x=15&y=5. [Accessed 10 December 2015]; 
2011: http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=272&t=2011&x=10&y=2  [Accessed 10 December 2015]. 
The three figures are based on OPI and Interior Ministry figures. It is not made clear, however, which 
OPI figures are used and whether they are definitely based on municipal records or EPA surveys. The 
figures should therefore be treated as likely, rather than definite. 
69
 A 2003 study on African migrant labour found “[g]eographical concentrations of single (or multiple) 
African nationalities” (Mendoza: 230). Some national groups – including  from Africa and Eastern 
Europe - are relatively evenly distributed across the four Catalan provinces (Statistics Institute of 
Catalonia, 2008: 16 & 17) 
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Chapter Five 
  
Primary and secondary findings on multi-level policy: 
dissonance in seeking control, labour and integration 
 
Having given an outline of the general political economy of Spain and Catalonia, and after 
providing a detailed portrait of immigration in the territories, this chapter has a twofold aim. 
First, the contextualisation to the research is completed – concretely by describing the policy 
and policymaking frameworks in which paradoxes have emerged. Second, through such an 
account some preliminary ideas are advanced as to the sources of policy gaps (1.3). In order 
to provide a three-dimensional view, literature is reviewed on policies and institutional 
processes at three territorial levels: the EU, Spain and the Autonomous Community (AC) of 
Catalonia (in all cases centring on the period between 1985 and 2011).  
The account begins with a fairly detailed outline of the complex and uneven 
development of European policy – particularly with regards to border management. Although 
the present study has a more territorially reduced scope, a minimum examination of 
continental processes is needed to identify whether political contradictions and procedural 
inconsistencies stem mainly from competing institutional jurisdictions and priorities. As shall 
be demonstrated, by introducing (and developing later) the inter-relationship between the EU 
and Spain with regards to immigration policy, it is easier to identify the exact political role of 
states even vis-à-vis subordinate institutions – such as the Generalitat (Catalan government). 
In the middle section first the general evolution of (official) Spanish policy is charted, as are 
policy processes (which in the Spanish case are little-researched, Bermejo, 2008: 32). The 
examination then moves on to survey the policy literature in relation to the large and growing 
levels of irregularity in the country. The conclusions from this sub-section will be compared to 
the relevant interview findings later in the dissertation. Other Spanish policies of interest – 
including in relation to asylum – are also briefly illustrated here. 
The final sub-section of this chapter focuses on the unsatisfactory attempt by the 
Catalan institutions to gain powers to politically manage the new immigration in order to give 
primacy to local cultural and linguistic “integration”. Chapter Five ends by looking at some 
important policies developed by the Generalitat. This discussion, as well as guaranteeing 
presenting the policy framework adequately for a state as decentralised as Spain, aids 
analysing the interrelations between state and sub-state (as is performed in later chapters). 
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In order to take advantage of interviewees’ generally high level of expertise on policy and the 
processes by which strategy is designed and implemented, findings from the interviews are 
woven into most of the present chapter (particularly on Catalan and Spanish policy and 
policymaking). However, with regards to the issue of irregularity and other areas where 
empirical findings undermine formal or surface political accounts, the findings presented here 
are only from the secondary sources (reports, books and articles) and the empirical results 
are analysed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
5.1 Europe 
 
5.1.1 Slow and uneven evolution of EU migration governance  
 
In Spanish political, media and social-activist discourse, the European Union (EU) is 
commonly presented as the key territorial level determining the immigration policies of 
member states and sub-states. Yet, in the immigration field political union has been slow, 
uneven and in 2015 began threatening to go into reverse1 (5.1.2.1). The 1957 Treaty of 
Rome2 established the principle of free movement for workers – alongside goods, services 
and capital – within a “common market” but this only permited cross-border labour transfers 
and it was not until 1985 (the Single Act) that the EU’s internal barriers to the public started 
being dismantled (Moraes, 2003: 117; Geddes, 2003: 129). Until the 1990s, law making on 
asylum, nationality and immigration remained national, and most immigration and asylum 
policy areas remain a “national prerogative” (Geddes, 2003: 130 & 131; Calavita, 2005: 4). 
There is no integral European immigration policy (or European Aliens’ Law; Mr. E – migrant-
network activist), and despite common border-control obligations, it is states that decide how 
many migrants can settle in them (see 5.1.2; Mr. R – Catalan policy advisor). 
Inter-state cooperation and “communitarisation” of policy has been slowed, and its 
decisions and proposals sometimes not ratified or ignored (for example on asylum after 1999 
– see 5.1.2 & 5.2.3), because the EU is a hybrid project – combining regional supranational 
structures with an unequal alliance of states. Differences, tensions and conflicts between 
states are common and leed to countries with similar interests “blocking together” during 
negotiations on common policy and its enforcement (Menz, 2009a: 6)3. The internal “core-
periphery” division in Europe employed by Lapavitsas et al. in relation to financial and 
economic policy appears to shape immigration dynamics also (2012). A southern-northern 
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axis appears to have emerged, despite occasional alliances between individual peripheral 
and core governments. Factors that may have encouraged polarisation include, on the one 
hand, the core’s economic, political and institutional dominance in Europe, as well as its 
older immigration and opposition to labour migration; and, on the other, a common 
experience of transition from military regimes to liberal states, geographical proximity to 
Africa, strong underground and (in many cases) bifurcated formal labour markets, late 
incorporation into the EU, and comparable economic cycles (4.2). According to Geddes, EU 
migration policy obligations have had most influence on processes in the newer immigration 
destinations of southern and eastern Europe – a view examined in 5.2, 6.1.1 and the 
Conclusion (Chapter 8; Geddes, 2003: 128). 
 
Gradual communitarisation and multi-tier development of policymaking 
 
The EU has a many-tier institutional framework. Formally, it has two decision-making bodies: 
the Council of the European Union (in which member-state ministries are represented) and 
the directly elected European Parliament (European Union, 2015a; Moraes, 2003: 116). It 
also has a “politically independent executive arm”; the European Commission (appointed 
commissioners and EU civil servants). Furthermore, European heads of government hold 
quarterly European Council summits “to set the broad direction of EU policy making” 
(European Union, 2015b; Moraes, 2003: 116; European Union, 2015a; European Council, 
2016). Decades ago routinized ad-hoc working groups of ministers began developing policies 
(for example on control, terrorism and policing in the “Trevi group”, Moraes, 20034). After the 
1992 Maastricht Agreement these became permanent structures. “Informal inter-
governmentalism” mutated into “formal intergovernmental cooperation” (Geddes, 2003: 132-
139). The European Council was allowed to make decisions for all member states, but only if 
unanimously supported – complicating policy evolution (ibid: 135). The Amsterdam Treaty 
passed at the end of the decade established the communitarisation of policy to be enacted 
by the mid 2000s (on “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies connected with people’s 
free circulation”, Pisarelo & Aparicio, 2008: 47)5.  
Some scholars have identified democratic shortcomings in European policymaking 
(Fernández-Bessa, 2008; Pisarelo & Aparicio, 2008; Cetti, 2015). Often, European civil 
servants have played an important role in developing policy initiatives, and decisions with a 
perceived security dimension are made at enforcement level by institutions such as Interpol6 
(Pisarelo & Aparicio, 2008: 47; Cetti, 2015). The European Agency for Border Management 
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(Frontex) has enjoyed a particularly high degree of autonomy, due to an absence of 
regulation, staff accountability, or democratic oversight by the European Parliament that 
provides it with many millions of euros per year (5.1.2.2). Moreover, Frontex’ present and 
past operations remain undisclosed (Mr. E; Cetti, 2015). This is despite considerable 
criticism of its practices from NGOs (5.1.2.1; Cetti, 2015). Control functions have been 
outsourced to security, defence and transport corporations, which  
 
play a fundamental role in setting Europe’s immigration and asylum agenda, helping 
direct its policy and manage its activities, and shaping its ideology, rhetoric and 
rationale (Cetti, 2015).  
 
Due to the extent of geographical and organisational outsourcing, the European Commission 
stated that it had encountered “major difficulties” obtaining Information on the EU’s extensive 
and varied network of detention centres. Several tiers have been identified within EU 
immigration management (ibid).  
 
 
5.1.2 Common policies 
 
Despite the slow and problematic development of EU policy-making and related structures, 
major EU immigration policies have been agreed with considerable implications for member 
states: on mobility within the Union and control of external borders. 
 
Near removal of internal borders under Schengen  
 
A Financial Times editorial celebrated the Schengen Accord as “one of the most visible 
manifestations of European unity” (Financial Times, 2016). The celebrated side to the 
agreement was to allow free movement for all persons between member states, and award 
European citizenship to all member-state nationals (Mr. R – Catalan policy specialist). The 
other side of the agreement was to strengthen external border controls. The agreement was 
first signed in 1985 by France, Germany and the Benelux countries (Geddes, 2003: 131). It 
became a Convention in 1990, and covered thirteen states by 1997 (ibid). Spain became a 
signatory in 1991 (Menz, 2009a: 40). With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, Schengen 
became part of the “aquis communautaire”7 (Geddes, 2003: 131.)  
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The agreement gave migrants entering EU border states the right to circulate to and 
between other states (although more restrictive conditions were applied for “third country 
nationals”, Pisarello & Aparicio, 2008: 46). Controversy arose because in the pre-crisis years 
border states such as Spain and Italy required labour in secondary markets (ibid). Irregular 
immigration into the countries became commonplace and it was perceived that they acted as 
a “back door” to Europe (see 5.2.2.2; Calavita, 2005: 3). In the crisis years, Schengen was 
increasingly weakened by unilateral state decisions to block entry or perform deportations. 
France returned migrants entering from Italy, and was strongly criticised by the European 
Commission vice-president after deporting 8000 EU Roma citizens in 20108 (Mr. E – Papers 
per a Tothom activist). Since the research was completed, an increasing number of member 
states have implemented a ”temporary reintroduction of border control” and disintegration of 
the Schengen system is being treated as a real possibility in elite circles (Directorate General 
of Migration and Home Affairs, 2016; Barker, Byrne & Vasagar, 2015; Financial Times, 
2016). 
Internal mobility has been a substantial factor in European labour strategies, 
particularly as the expansion of the EU eastwards has made available large reserves of 
unemployed and low-wage skilled workers (Hardy & Fitzgerald, 2008: 4). In Britain and 
Ireland migrants from the EU periphery have been hired – sometimes at source through 
temporary employment agencies – to work in transportation, construction, farming and food 
processing, and retail on lower-wage and/or flexible contracts (ibid: 6-9)9. EU-15 states were 
given the option of applying “transitional” restrictions on migrant entry from New Member 
States, and most countries chose to do this (ibid: 11). 
EU directive 2006/123/EC (popularly known as the “Bolkestein directive”10) attempted 
to make European companies operating services in other member states “subject only to the 
national provisions of their member state of origin” – meaning that companies from less-
regulated states (normally in the poorer periphery) could operate in more regulated countries 
applying the operating regulations of their “country of origin” (Monbiot, 2005). If combined 
with at-source hiring, which was considered likely, the measure would have been a clear 
example of migrants being used as a “reserve army” (see 3.1.3). The measure was highly 
controversial among continental unions and social movements. The COAG farmers’ 
representative interviewed even compared such attempts with “today’s slavery” (Mr. G). The 
measure was abandoned by Bolkestein’s successor but it has been interpreted as an 
indication of the direction of EU policy (Monbiot, 2005). The CIG trade unionist interviewee 
illustrated how such an approach already is being introduced: the Galician building sector 
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sub-contracts Portuguese firms that apply the lower wage rates and poorer conditions of their 
country (Mr. L). Importing low-wage labour and offshoring production have been identified as 
“interrelated aspects of European restructuring” – part of a “neoliberal agenda” to increase 
the competitiveness of the region (Hardy & Fitzgerald, 2008: 3).  
 
EU border policy and its two features 
 
The other side to Schengen – external border policing – also has been an integral policy of 
European integration, and has had considerable practical impact (Cetti, 2015). Under the 
Convention joint surveillance systems and a continental database were introduced (Ibid)11. 
Frontex was set up in 2004 to provide “integrated border management” using over a hundred 
boats, hundreds of mobile radar and two dozen helicopters and planes (Mr. R – Catalan 
policy advisor; Pisarello & Aparicio, 2008: 51) 12 . It was used in 2007 to prevent the 
“reopening” of the migratory route from Algeria and Morocco to Spain (Gil Araujo, 2008: 36). 
Common regulations have been agreed regarding visas and stays of over three months, and 
directives on return procedure for migrants entering irregularly (Pisarello & Aparicio, 2008: 
47; Mr. R). 
There are two features of EU border policy as it has developed that should be 
highlighted. First, from the 1980s onwards illegal immigration has been treated as 
overlapping with security threats (including terrorism) and organised “trafficking” of different 
kinds – leading to the “criminalisation” and “securitisation” of immigration (5.1.1; Geddes, 
2003: 130; Pisarelo & Aparicio, 2008: 46; Fernández-Bessa, 2008: 9; Cetti, 2015). The EU’s 
de facto constitution (the Lisbon Treaty) identified as a central policy aim the prevention of 
“illegal immigration” (Cetti, 2015).  
Second, the territorial scope of policy and enforcement has spread east and south – 
beyond European waters. This approach, now officially termed “the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Policy”, has meant African and Middle Eastern states 
receiving development aid in exchange for keeping their own citizens inside their state – in 
the case of the sub-Saharan African states – or playing an additional role of “buffer state” to 
control migration from other states – in the case of North African and Middle Eastern states 
bordering Europe (Mr. J – CC.OO lawyer; Fernández-Bessa, 2008: 9). This process began at 
the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Barcelona in 1995, and has been 
developed since at EU-Africa summits, in which Europe has threatened to raise import tariffs 
for those African states failing to reach agreements (Pisarelo & Aparicio, 2008: 51). “Second 
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generation” – repatriation – agreements with non-bordering African states became a political 
priority for the PSOE government after the large arrivals of migrants in the Canaries in 2006 
(the “small-boat crisis”; Romero, 2008). 
This “offshoring” of border control has also taken the form of bilateral agreements 
between individual states, a process which the PSOE government boasted of spearheading 
in the 2000s (due to the large number of agreements it signed with African states; see Table 
5.1; Fernández-Bessa, 2008: 813). Agreements incorporate issues such as (on the one hand) 
aid, investments, migrant-labour quotas and fishing rights; and (on the other) accepting 
“returns” of nationals and “readmissions” of all foreign entrants from their territory (see 
5.2.2.2; Mr. J – CC.OO.). In the Spanish case bilateral accords have reduced migration 
across its southern border14. Its key partner in this has been Morocco, which received from 
the EU a total of €654 million euros between 2007 and 201015.  
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Table 5.1: Bilateral agreements between Spain and countries of origin or transit  
1999-2009 
 
Country Year 
Morocco 1999 
Morocco * 
Colombia * 
Ecuador * 
Nigeria 
2001 
Romania * 
The Dominican Republic * 
Poland * 
2002 
Bulgaria * 
Mauritania 
Equatorial Guinea 
2003 
Peru 2004 
Ghana 2005 
Guinea Conakry 
Gambia 
Mali 
Cameroon 
2006 
Cape Verde 
Senegal 
Mauritania 
2007 
Niger 2008 
Equatorial Guinea 2009 
Source: Sacristán-Romero, 2006; Romero, 2008: 168 & 170; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 129 & 133; CEAR-Euskadi, 2008 
* Agreements that include labour “quotas” (Sacristán-Romero, 2006; 
Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 133). 
 
Agreements also include externalising detention facilities – meaning that many of the EU’s 
178 temporary internment centres are now located outside its territory, and creating “transit 
processing centres” for asylum applications (Pisarello & Aparicio, 2008: 50). In 2011 Frontex 
was given the role of offering “technical assistance” in the “third countries” (Cetti, 2015). The 
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European Council on Refugees and Exiles has denounced that agreements rarely contain 
criteria on asylum and detention procedures, or against discrimination and “refoulement”16 
(Cetti, 2015.)  
Some of the southern states involved have poor records on respecting human rights, 
and despite difficulties in monitoring processes NGOs have identified major abuses. Cases 
include thousands of migrants left in the desert on Morocco´s Algerian border without food or 
water, and many Africans killed by police and soldiers while trying to cross the fences into 
Ceuta and Melilla – including by Moroccan military police using live ammunition17 (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 172). The NGO Médicins Sans Frontières treated 2,554 immigrants for 
violent injuries at the hands of Moroccan security forces between April 2003 and August 
2004 (Legrain, 2006: 27). A by-product of offshoring control has been the greater 
“racialisation” of Sub-Saharan Africans in the countries of transit – also including Libya (Cetti, 
2015). 
The anti-racist organisation SOS Racismo has questioned the whole externalisation 
strategy as invisibilising the “tragic effects” of EU border control (2008: 46-48). The approach 
has been located within a wider “shadow” policy tier – as identified by Liz Fekete (Cetti, 
2015). Despite a European-Parliament-commissioned report finding many unacceptable 
conditions and processing delays in detention centres18, in 2008 the European Parliament 
extended maximum detention times to eighteen months.19 In practice guarantees included in 
EU directives are sometimes ignored – for instance over prohibition of refoulement and group 
expulsions (Pisarello & Aparicio, 2008: 49; Cetti, 2015).  
 
Other EU policies and their limitations 
 
With regards to asylum, regulation of the 1990 Dublin Convention ruled that applications 
should be made in the EU member state of entry – ostensibly to avoid “asylum shopping”20 
(Geddes, 2003: 133). This has proved unpopular among border states such as Greece and 
Italy in which asylum reception and processing has naturally become concentrated (Cetti, 
2015). Creating more general procedures on asylum was put forward at the 1999 European 
Council meeting in Tampere, as were proposals to make migrants’ rights “as near as 
possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens” (Pisarelo & Aparicio, 2008: 47). Yet by the 2002 
Council meeting, none of the proposals had been ratified in national laws (ibid; Calavita, 
2005: 4).  
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Directives have been approved on the right to family reunification (2003/86), the rights 
of long-term residents (2003/19), migrants’ integration and the seasonal employment and 
inter-firm transfers of employees (Mr. R – Barcelona-based policy advisor; Ms. M – 
construction employers’ representative). However, according to legal scholars Pisarelo and 
Aparicio (2008: 48), policy harmonisation took the form of generalising those national 
frameworks with lower guarantees.  
 
 
5.1.3 Neoliberalism and bidirectional political influences  
 
The above discussion shows that the Union’s role in directly determining policy formation and 
practice in member states clearly has its limits. However, political processes in Spain 
suggest that the EU is a major influence – even if sometimes a less visible one. One 
example is regarding Spain’s first “Ley de Extranjería”, which was introduced in July 1985 
“almost entirely” as a result of outside pressure in relation to Spain entering the EEC the 
following January (see 5.2.2; Cornelius, 2004: 404). There were fears that the new member 
state would become one of “transit” to the rest of the Union, and the new Law was highly 
restrictive (5.2.2; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 118, 119).  
Second, EU policy has encouraged visa requirements to be introduced for travel to 
Spain (Ms. B – specialist on irregularity and policy). This happened gradually and selectively 
nonetheless. In 1991 the prerequisite was applied to North African countries. From 2001 it 
was progressively extended to Latin American countries (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 120). 
This was a problematic step as many of these countries had dual nationality agreements with 
Spain, and it undermined the Hispanic community idea promoted by all governments from 
Franco to González, and made concrete in the PSOE’s practical initiative to create the Ibero-
american community of nations (Cornelius, 2004: 410). A last illustration of the EU’s role is 
that it was responsible for the increased surveillance at identified irregular-entry “hot spots” in 
Spain (Cornelius, 2004: 407). These examples make it understandable that activists for 
migrants’ rights felt that EU policy was the key to understanding processes. For a 
representative of a large Catalan anti-racist organisation, “Spain” is simply “not allowed to 
have a migratory policy different to Europe”, whose policy is labelled that of “fortress Europe” 
(Ms. A – SOS Racisme spokesperson). 
Yet the political relationship between the EU and member states has not been 
unidirectional. The continued agency of nation states is demonstrated by the reintroduction of 
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national border controls, the delayed removal of borders for migrants from new member 
states, the downwards harmonisation of policies unrelated to controls, and the Spanish 
government’s role in developing the European Neighbourhood Policy (5.1.2). EU migratory 
policy can also be understood as being shaped by the neoliberal strategies of European 
states and their regional project. Politically speaking these have helped develop the model of 
the “competition state” in which “migrants are welcome, as long as they promise to contribute 
to the prerogatives of a business-friendly national economic growth strategy” (Menz, 2009b: 
316 & 317). Such a development is reinforced by employers being increasingly incorporated 
in policymaking processes (particularly in Brussels) and providing data and ideas for these 
processes (ibid: 318-329). For Menz, the competition state encourages “a liberalised [labour] 
recruitment strategy” that exists alongside and conflicts with “more restrictive practices 
towards unsolicited migration flows” (ibid: 318; 2009a: 5).  
Fernández-Bessa sees that EU immigration policy has been characterised by the 
“interrelation between the logic of the market and the logics of control” (Fernández-Bessa, 
2008: 9). This could be used as a descriptive “shorthand” for dynamics but incorporates a 
similarly artificial economic and political bifurcation as in Harvey’s later writing – the 
limitations of which were indicated in Chapters Two and Three. Arguably as an institution the 
European Union exhibits less political autonomy from the large corporations than states, so 
the description probably has less explanatory power applied to continental processes. A last 
point is that the neoliberal political-economy of contemporary Europe, and its attendant social 
failures and inequalities, has been a factor in the rise of strong right-wing populist and 
xenophobic movements in several EU countries21 – a development that has encouraged 
more nationalistic and anti-immigrant policies in general and reinforced policy tensions and 
inconsistencies inside the Union (Cetti, 2014; 2015).  
 
 
5.2 Spain  
 
5.2.1 Spanish policymaking and transformations  
 
Most policy affecting Spain and Catalonia is decided in Madrid. As well as being determined 
by government and parliament, the Spanish “style of public policy” has meant “social agents” 
have played a major role in decision-making and consultation – a system that has its roots in 
the political culture that emerged during the Transition (Bermejo, 2008: 32; 4.1.2). On a 
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political-institutional level, until the mid-nineties, several ministries had immigration 
responsibilities: the Ministry of Labour (migrant labour, processing work permits and social 
security); variably the Ministry of Social Affairs (focused on integration); the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (visas); and Ministry of the Interior (control of borders; Bermejo, 2008: 33). 
Under Aznar’s majority government (2000-2004) immigration was transferred “structurally 
and physically” to the Ministry of the Interior  – reflecting and reinforcing a focus on security 
and public order – in other words, treating “immigration as a police function”, (ibid; Ms. T – 
the presidential advisor; Calavita, 2005: 34). At the same time, according to Bermejo, an 
“Inter-ministerial Commission” ensured that all ministries participated in developing policy 
(2008: 33).  
After the Zapatero government took over in March 2004, the political administration of 
immigration was transferred from Interior to the Ministry of Labour – although Interior 
retained some powers (Ms. T; Ms. R – border policy specialist). Following the government’s 
re-election in 2008, the ministry was renamed the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, in line 
with the “economic approach” to immigration advocated by the PSOE at the time (see 
5.2.2.1). Administratively, immigration rose in rank (Ms. R). The structure within each ministry 
is headed by a “state secretary” who is “responsible for executing the government’s policy in 
a specific activity sector” (Bermejo, 2008: 32). Practical implementation is the responsibility 
of a range of civil servants (state managers, general secretaries and sub-secretaries, 
technical general secretaries and general deputy managements, ibid: 32 & 33). These 
functionaries have played an important advisory role to the normally elected secretaries 
(ibid). In the early 1990s, a Permanent Immigration Observatory linked to the General 
Secretariat of Immigration and Emigration was introduced to perform research and 
monitoring on migration issues in general22.  
Border control is managed within the Ministry of the Interior by the General Directorate 
of the National Police – the force responsible for providing documents to foreigners and 
cooperating with the EU on immigration policing – and the Civil Guard – the paramilitary 
force that provides surveillance on borders where not equipped for entry (ibid). In Bermejo’s 
view, those responsible for implementing border controls are “privileged” in that they have a 
role in decision-making unlike other public servants (ibid). To underline the importance of 
migratory affairs to the PSOE government and coordinate better between ministries, in May 
2004 a Government Office for Alien Affairs and Immigration was set up led by someone with 
equivalent rank to state secretary was created (ibid: 34). According to its Deputy Director, the 
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Office also has also incorporated police agents to contribute to the “joint design of actions 
and planning” (ibid).  
The Aznar government had operated according to a more unilateral government 
approach, but now “social dialogue” was reincorporated at the centre of processes. A 
permanent Tri-Partite Labour Commission23 was set up by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs in 2005 (Ms. M – employers representative in Commission); and, according to the ex-
spokesperson for the migrant section of CC.OO., the general objective was to reach a social 
“consensus” to develop bills for parliamentary approval (Mr. M – ex-CITE representative). 
The “new model of social dialogue for immigration issues” was described as the most 
fundamental change in immigration management under the Socialists (CC.OO. lawyer Mr. J). 
Opposition parties have sometimes played a role in promoting legislative changes. For 
instance, in 1990 and 2000 the Communist-led IU – and centre-right pro-Catalan CiU on the 
latter occasion – helped bring about parliamentary processes to liberalise legislation 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 145 & 149). 
 
Consultative forums and their changing importance in the 2000s  
 
Two Spain-wide consultative bodies exist to develop policy. The Economic and Social 
Council (CES), attached to the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, develops or evaluates 
recommendations for bills and (sometimes) regulations on economic and socio-economic 
matters (Ms. S – CC.OO. representative in the CES; CES, 2011: 13). In 2011 the Council 
comprised twenty appointed “advisors” from “the most representative” employer 
organisations and trade unions24 (CES, 2011: 9); fourteen from “third sector” organisations 
(farming, fishing, consumers, and Spain’s large social-economy sector25); and six “experts”26 
(Ms. S; Ms. C –social-economy sector representative; CES, 20111: 9). The Council, which 
has been a permanent institution since 1991, produced the text that would form the 
foundation for the 4/2000 Aliens’ Law; and in 2004 produced a report on migrants and the 
labour market that influenced the new government’s immigration policy (Ms. S; Mr. J; CES, 
2004; see 5.2.2.1).  
Another significant (and high-profile) consultative forum is the Forum for the Social 
Integration of Immigrants (FSII), created in the last years of the Gonzalez government27 and 
legally regulated in the 2000/4 Law. 28  The FSII establishes short-term and long-term 
integration objectives and issues reports and recommendations (Ms. T – presidential 
advisor). “In theory the government then processes the information it receives to do 
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programmes” (Mr. R – Catalan policy advisor). Its committee is mainly made up of 
immigrants associations (of varied goals, nationalities and regions) and representatives of 
authorities at local, AC and Spanish territorial levels (predominantly from central 
government29), as well as the social agents included in the CES30 (Mr. R ; Mr. V – Forum for 
the Social Integration of Immigrants). 
The Forum is presided over by a respected academic in the field and meets at least 
twice yearly (Ms. T). Soon after the El Ejido conflicts the government appointed as president 
an anthropologist, Mikel Azurmendi, who had authored a book downplaying their importance 
(a “street brawl” motivated by “fear … not racism” or xenophobia; 1.1.1; Rius-Sant, 2007). 
Azurmendi became controversial again in 2003 by writing that “multi-culturalism” is the 
“gangrene” of democratic society (Calavita, 2005: 95). The fact that a person of such views 
was chosen to head the attempt to incorporate migrants into society, was interpreted as 
demonstrating a lack of official interest in integration (Rius-Sant, 2007). 
 
Civil society’s roles in processes 
 
Unions and large employers’ associations participate (alongside representatives from the 
ministries) in establishing the general strategy and numbers for the Annual Foreign Workers 
Programme (or “quota scheme”; see 5.2.2.1; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 128). Employers 
are then given a significant practical role in the hiring process: they can chose the country of 
origin (since 2002 only from those with which Spain has bilateral migrant-labour 
agreements 31 ; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 133). This capacity to select has sometimes 
resulted in Latin American hiring over Moroccan (ibid: 133 & 134). There is little participation 
by SMEs or “social-economy” firms, as generally it is not practicable for them to recruit 
through the system (Ms. C – CEPES spokesperson; Ms. B – Spanish policy specialist). The 
complementary regular process of determining a “catalogue of hard-to-fill occupations” 
includes social agents at more local territorial levels (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 128). A third 
process of legally hiring abroad, the “Régimen General” (General Provisions) process for 
posts where “native” employees have not been found, has meant migrants living in Spain 
playing the role of “recruiters” for migrants in origin through kinship networks (see 5.2.2; 
Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 132). 
Both formal lobbying and mobilisations by migrants and supporters play an indirect role 
in policymaking. The modification to the 1985 Aliens’ Law passed in 199632 that introduced 
the status of “permanent residence” and began regulating family reunification was promoted 
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first by migrants’ organisations, NGOs, and lawyers’ associations – backed by the 
ombudsman (López-Sala, 2007: 9; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 147). The migrants 
participating in the 2001 church lock-ins, hunger strikes and demonstrations were regularised 
as a consequence and helped bring about the 2001 regularisation (1.2.1; see 5.2.2.1). 
 
 
5.2.2 Spanish policy 1985-2011 
 
5.2.2.1 Evolution of policy 
 
The creation of Spain’s irregular migration model  
 
Although Spain’s legal and institutional framework was fashioned in 1978 – beginning with 
the Constitution, the first legal provisions expressly applicable to foreigners were those of the 
1985 Organic Law on Foreigners33 (Garcés-Mascareñas. 2012: 118). The Law introduced the 
first visa requirements, and permits for residence and work, as well as deportation measures 
in the case of non-compliance. Among those made immediately “illegal”34 was the large 
Moroccan-born population of Ceuta and Melilla, which mobilised through a little-known “civil 
rights” movement until they won Spanish citizenship (Rius-Sant, 2007). Detention for 
deportation could also be applied to those who act “contrary to public order” or “devote 
themselves to begging or other conduct deemed socially unacceptable” (Cornelius, 2004: 
404). The Law was compared by immigration scholars to a “police approach” (ibid). The 
externally and artificially created nature of such legislation (5.1.2) has been denounced by 
several writers (Cornelius, 2004: 404; Rius-Sant, 2007; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 118; Solé 
& Parella, 2001: 15). Solé & Parella wrote that in the mid-eighties “Spanish society did not 
consider the matter to require government intervention” (ibid). 
Migrants could gain work permits through the “Régimen General” (general provisions), 
according to which foreigners could be legally hired if was found that a job could not be filled 
by an EU citizen (Cornelius, 2004: 85; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 123). However, the 
provisions were applied restrictively, taking into account general rates of unemployment, as 
opposed to those of the sector in question (ibid). Application of the Law was limited in 1987 
after the Constitutional Court dismissed as unconstitutional articles on long-term internment 
prior to deportation, denial of migrants’ right of meeting and protest, and the prohibition of 
juridical suspension of expulsion orders35. Yet the Law set the template for policy over the 
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following decades. Police spot-checks on black and Arabic persons became commonplace – 
particularly as legislation formally aimed at combatting terrorism could for many years be 
used for this purpose36 (Cornelius, 2004: 404).  
The law, its application, and subsequent reforms over the following fifteen years 
underpinned the “model of illegal immigration” and hiring that shaped processes through the 
1990s (Garcés-Mascareñas: 2012: 119). Demand for migrant labour was growing 
(particularly after the 1990s recession ended), but work permits were complicated by being 
conditional on having residence authorisations from both the Labour and Interior ministries, 
and which required having a work contract – a “catch-22 built into the permit system”37 
(Cornelius, 2004: 404; Calavita, 2005: 41).  
The Annual Foreign Worker Programme (commonly known as “quota scheme”) was 
introduced in 1993, allowing the recruitment of a predetermined number of foreign-resident 
workers for particular sectors and provinces (Cornelius, 2004: 404). The scheme would 
require prior assessment of general labour needs (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 128). The 
countries of origin governments’ would normally determine the persons chosen (ibid: 130).38 
After difficulties emerged with administering hiring abroad, irregular residents were allowed to 
participate in the system (ibid: 124), leading the Programme to be criticised as a “disguised 
legalization program” (Cornelius, 2004: 406). As a result, immigration was fundamentally 
irregular. For the ex-CITE spokesperson, “restrictive regulations” meant “people enter 
irregularly or enter as tourists and begin to be irregular when they start working” (Mr. M). 
Furthermore, due to the hardness and unexpectedness of the 1985 Law, many migrants 
feared applying for regularisation when an extraordinary regularisation process (“amnesty”) 
was held in 1996, preferring to remain undocumented (Cornelius, 2004: 414). 
 
Hardening of policy under Aznar   
 
A 1999-2000 process to create a new Aliens’ Law involved the major parties, unions, 
immigrant associations and many NGOs, and produced what has been described as “the 
most liberal law on the rights of foreigners in Europe” (Calavita, 2005: 30; Mr. M – CITE 
representative in the negotiations). It introduced regularisation by means of demonstrating 
“rootedness” in Spain (“arraigo” in Spanish; CC.OO.’s Mr. J & Mr. M), and established a new 
programme of regularisations that would benefit migrants that have been resident for over a 
year, or that have a work permit (Calavita, 2005: 30). All migrants were allowed access to 
health and education services if included in the municipal “padrón” (ibid), and effectively 
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expulsions for unauthorised residence or employment were prevented (Garcés-Mascareñas: 
2012: 120 & 121).  
The minority PP government strongly opposed the Law, leading its negotiator in the 
process to “lose favour” within the party (Mr. M). It tried to delay the Law being passed in 
Congress before its first term ended but there was a consensus in favour of the measure 
(shared by CiU, which had allowed the PP to govern in minority). However, those backing it 
successfully lobbied for an emergency vote to be taken – becoming the only vote that the 
1996-2000 government lost (Mr. M; Mr. J). Before the PP won an absolute majority in the 
March elections, it announced its intention to repeal the (4/2000) Law, and applied a very 
rigid application of its provisions – forcing applications to be reviewed after most applicants 
for regularisation failed (Mr. J).39 The process was criticised as “discretionary” due to big 
disparities in the success of applications between cities and national groups. While 17 per 
cent were rejected in Madrid, 71 per cent were turned down in Barcelona (Rius-Sant, 2007: 
199). 26 per cent of Moroccans were rejected, compared to 9 per cent of Ecuadorians 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 152).  
The Aznar government claimed that the Law as it stood would have a “pull effect” on 
illegal immigration, encourage human trafficking and violate the Schengen and Tampere 
agreements (ibid: 121; 5.1.2; Calavita, 2005: 33). Within months a new “Ley de Extranjería” 
was passed (in August) that made regularisation and family reunification harder, rolled back 
some right to public provision (but not health and education), and barred documented 
residents from free legal aid and representation in municipal government processes 
(Calavita, 2005: 34; Cornelius, 2004: 407). By bringing in seventy-two-hour deportations the 
Law denied effective judicial protection (Calavita, 2005: 34; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 121). 
In short, the response was a return from “integration” to “control” (Cornelius, 2004: 407).  
According to the ex-CITE spokesperson Mr. M, the government’s hard stance was 
bolstered by the public reaction to the El Ejido events in January (Mr. M; 1.2.1). The attempt 
to remove the right to assemble, demonstrate, strike and unionise for irregular migrants was 
justified by FSII president Azurmendi. He said of the need to replace the 4/2000 law, 
 
With the right to assemble, demonstrate and strike in their hands, … that immigrant 
mass … in [Almeria…] would be a grave factor in social destabilisation and serious 
conflicts. (Rius-Sant, 2007: 277). 
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A progressive pro-Catalan (ERC) MP complained in parliament that the government was 
attempting to turn immigrants into “cheap labour” (ibid). In a repeat of events inthe 1980s, the 
legal provisions were again overturned by the Constitutional Court (after appeals by ACs and 
the Socialist opposition). 
More legal tightening took place in 2002 when the quota system was amended to 
exclude resident (undocumented) migrants and limit the countries of recruitment (5.2.1). Two 
laws in 2003 allowed facilitating deporting migrants that commit a crime, and the police 
accessing data included in the municipal register – access that made it risky for 
undocumented migrants to access welfare provision (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 121). The 
short-term nature of visas meant a lapse into irregularity was inevitable40 (ibid). Legalisation 
through the Régimen General was stopped (ibid: 127). The stricter policies were 
accompanied by a more hostile government discourse towards immigration and the tensions 
and conflicts introduced in 1.2.1. 
Migration management was not purely of a restrictive intent, nevertheless. After twelve 
undocumented Ecuadorians died in an accident while being transported to work in Lorca, 
Murcia, in 2001, a local businessman was arrested for illegally employing migrants – a rare 
act in Spain possibly linked to the media attention given to irregular employment after the 
road accident (Cornelius, 2004: 415; Rius-Sant, 2007: 237). This was followed by a wave of 
sackings of migrants (including of 20,000 workers – mainly Ecuadorian – in the Valencia 
region, Rius-Sant, 2007: 239). Migrants of this nationality held protests and the government 
responded by organising a regularisation process only for Ecuadorian citizens  – a partial 
“amnesty” in which 20,352 persons qualified (Mr. J – CC.OO. lawyer; Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2012: 154 & 155; Cornelius, 2004: 415; EFE, 2005).  
The regularisation programme held soon after the church sit-ins in 2001 accepted the 
idea of legalisation through rootedness yet no administrative procedure was introduced to 
implement it properly (Cornelius, 2004: 414). A further 223,428 people were regularised that 
year in another extraordinary process (Mr. M; EFE, 2005). In all, despite the PP 
government’s official belligerance towards illegal immigration, it regularised over a million 
migrants by the Aznar administration and the largest irregular immigration took place until 
then (Ms. B – Barcelona specialist on irregularity; Rius-Sant, 2011: 135). All the same, 
deportations rose – spiking just before the March 2004 general elections (Ms. R – researcher 
on border policy).  
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Continuities and change during Zapatero’s first term 
 
Interviewees of different backgrounds highlighted the different policy approach of the 
Zapatero administration from 2004 to 2008 (Ms. M – construction sector spokesperson, Ms. 
T – Moncloa advisor, Ms. B – Barcelona-based policy researcher; Mr. M – migrant-labour 
advisor). The new Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Jesús Caldera Sánchez-Capitán 
made a series of significant changes. First, Aliens’ Law regulations were introduced in 2004 
to expand the possibility of individual regularisation through proving “labour” or “social 
rootedness” – thereby implementing the ideas incorporated in the rejected 4/2000 Law and in 
the CES report that year (Consejo Económico y Social, 2004; 5.2.1). Demonstrating labour 
rootedness was not particularly demanding: the migrant needed to show she had lived in 
Spain for two years and worked for one year in any job – regardless of future employment 
prospects (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 160). The social route required a present job contract, 
proof of three-year residence, no criminal record in Spain or in the country of origin, proof of 
family ties, or a municipal report attesting to the applicant’s integration in local society (ibid; 
Mr. M – ex-CITE). In both cases the migrant was then given a one year renewable permit – 
limited to a certain work sector and province. Additionally, again encouraged by CES, the 
Régimen General was reintroduced but this time excluding migrants in Spain (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 127). The Secretary for Emigration and Immigration maintained that 
together the changes would  “bring to light jobs in the black economy” (ibid: 156).  
Second, in 2005 the largest “extraordinary” regularisation to date was carried out, 
benefiting half a million foreigners (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 156: 127). A total of 691,655 
applications were filed – confirming the huge dimensions of irregular residence (ibid: 158). 
The programme was supported by the employers and unions but was subject to hostility from 
the PP conservatives, now in opposition, and censured by French, Dutch and German 
premiers and ministers (Tremlett, 2006; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 157). Opponents argued 
that regularisation “rewarded” illegal entry and thereby stimulated future inflows (ibid). 
European critics were most concerned that regularised migrants would relocate within the 
EU. Madrid responded by introducing a system to share information on immigration and 
asylum measures that might affect other member states (ibid). Caldera became publicly 
controversial (Ms. T – presidential advisor), and this may have contributed to ending his 
ministerial career in 2008. 
To qualify for papers, migrants were required to prove both social and labour 
rootedness, but the criteria were not demanding: three years' residence according to the 
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municipal register or other source, and a job contract. A change from the previous procedure 
was that it became the employer, not the migrant, who had to request the legalisation 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 157). The sectors where employers were most responsive were 
domestic service (32 per cent); construction (21); agriculture, livestock and fishing (15); hotel 
and catering (10); and commerce (5; ibid: 158). Regularisation was more likely to be given to 
men than women (ibid), and the largest national groups were Ecuadorians (140,020), 
Romanians (118,546) and Moroccans (86,806; ibid). 
The new government also performed a significant (albeit limited) expansion of hiring at 
source (Ms. T). Alongside the quota scheme, a new “catalogue of hard-to-fill occupations” 
was introduced (often termed simply as “catalogue”; Mr. M; Ms. T – presidential advisor). The 
catalogue accelerated legal hiring: as jobs appeared in the catalogue, employers could 
assume authorisation to enter Spain for the migrant worker (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 
128). A total of 178,000 persons would pass through the system in 2007 (Rius-Sant, 2011: 
133). Additionally, encouraged by the Economic and Social Council (5.2.1), Between June 
2004 and June 2007 a total of 352,307 entries were managed through the reintroduced 
Régimen General system – a much higher figure than the 14,229 recruited abroad through 
quotas (ibid: 128).  
Integration initiatives developed in municipalities and ACs such as Catalonia were 
generalised across the whole State (FSII integration spokesperson Mr. V). In 2005 an 
“integration fund” was set up (the Support Fund for the Reception and Integration of 
Immigrants, SFRII; Ms. T – presidential advisor). According to the presidential advisor 
interviewed, its objective was to “avoid racist or xenophobic fractures” through financing local 
authorities to implement multi-cultural training and other measures (Ms. T; Consejo de 
Ministros, 2007: 145). Its annual allocation was 120 million euros in 2005, raised to 182 
million in 200641  (Consejo de Ministros, 2007: 143). After 2007 the fund was employed 
through four-year Strategic Plans for Citizenship and Integration (PECI). For the first year of 
the 2007-2010 plan, 200 million was budgeted to promote the positive reception of 
immigration and participation – as well as integration (ibid; Ms. T). For 2007-2010, 60 per 
cent of these funds were apportioned to incorporating migrants in society and 40 per cent to 
education (ibid). These initiatives led the FSII representative to affirm that integration had 
become a major focus of attention under the Socialists (Mr. V). 
Large numbers of migrants continued to arrive in the years after the 2005 “amnesty” 
but the PSOE government now chose to reduce irregularity by strengthening the procedures 
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of individual social or labour rootedness (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 160). One calculation 
has been that hundreds of thousands have benefited from the procedures (ibid: 161). 
As well as departures, there were many continuities in policy from the Aznar era. Policy 
was guided by the notion that immigration was necessary for the economy but otherwise 
requiring exclusion and control. Tying renewal of permits to continued employment meant 
authorised residence was precarious and dependent on the migrant preserving the goodwill 
of her employer (ibid: 158). Despite appealing against the 8/2000 Aliens’ Law in opposition, 
the CC.OO. lawyer interviewed was critical of the four years taken to create a new law, which 
he described ironically as being “a bit of a contradiction” (Mr. J). Even the expanded hiring at 
source represented a very minor part of all immigration into Spain, and when the global 
recession began, the numbers of migrants hired through the “hard-to-fill” vacancy scheme 
was lowered (see 5.2.2.2; López-Sala & Ferrer-Turrión, 2009). Finally, regular deportations 
also continued under the PSOE, whose Minister of the Interior was Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba 
from 2006 (5.2.2.2). 
 
Less visible and more mixed policies 2008-2011  
 
While José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero campaigned for re-election as premier in March 2008 
he emphasised his government’s priority of preventing, controlling and returning “illegal 
immigration” 42. He was omitting that widespread irregular entry and settlement had taken 
place under his administration, thereby continuing the gap between discourse and practice of 
his conservative predecessor. At the same time he was announcing the direction of migratory 
policy during his second term. That year deportations increased by 25 per cent (Romero, 
2010: 38). Most significantly Celestino Corbacho, a Catalan mayor with a reputation for 
toughness towards immigration, was appointed Minister of Labour and Immigration. One of 
his first measures was to introduce a controversial “Early Payment of Benefits to Foreigners 
Program” – also known as the “return policy” – by which a migrant who loses her job is 
encouraged to return to her country of origin in exchange for receiving the unemployment 
benefit she would be entitled to receive over the coming period43. Only 5 per cent of potential 
beneficiaries signed up, and the Programme was widely perceived to have failed (Ms. B;  Ms. 
A – SOS Racisme; Mr. M – ex-CITE; López-Sala & Ferrer-Turrión, 2009).  
Another transformation was that legal entry via quotas and catalogues effectively 
stopped (Mr. G – farmers’ union representative). This reverse plus the return policy could be 
interpreted as adjustments that cohered with the labour approach to immigration in a context 
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of shrinking labour markets. Nevertheless, in effect, rather than stopping labour migration it 
strengthened the existing system of irregular entry or stay and individual regularisation 
through rootedness. A further reverse was that the integration fund introduced by the PSOE 
(SFRII/PECI) began to suffer yearly cuts. Its budget was reduced from 200 million in 2007 to 
67 million euros in 201144 (Ms. T – Moncloa advisor; Mr. V – FSII president). For Catalonia 
this meant a reduction in its assignment from around 44 million to 15 million (Rius-Sant, 
2011: 189). In 2011 Corbacho was replaced as minister by Valeriano Gómez. 
In June 2009 a new Aliens Law reform bill was passed (2/2009). It increased the 
maximum internment of undocumented migrants from forty to sixty days (Rius-Sant, 2011: 
133). At the same time it also institutionalised some relatively progressive policies of the 
Zapatero and Caldera years. The right to family reunification was included – requiring five 
years’ residence in order to bring parents (ibid). Irregular migrant victims of gender violence 
were prevented from being deported (ibid: 133 & 134; Ms. A – anti-racist coordinator). In line 
with criticisms of the previous Law, the right of migrants to meet, demonstrate and strike was 
reintroduced (Rius-Sant, 2011: 130). The Socialists accepted forty amendments by CiU. As a 
result ACs were given powers that the Catalan parliament had been denied during the 
Statute reform process, and AC and municipal authorities were allowed to issue certificates 
to accredit migrants’ integration in rootedness processes (ibid: 134). The Catalan Generalitat 
also gained competences to renew work permits (ibid). Rootedness procedures were 
included in the reformed Law’s regulations approved in April 2011 (Mr. J – CC.OO.). One 
conservative MP complained that the policy meant “papers for all those that resist”45 (Rius-
Sant, 2011: 134). As we shall see below this was an exaggerated claim (7.1 and 7.2). 
 
 
5.2.2.2 Policy responses to irregularity  
 
The evidence thus far suggests that for at least a considerable time period the model of 
immigration in practice has been one of “restrictive regulations … that make legal entry 
difficult” and require people to “enter irregularly or enter as tourists and begin to be irregular 
when working” leading to iregular residence (Mr. M – ex-CITE spokesperson). This is despite 
suggestions otherwise by a ministerial advisor and border policy specialist (Ms. T; Ms. R.) 
Although a full appreciation of how irregularity has evolved and how policy has responded to 
and encouraged it will be made in the light of all of the interview findings in 7.2 and in the 
final Conclusion (Chapter Eight), some preliminary observations are made here based on the 
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literature and information on formal processes obtained from the interviews. I first provide 
some background on immigrants’ main routes of entry, and compare the volume of hiring at 
source with increases in residence by foreigners; then describe the pattern of “amnesties” 
that have developed as a policy response; and, finally, look briefly at the practical application 
of border-control functions of the state, and control of irregular hiring in employment. In this 
sub-section the account goes beyond looking at stated policy, to focus on practice. 
 
Irregular entry or settlement  
 
Although the policing of Spain’s Mediterranean border generally has been the focus of 
attention in discussion on Spanish border politics, only 5 per cent of immigration into the 
state is by sea (SOS Racismo, 2007: 15). 15 per cent is by land – mainly across the French 
border (ibid; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 169). However the bulk of migration enters via 
airports and is initially authorised (1.3). Surveys and police reports give some indication of 
the importance of this route. Research in 2000 found that half of the Latin American migrants 
interviewed said they entered as tourists; and in 2002 a total of 550,000 immigrants from this 
region flew to Spain, but only 86,000 returned46 (Cornelius, 2004: 394). Mainland release of 
detainees on the African border added to these numbers (1.3). 
The irregular nature of most new settlement is revealed by comparing official figures on 
immigration to the size of at-source recruitment. Quota hiring involved 135,000 migrants 
between 1993 and 1999, but according to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 90 per 
cent of these were already undocumented residents47 (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 124 & 
148). In contrast, the conservative official Interior Ministry figures showed an increase in the 
foreign-resident population by 609,000 between 1995 and 2001 (Figure 4.2). Despite 
“political rhetoric that, after 2000, presented the quota system as the core element in Spain’s 
immigration policy”, from 2002 the yearly quota maximum was under 20,000 (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 126). Many jobs did not materialise and much quota employment 
consisted of re-hiring previous temporary workers rather than new entries (ibid). 352,000 
foreign residents were recruited through the Régimen General between 2004 and 2007 
(5.2.2.1). But these volumes are dwarfed by the 4,278,000 million foreigners arriving 
between 2001 and 2009 (Figure 4.3). As well as being a very unrepresentative entry route for 
migrants, hiring at source contributes very little to promoting “legality” – compared to over a 
million migrants accepted in “extraordinary regularisations” between 2000 and 2005 (see 
Table 5.2). 
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Recurrent and larger amnesties 
 
A key policy response to the high levels of irregularity in Spain has been in-situ 
regularisation. Until 2005 this chiefly took the form of frequent “extraordinary” processes, 
which on each occasion would be presented as the last of its kind (Cornelius, 2004; see 
Table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.2: Spanish regularisation processes & numbers accepted 1985-2011 
 
Year 
Total no. of migrants regularised in 
individual processes 
1985-6* 
38,000 
44,000 
Total in year: 82,000 
1991 110,000 
1996 21,000 
2000 147,000 
2001* 
36,013 
20,352 
223,428 
Total in year = 279,793 
2005 500,000 
Source: Marfleet, Philip, 2006: 169/Cornelius, 2004: 412/Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 145, 146 & 152/ EFE, 2005.
48
 
* In these years more than one process took place. Figures are provided 
for each process and year – in italics. 
 
Regularisation was treated as a “reactive” policy by an immigration management researcher; 
and according to such a viewpoint the curve upwards in migrants “amnestied” – illustrated by 
the figures in the table – would respond to the similar-shaped climb in migration to Spain 
(Ms. B; 4.3.1). Whether this is simply the case, and whether regularisations also promote 
immigration, shall be examined in relation to the empirical evidence in relation to the primary 
and secondary findings in chapter nine. For the time being it should be sufficient to indicate 
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two things. First, the amnesty process is not one that only legalises: it also “illegalises”. The 
normally large numbers of unsuccessful applicants’ have their illegal status confirmed and 
alerted to; and for the successful, the requisite of regular renewal based on continuing in 
employment can ease falling back into irregularity for migrants. These have been features of 
the regularisation processes since the 1980s (Cornelius, 2004: 412). Only 64 per cent of 
migrants who applied for the 1991 regularisation were “legal” two years later (ibid). In the 
more open 2005 process, 15 per cent were not able to renew the following year according to 
the General Council of Spanish Lawyers (SOS Racismo, 2007: 65). For immigration scholar 
Antonio Izquierdo, 
 
[It is] difficult for the regularized to maintain legal status, because they tend to work in 
precarious and unstable jobs in sectors … where irregular contracts and the 
underground economy are the norm. (Calavita, 2012: 39). 
 
This is a major consideration in such a flexibilised labour market as the Spanish (4.2.1). 
The second point is that regularisation processes were a recurrent policy in Spain 
until 2005 (after which different dynamics operate), and numbers of migrants regularised 
increased over time. It should also be pointed out that repeated amnesties is not a pattern 
confined to Iberia. In broadly the same period as discussed here, other southern European 
states – Italy and Greece – showed a similar recurrence and comparable dimensions of 
“amnesties”49 (Marfleet, 2006: 169). These countries also share with Spain high levels of 
irregularity – or gaps between “law in the books” and “law in action” (Calavita, 2005: 9; 
Cornelius, 2004; Baldwin-Edwards, 1998).  
 
Limited acts of deportation 
 
Aided by the European Union practically, logistically and financially (5.1.2), the Spanish state 
has developed considerable capacity to control its southern border. It has also demonstrated 
its ability to deploy legal, police and administrative structures against “ilegales” within its 
territory. As Figure 5.1 shows, it has four ways of acting coercively against irregular 
migration: non-admission,50 turning back at the border (non-admission but including a ban 
from entry for three years), readmission (of any foreigner entering Spain from a country that 
has agreed to readmission), and deportations (from Spain’s interior). Annual return figures 
for each type, and their evolution, are visually represented in Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1: Numbers & types of returns of irregular migrants 2000-2008 
 
 
Source: Ministry of the Interior figures in Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 168 
 
To gain an indication of how much official tolerance of irregularity there is within Spain it is 
useful to look at the statistics for deportations and compare them with returns at the border. 
For the 1986 to 1999 period expulsions from the Spanish interior remained fairly constant at 
around 4,800 a year (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 162). Figures on annual deportations 
between 2000 and 2008 show a general rise but varying between 6,579 (in 2000) and 14,104 
(in 2003; Figure 5.1). Enforcing deportation orders was therefore probably a frequent and 
substantial enough punishment to inspire fear among the undocumented (and anxiety among 
the precariously regularised).  
However, if we look at the percentages of expulsion orders carried out, prevention of 
irregular residence seems less systematic. Even in a period coinciding with a policy of 
“crackdown” on “illegality” by the Aznar administration, between January 2002 and July 2004 
28 per cent of total deportation orders were executed (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 165). 
Under the Socialists in 2006 and 2007 the proportion was 23 per cent and 21 per cent (ibid). 
Nearly three quarters of all expulsion orders therefore had a different effect other than 
removing migrants. Because they obstruct regularisation,51 one consequence was to create 
the figure of “the undeportable, unregularisable deportee” – another immigration paradox 
(ibid). The percentages for deportations performed is particularly low if compared with the 
proportion of detainees repatriated at the border (92 per cent in 2007; ibid: 167). It can be 
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seen from the graph that in the last two years of the Aznar government and first three years 
of the Zapatero administration readmissions overshadowed deportations – grown partly due 
to the proliferation of bilateral migration agreements; 5.1.2. Revealingly, most of the 
readmitting was of Romanians and Bulgarians at Spain’s northern border, leading total 
readmissions to fall sharply after both nationalities became EU citizens in 2007 (ibid: 169). It 
is worth signalling that there was little appreciable difference in levels and kinds of control 
under governments of “the right” and “left”. 
 
Few actions against irregular employment 
 
Irregularity is not just in entry and settlement but also in employment, and another way to 
control immigration is via work inspections inside Spain. Exact figures on “illegal” hiring are 
not available; however, according to 2002 data from the Institute for Migrations and Social 
Services (IMSERSO52), 32 per cent of migrants worked without a job contract – a figure rising 
to 40 per cent for North Africans and 50 per cent for sub-Saharan Africans (Calavita, 2005: 
69). It is possible that these percentages increased in the subsequent years due the large 
size of immigration in the period (see 4.3.1) – at least until the 2005 regularisation (5.2.2.1).  
In response to irregular hiring, the 1985 Law53 brought in fines (although not criminal 
sanctions) for employers hiring irregular migrants (Cornelius, 2004: 408). Later criminal 
sanctions would be introduced. In 2001 a total of 6,813 infractions of immigration law were 
detected in the economy. Legal amendments under the second Aznar administration 
strengthened employer fines and criminal penalties (ibid: 409). Cornelius noted, however, 
that enforcement depended on general workplace inspections that are not focused on 
immigration issues and that employers employing “sin papeles” are normally only prosecuted 
when committing “the most extreme abuses of other labor standards”. He suggests that 
controlling irregular employment is complicated greatly by a culture of tolerance towards the 
underground economy,54  concluding that only “token” enforcement exists in Spain (ibid). 
Bureaucratic difficulties in prosecuting illegal hiring have been identified (ibid) – but the 
question arises as to how much political and administrative effort has been made to 
overcome these.  
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5.2.3 Two additional features of Spanish policy 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s small- and medium-sized farmers’ “unions” (associations) 
have played a substantial part in developing a specific model of hiring for the agricultural 
sector. The Catalan association Unió de Pagesos developed a “quota” scheme for at-source 
hiring, which requires employers to provide migrant workers with housing of a minimum 
standard, a paid return trip (Mr. G – migration specialist for COAG; Ms. B – Spanish policy 
researcher). The migrant residence permit is awarded under the employer’s name (Ms. T – 
Moncloa advisor; Ms. B). The system has been adopted across Spain and is managed 
through the Spain-wide farmers’ association COAG (Mr. G). Despite its peculiarities, in many 
regards this employer-centred model foreshadowed the regular-hiring models developed by 
the Socialist government (5.2.2.1; Ms. B).  
Article thirteen of the 1978 Constitution establishes the right to asylum as a 
fundamentally protected human right and provides asylum petitioners with “the right to 
housing, public education, and social assistance” (Cornelius, 2004: 411). Despite such 
constitutional provisions, Spain has introduced policy and (in particular) practical restrictions 
on asylum – sometimes criticised by and other times encouraged by the EU. The 1985 Law 
applied a highly selective approach in practice, and 96 per cent of asylum requests were 
rejected in 1991 (ibid). In 2000 the proportion of refusals fell to 71 per cent (ibid); but, 
according to Amnesty International figures, this rose again to 87 per cent in the first semester 
of 2006 (2,165 out of 2,504 requests, Ventura, 2007). NGOs protested that migrants entering 
the country were not usually asked about their refugee status; and Brussels criticised Madrid 
for being the slowest state at implementing common asylum (and family regroupment) 
legislation (Amnesty International, 2005; SOS Racismo, 2007).  
Although these figures are not complete enough to draw strong conclusions, it can be 
concluded that asylum policy did not became less restrictive under the Socialists, and 
possibly became the opposite. To provide a more complete picture of asylum policy under 
different administrations, however, it must be indicated that in keeping with Spain’s irregular 
model of immigration, often in practice failed asylum applicants find alternative routes to 
remain in the country. The 1985 Law allowed them three months after rejection to apply for 
work permits through the “normal procedure” without threat of deportation, and many 
refugees “simply disappear into the underground economy” (Cornelius, 2004: 411 & 412). 
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5.3 Catalonia  
 
5.3.1 Catalonia’s frustrated attempts at self-management of immigration  
 
One immigration scholar has described the post-1978 political framework as being one of 
“radical decentralisation” (Calavita, 205: 29). In this, it is argued, the “actual operation of the 
immigration system is decentralized to the regions, provinces, and municipalities” (ibid); and 
autonomous communities (ACs) “in effect have their own immigration micro-policies and 
procedures” (ibid). This characterisation overstates the decentralisation of migratory policy. 
Catalonia’s immigration powers are very limited in comparison with those of the Spanish 
state (Mr. M – ex-CITE). A member of government advisory boards in Catalonia and Spain 
described the former territory’s role in relation to immigration as “administrative” and the 
latter’s role as “political” (Mr. R – Catalan policy advisor). For a Barcelona policy researcher, 
the AC’s limitations in immigration management exist although, 
 
Catalonia for many years has been asking to participate more and have more of a 
voice – not just on issues related to integration but also issues related to the 
regulation of flows. (Ms. B – Barcelona-based policy researcher). 
 
Devolved competences are restricted to the areas of integration and reception55. 
On several occasions the Generalitat has been prevented from expanding its 
migratory policy capacities. In May 2001 President Pujol and his Chief Minister Artur Mas 
signed the Quebec-Catalonia Agreement on Immigration that aimed to develop a regionally 
differentiated immigration policy, including powers over selection of immigrants 56  (4.1.2; 
Davis: 2009: 432). For Pujol, the Generalitat, “had to be able to run its own immigration 
policy as immigration is, for Catalonia, a question of being or not being” (Arrighi de 
Casanova, 2014: 119). Proposals to share powers with Madrid were rejected by the PP 
government and PSOE opposition (ibid: 433; Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 119). The bid and 
response by the two main Spanish parties signalled the pattern for future relations over 
immigration powers between Barcelona and Madrid.57 
In 2002 and 2003 the CiU Immigration Secretary opened immigration offices in 
Poland, Morocco and Colombia (Davis, 2009: 433). The stated intention was to put Catalan 
businesses requiring labour directly in touch with foreign candidates, and act to facilitate 
obtaining permits through the Spanish consulates – thereby speeding up the process of 
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quota hiring (ibid). The other formal aims of the new agencies were to increase immigrants’ 
knowledge of Catalan through providing language classes in the countries of emigration and 
promote Catalonia’s international visibility (Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 119). The 
Constitutional Court prevented the Catalan agencies from promoting direct relations between 
host countries and Catalonia (Davis, 2009: 434). At the same time, central government 
responded that the Generalitat had invaded its competencies and prevented Spanish 
embassies from coordinating with them (Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 119; Davis, 2009: 434). 
This made the work of Catalan agencies “moot”, and led to their closure under the new 
Tripartite government (Davis, 2009; 4.1.2).  
The most ambitious effort to promote Catalan immigration policymaking was during 
the attempt to radically reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. This proposed gaining 
“greater powers in all [immigration] fields” (as described by Barcelona migrant-labour 
specialist Mr. M; 4.1.2). In line with the general response in Congress and the courts, most of 
the relevant articles were overruled; creating frustration for Catalan immigration chiefs, 
advisors and sections of civil society (Mr. M; Mr. R; Ms. A – SOS Racisme spokeswoman). 
 
 
5.3.2 The Catalan emphasis on integration and its rationale  
 
Despite the limitations described, the Generalitat has used its existing powers to shape 
processes of integration of the new immigration in the AC. This has been aided by producing 
long-term immigration plans (see 5.3.3). It has also been through continuing and developing 
policies responding to the very large numbers – a third of the local population – born outside 
Catalonia when autonomy was reintroduced in the late 1970s (4.3). Pujol, the “mentor of 
Catalan moderate nationalism”,58 treated this immigration as “Catalonia’s primary national 
problem” and wrote several books on the topic (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009; Santamaría, 2011: 
200). He concluded that a Catalan is a person “who lives and works in Catalonia and wants 
to be it” – specifying that this meant having “knowledge of the language” and “respect for 
Catalan culture” (ibid: 186-188 & 200). In other words he embraced a civic-nationalist 
approach and rejected the racial and ethno-cultural conceptualisations of Catalan identity 
that dominated pre-Civil War “catalanisme”59 (ibid; Davidson, 1999).  
The civic approach was shared by progressive pro-Catalans. The Republican Left of 
Catalonia (ERC) vice-president of the Tripartite government (2006-2010), Josep-Lluís Carod-
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Rovira described how it would later apply to non-Iberian migrants and how the focus 
contrasted with the dominant cultural policy in Spain: 
 
In Madrid a Castilian-speaking Ecuadorian will always be an immigrant. Here, if he 
makes the step and speaks Catalan, he will be Catalan, he will be from here, he will 
be seen like one of us. (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009: 205; 4.1.4.) 
 
Yet at least the dominant strategy in catalanisme – that of the conservative CiU – has not 
been based on authentic respect for those that have migrated to Catalonia. Pujol 
characterised the Andalusian as an “anarchic” and “destroyed man” that required 
assimilation into a superior culture (ibid: 202). There is a similar disrespect towards the “new” 
minority non-European cultures: Pujol spoke at a party summer-school of his opposition to 
“mestissatge” – meaning cultural or even racial “miscegenation” (Caussa, 2008: 74). Pujol’s 
successor as CiU leader (Mas) said before 2000 migrants at an election rally “[w]e do not 
want a multicultural Catalonia … We want a single people”60. As Calavita observed, the 
Interdepartmental Plan for Immigration 2001-2004 and the CiU administration overseeing it 
avoid a “politically incorrect” explicit model of “assimilation”, defending maintaining “an 
equilibrium between social cohesion and diversity”, but its single emphasis on integration as 
the practical way of achieving balance belies at least a semi-assimilationist approach61 
(2005: 96). Underlying this strategy is a “pro-active” project of “nation-building” (4.1.2; ibid: 
95). 
 
Envisaging the new immigration as a bigger “threat”  
 
Success in integrating Spanish migrants and particularly their children has been widely 
acknowledged. Among other effects it has provided CiU with a large non-Catalan vote, 
helping its domination of Catalan politics (McRoberts, 2001). Yet there are two reasons why 
CiU has been pessimistic over the chances of incorporating the new immigration into its 
national project. Firstly, its previous success was incomplete. Very many socially 
disadvantaged urban areas remain predominantly Spanish speaking  and identification with 
Catalonia is relatively weak.62  
Secondly immigration from outside Spain had lifted the proportion of the population 
born outside Catalonia to a similar level as in the 1970s (4.4), while crucially being seen by 
the government as being the most problematic for Catalan national identity. Artur Mas 
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outlined CiU’s general approach: “the new African, Asian, Latin American and Eastern 
European immigration is at the same time an opportunity for the progress of the country and 
a threat to its identity” (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009: 201). The Inter-departmental Immigration Plan 
2001-2004 identified it as more difficult to integrate than the earlier Spanish immigration: “it is 
no longer an internal immigration within a state having the same legislation, religious or 
family affinities" (Govern de la Generalitat, 2001).  
Practical reasons were offered for these concerns. In the words of a researcher 
specialising on immigration and national identity, the new immigration was “more complex, 
diverse and heterogeneous … in terms of origin, culture, language, customs, social class, 
etc.” (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009). Yet it is likely that unspoken religious or even ethnic chauvinism 
also influenced political attitudes. Marta Ferrusola, in a controversial 2001 speech later 
defended by her President husband, claimed that the new immigration was “an avalanche 
very different to the emigrations of fifty years ago” because it had “a different religion and 
culture and wishes for these to be respected” (Santamaría, 2003; 1.2.3). In 2003 the 
Generalitat introduced an income-tax deduction for any new mother in Catalonia to maintain 
Catalan demography without “depending on immigration”. In 2011 the CiU coalition withdrew 
the entitlement to those migrants not officially resident for a minimum of five years. The 
Catalan Minister for Social Welfare justified the limitation in terms of the reductions being 
“assistance from Catalonia to people from Catalonia”.63 The message transmited was that 
non-migrant children were desired over migrant children. There are two likely interpretations 
of these policies and viewpoints: either CiU and those associated with its tradition were more 
pessimistic about the possibility of integrating non-Spanish children, or they were acting in 
accordance with undisclosed ethnic or racial prejudice.  
 
 
5.3.3 Immigration-related institutional structure and policies  
 
Despite the limitations to the Catalan institutions’ ability to manage immigration, both 
government and civil society are making attempts that either are having a substantial impact 
on society in relation to immigration or demonstrate the political will to have a such influence. 
The area is institutionally administered through the Generalitat’s Secretariat for Immigration 
(SIM), which was the first “regional” body of this importance when created in 2000 (Calavita, 
2005: 95). The Secretariat is a sub-department of the Department of Social Welfare64– 
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perhaps reflecting that (alongside cultural policy) the main vehicles for shaping migration-
related processes are social, educational and housing provision.  
Due to the centrality of integration policy and its “integral and transversal” nature an 
Interdepartmental Commission for Immigration was created65 (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 77 & 
78; Kleiner-Liebau, 2009: 211). To consult on policy with migrant associations, employers, 
unions, NGOs and other civil-society groups, an Immigration Advisory Council (CAI) was 
created (later renamed the Taula de Ciutadania (Citizenship Board, Mr. R – Catalan policy 
specialist). The Catalan government advisor interviewed describes this as promoting “the 
pursuit of joint [immigration management] solutions” (Mr. R), but it also was recognised that it 
provides “a logic of complicity with the administration” (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 76), which 
could be interpreted as suggesting critical civil-society organisations are integrated into 
administration in a corporative way.  
The mentioned Immigration Plans establishing “short and long term [policy] horizons” 
are the 1993-2000 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan 66  (through which the 
Interdepartmental Commission was created, Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 76); the 2001-2004 Plan 
(by which the Advisory Council was set up, ibid); and two Citizenship and Immigration Plans 
for the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 (Mr. R; Department de Treball, Afers Socials I 
Famílies, 2009). The plans have been credited with developing the integration-centred 
approach to immigration (or “Catalan way”,  Zapata-Barreto, 2006: 78 & 79).    
 
Implemented policies  
 
Despite the obstacles described in 5.3.1, the Generalitat has been able to develop and 
implement many significant plans and policies. An illustration is that the 2001-2004 
Interdepartmental Immigration Plan proposed 133 wide-ranging practical initiatives 67 
(Calavita, 2005: 96 & 97). Some of the competencies included in the 2006 Statute passed by 
the Catalan Parliament were granted by the Spanish state (4.1.4). The Generalitat was 
allowed to set quotas for specific labour groups, and it was allowed to co-participate in 
designing the mechanisms by which these were decided (Ms. T – presidential advisor; 
Zapata-Barrero, 2012: 226)68. The Employment Services of Catalonia began issuing and 
renewing working visas (but residence permits were still Madrid’s responsibility so 
cooperation between the two administrations was required, Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 120). 
It was acknowledged that Barcelona would have more say on “state decisions in matters of 
immigration with a special interest for Catalonia” 69  (Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 120). A 
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bilateral governmental commission agreed in 2008 that Catalonia would become the first AC 
to attain competences in work inspection and authorisation of initial work permits (Zapata-
Barrero, 2012: 231).  
The 2009 Aliens’ Law incorporated some of the changes into law: allowing for use in 
permit decisions AC or municipal reports on migrants’ schooling, residence, housing, social 
integration and language learning (Aja, Arango & Alonso, 2010). In April 2010, the Tripartite 
Catalan parliament passed “the Reception Law” (“Llei de Acollida”70 ) that treated the “taking 
in” of migrants as a “shared responsibility” of the central and autonomous administrations 
(Ms. A – SOS Racisme). It gave Town Halls responsibility for providing initial rootedness 
certificates to foreigners accredited as having completed some hours of Catalan-language 
classes and knowing about Catalan society and labour relations71 (Aja, Arango & Alonso, 
2010; Rius-Sant, 2011: 190). The “Llei de Acollida” was never provided with funding – falling 
victim to Generalitat austerity measures in 2011 – a failure lamented by the Catalan anti-
racist association representative interviewed (Ms. A; Rius-Sant, 2011: 190). At the same 
time, an expert on immigration policy interviewed said that the Catalan model of 
regularisation through integration set the template for the “social rootedness” model applied 
across Spain and formalised in the 2009 Law (Ms. B – irregular migration researcher). 
The Barcelona-based Spanish policy specialist and the spokesperson for the Spanish 
Forum for the Social Integration of Migrants expressed the opinion that government and local 
authorities in Catalonia had implementing “leading” or “advanced” policies; and Catalan 
government officials have described their integration policy as “pioneering” (Ms. B; Mr. V – 
FSII spokesman; Calavita, 2005: 95). Examples of other original and progressive policies 
developed in the territory include the creation of the post of Commissioner for Immigration 
and Inter-cultural Dialogue and an “anti-rumours network” – to combat unfounded prejudices 
towards migrants (Rius-Sant, 2011: 192 & 193). A 2009 Law passed by the “Tripartit”-
dominated Catalan parliament compelled Town Halls to devote public or private land to 
different faiths for centres of worship, although the CiU administration – beginning in 2010 – 
made the measure more optional (Rius-Sant, 2011).  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a multi-layered framework for the rest of this study. It has also 
provided some pointers as to why gaps have emerged such as the high levels of irregular 
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residence in Catalonia and Spain. With regards to the EU we can conclude the following. The 
process of developing European Community policy has been slow and uneven. Policy has 
revolved fundamentally around a combined policy of controlling its southern and eastern 
borders and allowing (mainly) free circulation within the EU territory. Other policies – such as 
towards refugees – have developed slowly – particularly regarding implementation – and in 
accordance with the European focus on “security” and “criminality”. EU member states are 
directly compelled or indirectly encouraged to turn European priorities and policies into 
national laws and policies. Mediterranean states such as Spain have been expected to play a 
particularly active role in border enforcement – initially as the key gatekeeper against “illegal 
migration”. Before the economic crisis this created a contradiction for Mediterranean 
countries such as Spain that required large amounts of reserve labour (4.2.1, 4.2.2 & 4.4). 
Core-periphery differences have been an obstacle in the process of developing 
communitarisation policies, as have differences between nation states and the Union.  
Increasingly border control has been externalised to non-EU neighbours – a 
development part encouraged by the Zapatero administration. A “shadow” policymaking tier 
has developed around (and inside) Europe’s geographical borders involving outsourced 
surveillance, detention and deportation operations. European Union agencies such as 
Frontex appear to have the task of co-coordinating key processes. As well as border 
management, EU policy consists of encouraging internal migration within labour strategies 
aimed at increasing the “competitiveness” of European states. These different developments 
take place within the wider neoliberal political strategies that have dominated the EU project 
as a whole. They also provide support for the thesis that the liberalism of democratic states 
enshrined in constitutions, laws and much “common sense” political ideology can act as a 
counter to restrictive state tendences, as shown by the growing European practice of 
externalising restrictive procedure beyond the boundaries of European legal systems. 
There are many conclusions that can be drawn from the survey of Spanish policy 
development provided. One would be that the style of policy has varied from a mainly top-
down unilateralism in the Aznar period to a more consultative and multilateral approach in 
the first years of the Zapatero presidency; a transformation that, alongside the greater 
institutional centrality given to immigration by the PSOE, was celebrated by a variety of 
participants in policy forums interviewed (Mr. V; Ms. M – construction employers; Mr. J – 
CC.OO.; Mr. M – ex-CITE). A second would be that the “qué” (what) in immigration 
management has varied less than the “cómo” (how). Despite the discursive shift to an 
“economic” as opposed to “public order” approach to immigration, there have been big 
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similarities in policy and outcomes under Right and Left. In both cases there were high levels 
of immigration and irregularity, seemingly resolved by “amnesties”, despite shared official 
insistence that migrants “enter legally”; and the right to asylum has been constantly denied in 
most cases – with refugees normally treated as “economic migrants”. 72  This substantial 
continuity suggests that the fundamentals of immigration politics are resistent to changes in 
government and are not mainly electorally determined – a preliminary response to the third 
sub-question (1.4).  
The preliminary investigation presented in this chapter shows that the de facto 
immigration model was one of at least a period of irregularity in residence and employment, 
and frequent and progressively larger reactive regularisations. The combination of large-
scale settlement through legal entry and visa overstay, the rarity of workplace inspections, 
and limited proportion of street arrests and deportations confirm substantial tolerance 
towards undocumented residence and employment. At the same time the visibility of 
Mediterranean border control and a constant level of deportations from inside Spain 
combined with the need for migrants to have future employment to be able to renew permits, 
will encourage insecurity and dependency on the goodwill of employers – effects that 
increase the potential exploitation of migrant labour. Legal migrant recruitment schemes are 
very small compared to the size of immigration and sometimes have involved irregular 
residents. Furthermore these have proved to be contingent on the economic cycle – as has 
integration funding. The question of whether irregularity is in nature structural and even 
intentional shall be developed in Chapter Seven. 
The desire for greater policy decentralisation in Catalonia has been met by political 
inertias and legal prohibitions. This appears less the case when decentralisation aids labour 
or economic management, and more the case when it is linked to institutional actions 
associated with exercising nationhood (including the powers demanded in the 2006 Catalan 
Statute and the abandoned project of having foreign immigration offices, 5.3.1). A partial 
exception is that in the late 2000s pioneering Catalan policies to regularise through 
demonstrating rootedness or integration were adopted by the Spanish government. Despite 
the existing limitations, the Generalitat and Catalan civil society have used the powers 
available to develop a specific Catalan approach to immigration. This has centred on 
continuing to promote linguistic and cultural integration as it did for earlier groups of migrants, 
as well as developing ambitious government plans to incorporate migrants from poorer 
countries that conservative catalanisme treats as less easy or desirable to assimilate.   
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More deeply it can be concluded that immigration policy and policymaking is still 
fundamentally state-determined. The twin policy of European internal mobility and external 
control has been a major development affecting member states, but even in this area “realist” 
state dynamics can be detected: a tolerant attitude towards states wishing to slow the 
liberalisation of borders or re-introduce national controls; and policies best reflecting the 
labour and demographic interests of core states. As well as the Spanish state developing 
policy and particularly implementation in accordance with its labour needs, it does so in a 
way consistent with the linguistic and mythological aspects of Spanish nationalism (in 
practice promoting Latin American and European immigration and naturalisation over North 
and Sub-Saharan African). Therefore policy can be understood to be serving nation-craft as 
well as socio-economic functions – as was posited theoretically in 3.2. This view is reinforced 
by centralist Spanish concern over Catalonia becoming able to politically manage 
immigration – and not just instruct Madrid regarding its labour-market needs; and by the 
importance Catalan policymakers have given to integration as a practice and as a 
component in a general attempt to gain greater policy powers. It suggests that perceived 
national interests play an important role alongside – or even over-determining – economic 
interests in producing migration policies and outcomes (sub-questions 1 & 2).  
At the same time, in direct response to the fourth question, the multi-territoriality of 
policymaking is clearly a factor in the emergence of large policy paradoxes (1.4). The EU has 
imposed migratory controls on the Spanish state that create problematic administrative 
difficulties for political representatives, state administrators, employers and (most obviously) 
migrants in Spain and Catalonia, even if negative effects are cushioned by the existence of a 
large informal economy. This has led to the development of a general Spanish model based 
on repeated irregularity and regularisation. Lastly it should be added that multi-level nature of 
policy is important because it is based on major hierarchies of territorial power: between the 
core-dominated EU and its periphery, and between state and sub-state (with limited powers 
despite Spain’s relatively high levels of decentralisation). These are the findings developed 
from the case study when engaging with policy as formally developed and applied, and when 
examining irregularity in Spain using secondary sources only. In the following two chapters 
many processes are re-examined after reporting on observations and analyses given by 
interview policymaking participants and other close observers. 
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1
 A possible reason for exaggerating the EU’s role is that it is assumed that the process of political 
union has been an even process, when in reality it has advanced more and faster in economic 
spheres such as trade, production and investment. 
2
 The founding treaty of the European Economic Community. 
3
 An example was when the Austrian EU presidency in the 1990s complained that northern European 
states had taken a disproportionate number of refugees from the wars in Eastern Europe, compared 
to Spain and other Mediterranean countries (Moraes, 2003: 118). 
4
 The Trevi Group was instrumental in developing the EU’s security-focused (“securitised”) approach 
to immigration (Cetti, 2015). 
5
 Policy was decided through “intergovernmentalism” in the meantime (Geddes, 2003: 137). 
6
 Interpol is the EU enforcement agency. 
7
 EU law. 
8
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d1c4b4a-bff5-11df-9628-00144feab49a.html#axzz3wNKFsvOR  
9
 Some unions have described these practises as “social dumping” and held disputes – sometimes 
expressed in nationalist terms (Hardy & Fitzgerald, 2008: 6.) 
10
 Bolkestein was the EU internal market commissioner responsible for the directive (Monbiot, 2005).  
11
 In 2004 a central register of asylum-seekers’ fingerprints was incorporated into the database (Cetti, 
2015.)   
12
 In 2013 the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) began to provide non-stop 
surveillance beyond EU’s waters, using drones, satellites and cameras (Cetti, 2015.) 
13
 Less-convincingly the same author has treated this as a “de-territorialisation” of border 
management, rather than a European territorial process (Fernández-Bessa, 2008: 8). 
14
 Due to diplomatic disputes between the two countries over Ceuta and Melilla and fishing rights, 
between 1999 and 2004 Morocco refused to readmit 6420 third-country nationals that had entered 
Spain through its territory. After a new bilateral trade agreement was reached, repatriations increased 
greatly (Gracés-Mascareñas, 2012: 170).  
15
 See: http://elpais.com/diario/2007/03/03/internacional/1172876419_850215.html [Accessed 12 
December 2015] 
16
 Handing over an asylum petitioner to her country of persecution. 
17
 Eight were shot dead in three incidents between September 2005 and July 2006 (Amnesty 
International, 2006: 5-9). Not all responsibility has been Moroccan. In 2014, after the period of this 
study, fifteen African migrants drowned in the sea around Ceuta after “warning shots” were fired by 
Spanish police, leading to UN concern over Spanish practise. See: 
http://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/ONU-explicaciones-Espana-Ceuta-
devoluciones_0_323718336.html) [accessed 5 January 2016] 
18
 See: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/05/18/internacional/1211061602_850215.html [accessed 5 
January 2016] 
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19
 The directive in question was labelled by critics as the “directive of shame” (Pisarelo and Aparicio, 
2008: 50). It was backed by most PSOE MEPs. See: 
http://elpais.com/diario/2008/06/19/internacional/1213826402_850215.html [accessed 5 January 
2016] 
20
 Making applications in multiple states to guarantee greater chances of success. 
21
 Such policies also have faced a backlash from the rise of mass social movements and left parties in 
Spain, Greece and other EU states (Stobart, 2015a). 
22
 See: http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/ObservatorioPermanenteInmigracion/index.html 
[accessed 23 January 2016] 
23
 Also named the Round Table for Social Dialogue by Mr J. 
24
 The unions were the UGT, CC.OO., Basque Workers’ Solidarity (ELA), and the Galician Trade 
Union Confederation (CIG; CES, 2011: 9). 
25
 The sector includes cooperatives and companies in which no one party holds a majority of shares 
(“sociedades laborales”). 
26
 The experts are normally academic researchers chosen by the third-sector representatives (CES, 
2011: 9). 
27
 See: http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1995-8878 [accessed 12 January 2016] 
28
 See: http://www.foroinmigracion.es/es/index.htm [accessed 11 January 2016] 
29
 See: http://www.foroinmigracion.es/es/MANDATO-FORO-2010-2013/Vocalias/index.htm [accessed 
11 January 2016] 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 In 2002 this meant Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Morocco, Colombia, Poland and Romania 
(Cornelius, 2004: 406; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 133). 
32
 See: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1996-4138 [accessed 23 January 2016] 
33
 Aliens’ Law. 
34
 Irregularity was associated by Interior Minister José Barrionuevo with “international delinquency”, 
ibid: 118 & 119) 
35
 See: http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/847 [accessed 15 January 2016] 
36
 The legislation in question was known as “the Corcuera law” – after the minister of justice that 
introduced it. 
37
 An MP described how “you can’t get residence if you don’t have a work permit and you can’t get a 
work permit if you don’t have residence” (Calavita, 2005: 41). 
38
 In its first year the sectors in which shortages were identified were agriculture (10,000 workers), 
domestic and other services (5000 and 3500 respectively), and unskilled construction (1100; ibid: 29). 
39
 147,000 applicants were accepted in the first round, 36,000 were added during the review in 2001 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 152; EFE, 2005). 
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40
 Working visas of three-months duration were given to 2,233 domestic-service workers (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 121). 
41
 Of the 2006 budget 50 per cent was devoted to educational support, and 40 per cent, to assisting 
Town Halls (Consejo de Ministros, 2007: 143) 
42
 During an election debate on 3
rd
 March he did this graphically, saying, “[o]ur immigration policy has 
one principle: only those that can work in accordance with the law can come and stay here. That 
means firmly fighting against illegal immigration. And this must be done on three fronts. First, people 
driven by desperation must not leave their countries of origin. Second, border control must stop 
immigrants that do not have a guaranteed job contract. And, third, people that enter here illegally 
must be returned to their countries of origin. This is only possible by signing agreements with those 
countries. We have signed a dozen agreements with countries – basically in sub-Saharan Africa.” 
(Romero, 2008: 169.) 
43
 Half of the benefits were paid before departing from Spain; the rest were to be paid via the 
authorities of the country returned to. Concern over whether the second instalment would get to the 
end of the administrative chain was a disincentive to joining the programme (particularly in countries 
with inefficient state bureaucracies). 
44
 The funding would totally disappear after the PP came to office in 2011 
45
 This was adaptation of the term “papeles para todos” – a main slogan of the undocumented 
migrants´movement. 
46
 Even assuming that some then left Spain for other EU countries, this is a large influx that helps 
explain the demographic transformations identified previously (4.3.1). 
47
 Yearly 20,000 and 30,000 benefited from quota hiring in the mentioned period (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 124.) 
48
 Figures vary substantially between the sources. Those that are from official sources, reproduced in 
more than one study, or broken down according to year are given priority. 
49
 Particularities identified in the Spanish case also have taken place in the other countries. The 2006 
Italian regularisation process allowed applications from locally resident migrants (Romero, 2010: 73). 
50
 Non-admission includes rejecting visas before intended travel or refusing entry at the border 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 168.) 
51
 Concretely legalisation is hindered by penalising the length of residence required (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 165.) 
52
 In 2004 the institute was renamed the Institute for the Elderly and Social Services (while keeping 
the initials IMSERSO). 
53
 Implemented in 1988. 
54
 This largesse is despite the many individual complaints against cases of this that are accrued by 
the authorities and criticisms from the Ministry of the Interior (Cornelius, 2004: 409). 
55
 These limits also exist in other stateless nations such as Scotland (Arrighi de Casanovas, 2014.) 
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56
 The Quebec government has these powers (Davis, 2009: 432.) 
57
 They also foreshadowed relations over other political matters (5.1.4). 
58
 The ex-President of the Generalitat, nonetheless, is widely recognised as a disgraced figure since 
in 2015 he and his family were investigated and charged with obtaining a personal fortune through 
government bribery and money laundering. See: 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/12/30/actualidad/1451485396_938484.html  [accessed 20 
January]; 4.1.4. 
59
 Pujol’s successor as leader of CiU, Artur Mas, held a similar view: stating in 2006, “[t]he feeling of 
belonging is more important than the administrative condition of living in a territory […] [T]he will to be 
Catalan is the most decisive element” (Caussa, 2008: 75-77.) 
60
 “CiU ‘enseña’ a 2.000 inmigrantes cómo ejercer el voto el 28-N,” El País, 21 November 2010. 
61
 This view is underscored by a Catalan official interviewed by Calavita, for whom the integration 
model was justified because “we are who we are and we are not going to change” (Calavita, 2005: 
96.) 
62
 Weaker support for independence in such areas was demonstrated most sharply in the September 
2015 Catalan elections that were recognised to have represented a plebiscite on independence.  In 
these the strongly pro-Spain Ciutadans (Ciudadanos) party came first in the blue-collar 
neighbourhoods of Barcelona (Stobart, 2015b.) 
63
 See: http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/03/catalunya/1307063238_850215.html [Accessed 19 
January 2016] 
64
 Departament de Benestar Social i Famílies in Catalan. Now the Department is called the 
Department of Work, Social Affairs and Families (Departament de Benestar, Affers Socials i 
Famílies). 
65
 An inter-departmental role is also played by the Department of the Presidency (Kleiner-Liebau, 
2009: 211.) 
66
 This particular plan created the Interdepartmental Commission itself (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 76.) 
67
 These included provision of cultural facilitators in public services, information on access to 
accommodation, help for job searches, responses to cultural and social conflicts in schools, promotion 
of  studying diseases associated with immigrants, sponsorship of fairs celebrating culinary and 
cultural diversity, dissemination of anti-racist material, funding publications addressing the needs of 
migrant women, and co-development projects with migrants’ countries of origin (Calavita, 2005: 96 & 
97.) 
68
 Zapata-Barrerro felt this gesture was little more than “symbolic” however (2012: 226.) 
69
 This decision that was subjected to a legal appeal by Madrid’s right-wing regional president 
Esperanza Aguirre (Arrighi de Casanova, 2014: 120.) 
70
 “Acollida” can also be translated as “welcoming” and the Catalan term transmits a positive attitude 
to immigrants. The AC Law is formally named 10/2010. 
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71
 In August the Law was challenged by the ombudsman in the Constitutional Court (Zapata-Barrero, 
2012: 230 & 231.) 
72
 Arguably another example of continuation is that the PP-appointed FSII president Azurmendi 
defended regularising 600,000 migrants identified as remaining irregular after the Socialists’ 2005 
Process. This was despite the hostility to regularisations by the People’s Party opposition (SOS 
Racismo, 2008: 118). 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Empirical discoveries: migration policymaking from the 
inside 
 
The previous chapter introduced many mechanisms by which policy is developed at 
European, Spanish and Catalan levels, and provided some indications of territorial balances 
of power. Yet in order to adequately answer research sub-question four on the impact of 
hierarchies between different territorial levels of policymaking and question six on the 
subjective ways by which immigration policy and practice are shaped, a more in-depth 
examination is required of the mechanisms, actors and alliances that dominate “really 
existing” processes (1.4). Accordingly this chapter presents interview findings that go beyond 
formalities and appearances to identify the “inner workings” of institutional politics in relation 
to immigration. This is performed by critically presenting  the views of participants firstly on 
the structural relationships between different territorial institutions (in particular the relative 
powers of the Spanish state vis-á-vis Europe and Catalonia), and secondly between different 
political and social actors (government, state administrators, employers, migrants and 
unions). Some of the (unexpected) discoveries made have implications that require 
qualifying conclusions in earlier chapters.    
 
 
6.1 Effective relationships between scales of policymaking 
 
6.1.1 Spain is partially sovereign in relation to Europe  
 
Almost all of the interviewees who had participated in or researched the development of 
policy appraised the Spanish state as being a much more important actor than the EU (Mr. 
G, Ms. B, and Mr. R), as did a migrants’ rights activist (Mr. E – from the Catalan migrant 
network Papers for Everyone – Papers per a Tothom). Within this general view opinions 
ranged from Spain enjoying “exclusive powers” over entry (the Catalan and Spanish policy 
consultant Mr. R) to the State sometimes being influenced by Europe – with the EU “not” 
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being “an important actor” (Ms. B). For the Catalan policy advisor cited, the supremacy of 
the Spanish state is not coincidental: “[t]he last bastion of the state is the power to manage 
immigration. … If it were lost, it would stop being a sovereign state” (Mr. R). Practical 
grounds exist in support of this state-centred approach: the PSOE government continued 
with its “very visible” and largescale amnesty in 2005 despite strong criticisms towards the 
project from the EU (ibid), the large EU funds and logistical support in monitoring and 
policing Spain’s southern border (for example in response to the 2006 Canarian crisis; 
1.2.2) were requested by the Spanish government (Mr. R) and (according to a researcher 
on border management) the Integrated System of External Surveillance (SIVE: a twenty-
four hour single border surveillance system using radar, infra-red and sound sensors) used 
around all of Spain’s borders was a Spanish initiative1 (Ms. R). The Papers for Everyone 
activist light-heartedly shared the view,  “there are places where policy across Europe is 
discussed but there is no European policy” and increasingly, in relation to immigration, “the 
European Union has become just a piece of paper. There are more and more policies of 
internal rupture” (Mr. E). The latter view he illustrated in relation to the French transgression 
of Schengen (5.1.2) 
 Yet, reviewed as an integrated whole, the literature on Europe points to the EU 
playing a major role in shaping national immigration policies – through indirect as well as 
direct means (which, it could be added, would be able to reinforce each other). This 
influence has also been confirmed by the primary research. As well as issuing directives, 
occasionally legal action has been taken against member states (interview with the 
Barcelona-based Spanish policy researcher Ms. B). According to the president of the 
Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants (FSII) interviewed, the creation of this 
particular body and the Permanent Immigration Observatory was inspired by the Council of 
Europe. Pressure by the EU on Spain to adopt visa requirements for Latin American visitors 
must have been significant as some Latin American governments protested greatly 
because of the millions of Civil War refugees they had accepted in the past (Ms. B; 5.1.3). 
The PSOE in opposition promised to overturn the measure but in office claimed it was 
prevented from doing so by Europe (Ms. B). Although general regularisation processes did 
not continue after 2005, legalisation continued using a “case by case” procedure similar to 
that recommended in an EU report (ibid; see 7.1.1.2).  
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Evidence that the EU directly administers borders 
 
A notably discordant (and unexpected) view on the EU-State relationship was provided by 
an associate of the Madrid-based Elcano Royal Institute “think tank”, who had performed 
research on border policy processes with the Interior Ministry. In sharp contrast with the 
other accounts, for Ms. R, in the border control field “it is the European Union and the 
National Police that decide and organise, or that influence policy and what happens at 
every moment in Spain” (see transcript in appendix – 9.3.2). The chain in command begins 
with police chiefs in Brussels, followed by the “policía nacional” (5.2.1), and then, the 
Spanish government. “Policía nacional” from the Interior Ministry attend a large variety of 
working groups alongside other European police chiefs. There, they “observe what is being 
applied and develop it [in Spain] also” (Ms. R). Despite developing initiatives such as SIVE 
locally, policy 
 
is more than anything the product of the work carried out in the work groups in 
Brussels. It is they that provide the ideas and make sure that all proposals get to the 
top: to the Ministry, when a bill needs to be created, when a change needs to be 
made. Therefore everything that is done in border control comes from there. (ibid.) 
 
Most of these Spanish “functionaries” would participate in a meeting with their European 
colleagues every one to three months, as well as attend conferences and communicate 
through less-formal networks (ibid). There were EU worked groups on visas, border control, 
the Schengen Information System (SIS) and to link Frontex “contact points”2 (ibid). This 
strong European-Spanish police relationship began, according to Ms. R, with the transfer of 
immigration powers from the Interior Ministry (hereafter described as “Interior”) to the 
Ministry of Labour (hereafter referred to as “Labour”) – after which “those with particular 
[immigration] responsibility had to go to every formal meeting in Brussels on that subject” 
(ibid).  
Interior’s way of operating of was contrasted with that of other ministries by Ms. R 
and by the Moncloa (presidential) advisor Ms. T: Interior having an “opaque” (Ms. T) or 
“totally closed” way of operating (Ms. R), and the Immigration Secretariat being more “open” 
(ibid). The bypassing of ministerial control of borders presented is a surprising discovery as 
it is, but even more so bearing in mind who led the department: since 2006 this had been 
Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba (2006-2011), who at the time of the interviews was also Deputy 
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Prime Minister, government spokesperson, and choice for PSOE presidential candidate in 
the November elections – a combination that led him to be nicknamed “Superminister”. 
Furthermore, the Moncloa advisor described his Interior Ministry as being powerful in 
relation to other ministries (Ms. T).  
 
 
6.1.2 Confirmations and qualifications on the Spanish-AC order 
 
There was consensus that Spanish powers on immigration overshadowed those of the 
historic nations and other ACs (Mr. R; Ms. B; Ms. A; Mr. L). In 5.3.3 the way the Catalan 
government has used its limited powers to promote integration was outlined. It is worth 
remembering that this was mainly through social provision – including  income support and 
child benefit as well as healthcare and schooling – as devolved to Catalonia or Galicia 
within the State of the Autonomies framework (the Galician union leader Mr. L). At the same 
time this devolution also was identified by the same union leader as a factor in inter-
territorial tension over immigration policy. This was the case, he maintained, because the 
social-provision responsibilities of ACs (and municipalities) are proportional to the size of 
the local population, non-native speakers and unemployed, meaning that through 
immigration policy “the state makes decisions that have a knock-on spending effect on the 
ACs” (Mr. L). He and other interviewees maintained that strains also emerged because of 
decisions affecting cultural and linguistic integration (ibid; see 7.3 for details).   
The frustration created among Catalan civil-society and politicians after the failure to 
gain considerable more immigration-policy powers through reforming Catalonia’s Statute 
was reinforced in several interviews (Ms. T; Mr. R; Ms. A; 4.1.2; 5.3.1). Yet the Moncloa 
advisor felt that the Generalitat had achieved much of its demands in practice through the 
generalisation across the State of regularisation via social rootedness (Ms. T). She added 
that the Catalan government had been allowed to determine the legal quotas for foreign 
hiring in certain occupations and (in theory) volumes for certain hard-to-fill vacancies 
involving particular professions (ibid). Beyond these examples, the interviews confirmed 
that the Catalan institutions remain in a highly subordinated position in the field of 
immigration policy.  
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6.2 Four-tier decision-making and the limits to consensus 
 
Despite scholarship (and the media) frequently highlighting the degree of direct civil-society 
involvement in immigration matters, the interviews demonstrated the limits to this (5.2.1). 
Decision-making was built on a hierarchy firstly led by central government (Mr. L). The 
second policymaking “tier” is the Tripartite Labour Commission where “social dialogue” 
takes place between of government, the two largest employers’ organisations3, and the 
UGT and CCOO union federations (Mr. M). Broader consultation involving representation 
from wider civil society takes place in a third tier: including the monthly meetings of the 
Economic and Social Council (CES; see 5.2.1). The second and third tiers described 
normally pool immigration issues together with other economic and social policy matters, 
and only occasionally treat immigration separately.   
The existence of this broad “order of command” was signalled by policy advisors 
and social agents in Madrid (Mr. J; Ms. T; Ms. M & Ms. R). Zapatero’s advisor described it 
in particularly sharp terms: “Outside [the social] dialogue there is hardly any power to 
intervene in politics. All of the other policy spheres are of lower rank.” (Ms. T.) Under Jesús 
Caldera in Labour, the Tripartite Commission became “permanent" (ibid) and there was an 
increase in the participation of “social agents” in decision-making processes (Ibid; Ms. M; 
Ms. B). Yet the Moncloa advisor also provided some qualifications as to its limits. Firstly 
rather than “social dialogue” being a constitutionally-embedded process, it is “summoned” 
by central government (Ms. B). Second (perhaps obviously) Commission meeting decisions 
require the approval of both Congress and Senate (ibid). Arguably the forums that include 
migrant organisations and NGOs (including the celebrated FSII and Catalan Citizenship 
and Immigration Board), would be limited to the fourth tier of the general policymaking 
organisational structure. 
Despite the CES, which two interview participants appeared to confuse with the 
more limited Tripartite “dialogue”, having helped shaped reforms and processes in 2004-
2005, evidence was provided by participants of its limited political reach (Mr. V; Ms. B; 
5.2.1). One participant – a representative of social-economy enterprises – lamented that its 
evaluations were sometimes “ignored” (Ms. C); and another that its opinion was requested 
after the government had prepared draft bills – even if the CES’ own report is later passed 
on to all MPs and its contents sometimes incorporated into proposed amendments (Mr. L). 
The model of “policymaking by consensus” proclaimed by the Socialist government seems 
also limited by the internal processes in the Councils and Forums. For instance, although 
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the CES formally works through its participating organisations reaching “consensus” the 
representative for the left-wing Galician Trade Union Confederation (CIG) said that his 
organisations and the Basque ELA federation regularly oppose or abstain on matters but 
that this is ignored (Mr. L). A radical migrants’ rights activist described consensus 
policymaking not as being about a genuine devolution of powers but extending 
responsibility for the outcomes of problematic policies: because it meant “everyone is to 
blame and [the Socialists] come across as democrats” (Mr. E).  
 
 
6.3 Key policymaking actors in practice 
 
6.3.1 The state 
 
6.3.1.1 Governments and outside pressure 
 
The evolution of Spanish policy under the 2004-2008 Zapatero government presented in 
5.2.2.1 confirmed my expectation that – despite the essential relationship between the state 
and capitalist social relations – the institutions have considerable autonomy from civil 
society; and that party politics shapes the decisions of the state or sub-state from both 
inside and outside government. Another example can be found in some of the progressive 
policies passed (if not always properly funded) by the “Tripartit” Catalan government, and 
the receptiveness to recommendations made during civil-society consultation of 
Immigration Secretary Oriol Amorós i March – as identified by a policy researcher (Ms. B; 
4.1.4; 5.3.3). Also identified in the interviews were considerable variations between the 
policies of different Catalan municipal authorities and associated tensions between certain 
municipalities and the Generalitat (Mr. V & Ms. B). These discrepancies were linked by the 
FSII representative with stronger xenophobic and Islamophobic movements present in the 
AC and the unique electoral success of a racist far-right party (Mr. V; 1.2.3).  
The above examples highlight the centrality of governments. However, there were 
indications that governments attempting progressive programmes will be under enormous 
pressure from media and opposition not to apply them. It appears that such pressure may 
have been a factor in the PSOE’s “hard” policy turn in 2008 – after which it produced a 
Aliens’ Law reform that received parliamentary support from the conservatives and the 
opposition of United Left (IU) and the Catalan parties CiU and ERC (5.2.2.1; Mr. E). 
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Suggestions as to the differing relationship between party and electorate in the cases of 
Right and Left were provided by interview participants. The decision to prioritise expelling 
undocumented migrants for a short period of time just before the 2004 elections appears to 
have been an electoral calculation aimed at mobilising enthusiastic backing from right-wing 
voters (Ms. R). On the other hand, a radical critic of the PSOE government expressed the 
opinion that when the PSOE hardens the Law or “each time people die in a small boat, [the 
party] loses its voters” (Mr. E).  
 
 
6.3.1.2 The political influence of civil servants  
 
The findings on the relationship between the EU and the State pointed to professional state 
administrators such as police chiefs having an influence on policymaking in Spain (6.1.1). 
The relation between political representatives and public servants is described in 
surprisingly simple terms by the Madrid-based researcher of border policy processes. In her 
field of study “[i]n reality it is not the politicians that design policy” (Ms. R). Elected 
representatives “might determine priorities” but implementation methods were decided by 
Deputy Director Generals, police chiefs and other professional “functionaries” (ibid). She 
backed these assertions with several examples. One was that two State Secretaries for 
Alien Affairs and Immigration during the Aznar period had no previous background in 
immigration 4 , meaning their civil-servant Deputy “was the person who organised all 
immigration policy” (ibid). This official’s role was particular crucial because at that time all 
immigration powers were in the same ministry (Interior, ibid). Secondly, at the time of the 
interviews the Secretary – a vice minister – was also a civil servant. The CC.OO. lawyer 
said that it was professional civil servants that took the initiative of performing a second 
regularisation process in 2000 (a process he described as a “resit”) when the PP 
government’s strict application of rules meant the vast majority of migrants failed to gain 
permits as a result of the passing of the 4/2000 Law (Mr. J; 5.2.1).   
A further illustration is that, in line with the researcher’s view regarding the European 
and local chain in command in the immigration field introduced in 6.1.2, within Interior 
“[t]hose in charge of applying and managing policy are the National Police” (ibid). 
Concretely it is highlighted that civil servants were put in charge of migration sub-
directorates created after the 2006 Canarian crisis, and that were given substantial 
international and geopolitical roles. The new International Police Cooperation Sub-
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Directorate was given a diplomatic as well as police liaison function, and was headed by a 
police superintendent5 (ibid). The second body created was the International Relations, 
Immigration and Alien Affairs Sub-Directorate, which was given the “fundamentally political 
role” of seeking bilateral agreements with African countries where these were lacking – a 
task for which a career diplomat was appointed6 (ibid). Rubalcaba will no doubt have had a 
role in guiding the work of the new bodies (which helped establish the government’s Africa 
Plan, 5.1.2), but it appears that the state administration was also given a directing role and 
through the Sub-Directorates became organically linked to other state bureaucracies. The 
major role of the police in policymaking in practice is emphasised by the fact that several 
police chiefs joined the General Director of Immigration – Marta Rodríguez-Tabuchy Díez – 
when she transferred from Interior to Labour (Ms. R.) The background provided suggests 
that unelected administrators play an active role in practical policymaking and maybe have 
substantial influence on processes.  
The idea that functionaries played or at least should play such a function was 
presented acritically by the border policy expert (ibid); but met with unhesitating disapproval 
by the presidential advisor interviewed (Ms. T). However, when discussing working 
relationships between different ministries, the latter analyst complained, 
 
[I]n the Foreign Ministry you find diplomats that always think they are right … They 
consider themselves an elite body within the administration and consequently are 
above a series of more earthly questions! The police deal with earthly problems, but 
nobody should mess with them! And Labour is there coordinating all of them, in 
principle. (Ibid.)  
 
This account would seem to suggest at least tacit support for the view of the Interior 
researcher. Yet the bureaucratically driven view of processes requires some qualification at 
least. Both consultants recognised that “many changes … occur in the civil service when 
the government changes” – specifically among the Deputy Director Generals (the top rank 
of the state administration, ibid). Concretely, the new government would demote or 
“horizontally reassign” Deputies not aligned with the party in office and promote civil 
servants that are politically “close” (Ms. T; Ms. R). This was justified by the border policy 
analyst: “[T]o coordinate well, sharing political affinity is important”; and was described as 
“widely accepted” in Spain7 (Ibid). Neither participant provided indications of tensions and 
conflicts caused by such reshuffling.  
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6.3.2 Civil society 
 
Despite the central role of government and state, there also is substantial participation by 
civil-society organisations in policy processes. For a Spanish policy researcher interviewed 
this has meant “the state has not acted as it pleases” (Ms. B). In this sub-section the role of 
some major agents is examined in some detail.  
 
 
6.3.2.1 Employers and their part in liberalisation  
 
In formal terms employers have less of a part than unions in the political management of 
migration, but for some very different interviewees this socio-economic group dominates 
processes (Ms. A; Ms. T). For the Moncloa policy advisor, “[t]hey are making the law. They 
are saying what they wish to happen” (Ms. T). As well as being part of official policymaking 
and consultation processes such as the Tripartite Commission, CES and a range of Forums 
(5.2.1), employers were identified as benefiting from informal channels of influence (Ibid.) 
This was not through lobbying, a process described as  “European” and not taking place 
usually in Spain (ibid). According to the ex-CITE representative, the migrant-labour-
dependent construction sector has weight within the People’s Party itself (Mr. M). Several 
non-employer interviewees effectively agreed that before the crisis employers wished for 
the mass entry of immigrants and that employers put key pressure on the government to 
liberalise immigration policy (Ms. B; Mr. E; Ms. A). The representative of the anti-racist 
association believed that the employers’ goal had been to access “cheap labour” (Ms. A). 
In Spain different sub-groups of employers have different associations. The Spanish 
Confederation of Employers’ Organisations (CEO) is dominated by the employers of large 
firms. SME employers are organised in the Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (CEPyME). “The social economy sector” consisting of cooperatives and 
firms under relatively collective management is represented by CEPES. According to 
estimations shared by a representative of the latter association in the Economic and Social 
Council (CES), the social-economy sector employs 12 per cent of all workers and 
generates 9-10 per cent of GDP, yet it is not included in second tier of “social dialogue” 
(Ms. C). These associations group together smaller bodies – including those representing 
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employers in specific sectors (such as the National Confederation of Construction 
interviewed). 
 
Farmers  
 
The Spain-wide Coordinating Committee for Agricultural and Livestock Farmers’ 
Organisations (COAG) and Catalan Farmers Union (Unió de Pagesos, UdP both participate 
in the CES. According to a leading COAG member responsible for Labour and Migration, 
the COAG participates in the processes to manage hiring at source through the longer-term 
“quota” system and more recent catalogue of hard-to-fill occupations (Mr. G). Agricultural 
cooperatives organised in the Spanish Business Confederation of Social Economy 
(CEPES) sit on Ministry of Agriculture panels (Ms. C). The UdP is the organisation that led 
the introduction of hiring at source in Spain (ibid). Because the farmers organisations 
mentioned are not members of the CEOE employers’ organisation they are not involved at 
the centre of policymaking (Mr. G).  
 Since policy hardened in the crisis period, COAG maintains it has had a more liberal 
stance than the PSOE government on several matters. The farmers’ organisation opposed 
a government extension of prevention of legal entry for Romanians after accession and 
opposed stopping hiring at source (according to the COAG representative; see 7.1.1). 
According to the organisation’s representative, the agricultural sector “has a lot of problems 
hiring labour” and this is “because work in the countryside is hard” and “because the wages 
paid cannot compete with those paid in the construction sector” (ibid.) For similar reasons 
migrants would approach agricultural work as a “gateway to other employment” (ibid.) 
 
 
6.3.2.2 The unexpected and semi-progressive role of the unions 
 
A variety of interviewees indicating how the two main union federations – CC.OO. and the 
UGT – play a central role in creating immigration procedure (Ms. B, Mr. M; Ms. R). In 5.2.1 
the many commissions and forums in which these two federations are represented were 
detailed. These included all of the social-dialogue and advisory forums. According to the ex-
CITE (CCOO) spokesman interviewed, the union movement played a leading role in 
reforming the Aliens Law after 1999 (Mr. M); and the Barcelona-based Spanish policy 
researcher interviewed said the “labour rootedness” initiative first was developed by the 
 
 
181 
 
Barcelona branch of CC.OO. (Ms. B). For the ex-CITE activist, the two large union 
federations were given a greater policymaking role in the 2004 reform and out of all of the 
actors intervening in policymaking have been “those with the most influence” (Mr. M). 
Likewise, for the Moncloa advisor, “decision-making involves consensus with the unions” 
(Ms. T).  
 Unions also have been a partner in applying policy in practice. Their varied role in 
implementation includes participating in official discussions on foreign-recruitment “quotas” 
(including co-creating the catalogue of “hard-to-fill” professions), to providing in-depth 
assistance with the paperwork required for migrants to legalise (through union migrant 
sectors, such as CITE), and running free language courses (Mr. M; Ms. B; Mr. M; Mr. J). 
The impact of the unions often has been progressive: extending industrial agreements to 
those hired outside Spain, opposing the generalised implementation of the EU “blue-card” 
scheme that favours the skilled over the less-skilled in awarding work visas, and 
encouraging reforms to be funded and implemented (Ms. T; Ms. A). The CC.OO. 
immigration-law expert who participated in the research shared the view that “[t]he Spanish 
unions had always stood out for having positions of defending immigrants’ rights” (Mr. J). 
Despite having many criticisms of the two large federations’ stance on migration issues, the 
Papers for Everyone activist said the unions had become more critical towards the Socialist 
government on migratory matters; and he attributed this to their increased migrant 
membership (Mr. E). According to its representative in the Economic and Social Council 
(CES), the Galician CIG has as aims to “encourage regulating [employment], hiring at 
source”, and “training and ratification of qualifications” in order to incorporate migrant labour 
into the existing legal and union frameworks (Mr. L). 
Limits to union solidarity with migrants were identified in the conversations. A policy 
expert stated that historically unions had been “reticent” towards immigrants because most 
had to pass through a period of irregularity (Ms. B). Under general secretary José María 
Fidalgo (2000-2008), the CC.OO. federation backed tighter restrictions on immigration; Mr. 
M). Representatives from different unions interviewed coincided that a section of their 
members were hostile towards “immigration” (Mr. L; Mr J). CC.OO. and the UGT support 
the policing of irregular entry on the Mediterranean border – despite the humanitarian 
consequences of controls8 (Mr. E). The migrant-network activist implied that the UGT and 
CC.OO. (and on one occasion the General Confederation of Labour, CGT) had acted in a 
corporatist manner while mediating in conflicts between migrants and authorities: 
administering work hiring of protesters and effectively acting as an “employment mafia” (Mr. 
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E). The Galician CIG federation gives a priority to “reinforcing labour inspection” (according 
to its representative Mr. L).  
The Papers for Everyone activist outlined in plain terms who he felt this affected 
most:  “[t]hey send the foreign worker to their f***ing country or to a detention centre and 
‘then we’ll see if this gentleman [the employer] gets fined’”. For the Barcelona activist, 
“[e]mployers are not scared by [raids]” (Mr. E). The issue of how representative the UGT 
and CC.OO. are of Spanish workers was raised by several participants, some of whom 
complained about the exclusion of other unions from the key policymaking processes (Ms. 
T; Mr. E & Mr. L). It was not named directly but the anarcho-syndicalist CGT union 
federation has been widely recognised to have played a major part in migrant mobilisations 
under Aznar and Zapatero, and it probably can be safely assumed that this smaller 
federation is one of those that interview participants would have deemed necessary for 
inclusion in migrant-labour policy design.  
 
 
6.3.2.3 Convergence and divergence between unions and employers  
 
Interviewees identified two kinds of social or political alliances that helped bring about the 
more liberal migratory policy of the mid-2000s. Firstly good relations between the 
government and large unions were identified. Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, 
frequent cooperation between unions and employers was highlighted (in the process to 
create the first 2000 Aliens’ Law, which “brought together what was being argued by 
[unions and large employers’ associations]”, Mr. J). The CC.OO. immigration specialist 
spoken to said that “the unions and employers had reached an agreement that immigration 
in Spain is a labour issue” and pointed out that irregular hiring had been opposed by the 
whole of the CES, including employers, hinting that this was because the “social dumping” it 
produced benefited only certain employers9 (Mr. J). A Spanish policy researcher described 
the unions and employers (using Watts) as “strange bedfellows” (Ms. B; 2.1.1.)   
 The CC.OO. representative also identified major boundaries to the common ground 
between employers’ and workers’ organisations. For him, employers are happy to have 
surplus migrant labour, while unions are concerned about “substitutions” (Mr. J). 
Differences between the two groups that had emerged during policymaking were identified 
by different policymaking participants. Employers’ organisations (unsuccessfully) attempted 
to prevent the extension of general workplace and sectoral agreements (“convenios”) to 
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migrants hired at source (Ms. T). During the negotiations to draw up the 2009 Law, 
employers managed to restrict giving migrants’ parents the right to family reunification10 
(Mr. J; Mr. R.) The limitations to migrants’ mobility introduced in the agricultural system of 
hiring at source has been denounced by unions (Ms. B).  
 
 
6.3.2.4 Migrants as shapers of processes 
 
The interviews identified several different ways by which migrants have agency and 
influence processes. The first was through shaping formal policymaking. This mainly took 
place from outside the official forums, as migrants’ associations are not included in the first 
three tiers of decision-making identified (6.2). Some organisations are included in 
consultation – in the FSII and AC forums, but the migrant organisations involved are limited 
to those perceived as most “representative”: based on numbers of members, votes in 
internal elections and the formal initiatives the organisation participates in – according to 
the Forum representative (Mr. V.) In practice this tends to reduce participation to regional 
and formally constituted organisations and has led to the controversial exclusion of Sub-
Saharan organisations (ibid.) The less-formal more-autonomous activist networks, such as 
Catalonia’s Papers for Everyone (Papers per a Tothom), normally intervene in formal policy 
processes only from the outside11. This network was a key platform in the 2001 migrant 
protests – including the church sit-ins and hunger strikes that achieved much of their 
demands (1.2.1; Mr. E.) It also organised less successful cathedral sit-ins in 2004 and 
occupations in 2005, in which many migrants protested against having their application 
refused for processing for the “amnesty” that year (Mr. E; see 7.2.4).  
According to the Papers for Everyone activist, since 2005 migrants’ agency has 
focused on the more individualised pursuit of obtaining documentation, whether genuine or 
otherwise (Mr. E). It can also be identified in migrants’ response to the changes to labour 
markets and migratory policy during the crisis (4.2.3; 5.2.2.1). The SOS Racisme 
representative said that the PSOE government was genuinely surprised by how few 
migrants chose to return to their countries of origin through the Early Payment of Benefits to 
Foreigners Program (Ms. A; 5.2.2). One mistake the administration made was to treat all 
migrants as “economic migrants” and ignore that many had left their countries fleeing 
political conflict (Ms. A). More fundamentally, however, they were reducing migrants to only 
being passive recipients of policies. As the Papers for Everyone and CC.OO. 
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spokespersons pointed out, migrants preferred to make their own “individual plans”, which 
even in the case of unemployed foreigners included staying in Spain, moving to other EU 
countries, or “returning home” of their own accord and when this most suited them (Mr. J; 
Mr. E).  
A final example of how migrants’ actions shape immigration procedure is through 
strategies of labour substitution that have been applied to specific groups of migrant 
workers. The CC.OO. immigration specialist pointed to a policy of replacing Moroccan 
workers with other groups of workers in the agricultural sector (Mr. J). For the trade 
unionist, “the Moroccan immigrant, … the first to reach Spain, … knew about workplace 
agreements, unions, wage demands, industrial tribunals”12 (ibid.) As a result this national 
group suffered a “process of substitution by a more contingent, newer and more exploitable 
labour force” – including Eastern European women with little previous experience in this 
employment sector (ibid). The farmers’ representative recognised that the proportion of 
Moroccans hired in the sector had fallen and was defensive about rejecting any 
discrimination toward the North African group13. The national groups of agricultural workers 
that had grown had been Romanians, Columbians and Ecuadorians. The COAG leader 
thought that it was “the influence of the language that biased hiring Ecuadorians and 
Colombians” and that both PP and PSOE governments had helped this process by hiring 
directly in the two countries (Mr. G.) Unlike the CC.OO. lawyer, the farmers’ representative 
relativized the fall in Moroccan recruitment14 and attributed it to disagreements over corrupt 
practices by the Moroccan government in hiring processes (Mr. G). 
 
  
6.4 Conclusion  
 
Through analysing the findings on the less-formal and more-hidden sides to institutional-
political processes the dynamics behind outcomes have been clarified – helping further 
develop the overall analysis. Two key relationships have been examined: territorial and 
state-civil-society. With regards to the territorial, policymakers have confirmed that the 
central state is broadly sovereign over immigration matters. Minority nations including 
Catalonia were clarified as being in a highly subordinate position vis-á-vis the state with 
regards immigration administration. As well as the sources of Catalan irritation over lack of 
powers identified in the previous chapter, further frustrations were identified – such as the 
contrast between ACs having little capacity to manage immigration and full responsibility for 
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organising social provision that must adapt to the demographic and cultural transformations 
contributed to by immigration.  
The revealing observations shared by the border-management researcher suggest 
that the EU effectively administers Spain’s southern border – bypassing Spanish political 
control when Brussels deems this necessary. This requires nuancing both the extent and 
evenness of Spanish sovereignty in migratory affairs and greatly strengthens the conclusion 
from the previous chapter that the core-periphery relationship in the EU identified in 
financial and economic policy spheres also shapes immigration policies and outcomes 
(Lapavitsas et al., 2012). Crucially for the purposes of this study, the core-periphery 
hierarchy must be recognised as a key underlying factor in Iberian irregularity paradoxes. 
Quite simply before the crisis Spain did not share Europe’s lack of interest in recruiting new 
sources of labour from outside the Union. This issue is developed more in the following 
chapter. 
Evidence is provided of how Spanish police chiefs act as the conduit for EU border 
policy and play a seemingly disproportionate role in policy practice and even design. Many 
practical illustrations were shared of how other civil servants play a crucial role in the 
politicall as well as administrative management of immigration. This suggests that Spanish 
immigration policy can be seen as state-inspired as well as government-determined – 
corresponding with Milliband’s characterisations of the state (3.2.3). 
 At the same time, governments also dominate the order of decision-making more 
than is suggested by some structuralist commentators (for example Miles or De Gaudemar 
– Chapter Three). In the period in which Caldera administered immigration the big unions 
and employers’ associations were also given a major role. This probably was aided by the 
overlap in attitudes between the organisations of labour and capital (a convergence 
corresponding with contemporary international tendency towards employer-union alliance 
identified by Watts, 2.1.1).  
Other civil society organisations play no more than an advisory role (in lower 
programme-making tiers such as the CES), although farmers’ associations were able to 
develop their own migrant-recruitment model until the crisis period. The CES has played a 
significant role in processes at particular conjunctures (such as to produce the 2000/4 Law 
and 2004 reforms), however it is not generally the main policy-making tool. Last, but not 
least, migrants shaped processes – albeit mainly through collective and individual actions 
as opposed to formal participation in policy-consultation processes.  
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With regards to the research question on subjective power within policymaking 
(Question 5, 1.4) the following has been demonstrated. To begin with, the key locations of 
policymaking are Brussels, the government in Madrid and (under the Socialists) Tripartite 
meetings between ministers, employers and unions. Despite the strong public profile of 
policymaking forums such as the FSII, CES or the Catalan Citizenship Board these act 
mainly to give feedback on and help implement decisions rather than design practical 
policy. The consultation process, therefore, might better be comprehended as a process of 
exercising Gramscian state hegemony through the “integral state” than a genuine 
devolution of policy powers. Such hegemony is only constrained by the international 
influence of the EU, which despite its formal “horizontality” is itself dominated by core states 
such as Germany. Therefore in simple terms it is states and the uneven associations 
between them that are the central actors and relationships through which policy dynamics 
and contradictions develop. The identified prominence of senior civil servants in policy 
design as well as implementation adds extra backing to a state focus on paradoxes and 
tensions. Such conclusions give empirical support to the theoretical conclusion (in Chapter 
3) that policy-related contradictions develop from conflicting tendencies within capitalist 
states (the requirement of breaking and preserving their own borders, the conflict between 
their long-term and short-term interest in immigration) – helping answering the main 
research question. In the subsequent chapter the relationship between state centralism and 
the Catalan national project will be examined with regards to linked findings. 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 This was developed by several private firms including the Spanish defence technology company 
Indra.  
2
 “Focal points” offer border support at control points identified as particularly key by Frontex and 
include personnel from other EU countries. 
3
 CEOE and CEPYME. 
4
 Enrique Fernández-Miranda and Ignacio González (Ms. R). 
5
 The name of the sub-directorates and details on those appointed as Sub-Directors were unclear 
from the recording and information presented here benefited from secondary checking of legal and 
written sources. José Ignacio López-Chicheri Sánchez was the superintendent appointed for the cited 
post (Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, 2007.) 
6
 Ángeles Moreno Bau was the diplomat appointed to the mentioned position (ibid).  
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7
 The advisor had performed comparative research on Spanish and British policymaking and strongly 
contrasted the political-administrative cultures of the two states (Ms. R).  
8
 There have been several reports of migrants drowning when their boats have capsized during 
interception by Civil Guard patrols (either due to traffickers choosing to sink boats, boat collisions or 
because large waves from patrol boats capsize smaller migrants’ vessels; Díaz, 2004; Ceberío-
Belaza & Santana, 2012; 1.2.2).  
9
 “The CES sets forth that it is necessary to establish legal mechanisms to rescue people from 
irregularity to avoid situations of social exclusion and super-exploitation at work and even social 
dumping between employers.” (Mr. J.)  
10
 It seems from the secondary sources consulted that the restrictions on reunification described were 
applied to more recent residents (5.2.2.1). 
The Galician trade unionist interviewed suggested that his federation was divided over this matter (Mr. 
L).  
11
 This does not meant that they do not negotiate with the authorities, as occurred between Papers for 
Everyone and the leftist Tripartite government (Ms. B.) 
12
 This view is very similar to one shared by a Moroccan union organiser of the strikes in El Ejido in a 
conversation we had in 2000. 
13
 When I asked who decided which national groups were hired through the quota scheme, the 
farming representative responded (without prompting regarding specific nationalities) “mind, it’s not 
the case that there has been a decision to not employ Moroccans” (Mr. G). 
14
 According to the COAG executive member, Moroccans are still one of the two biggest national 
groups of migrant farm labourers (Mr. G).  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Interview findings: underlying dynamics of policy “gaps” 
and tensions 
 
In Chapter Five ideas were advanced that help identifying the undercurrents of immigration 
“problems”. For example it was posited that nation-crafting is a factor shaping immigration 
processes in Catalonia and Spain as well as labour and economic processes. On the other 
hand it was suggested that Spain has its own policy model of “illegality-amnesty-illegality” – 
pointing to irregularity being at least structural and possibly intentional. The aim of this 
chapter is to attempt to re-examine such questions in the light of “insider” insights and 
information. 
To aid this endeavour the chapter begins by examining the evolution of policy in 
practice – in other words beyond the merely formal – focusing on the less-researched period 
of Socialist government (2004-2011). It examines the degree to which the “labour model of 
immigration” introduced by the first Zapatero government (2004-2008) was an exception in 
terms of immigration outcomes – as has been claimed by both supporters and detractors of 
such measures. Concretely I examine the impact on labour and residential precariousness 
produced by Caldera’s regularisation and renewal procedures, as well as evaluating the 
evolving impact of the immigration model in the crisis period, and public interventions to 
promote integration. Continuities with conservative government immigration outcomes are 
identified to help draw out the fundamental relationships between state, capital and migrant 
labour. The reasons for the irregularity-regularisation model of immigration are outlined after 
presenting the views of privileged insiders on irregularity and political responses. 
Subsequently I test the theoretical idea developed in Chapter Two and Three that “illegality” 
is mainly a coincidental consequence of political-economic contradictions, even if one 
tolerated (within certain dimensions) due to the competitive advantages it provides 
employers. This re-evaluation is performed using qualitative evidence from representatives 
and observers of the construction, farming and “social economy” sectors. The final part of 
this section examines the indications that cultural considerations linked to national projects 
shape both Spanish and Catalan immigration policy, and feed disagreements over 
centralisation or decentralisation of policy. At the end of this chapter and in the thesis 
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Conclusion (8) these findings shall be compared with the theoretical framework advanced in 
Chapter Five. 
 
 
7.1 Lived policy in the 2000s 
 
The presidential advisor interviewed suggested that in theory the immigration “model” 
applied by the Zapatero government was as follows: 
 
If you manage to control the flows that enter irregularly, you can do good 
management of immigration … policy, and … of your labour market; and you do good 
management of integration policies and avoid the emergence of serious [social] 
conflicts. (Ms. T) 
 
In the following sub-section this view is implicitly tested against the experience of “policy in 
action” as presented in the interviews (5.2.2.2). Most attention is given to immigration 
policies and practice under the Socialists. However, a comparison with the previous period 
of Popular Party government also is included as part of a short examination of responses by 
social agents to government policies and procedure.   
 
 
7.1.1 Limited legal migration routes    
 
In 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.1 several ways were identified by which immigration became treated as 
labour policy in the Zapatero period. According to the Moncloa advisor, the overall 
transformation could be summarised thus: “[p]reviously immigration was treated as a matter 
of control. Now, it was treated as labour-related – a substantial change in all ways.” (Ms. T). 
After immigration management was transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(Labour), this department resisted the attempt by the Interior Ministry (Interior) to have some 
police stations administer “aliens’ issues”, leading to inter-departmental tensions (Ms. T). 
Zapatero’s advisor understood that this was because Labour wished to avoid the “symbolic” 
mistake of re-establishing “the link between immigration and security issues” after a long-
term effort to separate them (ibid).  
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 One aspect of the new approach was the strengthening of legal at-source hiring, the 
sub-types of and development of which were charted in 5.2.2.1. Their limitations relative to 
processes of irregular entry and / or residence and regularisation have been identified. 
Criticisms were added by participants in policymaking and stakeholders that positively value 
legal migration. For a specialist in Spanish migratory policy and irregularity, legal entry 
remained even more restricted in practice than in theory (Ms. B). The farmers’ representative 
revealed that much recruitment abroad involved repeated hiring of foreigners without the 
right to long-term residence in Spain (Mr. G). Consequently, figures for foreigners hired at-
source necessarily provide inflated measures of “legal migration” (5.2.3). The COAG 
farmers’ leader lamented the ending of quota hiring by the PSOE government in the crisis 
years. This change negatively affected foreign workers that had performed repeated 
seasonal work in Spain and COAG  “did not agree that those same workers could now not 
be hired”1 (Mr. G). The COAG leader suggested that the consequence for the agricultural 
sector had been a return to “disorganised” local recruitment – often of undocumented 
migrants – and that this meant that migrants were being hired with less legal and social 
guarantees2 (ibid).   
Policy advisors and researchers participating in the present study confirmed that 
regularisation in situ continued to strongly overshadow legal hiring abroad as the route to 
legality in Spain. According to a presidential advisor, the Zapatero government wished to 
avoid the return of large-scale irregularity after 2005 (Ms. T). Because of the criticisms 
received from Europe due to the large 2005 process, the PSOE took EU advice and 
performed regularisations through more individualised (or molecular) systems: concretely by 
the individual migrant demonstrating her social or labour rootedness (Mr. G; 5.2.2.1; 5.2.2.3; 
Ms. B; see 7.2.2). The Papers per a Tothom activist and CIG union representative 
suggested that legal at-source hiring sometimes incorporated illegal recruitment strategies, 
and that the authorities tolerated such practices. Concretely, according to the former 
interviewee, employers incorporated into the official calculations on labour shortages a 
comparably sized “cushion” of surplus labour (“in case of necessity”, Mr. E). The Galician 
trade-unionist indicated that local employment agencies publish estimates of the number of 
workers requested through legal at-source hiring by local economic sectors but without 
facilitating legal contracts for such employment (Mr. L). Thus in practice, he maintained, local 
labour filled the “quota” – including irregular migrants (ibid).  
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7.1.2 Employer dependencies encouraged by regularisation rules 
 
If the PSOE’s “labour approach” to migration provides more guarantees for the migrant, it 
also makes the migrant more dependent on the continued goodwill of her employer. The 
existing regularisation routes require the migrant to have an employment contract (5.2.2.1), 
which means residential precariousness can become determined by labour precariousness 
(Ms. B). Furthermore, the at-source hiring model developed in the countryside also ties 
migrants to their employers (ibid). Some benefits of the scheme for migrants have been 
outlined already (5.2.3; 7.1.1.) However, there are several ways by which the system 
becomes paternalistic (or “very paternalistic”; Ms. B). As well as work permits being awarded 
under the employers’ name, because jobs are seasonal if the worker does not retain the 
goodwill of her employer she may not be hired again (3.2.3; Ms. B.) Furthermore, when 
employed because the migrant is limited to a particular employer (or at best sector and 
locality), 
 
 “if something unexpected comes up, they make you work more … [Y]ou don’t have 
the chance of saying ‘I’m not carrying on and am working for the next-door 
neighbour3, because if you do, you lose your work permit’.” (Ms. B) 
 
The overall result has been to create “a series of dependencies” (Ms. B.) 
 
 
7.1.3 The labour approach to policy before and after the crisis 
 
Several civil-society representatives and advisors celebrated the “economic” or “labour” 
policy model developed by the PSOE – sometimes contrasted with the “politicised” 
management of the Aznar period (Mr. G; Ms. R; Mr. J; Ms. T & Mr. V). The construction-
employers’ spokesperson claimed that in the years preceding the interview,  
 
“[t]here has been an advance in the premise or objective of adjusting immigration 
policies to the needs of the labour market” (Ms. M).  
 
Likewise the CC.OO. representative celebrated that “unions and employers” had “reached 
an agreement that immigration in Spain is a labour matter” and that the Zapatero 
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government had furthered such an approach through reactivating the tripartite dialogue (Mr. 
J; 3.2.1; 6.2).  
Yet many interviewees also highlighted shortcomings with the “labour market” 
approach to migration, which were exposed by the deepening recession. First, the specialist 
on irregularity and policy estimated that rootedness had ceased to reduce illegality as the 
crisis advanced. She pointed out that while “[i]n 2007 there were a very large number of 
people regularised via rootedness” (Ms. B), by 2011 regularisation via rootedness “is still 
considerable … but it is increasingly difficult because you need to have a proper job and be 
paying into the national insurance scheme” (ibid.). As a result, it was identified that a great 
many migrants had “slipped back into irregularity” (ibid; Mr. E; Mr. M). This “calamity of the 
Spanish system” prompted attempts to flexibilise the criteria for renewal of regularisation in 
the 2009 Law (Ms. B). As mentioned in 6.3.2.4, the consensus in the interviews was that the 
2008 “Return Policy” failed, and that this may have been aided by an approach that denied 
the many non-labour motivations encouraging international mobility and settlement. It should 
be added, however, that for many left-wing activists 4  – including the SOS Racisme 
representative interviewed – the measure was less of a real policy and more of an 
instrumental (or Machiavellian) attempt at encouraging associations between migration and 
high unemployment and thus deflecting political responsibility for the crisis onto migrants 
(Ms. A; 5.2.2.1).  
 The same anti-racist spokeswoman diagnosed that the problems identified originated 
in a policy approach "centring [the desirability of] people's mobility on the labour issue”, as 
well as reducing immigration to migrant labour and “not having a view of the immigrant as a 
person" (Ms. A). Similar views were expressed by the other anti-racist activist and a policy 
researcher (Ms. B & Mr. E). The partially successful attempt to restrict family reunification 
was cited by the SOS Racisme representative as illustrating the reductionist approach (Ms. 
A; Mr. J.) For the FSII representative, “[p]olicy assumed that admission and entry of 
immigrants would be tailored to the state of the labour market”, which meant a positive 
attitude to immigration during the years of economic expansion (Mr. V.) None of the 
interviewees identified migratory policy as having greatly changed under the slump and the 
Barcelona-based policy specialist felt the policies had broadly remained the same (Ms. B.) 
But the labour focus in policy meant problematizing migration when the labour market 
contracted, as occurred under the second Zapatero administration (2008-2011; Ms. B). As a 
result migrants’ security and life chances have been strongly undermined under the crisis 
(Ms. A; Ms. B; Mr. M; Mr. G). 
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 This effective retreat in migrants’ social rights has not been total, however. Despite 
her hard criticisms towards the general policy approach adopted by the Socialists, the anti-
racist spokeswoman also identified some extensions of legal rights. As the FSII 
spokesperson pointed out, the right to reunification was extended (despite some parents 
being excluded; Mr. V; 6.3.2.3). Migrant victims of gender violence were given rights5 (Ms. 
A). Attempts by certain Catalan municipalities to prevent the undocumented from accessing 
services were abandoned in response to public controversy and opposition from other public 
authorities.  
 
Tensions between social agents and government have been greater under the PP   
 
Another revealing finding from the empirical research was that policymaking was more 
harmonious during the period of Socialist government (2004-2011) than during the Aznar 
period, particularly when governing with an absolute majority. Evidence for this view was 
provided in many interviews, and the most unexpected and intriguing aspect was the finding 
that tensions between employers and government were discovered to have been greater 
under a right-wing government which could be expected to have the strongest political and 
organic links to business leaders of the major Spanish parties6. Despite employer views on 
policy and policymaking being a key component of the interviews, the only unhappiness 
expressed by employers was in response to the restrictive tendencies of the PP 
administration. The farmer and construction-employer participants celebrated the virtues of 
the regularisation that had taken place after 2005 and the importance of “social dialogue” in 
processes (Ms. M; Mr. G). 
Direct participants in the development of policy, as well as observers, consistently 
described how tensions and conflicts inside and outside of policy processes were sharpest 
when governments were understood to have acted against economic interests and/or human 
rights. They cited as examples the PP’s conduct during the creation and application of the 
second Aliens’ Law (4/2000), the subsequent reform (8/2000), and a series of “restrictive” 
policies that encouraged irregular entry, residence and employment in the 2000-2004 period 
(Mr. M; Mr. J; Mr. V; Ms. B & Mr. E). Similarly, but in a more limited way, frustrations 
emerged among social agents when the PSOE hardened its policies in 2008. Examples 
have been provided of disagreements among COAG, the unions and SOS Racisme (7.1.1; 
7.1.3).  
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 A last point regarding harmonies and tensions among policymakers is that no 
significant evidence was obtained from any of the interviews that might suggest that policy 
tensions or gaps were significantly shaped by different fractions of capital having varying 
labour needs. The uneven labour requirements of different industrial sectors, and between 
Catalan and Spanish employers, were rejected by interviewees as a significant source of 
policy differences.    
 
  
7.1.4 Questioning of political commitment to integration  
  
The SOS Racisme spokesperson shared the view of policy advisors introduced in 5.2.2.1 
that the policy turn towards integration by the first Zapatero administration was a welcome 
development because it “put onto the political agenda the integration of foreign persons” 
(Ms. A.) The removal of integration funding was treated as a “retreat … due to the economic 
crisis” by the Moncloa advisor (Ms. T; 5.2.2.3.) However, for the anti-racist representative the 
crisis was an “excuse” for a lack of political commitment to integrating foreigners (Ms. A.) 
The Papers per a Tothom activist was even more critical – lamenting that “[t]here is no 
attempt at integrating” (Mr. E). These negative assessments are justified by failures to bring 
in required regulations that would enable implementing integration policy, leaving policies as 
as “scraps of paper” (Ms. A).  
The interview with the president of the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants 
provided some evidence that even after the unfortunate presidency of Azurmendi, the Forum 
has an “influence” that is “not determinant or predominant" (Mr. V). This, he suggests, is 
related to it remaining a “declarative” body whose decisions are non-binding, and due to 
limited powers and financial and regulatory support (ibid; Mr. Z; Ms. F). The Forum president 
joked that his informal personal contact with ministers had more influence than the Forum 
itself, which, based on his other comments, may have included some truth (ibid). The 
Catalan interviewees said little on the failure by the Generalitat to fund its own big law to 
promote integration (the Reception Law), but the anti-racist activist calmly cited this as a 
further retreat in the political attempt to integrate migrants (Ms. A; 5.2.2.1; 5.3.2). She 
concluded that policymakers had “not [been] working well enough to do real integration of 
people in all of the … complexity that human beings have”, and that immigrants had been 
reduced to being “guest workers” that would return to their countries of origin (Ms. A; 2.2) In 
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other words, the political failure to promote integration was another product of the labour 
approach to migration discussed in 7.1.3. 
 
 
7.2 Participant views on the irregularity paradox 
 
7.2.1 Qualifications on the extent of irregularity 
 
“Insiders” and “outsiders” in political processes provided confirmation of the dimensions of 
gaps between stated and applied policy on regular immigration to Spain. For the CC.OO. 
lawyer, “[i]rregularity is a classic aspect of the Spanish immigration model … and has 
accompanied us in all of our processes” (Mr. J). Despite government claims and common 
assumptions to the contrary (Ms. B), it is “a fiction” that a migrant arrives at their workplace 
with a “contract under [her] arm” (Ibid.) By comparing Interior and municipal “padrón” 
statistics on migrant residence it was calculated very approximately that around a million 
persons were undocumented at the end of the Aznar administration in 2004, and that this 
widespread irregularity had developed in the previous half decade (4.3.1). The interviews 
also provided insights that enable making a more careful and confident estimation of the 
extent and evolution of irregularity. For the technician in the CC.OO. legal team, exact 
figures on irregular residence are “the million-dollar question” (Mr. J). He felt that using 
figures from the padrón provided insights but warned against using them as accurate 
demographic measures. This, he argued, was, 
 
because it includes people living here or who lived here and have left. There can be 
duplications: people that have registered in two different towns. Town Halls are 
interested in keeping them on the register because it helps them receive grants from 
the central authorities, etc. People might have returned to their country, or gone to 
another EU country. People may have died. The register includes people that lived 
locally but have moved away (including to their countries of origin). (Mr. J) 
 
 An alternative measure of irregular residence used by the ex-CITE spokesperson 
interviewed was based on calculating the difference between the number of migrants 
registered as paying social-security (national insurance) contributions and those identified in 
household Active Population Surveys (EPAs; Mr. M & Mr. J). Using such a comparison the 
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Catalan ex-CITE leader had concluded that authorised entry overtook unauthorised 
migration in 2005-2006 and that irregularity had shrunk after 2007 7 . As the recession 
deepened, and hiring at-source effectively ended, fewer people entered legally. It is possible 
that irregularity has risen again, encouraged by immigrants being unable to renew their 
residence due to lack of employment 8  (Mr. M.) The other reason why undocumented 
residence has decreased is that very many migrants have been regularised. 
 
 
7.2.2 Rootedness continues the Spanish model  
 
For the Barcelona policy specialist regularisation processes “have been the true immigration 
policy, as across southern Europe” (Ms. B). In 5.2.2.2 the growing curve of regularisation 
through such processes was identified for the period up until 2005. After then, individual 
regularisation via social or labour rootedness was expanded and no more general 
“amnesties” took place. According to the specialist on irregularity and migratory policy, 
“arraigo” became the main path to legal residence and employment (Ms. B). She believed 
official government figures had not been provided,  
 
because if they were to make them public, there would be a big debate about 
regularisation via rootedness in Spain and particularly in the EU, which I’m not sure 
would be so good for [the government]. (Ibid.) 
 
For the Barcelona researcher, individual rootedness is a faster, more flexible, more hidden 
and therefore less controversial system, and politicians and scholars in the core European 
states were unaware of the large volume of regularisation that had continued since the last 
general amnesty in 2005 (ibid). Therefore the transformation of policy under the Socialists 
had not been from illegal to legal immigration, but rather from general to individual 
regularisation (ibid.) As under the previous government, migrants normally spent a 
significant period of time in unauthorised residence before performing in situ regularisation 
(ibid). Instead of a process of “regularisation first, integration second”, demonstrating 
integration became a prerequisite for regularisation (ibid). In other words, only the order of 
the two steps had changed.  
A consequence of the rootedness process, identified by the Papers per a Tothom 
spokesperson, has been to compel migrant persons to engage in a time-consuming pursuit 
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of work contracts and other documents, sometimes requiring the purchase of such from a 
flourishing black market involving lawyers from real or fictitious companies (Mr E.) Thus the 
rootedness procedure encourages migrants to come into contact with criminal networks such 
as document forgers – the kind of illegal activity that can reinforce problematic associations 
between immigration and criminality (ibid). The pursuit of documentation is encouraged by 
the combination of the requirement to renew residence annually and the lapse into 
irregularisation suffered by many migrants as a consequence of the crisis.  
 
 
7.2.3 Structural and tolerated irregularity in construction  
 
The degree of regularisation between 2004 and 2011 appears to have been large, even if it 
cannot easily be gauged. Some tendencies in the direction of greater legalisation of foreign 
residence have been identified. Yet other tendencies point in the opposite direction and it 
appears that irregularity, which became a major social phenomenon in the four years before 
2004, has continued to shape immigration in Catalonia and Spain. Tolerance of irregularity 
among different employers and governments and was identified by several interviewees (Mr. 
E; Ms. A; Mr. L; Mr. J & Mr. M). 
The three union sources concurred that irregularity benefited employers (Mr. J; Mr. L; 
Mr. M). For the CC.OO. lawyer reduced “legal status conditions [migrants’] labour status” 
(Mr. J). As well as undermining migrants’ bargaining power through linking the right to legal 
residence with having obtained and kept employment (7.1.2), irregular migrants were seen 
as being particularly vulnerable. In the words of the SOS Racisme spokesperson,  
 
an undocumented person is an invisible person … you have incredible vulnerability. 
You are going to be willing to work … without a contract. (Ms. A.) 
 
For the ex-CITE leader, when labour is “irregular, low-waged [and precarious]” it feeds 
“economic growth” for particular business sectors (Mr. M). This meant that governments did 
“not dare” act against such (Ms. A). The two interviewees that have represented CC.OO. in 
policy negotiations cited tolerance towards irregular employment in the building trade (Mr. J; 
Mr. M). For the CITE activist, 
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construction employers are a powerful group … with presence in some parties – in 
particular the Popular Party … Could we say that the PP looked the other way when 
so much irregular immigration was arriving because they knew it was good for the 
construction employer? (Mr M). 
 
The trade-unionists’ view of the construction industry was given much unintentional support 
by the National Confederation of Construction (CNC) spokesperson themselves. To begin 
with, in response to a question about whether migrant workers were recruited locally (as 
opposed to through foreign hiring schemes), the employers’ representative became visibly 
uncomfortable, pointing to report figures showing total (official) employment of migrants and 
employment through quota hiring and recommending consulting editions of the Boletín 
Oficial del Estado (BEO, Hansard) to obtain an “idea of demand” from published catalogues 
of hard-to-fill occupation (Ms. M). Yet the figures signposted give several indications that 
large-scale hiring of irregular migrants is taking place in the sector. First, the figures for hiring 
of migrant construction workers were much lower than those estimated using EPA figures by 
the Ministry of Employment and Social Security’s Permanent Immigration Observatory (OPI). 
These calculated that 655,000 migrants worked in construction in 2007 – almost double the 
391,000 recognised as working in the sector by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration9 (see  
Figure 2.7). The gap between the two strongly confirms very widespread irregular hiring. 
 
Table 7.1: Evolution of employment of foreign workers in construction 
 
Year No. of foreigners working  
in construction 
2003 140,000 
2007 391,000 
2011 174,000 
 Source: Ministry of Labour and Immigration figures provided in 
interview with Ms. M  
 
Reinforcing this view is the evidence that the hiring of migrants at source makes up only a 
small proportion of total migrant recruitment. The published catalogues in the pre-crisis 
period include the requirement for “builders” (albañiles) across Spain 10 , but the same 
professional group had stopped being officially requested by the four Catalan provinces by 
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2007 and by all Spanish provinces before the end of 2008 (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos 
Sociales, 2007: 44,160-44,164; 2008: 42,022-42,028).   
 Likewise, despite the fact that construction includes many large multinationals with 
the ability to participate in quota hiring, the figures for employment through the scheme 
presented by the CNC spokesperson were very low (see table 7.2): the quota of 5,234 
migrants hired in 2007 is a tiny fraction of even the greatly underestimated figures for migrant 
employment shared by the construction representative (391,000 migrants; Table 7.1). All of 
the indications point to the in situ hiring of very large numbers of irregular (as well as regular) 
migrants.  
 
Table 7.2: Evolution of foreign hiring through the quota scheme 
 
Year No. of migrants hired through 
quota scheme 
2006 4,868 
2007 5,234 
2008 1,818 
2009 6 
Source: Interview with Ms. M. 
 
When I asked for confirmation that most migrant contracting must have been performed 
locally, the spokeswoman responded sharply: “[o]nly those with residence permits are 
employed” (Ms. M). Considering the huge number of migrant labourers employed in the 
sector before 2008 (2.3.1.2), this is highly unconvincing, and the mechanical tone employed 
by the interview participant suggested she was giving a “public-relations” response.  
 Similarly when I asked directly whether employment in construction was always legal, 
the CNC representative gave an even more “political” response, stating abruptly that “[n]on 
compliance means unfair competition. That is the way we encourage employers to abide by 
the law” (Ms. M). Then the construction association representative admitted that her sector 
“hadn’t adopted any specific measures” to reduce irregular employment, adding that she 
thought that the responsibility for adopting measures was limited to the government (ibid). 
There are two observations that can be made here. First, according to its spokesperson, the 
CNC did nothing practical to reduce what was clearly very widespread illegal activity by its 
members. Secondly, the disapproval exhibited towards such a practice was limited to 
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avoiding unfair competitive disadvantages for any firms that abide by the law. No legal or 
ethical considerations were added to this assessment. Assuming that the views shared by 
the CNC spokesperson are representative of employers in the sector, it appears that there is 
little will to avoid irregular hiring, and that it has been a structural feature of the industry.  
 
 
7.2.4 Doubts that irregularity is intentional  
 
Although recognising the structural nature of irregularity in Spain seems uncontentious, 
participants shared different views as to whether irregularity was an intentional policy. The 
Barcelona-based ex-representative of CC.OO. felt that it was difficult to establish “a cause-
effect relationship” between the economic benefit of illegality for certain employers and the 
lack of effective control against irregular migration (Mr. M). The 2005 process, the expansion 
of individualised regularisation, and the attempt to flexibilise renewal requirements, were 
signalled by the Barcelona-based irregularity specialist as demonstrating that the Socialists 
wished to tackle irregularity (Ms. B). However, the migrant-network activist in the same city 
was sceptical that the government had this intention (Mr. E). Rather than being part of a 
long-term political regularisation strategy, the 2005 regularisation process was a response to 
migrant mobilisations and the increased visibility of undocumented persons (ibid.) The 
Socialists did not mind that 400,000 migrants failed to obtain regularisation, most of whom 
were not allowed to have their application considered (ibid). Commenting on the 2009 Aliens’ 
Law reforms, the Papers per a Tothom activist expressed the view that, 
 
[o]ur analysis is not so much that the aim of the Aliens’ Law is to close the border but 
to make immigrant labour feel frightened and right-less: fearful of expulsion and 
police persecution … [That way t]hey are forced to accept worse labour conditions 
and they can’t protest … That is the real objective of the law. (Ibid.) 
 
Two policy experts coincided that irregularity benefited some employers, yet they dismissed 
the notion that it was a deliberate immigration policy in the interests of employers (Ms. R; 
Ms. B). The Barcelona-based policy researcher pointed to repeated occasions on which 
employers had playing a proactive role in promoting legalisation (Ms. B). On top of the 
examples already shared, the Papers per a Tothom activist shared the anecdote that 
construction employers had lobbied for regularisation in the 1990s – an intriguing comment 
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bearing in mind the signs of tolerance towards irregularity in construction provided in the 
previous sub-section – (5.2.2.1; 5.2.3; 6.2.3.1; Mr. E). A further instance of employer support 
for legalisation cited by the irregularity specialist is of employers of domestic labour that 
lobbied in support of and actively collaborated in the 2005 “amnesty”. These actions were 
explained in relation for the desire of this particularly group of employers to encourage 
“fidelity” among employees (Ms. B). Other employers interviewed for her own research saw 
the 2005 regularisation “as something positive, as a recognition of their workers, and the 
legitimacy of being able to employ workers who until then were not recognised legally” (ibid.) 
The same regularisation process was described as a “success” by the construction 
representative – despite her limited criticisms of employers that hire illegally (Ms. M). 
 The freeing of migrants arrested on Spain’s borders was confirmed as continuing in 
2011 and having been of a large magnitude. The Papers per a Tothom activist confirmed 
that hundreds of thousands of African ex-detainees had been released on the peninsula (Mr. 
E; 5.2.2.2). When questioned as to whether such practice was a deliberate policy, several 
interviewees provided indications otherwise. The specialist on irregular migration highlighted 
that there had been a large decline in releases of migrants whose country of origin had 
signed a bilateral agreement with Spain, and that thanks to an early agreement with 
Morocco, repatriations of citizens from this country had been performed systematically (Ms. 
B). It appears that ambassadors from poorer countries had been brought in to identify the 
national origin of migrants without identification, and that release occurred when 
representatives failed to recognise migrants as fellow nationals. According to the Barcelona 
activist, this happened to “a boatload” of Bangladeshi migrants (Mr. E).  
Both the Barcelona-based ex-CITE representative and Madrid border-policy 
specialist cited statutory and practical limits as compulsion for the authorities to free 
undocumented migrants from detention centres: release on the mainland took place if 
migrants had been held for the maximum time allowed, or if there was a lack of internment 
capacity (Mr. M; Ms. R). For the Madrid researcher, 
 
if you didn’t demonstrate that [migrants] had come through a country with which you 
had an admission agreement, you could not send them anywhere, and you did not 
have centres to detain them in either. You had to put them on the street. … [I]f in 48 
hours you couldn’t show that this person was from a certain country you could not 
detain them further. (Ms. R.)    
 
 
 
203 
 
A second reason offered to doubt that the porousness of Spain’s African border was 
intentional was that (Sub-Saharan) immigration along this route “numerically speaking did 
not reach even 5 per cent of the [total] immigration received” (Mr. M). This leaves the 
question as to whether the much larger entry of Latin Americans through airports was being 
treated differently (5.2.2.2). The border-policy researcher was defensive about this issue, 
maintaining, “the controls currently being carried out in airports of international flights direct 
to Spain are the most exhaustive around”, citing as positive examples the routes from Brazil 
and other Latin American countries (Ms. R). Somewhat contradictorily she attempted to 
make the case that immigration through airports and subsequent overstay was 
uncontrollable because, 
 
[y]ou don’t have control measures [available]. You know that this person entered on 
this date, but you don’t know where they are [now]. You would have to find police 
officers to search for the person. You know they had a 3-month visa but you hadn’t 
recorded when they entered and when the visa expired. (Ms. R) 
 
The scholar did not volunteer ideas as to why control could not take the form of workplace 
inspection. She did, however, identify the existence of a cultural tolerance of unauthorised 
employment in Spain and how this was encouraged by limitations of an administrative or 
bureaucratic nature:  
 
There is no culture or morality that prevents hiring someone irregularly. It is … [seen 
as] the most normal thing. Southern Europe is very different in this regard than most 
northern European countries … [In the former region] everybody has an irregular 
migrant hired. Well, maybe not everybody but ... Requirements [to regularise] have 
changed a lot compared to a few years ago. Now it’s very difficult [to qualify] for 
someone looking after children or cleaning houses. Before [the migrant] could add 
together work hours in different jobs to be able to claim social security. Now, you are 
required to have a single employer, with a certain amount of earnings … Most people 
are not able to comply with the complicated law but need someone to pick up their 
children from school. Most would never ask if the migrant is documented. This 
attitude is pervasive. (Ms. R.) 
 
It also occurs in many spheres of economic activity: 
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If someone comes to mend your blind, for instance, they ask whether you want an 
invoice or not, whether you want to include VAT or not. This is not a feature only of 
immigration. It exists in all fields. (Ibid.)  
 
According to the specialist in border management, in this field “permissiveness” has been 
applied to the control and expulsion of irregular migration (Ms. R; 5.2.2.2). For the 
researcher, “[i]t has never been a priority to expel people located inside the territory” and the 
National Police had “never had clear guidelines on looking for migrants, identifying them and 
deporting them” – beyond a limited period before the 2004 elections, and later when (for a 
time) Madrid police stations were instructed to perform a minimum quota of arrests of 
undocumented persons (Ms. R; 3.2.2.1). Other interviewees would probably add further 
qualifications. Based on his experience in migrant networks, the Papers per a Tothom 
activist signalled that expulsions of migrants were constant and had increased during the 
crisis years (Mr. E).  
 The rationale behind the limits to control provided by the Elcano Royal Institute 
associate was that it is expensive and time-consuming: 
 
Economically it doesn’t make sense to chase people because … you end up … 
starting up an expulsion procedure. The person is not detained. They are in the 
street. When you begin a procedure you have to look for the person in the street, try 
and locate them (Ms. R.) 
 
Citing her own research interviews, the Madrid scholar maintained that the police only act if 
they suspect the migrant is engaged in criminal activity. If this was not their suspicion, they 
would protest,  
 
[l]ook, we have limited resources and our main role is to arrest criminals and not 
irregular immigrants. If I have to decide on where to put resources, I will put it into the 
first thing and not the other. (Ibid.) 
 
As well as complaining that it would be preferable if the Ministry of Labour did workplace 
inspections, revealingly (and ironically), police also justified migrants performing irregular 
employment. According to the specialist in immigration control, police officers would reason, 
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“[i]f the only thing they are doing is working illegally then we all earn a bit on the side on 
something” (ibid.) If this view is in any way representative of those public servants whose 
duty is to enforce the law. it would underline graphically the degree of normalisation of 
irregularity in Spanish society.  
 Yet the specialist on irregularity suggested that governments had an opposing 
interest in actively opposing irregularity. For the Barcelona-based scholar, illegal residence 
acts “against the logic of governance” by reducing the social-security contributions 
sustaining the welfare state, concealing real demographics (for planning purposes), and 
limiting state control over the inhabitants of a territory (Ms. B).  
 
 
7.3 Hidden national considerations in immigration policy 
 
It was expected that a source of tensions between Catalan and Spanish policymakers would 
have been differences in migrant-labour and other economic needs between the two 
territories, and many interviewees in both Madrid and Barcelona were asked about this 
matter. The one participant that signalled varying migrant-labour needs as a source of 
tension provided no concrete details on such (Mr. R – the Catalan and Spanish policy 
advisor). On the other hand, unexpected opinions were shared by the same interviewee and 
a variety of others on the way immigration policy is shaped by and shaped nation-building 
projects – views that are presented below in some detail. 
 
 
7.3.1 The cultural preferences of Spanish elites 
 
I have identified the disadvantaging of Moroccan and other North African migration in 
agricultural hiring and quota hiring, and this likely has been a factor in the greater levels of 
underground hiring, rejections during “amnesties” and deportation suffered by these groups 
(4.3.1.2; 5.1.3; 5.2.2.1; 5.2.2.2; 6.2.3.4). As well as attributing discrimination by business and 
political elites to the perception of Moroccans as being “veteran labour”, the CC.OO. lawyer 
says the group is perceived as having a different in culture, language and religion. The idea 
had little basis as the Moroccan had,  
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a lot more in common with the Spanish worker than us Spaniards wish to recognise: 
the same idiosyncrasies, the same farming culture in certain segments, the same 
resistance to weather conditions, which are very similar, similar gastronomy even, 
and living only fourteen kilometres away. They represent our natural immigrant 
worker. (Mr. J)  
 
European and Latin American migration is often treated as being culturally closer and 
received more favourably11. For instance, as well as the cases presented in earlier chapters, 
the farmers’ representative pointed out that both PP and PSOE governments had favoured 
hiring for the countryside from Latin America, performing direct hiring in Colombia and 
Ecuador (Mr. G). The representative of social enterprises in the CES compared northern 
Europeans with other migrant sub-groups that “society does not understand”, suggesting 
that Europeans are (universally) “skilled” and that the other group had suffered from “very 
unequal educational systems” – encouraging “cultural collisions” in the new country (Ms. C). 
The view suggests that immigration is problematized or normalized according to the 
speaker’s identification with or rejection of particular regional groups.  
 
 
7.3.2 Cultural components in the decentralisation debate 
 
The interview with a Catalan policy advisor and specialist on immigration in stateless nations 
offered some insights as to what is driving the desire for Catalan immigration powers (Mr. R; 
5.3.1). In the first place he said it was about the “principle of being able to decide for oneself” 
– or gaining the sovereignty he identified as being monopolised by the Spanish state (ibid; 
6.1.1). This view could be interpreted as saying that having an immigration policy was a 
symbolic ingredient in enjoying national statehood. The advisor also identified specific 
motivations why Catalan policymakers wished to devolve immigration powers. Despite the 
fact that much Catalan policy towards migrants was characterised by being inclusive and 
progressive – even by Generalitat critics such as the FSII president (Mr. V; see 7.3.3), the 
motivations cited did not include liberalising entry. The Catalan advisor predicted that if 
policymaking were performed by the Generalitat, “flow management would not be 
substantially different. Catalonia would not necessarily be more open; it would likely apply 
restrictive criteria like Spain” (Mr. R). Rather, different immigration “profiles” would be 
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adopted to those currently applied, taking into account “nationality”, “language” and “origin” 
(Mr. R).  
Concretely he advocated overturning the criteria of knowing the Spanish language 
applied in official immigration processes – such as naturalisation. He believed that the 
“positive discrimination” enjoyed by Latin American migrants was not of benefit to Catalonia: 
  
The fact that Latin Americans speak the Castilian language is decisive for the State 
… I don’t know to what extent Catalonia is interested in promoting having immigrants 
that speak Castilian. (Mr. R).  
 
There is an overlap here with the approach to immigration adopted in the Galician AC and 
celebrated by the representative of the left-nationalist union federation (Mr. L). This 
deliberately favoured immigration by the children and grandchildren of the very many 
persons that had emigrated abroad from Galicia in the twentieth century (ibid). According to 
the trade unionist, the pro-Galician-progressive government at the time used its powers in 
education to encourage migration through legal study (and overstay; ibid). It also applied a 
preference for Portuguese-speaking migration due to the closeness between the language 
and Galician. The (crude) logic of the Galician government was paraphrased by the 
interviewee as being,  
 
 [i]f there is a lack of labour, I’d prefer to bring those from Uruguay, Colombia, 
Mexico, … than those from … Ghana … And even from Africa I’d prefer 
Mozambicans … Why? Because of a preference for the common language and 
roots. (Mr. L.) 
 
The preference was for those “more from home … we could say” – a group from which he 
excluded Moroccans and Algerians. His justification for applying such linguistic and cultural 
bias was that it would facilitate attaining social integration, cohesiveness, social cooperation 
and equality12 (ibid.)  
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7.3.3 Integration and nation building 
 
As well as resistance to Spanish cultural preferences being voiced by minority-national 
policy consultants, interviews in Madrid and Barcelona confirmed that unease exists in 
Spanish policymaking circles about Catalonia being able to use immigration powers to 
promote Catalan linguistic and cultural assimilation. Despite the PSOE-appointed FSII 
president praising the advanced nature of many Catalan integration initiatives, he spoke in 
hostile terms about the Catalan policy of rootedness, which he said “masked” a policy to 
“force immigrants to study in the Catalan language” and “socialise [them] in Catalan” (Mr. V). 
The interviewee offered no criticisms of Spanish policies that seek equivalent socialisation 
processes in Castilian. The view also would appear broadly to be that of the government. As 
well as instances already cited in which the Madrid government resisted Catalonia having 
powers and policies on immigration that might be used to promote Catalan nationhood, 
allowing knowledge of Catalan to be included in the rootedness procedure generalised 
across the State was “grudgingly awarded” according to an interviewee that had participated 
in Spain-wide policy consultation (Mr. R; 5.2.2.1; 5.3). An even more centralist approach to 
immigration policy was exhibited by the construction-employers’ spokeswoman in Madrid, 
who expressed the view that immigration policy should be “State policy” rather than devolved 
(Ms. M.)   
 In Barcelona some interviewees provided a more nuanced and non-aggressive 
critique of the Catalan institutions’ approach to integration. The policy researcher from 
Barcelona highlighted that the institutional “circuit” created to manage rootedness had turned 
from being a voluntary provision to “an obligation” that attempted “at heart” to make 
“residence ... depend on … whether you speak Catalan or not”13 (Ms. B). The Papers per a 
Tothom activist denounced the fact that the official interview for migrants to gain legal 
residence is held in Catalan even in cities and towns in which migrants speak Castilian, 
leading to many applicants being turned down (Mr. E). He implied that this procedure was 
based on a narrow vision of rootedness, saying that non-Catalan speakers might be “a 
member of fifty charities, an active member of the Socialist Party, etcetera” but still be 
rejected by the process (ibid.) He suggested that in Catalonia (and to a lesser extent in 
Spain) Muslim migrants had “to put up with s**t mosques” – referring to the converted 
buildings used for all mosques in Catalonia as opposed to the purposely built buildings with 
minarets such as Madrid’s M-30 mosque (Mr. E). This, he maintained, was about “depriving 
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people that come with a cultural background the right to that background”, and that 
Generalitat’s policy was one of “assimilation”, not “integration” (Mr. E).  
The approach described was not exclusive to Catalonia. For the SOS Racisme 
representative, in Catalonia and Spain integration was approached in a one-directional way, 
in which immigrants always had the responsibility for their integration and the recipient 
society never asked itself “are we willing to integrate?”14 (Ms. A). The anti-racist offered the 
example of migrants being excluded from enjoying the key “political right” of voting – a 
demand removed from Catalonia’s National Agreement for Immigration on the request of the 
governing CiU coalition (ibid). 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has built on the analysis of the evolution of policy and policymaking and its 
impacts provided in Chapters Four and Five, which among other aspects identified the 
permeability of Spanish borders, limitations to deportations – however intimidating, and the 
absence of inspections of illegal employment. The interview findings presented in this 
chapter extended the portrait. Firstly they showed that in practice there has been much 
continuity in policy under the Aznar and Zapatero governments – despite the many formal 
(and sometimes substantial) changes identified in 5.2.2 and the start of this chapter. Under 
Caldera’s ministerial direction far more migrants became regularised – after 2005 exclusively 
through individual rootedness. However, they effectively remained precarious as residents – 
due to the requirement to annually renew residence – and vulnerable in employment – 
because their stay required them keeping their jobs – of a mainly insecure kind – raising the 
potential for exploitation (4.2). This means that very many regular migrants shared with 
“irregulars” being a conditioned and more-malleable workforce. Indeed because during the 
period studied irregular residents generally could access social provision, regularisation 
meant limited social advance. The still-precarious position of migrants was underlined when 
a large proportion slipped back into irregularity after losing their jobs after 2007. 
 These discoveries might seem to give credence to a direct and dramatic Spanish-
language account of migrant-labour policy which concludes that both PP and PSOE 
governments, 
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have applied the Aliens Law to guarantee there are an important number of 
undocumented migrants to feed the underground economy, as well as having 
documented immigrants to be exploited legally. Through sufficiently threatening 
legislation, it is aimed for [migrants’] labour militancy to tend towards nothing and 
their submission to the infinite. Migratory policy is not, therefore, a policy of border 
closure but uses borders to generate different degrees of vulnerability, in a vicious 
circle of legal insecurity and labour precariousness (Romero, 2008: 167). 
  
This description would be a good summary of the recent evolution of policy in Spain except 
that assumption of Machiavellian intentions is contradicted by other interview findings. 
Concretely different examples were given in which Spanish employers promoted the 
legalisation of migrants (including through employers lobbying and participating voluntarily in 
regularisation programmes). Furthermore corporate representatives effectively reported 
having a considerably less harmonious relationship with the more restrictive Popular Party 
government than its more liberal successor. (Continued good employer-government 
relations after the PSOE hardened its migratory policy under crisis might be explained by the 
fall in demand by businesses for migrant labour. Likewise, interviewees signalled the real 
difficulties that the authorities encounter when acting against irregular entry and stay (such 
as monitoring overstay by those entering the peninsula as tourists) and how border control 
was enforced through migratory agreements with non-EU states. None of these findings 
support a simple instrumental view (as is also identified in some of the structuralist writing 
reviewed in 2.2.3.2). Therefore the theoretical conclusion in 2.2.2 that the irregularity 
paradox is structural but not deliberate can be treated as fundamentally proven in the 
Catalan/Spanish case.  
 Finally the findings suggested that policy tensions or “gaps” could not be accounted 
for merely in terms of the interplay of economic factors. Firstly no evidence was found that 
differences between different fractions of private capital – or between particular factions and 
capital as a whole – were key to policy contradictions. Moreover, it was discovered that 
political and cultural considerations were identified as conditioning immigration policy and 
debates at a greater extent than recognised in the literature. Examples were given of 
unfavourable treatment towards North Africans (and favourable towards Latin Americans) in 
agricultural and at-source hiring, deportations and regularisation processes. Policy advisors 
described this as being a response to (misplaced) perceptions of cultural incompatibilities 
between Maghrebis and Spaniards/Catalans. These cultural dimensions to policy (and 
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business) decisions – together with the examples of discrimination and favouritism outlined 
in 5.2 – confirms that the kind of nation-statecraft based on national mythologies identified by 
Soguk (and developed in this thesis) is in play in the contemporary Iberian context.   
 The significant role in migration policy of national projects is also exposed by the 
mutual distrust between Catalan and Spanish policymakers regarding keeping immigration 
powers centralised or decentralising them, and by the way Catalan policymakers created 
and applied policy in the limited spheres they have responsibility for. As well as the desire for 
sovereignty over immigration being part of general desire for genuine Catalan autonomy, the 
call to further “Catalanise” migratory-policy powers was linked with the desire to influence the 
regional “profiles” of migrants – including their language and cultural background – an 
example of stateless-nation-craft. In 5.2.2 evidence was presented that the Spanish state 
had (under EU pressure) introduced visa requirements for Latin American entry much later 
than for African visitors. It can be assumed that Spanish adoption of regularisation via 
rootedness would favour Castilian speakers from Latin America over other groups (including 
Spain’s southern neighbours). On the other hand a Catalan migrants-rights activist and 
Madrid-based integration specialist lamented that rootedness procedure in Catalonia 
disadvantaged those without knowledge of Catalan. In all, national cultural considerations 
also can be seen here to be a factor influencing policy (and related disagreements and 
compromises). 
 
 
                                                        
1 The same interviewee also indicated, however, that his organisation (COAG) eventually accepted 
the principle that rural jobs should first be given to the local unemployed – whether “native” or foreign 
– rather than foreigners living abroad (Mr. G.) He suggested that this stance meant convergence with 
the positions of the workers’ unions’ (ibid.) 
2 There is no obvious reason why the sincerity of this account should be distrusted. Through the legal 
foreign recruitment scheme migrants were provided with a range of accessible and well-produced 
audio-visual and reading materials in a variety of languages on Spanish legal rights, labour conditions 
and practical and cultural matters (which were facilitated during the interview). Also, the farmers’ 
union leader displayed a deep knowledge of migrant-rights issues and provided little cause to 
question the sincerity of COAG’s concern for providing minimum guarantees for migrants under the 
agricultural foreign hiring scheme. Lastly the COAG leader also participated in the progressive Vía 
Campesina international network of small and medium farmers: an organisation that played a leading 
role in global justice movement protests in Seattle and elsewhere. (Mr. G.) 
3 “Next-door neighbour” has been taken to mean a nearby farmer. 
 
 
212 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 According to the PSOE-appointed FSII spokesman (Mr. V). 
5 Under the 2009 Aliens Law, migrant women obtaining recognition by the courts or public prosecutor 
of suffering gender violence are guaranteed provisional residence and work permits (Ortega-
Giménez, Alarcón-Moreno & Alonso-García. 2013.) According to the Observatorio de la Violencia de 
Género, in the first half of 2012 a total of 36 per cent of all women reporting suffering such violence 
were foreigners (ibid). 
6 This would have been the case until 2011, when the interviews were performed, but would be less 
so since then due to business support for the new Ciudadanos party.  
7 This finding is similar to that obtained from comparing Interior and municipal-register data (4.3.1)  
8 The interviewee did not offer any figures for either immigration or irregular residence. 
9 The Ministry of Labour figures very likely will be limited to those paying social–security contributions 
(regularly employed). 
10 I looked at the fourth quarter of 2005 and second quarter of 2006 and found that for both periods 
all four Catalan provinces required “builders” for (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 2005: 
42517-42523; 2006: 20385-20389).  
11 This is only up to a point however: xenophobia and racism has been experienced by many poorer 
migrants from these regions. In particular, Roma persons frequently are cited in anti-immigrant 
discourse and Latin Americans suffer from range of popular stereotypes. 
12 He illustrated this assertion by signalling the strength of the cooperative movement in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, where he maintained that local languages and cultures offered a “fundamental 
integration vehicle” (Mr. L.) 
13 The language requirement was “among other things” (Ms. B.) 
14 The anti-racist spokesperson expressed the view that the FSII had operated according to the on-
side view outlined, and that this had led it to create “a thousand [new] structures” in order for 
immigrants to find out how to benefit from their social rights (Ms. A).  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion:  
immigration paradoxes  
as dilemmas of a European state 
 
 
The case study presented proves that disparities between immigration policies and 
outcomes can best be understood in relation to two impacts: that emerging from the internal 
contradictions of capitalist states themselves and the effect of territorial subordinations and 
semi-subordinations of nations to higher political authorities – in particular Spain to the EU 
but also Catalonia to Spain. The two central dynamics are summarised as follows. 
 
The capitalist state as generator of immigration policy “problems” 
 
States – despite their inverted appearance – are capitalist in terms of their functions and 
internal and external social relations. They must necessarily promote both the 
internationalisation of “national” capital and of its “factors of production” (including labour). 
Although capital can operate with and benefit from unfree or semi-free labour – including 
conditioned migrant work – it works more efficiently (both economically and politically – to 
ensure political consent) by employing “free” labour. International migration is often required 
– particularly at moments of economic expansion –  but it is also perceived as a threat to 
states. This is because capitalism is (still) based on the nation-state system (despite 
globalist indications otherwise). The nation state remains the ideal “community” around 
which the system of competitive accumulation is organised. The ability of a state to arbitrate 
(including through threatening and performing coercion) between competing capitals, social 
classes and individuals, as well as represent “national interests” on the world stage rests on 
perceived legitimacy of its claim to sovereignty, which itself is linked to being seen as 
representing a bounded people.  
Because the “community” around which such representation is based is 
fundamentally abstract in nature, and must compete with alternative social identifications – in 
particular related to class – that permanently threaten to undermine its ideological purchase, 
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the state must constantly engage in nation-craft. This must be performed invisibly in order 
not to expose the (generally) arbitrary nature of the nation. This can be done negatively 
through the state’s interaction with immigration. By controlling and managing immigration 
and accompanying, prefiguring or substituting this with relevant discourse, the nation’s 
boundaries and symbolically made and remade.   
 The process is complemented by the ways states incorporate their populations in the 
national polity. Modern states play the main role in managing the reproduction of the 
conditions for economic activity through administering a range of activities (including 
education, health and social-security provision). They include legal and democratic systems 
that guarantee the formal benefits of citizenship – even if these become undermined in 
practice by economic and democratic inequalities. The state functions described are made 
possible by means of systems of taxation – incorporating vertical and horizontal forms of 
distribution of income but always within the confines of the “imagined community”. Despite 
their great social limits, such political and administrative organisation provides some material 
basis that underpins ideologies of belonging and exclusion. In relation to states migrants can 
represent both a “saving” – by providing generationally reproduced labour power – and a 
threat to the precepts of legal and social (citizenship) contract. Therefore both materially and 
symbolically migration is inherently a problem for the modern state as well as very often a 
necessity. This paradox is deepened firstly due of internationalising tendencies in the 
economy, politics, culture and law that make state control of mobility harder (but not 
impossible). Secondly, adding to the analysis developed thus far, Calavita observes (in 
relation to low-wage migrant employment in Spanish agriculture) that the qualities making 
migrants attractive to some employers (for example their poverty and perceived low status) 
are precisely those that can make them unattractive as potential new members of the 
national “community”1 (2005: 11 & 12). 
The deeply rooted ambiguities described encourage policy fudges, “muddles” and 
vaciliations. In the Spanish case they have been a factor in the development of high levels of 
irregularity and enormous disparities between political discourse and action. This, and the 
concomitant emergence of social divisions between migrant and non-migrant, formed the 
background to the El Ejido riots. After these Catalan and Spanish farmers attempted to avoid 
future social fracture through the generalised introduction of a variant of the “guestworker” 
immigration model. Although this provides a minimum of social conditions for migrants it 
does so paternalistically – restricting migrants’ ability to change employment and excluding 
them from the chance of citizenship and arguably real membership of society. (As with the 
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similar post-war German model of immigration, it may encourage anti-migrant reaction from 
the local population by treating migrants as having a qualitatively lower status). 
The systemic contradiction identified also can be understood as the backdrop to 
differences between states and capital fractions, between migrants / contemporary unions 
and restrictive governments, and between different political parties. When conservative 
minister Pimentel resigned complaining that his Ministry of the Interior was treating 
immigration as a “problem of public order” rather than “a source of wealth and well-being for 
everyone”, he was revealing a fissure in the government likely related to the contradictory 
needs of the capitalist state (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda & González-Enríquez, 2001: 107). 
It is revealing that irregularity and political disputes over immigration both reached their 
heights in the period of Popular Party government and subsided under the subsequent 
social-democratic administration. The most likely reason is that the Aznar government had a 
more (Spanish) nationalistic political agenda, whereas the PSOE had an immigration 
approach more in accordance to business interests (exemplified by regularising hundreds of 
thousands, moving state management of migration from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry 
of Labour, and putting the main social agents at the centre of policymaking – before the 
crisis. It genuinely did treat immigration as a “labour issue” – leading to new policy gaps and 
injustices when the crisis impacted hard on migrant employment.  
Comparisons between experiences under the conservatives and Socialists indicates 
that party politics has a considerable influence on policy, but not just or mainly because of 
voter influence. The Popular Party alongside the media led much of the backlash against 
immigration in the early 2000s (even if both further hardened their attitude to migration in 
response to the subsequent growth in popular anti-immigrant sentiment). Unease over 
immigration in the same period was a bi-directional process led frequently from above – a 
development inconsistent with much mainstream migration scholarship). 
 As well as national-construction being a factor in the inclination to limit “volumes” of 
immigration, it also shapes the desire to select particular migrant “profiles”. It has been 
identified that in Catalonia and Spain these are related to dominant national self-conceptions 
(which logically would normally be dominated by elites’ perceptions). These views are 
shaped by the historical and contemporary national mythologies and fears. The idea that 
Spain and to a large degree Catalonia define themselves (at least partly) in opposition to 
“Muslim occupation” has been identified in the interviews and literature as negatively 
shaping attitudes to North African migration (Carmona, García & Sánchez, 2012: 128 & 
129).  
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On the other hand, European immigration is normally invisible – probably linked to 
the strong “Europeanism” of twentieth-century Catalan nationalism and post-Franco Spanish 
centralism – partly related to its association with modernisation and liberalism. Less 
obviously the research discovered a strong element “Hispanismo” in immigration policy and 
practice, Zapata-Barrero: 229). Different Spanish governments have introduced measures 
giving preference to Latin American entry and access to citizenship – awarded to “latinos” 
after two years’ residence – rather than eight for other migrants2 (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 
117). Accordingly South and Central Americans have become by far the main beneficiaries 
of naturalisation processes3. The children and grandchildren of Spaniards are treated as 
nationals. According to one Catalan researcher, citizenship policies are linked to “the identity 
myth [sic] establishing the foundation of the country” (referring to the early-modern idea that 
Spain and its empire were one and the same, Zapata-Barrero: 229). This view is echoed by 
conservative Spanish analysts. For instance, the popular right-wing commentator Federico 
Jiménez Losantos argued, “mass entry of African Muslims would produce racial and cultural 
conflicts” and contrasted this regional group with “Hispano-American immigrants” who he 
described as “sharing our language and religion” and being “easy to assimilate”4 (Carmona, 
García & Sánchez, 2012: 128 & 129. Such thought could be traced to traditional Hispanist 
thinkers such as of scholar Menéndez Pelayo, who in 1890 stressed the Catholic, linguistic 
and cultural ties between Spain and its former colonies; Balfour & Quiroga, 2007: 32).  
 The empirical investigation revealed that tensions between Catalan and Spanish 
policymakers may be greatly related to regional biases in policy than other factors (and are 
not rooted in economic differences). Catalan identity centres on its language – often in rivalry 
with Castilian – and Spanish speakers  – including from the Americas – are understood to 
less willing to learn it. Yet it is not that all Catalan nationalist policymakers would prefer 
African immigration: conservative Catalanism shares with contemporary Spanish centralism 
identifying with Europe and its supposedly Christian “values”. The emergence of 
Islamophobia since S11 and the War on Terror has added to previous right-wing prejudices 
against Muslims (Keiner-Liebau, 2009: 208). 
The influence of nationalist worldviews in contemporary immigration policy should not 
be assumed to be circumscribed to nation-states and stateless nations in competition for 
people’s allegiance. While it is true that this rivalry might reinforce the importance of national 
consideration within immigration policy processes, its main role may just be to make 
processes more visible. The White Australia policy in effect until the 1970s or the 
advantages given in immigration policy to the foreign families of British people in Britain in 
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the 1980s show that cultural selection is an international phenomenon. Indeed it could be 
asked if it is a coincidence that free circulation of European citizens has coincided with the 
prominence (on the continent) of ideas of European “community” and “cultural heritage” 
(Haynes, 1999). Relatedly Cetti maintains that EU outer-border management might help 
encouraged European identity through comparison with outsiders. Concretely, she 
maintains, this might stimulate 
 
the ideological construction of a specific “European” identity, distinguished by a 
fabled commitment to democracy, the rule of law and Enlightenment principles 
(2015). 
 
If the EU is assumed to be a partial project in nation-building this observation might reinforce 
the idea discussed above of borders and related discourse as negative nationcraft. 
The interviews performed presented strong evidence to reject seeing migration 
controls simply as labour policy – as some radical structuralists argue. This mistake stems 
from applying a political economy approach that is overly reduced to the abstract economic 
and that pays insufficient attention to the role of the state as a political and economic actor. 
Interpreting paradoxes as originating from a clash between pre-capitalist territorial logics and 
the logics of markets is a misleading binary – even if one somewhat difficult to avoid when 
summarising processes in simple terms. 
The main problem with seeing borders principally as instruments of labour discipline 
is that the empirical enquiry found that employers often acted to liberalise borders – doing so 
individually or in a seemingly unlikely alliance with unions. It is likely that the partial 
detachment of Aznar’s immigration policy from business requirements was not merely an 
electoral calculation – as suggested by the government’s pro-active hardness towards 
migrants. Instead it likely also reflects the role of government and state in the capitalist 
division in labour: guaranteeing the social and political conditions for successful 
accumulation in the long term (albeit doing so through a worldview little-evolved from that 
bequeathed by Franco’s dictatorship). Employers, on the other hand, played their historic 
role by prioritising short-term competitive interests. The shallowness of their liberalness 
towards immigration was revealed when they pressed (successfully) to exclude the parents 
of migrants from reunification processes: indicating that it is labour power that attracts 
business to migration, not people aspiring to improve their (or their families’) lives or simply 
to survive).  
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Another finding warning against economic reductionism is that the severe economic 
crisis post-2007 had limited impact on policy gaps and the problematisation of migration. In 
recent years political, media and scholarly analyses often have assumed that more 
restrictive immigration policies and the growth of anti-immigrant politics are products of the 
economic crisis. Spain has been shown to be a paradigmatic case of “boom to bust” yet the 
interviews and literature survey suggest that polemics and popular concern regarding 
immigration grew faster before the crisis than after. According to a study of CIS monthly polls 
many other issues are now cited as “Spain’s main problems” before “immigration” – unlike in 
2006 when immigration topped the poll; Aja, Arango, & Oliver-Alonso, 2010). There were 
less disagreements over immigration in the crisis period and the most significant electoral 
advance of xenophobic parties in Catalonia began before 2008 (Rius-Sant, 2011). 
Irregularity did grow under the crisis due to rootedness procedure but a few years into the 
crisis migration into Spain had slowed greatly and many earlier migrants left the country. In 
all, policy gaps and tensions were more notable in the “boom” years. 
All the same, if irregular migration is mainly a consequence of the inherently 
conflicting relationship between states and foreigners, this does not stop it from being used 
to benefit sections of capital and the state – as clearly has been the case regarding the 
employment of migrants in sectors such as agriculture, construction and domestic services. 
The (partial) benefits for elites gained from conditioning migrants’ rights may act to lessen 
motivations to overcome policy gaps. Yet the experience under the Socialist government in 
which worker vulnerabilities were continued after mass regularisation by tying regular 
renewal of residence to remaining in employment (including in the adverse post-2008 
economic climate) suggests that it is the conditioning of migration that creates competitive 
advantages for employers, and not strictly illegality. This conclusion points to the need to 
develop a more sophisticated view of policy dynamics. 
  A last factor shaping gaps is migrants’ subjectivity. Whether penetrating genuine 
attempts at border enforcement or refusing to “return home” in periods of crisis, migrants do 
not simply respond mechanically either to economic fluctuations or policy decisions. By 
transgressing they themselves shape the size of paradoxes – for example when choosing to 
reside irregularly or holding strikes to gain papers – as they did in in the early 2000s.    
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A second source of paradox: a partial, divided and de-embedded Europe 
 
The other major factor encouraging the large policy gaps identified in Catalonia and Spain, 
and that has aids the problematization of immigration, has been the disparity between EU 
policy and Spanish pre-crisis labour requirements (thus confirming the suspicions of Catalan 
writer Rius Sant). Between the mid 1990s and 2008 several sectors of business activity 
needed to mobilise large new reserves of labour to fill vacancies: particularly doing anti-
social, physically demanding, low-skilled and low-status labour that non-migrants had 
become reluctant to perform. However, Spain’s incorporation in the Union forced migratory 
policy to develop in a (contrasting) restrictive direction: beginning with the 1985 Aliens’ Law 
that illegalised many residents and set the template for Spain’s irregular model of 
immigration. It is likely that the strict border policy introduced due to Schengen encouraged 
legal migration to develop through in situ regularisation processes, which themselves 
probably stimulated further “illegal” immigration5.  
Despite media attention on immigration to Spain focusing on its African border, the 
bulk of migration has taken place across its French border – from Europe – and through 
airports – from the Americas. As a result the demographics of migration have transformed 
significantly. Statistical evidence analysed shows that the two regions formed approximately 
three quarters of all foreign-nationality groups in Catalonia and Spain by 2011. European 
policy was a factor in these patterns – alongside Spanish regional preferences. 
 It might be said that the EU project has produced a “territorial paradox” over 
migration in Catalonia and Spain. This is partly due to its political integration being both 
partial and unequal. Inequality between core and periphery was illustrated vividly by the 
interview example of police chiefs in Brussels bypassing powerful Spanish ministers to direct 
border control. It is difficult to imagine such a direct intervention in a more powerful member 
state – such as Germany or France.)  
 It has been shown, nonetheless, that the EU is more than simply a hierarchical 
amalgam of states. It also has its own institutional structures, power and dynamics allowing it 
to act internally and externally in ways subject to less control by citizens and legal systems. 
This has allowed the EC institutions to evolve to play a notably instrumental role in the 
migratory field. As signalled by migration scholars, European integration have made possible 
interventions that likely would have encountered more resistance if carried out by national 
institutions. Schengen’s precursor (concretely an accord between France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) was described by Guiraudon as being based on the following progression,  
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[A] growing realisation of domestic legal and political constraints on immigration 
control capacity prompted these countries to seek new European level venues where 
co-operation could be insulated from these constraints. (Geddes, 2003: 130). 
 
More concretely, for Hollifield and Geddes the externalisation of border policing to “third-
party states” – including the creation of “buffer states” – allows taking the “burdens and 
dilemmas of control outside the jurisdiction of liberal states in Western Europe” – an effect 
further encouraged by outsourcing border enforcement to private security, defense and 
transport firms (Geddes, 2003: 127 & 8; Cetti, 2015).  
 These qualities combined with the relative power of a bloc representing a large 
segment of the world economy allow imposing authoritarian immigration policies on 
peripheral states outside and inside the EU – particularly those on its geographical edges. 
This can lead to intensified political “fudges” in countries such as Spain (or Greece) that 
criminalise rising numbers of migrants, undermine government legitimacy further, and 
encourage xenophobic local reactions (while humanitarian tragedies pile up at the border). 
“EU pressure” may also provide “useful ‘political cover’ for … officials already bent on a 
restrictionist immigration policy” – as Cornelius & Tsuda wrote on the Aznar administration 
(2004: 423). Together these conclusions point to the current model of EU integration being a 
key destabilising factor in migratory affairs in peripheral border states (although more 
research on the topic would need to be carried out to confirm this). 
 Yet neither irregularity paradoxes or contradictory attitudes to immigration started 
with the European Union and they also exist in extreme form in countries that are not 
subordinate partners in political unions – most notably in the USA. Accordingly it is likely that 
policy gaps are best seen as responding to both of the dynamics identified: the intra-state 
contradiction and the inter-state contradiction between EU core and periphery. Identifying 
the exact juncture and hierarchy between the two axes would again require future enquiry on 
the subject, which could be comparative or a more ambitious continental research project. 
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1
 In her own words “immigrants are useful as ‘Others’ who are willing to work, or are compelled to 
work, under conditions and for wages that locals now largely shun. The advantages of immigrants for 
these economies resides precisely in their Otherness. At the same time, that Otherness is the pivot on 
which backlashes against immigrants turn. For, if marginalized immigrant workers are useful in part 
because they are marked by illegality, poverty, and exclusion, this very marking, this highlighting of 
their difference, contributes to their distinction as a suspect population” (Calavita, 2005: 11 & 12). 
2
 This relative advantage is also awarded to nationals of the Philippines – anoth ex-Spanish colony. 
3
 In 2006 Ministry of the Interior figures found that this regional group made up 81.5 per cent of all 
foreigners that acquired Spanish nationality (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012: 117). This preferential 
treatment is guaranteed through a Citizenship Law developed from the 1889 Civil Code that gave 
citizenship to residents of Spain’s colonies and ex-colonies in Latin America and the Philippines (ibid).  
4
 He qualifies his support for Latino immigration by suggesting it should be of Spanish descendents 
(Carmona, García & Sánchez, 2012: 128 & 129) 
5
 A third of migrants in one survey said they had been encouraged to move to Spain due to the 
perception they later might gain regularisation through an amnesty (Cornelius, 2004). 
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Advisor for the Catalan government and participant in the Spain-wide Strategic Plan for 
Citizenship and Integration and various advisory forums 
Mr. R 
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24 May  
 
Ex-spokesperson for the Information Centre for the Foreign Worker (CITE) and ex-
participant in the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants  
Mr. M 
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6 June  
 
Academic researcher on Spanish policy and irregular migration  
Ms. B 
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14 June 
 
Elcano Royal Institute associate researcher and specialist on border policy and policymaking 
Ms. R 
Madrid 
21 June 
 
Senior Advisor for the Ministry of the Presidency of Spain and ex-consultant in the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs 
Ms. T 
Madrid 
22 June 
 
Spokesperson for the Social Forum for the Integration of Immigrants 
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Mr. V 
Madrid 
24 June 
 
National representative for the Workers’ Commissions union federation (CC.OO.) on the 
Economic and Social Council1 (CES) 
Ms. S 
 
Member of CC.OO.’s national legal office and specialist on immigration law. 
Mr. J 
Madrid 
18 July 
 
Head of international affairs for the National Confederation of Construction (CNC) 
employers’ association 
Ms. M 
Madrid 
18 July 
 
Representative of the Galician Trade Union Confederation (CIG) on the CES 
Mr. L 
Madrid 
20 July 
 
Spokesperson for the Spanish Business Confederation of Social Economy (CEPES) and 
representative on the CES 
Ms. C 
Madrid 
20 July 
 
Member of the executive for the Coordinating Committee for Agricultural and Livestock 
Farming Organisations (COAG) 
Mr. G 
Madrid 
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21 July 
 
Spokesperson for the Papers per a Tothom undocumented-migrants support network 
Mr. E 
Barcelona 
4 August 
 
Spokesperson for the Catalan anti-racist organisation SOS Racisme 
Ms. A 
Barcelona 
5 August 
 
Preliminary meetings held in 2010: 
 
Researcher in industrial relations and applied economics  
Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) 
2 June 2010 
 
Members of the Immigration and Minorities Research Group (GEDIM)  
UAB 
Barcelona 
14 June 2010 
 
Ms. B 
Barcelona 
15 June 2010 
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1
 This interview was very brief, as it was suggested that it would be more interesting to talk to 
someone with more of an immigration specialism. Nevertheless, some brief comments by the CES 
participant have been included in the interview findings. 
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Appendix 9.3 
 
Two edited interview transcripts (translated from Spanish) 
 
The transcripts included here are two almost complete recorded interviews. Questions  and 
answers have been edited to remove information that was not significant for the purposes of 
the study – a very minor part of the interviews. This was even the case when the direction of 
parts of the exchange was considerably influenced by the interviewee. Where any significant 
removal of content takes place, this is marked with a “(…)”. The transcript contains many 
summaries of the exact words enunciated in order to eliminate insignificant content. No 
indication is made where this takes place.  
 
 
9.3.1 Interview on Spanish border policymaking and practice 
 
The following transcript is of an interview with the Elcano Royal Institute associate 
researcher and specialist on border policy and policymaking (Ms. R). The interview took 
place on 21 June 2011 at Madrid’s King Juan Carlos University (Universidad Rey Carlos, 
URJC) and lasted for one hour eleven minutes. The guideline questions used included a 
strong focus on policymaking processes. The border-management specialist had performed 
comparative research on policy processes in Spain and Britain.  
 
Interviewer:  Who are the main actors participating in [immigration] policy processes? 
 
Ms. R: It depends a lot on the area. Integration is very different from – or much more 
open than – the area I have worked on: border control. In border control it is 
the European Union and the National Police that decide and organise, or that 
influence policy and what happens at every moment in Spain. It is not an area 
of decision-making that is open and in which many actors participate because 
those in charge of applying and managing policy are the National Police. 
 
I:  Then who determines border control policy? 
 
 
 
261 
 
MR: My impression is that it comes from below. All of the people I know in the 
National Police participate in all of the European Union meetings and work 
groups. What they do is observe what is being applied [in Europe] and 
develop it [in Spain] also. There are novel things that have been developed 
first in Spain such as the Integrated System of External Surveillance [SIVE 
according to its Spanish initials]. But [policy] is more than anything the product 
of the work carried out in the working groups in Brussels. These are the ones 
that provide the ideas and make sure that all proposals get to the top: to the 
Ministry, when a bill needs to be created, when a change needs to be made. 
Therefore everything that is done in border control comes from there. 
 
I:  So does the [Spanish] State decide policy? 
 
MR:  [Immigration] powers are the State’s, they are state-wide. 
 
I:  But the ideas often come from Brussels? 
 
MR:  Yes, because those people work in Brussels. I mean all of the high command 
of the National Police working on borders take part in the working groups in 
Brussels, those that have participated in creating the SIVE [Integrated System 
of External Surveillance] and the VIS [Visa Information System], in all of the 
technological systems, in everything that’s done in Brussels. They are the 
ones who say how things are heading, what the developments have been. 
And they often tell you that what most brings about fluidity and change is 
these exchanges: formal and informal contact with other European 
colleagues. When I did interviews for my thesis in 2004, almost everything 
already operated that way. (...) 
 
I: So the police have some weight when deciding control policies? 
 
MR: “I think so. It is basically them that decide. The other side [to decision-making] 
is the politicians. To what extent do they decide? Well, in the 2000 and 2004 
reforms, which were the last ones carried out by the Popular Party, there were 
politicians that liked to be in the papers and show their policies. One of those 
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that had most influence on policy was the Secretary of Immigration who was 
not an elected representative but a civil servant, and it was he who designed 
the last reform. In reality it is not the politicians that design policy. They might 
establish priorities at a certain time, for example ‘at the moment the priority is 
against illegal immigration’, that they will do. But to decide how to go on to do 
it, [there] are professional civil servants – in this case the Deputy Director 
General or members of the National Police itself. At the moment this works 
well. There are many coordination teams inside the Ministry. And this 
[Socialist] government has made some political appointments within the 
Ministry itself. It has created a new department – of International Policy if I am 
not mistaken – (...) [run by] a professional police officer – from the National 
Police. It’s just that they make him a political appointee so that he becomes 
the visible face. That’s why I say to you that in reality it is the National Police 
that directs and manages [things] in [the Ministry of] Interior.”   
 
I:  Could you tell me more about the working groups in Brussels? 
 
MR:  Each of the [EU] treaties reformulates what the working groups are: the group 
of article 7, or article 36. Work groups are set up when priorities are 
established: now for example with the European Pact 1  or the Stockholm 
Programme2, which is in effect now. The priority work areas are identified and 
within them working groups are set up, which comprise of all EU member 
countries plus invited countries: those in the process of joining the EU (such 
as the Eastern European countries, which were guests in the working groups 
for many years). There are specific work groups in all areas: visas, border 
control, for the SIS [Schengen Information System3]. There are groups for 
everything. As well, there are forums of (for example) FRONTEX focal points4. 
[In Spain] the person [involved] is Andrés Montero. These [groups] also meet 
periodically. Most public servants have a working group meeting with all of 
their European colleagues at least once a month, at the very least every three 
months. These are the formal groups. But, also, many parallel working 
networks have been set up. Many international conferences are held to which 
experts from each country go – [something that] didn’t used to take place in 
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Spain. These are the main networks through which a public servant acquires 
information about what needs to be applied and how. 
 
I: What are processes like in other fields of immigration policy – for example 
migrant labour? 
 
MR:  I think it operates very very differently. The Interior area is very closed. I study 
policy powers in this field. I understand, however, that in fields such as the 
labour market, there are many more actors involved in policy-making. There, 
different immigrants’ associations participate, such as that of Ecuadorians in 
Spain. I think the field is more open and Ministers meet more regularly. More 
than anything this is because there are much more interests at stake. Interior 
is a very different field. Interior is closed in all ways. However, in other areas 
such as Integration and Labour I think there is a lot more participation by 
associations (...) I think [they are] much more open. Also because of the 
people that are working in the ministries, such as (...) the [Immigration] 
Secretary, who is Ana Terrón i Cusí who was in Brussels for many years and 
has a much more open mentality and way of working than in other fields. 
 
I:  How are political advisors chosen? Are they chosen simply by the acting 
Minister at the time? Is there are more fixed system? 
 
MR:  Basically yes [they are chosen by the acting Minister]. But bear in mind that in 
Spain there are appointed political positions and there are civil servants. They 
tend to be civil servants up until [the rank of] Deputy Director General (DDG). 
However they also tend to be civil servants aligned to the party in office. 
 
I:  So they change with the government? 
 
MR:   Right. (...) They are professional public servants. They may have worked for 
many years in the Ministry, many years working on these topics. But it is 
accepted that both they and the people [following them] should be politically 
aligned [with the Minister].  
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I:  So the government simply appoints new civil servants? 
 
MR:  [Breathes in deeply]. You can make changes. But the civil servant has a 
certain level and seniority. You can tell the other person to move to a job of a 
similar category and wage somewhere else. 
 
I:  Does this happen a lot? 
 
MR:  Yes [emphatically]. It’s a very different way of operating than for example in 
the UK. It doesn’t compare hardly (...) Then you have the political positions, 
which are normally [those of] the Director Generals. They are politicians – 
they shouldn’t be civil servants. Above [them] you have Ministers. These have 
advisors. (...)    
 
I:  Do they only have one adviser? 
 
MR:  Generally they would have more than one. Finally, you also have the Moncloa 
[presidency]’s advisers. (...) Normally at the top rank of the civil service is the 
Deputy General Director and these are people [politically] aligned to the 
government. Even though they are professional civil servants, they have 
normally been appointed to this political post by the government.  
 
I:  Have there been changes to the policy/political processes in relation to 
immigration?5  
 
MR:  In the area of border control I would say no. Restructuring has taken place 
that could be seen as substantial: for example managing immigration at 
ministerial level – as opposed to at that of deputy general director or 
equivalent. When the PSOE won the last elections, immigration was let’s say 
promoted in [administrative] rank. From around 2000 immigration became 
separated from Interior and Justice and incorporated into Labour and Social 
Affairs. That was the general perspective. But Interior’s [immigration] powers 
stayed with the ministry. [The responsibility for] explaining immigration issues 
to citizens changed ministry, but powers not that much. What has improved, in 
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my opinion, is the coordination between the different actors with a role in 
[immigration] policy: better coordination between the Autonomous 
Communities by bringing them together in a Political Council; and forums with 
participation by civil society. Work has been done on increasing participation. I 
also think there has been a change of mentality with regards to Europe. (...) At 
first, Europe was treated warily: “I want to do my policy. I’m in charge of my 
borders, and it’s fine if Europe makes its own policies but ultimately I decide”. 
This viewpoint has changed. Spain has been much more pro-European for 
some years. 
 
I:  How do employers participate in processes? 
 
MR:  In the areas that I know about, not at all. You would have to look at the 
Labour area. 
 
I:  Even in cases in which border control affects labour mobility? 
 
MR:  As far as I know, there has not been an open discussion about this in Spain. 
At least I’ve not heard it raised in Interior. (...) My perception is that there has 
not been demand for this by employers. (...) 
 
I:  You mention in a study that public servants influenced policy between 2000 
and 2004. Could you go into more details? 
 
MR:  (...) There was a period when they changed political appointees greatly. We 
are now in a period of crisis when the situation of immigrants is not discussed. 
However, in 2000-2004 it was constantly talked about by the Aznar 
government.  There was what we could call an alarmist discourse towards 
immigration. Immigrants were always in the news. They were treated as a 
danger in certain sectors. Immigration was a big political issue. There were 
big changes at the top of politics. Fernández Miranda was made DDG for 
immigration, and then Ignacio González (...) These were people who did not 
have any experience in working with immigration. They were party people. 
Fernández Miranda was a businessman with PP connections. They were 
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[given the job] because they had the party’s discourse but in fact they didn’t 
know anything about the immigration issue. They knew how to spin the 
government’s priorities, but they didn’t know how things were done. They had 
a DDG who designed everything they asked for – the person I spoke to you 
about. This is the consensus view of how things worked. (...) [The DDG] was 
the person organising all immigration policy. In those years he was the only 
person you could talk to about policy. All of the government representatives 
repeated the same discourse you found in the press. They couldn’t explain 
how things were done. (...) 
 
I:  How would you characterise the relationships between the different 
government departments that deal with immigration? Has it been based on 
agreement or conflict? 
 
GM:  There has been a bit of everything. In the 2000-2004 period the person that 
centralised all [immigration] administration because all powers were there. 
Once powers were moved to [the Ministry of] Labour there were conflicts over 
who had what power. The last Minister Consuelo Rumí did a great deal to 
have informal [consultation] meetings. Those with a particular responsibility 
had to go to every formal meeting in Brussels on that subject: even let’s say 
on the latest on contracts for temporary workers. It’s good to coordinate with 
[other Europeans]. I think this has helped avoid too many frictions arising. 
There were some frictions particularly when powers were transferred from one 
ministry to another. I don’t know whether it is a question of culture but different 
border police forces (the National Police, the Civil Guard) have had to learn to 
work together despite each having their own [jurisdiction].  
 
I:  Did they not used to manage to agree? 
 
MR:  Right, or they have to get to agree bit by bit. The Civil Guard has the border 
control management role. The National Police is in all of the equipped 
immigration stations: land, air and sea. But where there is not a station, it is 
the Civil Guard’s jurisdiction; and in stations the National Police is responsible 
for controlling persons and the Civil Guard, goods. Zapatero at one point 
 
 
267 
 
proposed creating a Spanish border agency (like there is in the UK) to 
oversee matters and centralise powers, but dropped the idea and didn’t 
mention it again. I think that coordination should be compulsory. I am aware 
that informally there has been an effort to work in such a way in the PSOE 
governments. When Marta Rodriguez Tarduchy [Director General of 
Immigration] moved to the Ministry of Labour professional police officers also 
moved [with her]. They are people that have worked well together. (...)Good 
coordination, sharing political affinity is important and that explains the many 
changes that occur in the civil service when the government changes.  
 
I:  What role does the Police General Directorate play in processes? 
 
MR:  An important one. Inside the State Secretariat for Security is the Police 
General Sub-Directorate which is made up of the Civil Guard and the National 
Police. There is another General Directorate that I think was created after the 
2006 “small boat crisis”. This was pretty much a political leadership in a period 
in which bilateral agreements were sought with African countries where they 
didn’t exist. The International Relations General Directorate had a 
fundamentally political role: bilateral, international relations. These people are 
those that coordinate and organise almost anything related to Interior. The 
other bodies are responsible for applying and supporting what is decided by 
the Directorate. 
 
I:  Who and what is the General Directorate made up of? 
 
MR:  At the moment there are two special areas. The International Police 
Cooperation Sub-Directorate manages all [international and national] police 
cooperation in all fields – including immigration. Then you have the other 
specific sub-directorate for immigration. (...) One Deputy-Director is a 
policeman, but another is a politician. (...) There are civil servants in the sub-
directorates. We met with three6. There are not much more of them. (...) We 
met with the Deputy Director and all of the people that accompany him to 
Brussels [working on] mafias and all kinds of things. [The Deputy Director’s] 
work is to coordinate who is the person responsible for going to this, who for 
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the other, who is interested. Work is done much better han some years ago 
because there is a central person who knows what to do and who should do 
it. 
 
[...] 
 
I:  Why do you think there is so much irregular immigration in Spain? 
 
MR: There are many different views on this: there are those who say that controls 
aren’t working properly, those that say that the territory is difficult to control. 
But basically it is because there is irregular work [available] and this is not 
[seen as] a problem. There is no culture or morality that prevents hiring 
someone irregularly. It is [seen as] the most normal thing. Southern Europe is 
very different in this regard than most northern European countries – the 
scandals that emerge occasionally in the UK because someone hired an 
irregular carer. Everybody has an irregular migrant hired. Well, maybe not 
everybody but… Requirements [to regularise] have changed a lot compared 
to a few years back. Now it’s very difficult for someone looking after children 
or cleaning houses. Before she could add together work hours in different 
jobs to be able to claim social security. Now, you are required to have a single 
employer – with a certain amount of earnings. Most people can’t comply with 
the complicated law but need someone to pick up their children from school. 
Most would never ask if the migrant is documented. This attitude is pervasive. 
If someone comes to mend your blinds, for instance, they ask whether you 
want an invoice or not, whether you want to include VAT or not. This is not a 
feature only of immigration. It exists in all fields. (…) 
 
I: Because of bilateral agreements with countries such as Morocco, Spain is 
able to repatriate irregular migrants, but I think 80 per cent of immigration into 
Spain is through airports and visa overstays and there seems little response 
towards this. And there are Africans intercepted on the southern border that 
are later released in Spanish cities, are there not? 
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MR: Everyone that enters through Morocco can be returned to Morocco. That’s the 
simplest case. There are other things that are more or less difficult, more or 
less expensive, or that require more or less legal paperwork. What is the least 
demanding is to return people at an airport. I think that the controls currently 
being carried out in airports of international flights direct to Spain are the most 
exhaustive around – flights from Brazil or other Latin American countries. 
What do you do there? If you identify people within a certain timeframe, the 
airlines are responsible and they must take them back.  
 
L: Could you clarify the point about airlines? 
 
MR: If you as an airline let someone in without the due documentation, and you at 
the border see that there is not this documentation, the airline must take the 
person back. What does that cost the Spanish state? Nothing. 
 
L: For someone that does not have a visa? 
 
MR:  Right.  
 
I:  But there are people that are documented but decide to stay longer… 
 
MR: What is the problem? You don’t have control measures. You know that this 
person entered on this date, but you don’t know where they are [now]. You 
would have to find police officers to search for the person. You know they had 
a 3-month visa, but you hadn’t recorded when they entered and when the visa 
expired. I think in the UK you keep this information, but here the information is 
not kept. Here you only know that the person had a valid visa and that she 
entered the country. For that reason I’m saying you have no way of controlling 
the person. So depending on the area, there are things that are easier to 
control and things that are not. 
 
I:  What about the African migrants that are intercepted? 
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MR: Wait a moment, you asked me about readmission agreements before. (…) 
From 2007 to 2009 many readmission agreements were signed, but before 
then there were very few readmission agreements. There were very few 
people that if you didn’t demonstrate that they had come through a country 
with which you had an admission agreement, you could not send them 
anywhere, and you did not have centres to detain them in either. You had to 
put them on the street. That’s why I say it depends on the situation because if 
in 48 hours you couldn’t show that this person was from a certain country you 
could not detain them further.  
 
I: I suppose my question is whether the permeability of the Southern border… 
 
MR: What?... 
 
I: … is simply due to not having applied a system like in other countries to 
control entry or whether there has been an undeclared permissive attitude 
due to the need for labour earlier? This is a question I ask myself: whether the 
failure to control is accidental. 
 
MR: I reckon that both things are happening. On the basis of what I know about 
the National Police force its attitude is, it’s true that in terms of enforcement, 
they have never had clear guidelines on looking for migrants, identifying them 
and deporting them. During a very short space of time with the PP [in 
government] they did, in 2004. If you ask them, they say, “Look, we have 
limited resources and our main role is to arrest criminals and not irregular 
immigrants. If I have to decide on where to put resources, I will put it into the 
first thing and not the other”. 
 
I: The police no longer check documents in the street? 
 
MR: They have done it for very short spaces of time. 
 
I:  I remember it happening a lot – in the centre of Barcelona. 
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MR: I was told that this only happened when [the police] suspected that the person 
was involved in some other [criminal] activity. In Madrid, for example, in most 
local areas I was told “If you think the person is involved in this, if they go to 
the same square every day, and you think they are involved in some kind of 
trafficking, you ask to see their papers”. I have always been told that they 
have other priorities. It’s a question of mentality. The policeman tells me, “If 
the only thing they are doing is working illegally then we all earn a bit on the 
side on something”7. […] And there are police that have a job on the side. 
That’s why I say mentality is everything. From time to time there are 
instructions to arrest illegal immigrants. Two years ago in the Madrid region 
police stations were instructed to bring in a certain amount of undocumented 
immigrants per month … Economically it doesn’t make sense to chase people 
because the only thing you end up doing is starting up an expulsion 
procedure. The person is not detained. They are in the street. When you 
begin a procedure you have to look for the person in the street, try and locate 
them. That’s why I say it has never been a priority throwing out people 
located inside the territory.  
 
I: Didn’t you say that for a time the Popular Party government was… 
 
MR: Sometimes there are guidelines of this kind.  
 
MR: Are we talking about throughout the period of the Aznar administration? 
 
I: I think his policy was more hard-line from 2000 to 2004. That was the period 
in which these kind of issues were most discussed. […] But a year or two ago 
it was published in the news in Madrid that the police stations in Madrid had 
been given objectives regarding how many irregular immigrants had to be 
identified and arrested each month. But I think that now migrant people that 
are undocumented are not feeling the harassment and pressure that they felt 
in those years, when they could be arrested leaving the underground… (…) 
Another criticism has been that there are no workplace inspections. Another 
complaint made by the police is, “Why should I have to look for irregular 
immigrants when [the Ministry of] Labour can also do this – through 
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workplace inspections. Why should I have to stop people on the tube when 
their people could go to the factories and workplaces.” (…)
                                                        
1
 This appears to be the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ajl0038)  
2 
The Stockholm Programme sets out the EU’s priorities on justice, freedom, security and citizenship – 
replacing the earlier Tampere and Hague programmes (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Ajl0034)  
3
 This is the EU’s database used for border control (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system/index_en.htm) 
4
 FRONTEX is the European Agency for Border Management. 
5
 There was a significant misunderstanding in the interview here. The aim of the question was to ask 
about policymaking. Unfortunately the Spanish word for “policy” (“política”) can also mean “politics”. 
The interviewee answered focusing on the ministerial organisation of immigration and relations with 
the EU. Because some of the information offered was of interest, I opted to not interrupt the response 
and to ask more-concrete questions about policymaking processes afterwards. 
6
 The interview is clearly referring to research performed in the Ministry of the Interior. Her use of the 
third person plural may refer to group research performed with immigration officials.  
7
 “Sobresueldo en algo” could also be translated as “bonus in something” but the meaning seems 
clear from context. 
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Appendix 9.3.2 Interview with union specialist on migration  
 
Interview with an advisor in the central legal team of the Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) 
union federation and specialist in immigration matters. The interview was performed at 
CC.OO.’s central headquarters in Madrid on 18 July 2011, and lasted one hour seventeen 
minutes. 
 
(…) 
 
Interviewer: In 2000 there was a lot of political discussion about the Immigration 
legislation. Could you explain more about the background to the [Economic 
and Social Council] report that became a framework for later legislation? 
 
Mr. J: (…) The unions and employers had reached an agreement that immigration in 
Spain is a labour matter. Accordingly it should be managed as a social and 
labour issue by the social partners themselves – meaning the unions and 
employers’ representatives. The [2000] Economic and Social Council (CES) 
report created the basis for deciding how and through which mechanisms 
labour migration should be managed in Spain: through channelling migratory 
flows, introducing efficient management mechanisms, identifying the national 
employment situation. “Are foreigners going to come?” “Yes.” “Are they 
needed in the economy?” “Yes.” “Is immigration going to be tailored towards 
the needs of the economy, towards labour market needs?” And then there is 
another aspect which is crucial to the Spain. You know that that the Spanish 
system produced irregularity? The CES report says “we must establish 
mechanisms to occasionally remove people from irregularity through what are 
called rootedness mechanisms” – processes of individualised regularisation”.  
 
I: Was rootedness not introduced later? 
  
MJ: Rootedness is introduced into laws later, particularly in the 2001 regulations. 
The CES sets forth that it is necessary to establish legal mechanisms to 
rescue people from irregularity to avoid situations of social exclusion and 
super-exploitation at work and even social dumping between employers.  
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I: There was a lot of irregularity after 2001, was there not? 
 
MJ: Always. In Spain there has always been irregularity. You should see how 
many extraordinary regularisations there have been. The 4/2000 Law started 
a regularisation process. The PP government opposed the Law but because it 
was a minority government it had to accept it. It was the first and last time 
they lost a vote in government, on 22 September 1999. The PP won a 
majority in the General Elections in March and modified the 4/2000 Law, but 
first it had to administer the Law that it hadn’t passed. The PP applied the law 
very strictly. As a result, the regularisation failed and to such an extent that 
the government was forced to review the rejected cases in what we call the 
“resit”1. The government realised that it had been so strict due to its lack of 
belief in the regularisation mechanism that the regularisation process ended 
up being laughable. It was the professional administrators who put 
themselves forward to review all of the cases rejected in order to rescue the 
regularisation.  
 
I: The decision to hold a new regularisation process had nothing to do with the 
protests by immigrants in that period? 
 
MJ: The mobilisations came later. There was another event first. There was an 
accident in Murcia in 2001, when a train collided with a van of Ecuadorian 
immigrant workers. The PP government then did a selective process, 
exclusively for Ecuadorians – also in 2001. And the famous rootedness 
procedure was introduced then but without having any legal procedure in 
place behind it. Rajoy announced after a cabinet meeting that it would cover 
all of the foreigners that could show they had been in the country before a 
certain date. Irregularity is a classic feature of the Spanish immigration model, 
unfortunately. And it has accompanied us in all of the processes. 
 
I: Do you understand irregularity to be coincidental or is something almost 
structural in Spain? 
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MJ: Irregularity is linked to the size of the underground economy. CC.OO.’s stance 
is not so much to link irregularity with immigration, but associate irregularity 
with the underground economy. So if we attack the underground economy, we 
would end irregularity. That is why we help break the link between the 
underground economy and not just to immigration but in employment in 
general. (…) The foreign workers come to Spain because they knows that 
they will get work – regular or irregular. In other countries around us, maybe 
this is not so because they have greater control mechanisms (…)  
 
I: Is this still so with the crisis? 
 
MJ: The other day the OECD produced a report pointing out that foreigners are 
still coming here. Why? It’s logical because migratory projects take a long 
time to gestate. When I arrive in Spain it is after developing a project I decided 
on three years ago. If Spain is now in crisis, that’s not going to stop my 
migratory project. There is an inertia that made me come to Spain. My hopes 
are tied up in the idea. Spain is in crisis? What a shame, but I’m going to go 
ahead. I began my process a while ago. People think that migratory 
processes are spontaneous and ‘off the cuff’. That’s not so. We see it a lot 
with the Libyan case. Because of the Libyan crisis lots of new immigrants are 
arriving in Lampedusa?2 No. The country was acting as a buffer, which was 
handy for the EU, because it could hold back people that had come from 
elsewhere some time back. And it is those people that were already in Libya 
that are now continuing their journey to Europe. It’s not that they are setting 
off as a consequence of the Libyan crisis. They had decided to leave a long 
time before. There are Libyans, Sub-Saharans, Algerians, and Tunisians. 
There are frivolous views about migration that treats migration as 
spontaneous. It is not, and people weigh up the pros and cons of migrating 
when they begin the migratory project. (…) 
 
I: In the Spanish case do you think that the continuation of migration responds 
to previous immigration by family networks? Or is because people hope to 
gain employment – for example in the underground sector? Or it is both? 
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MJ: Before we were in the first phase of the process, which is the arrival of 
individuals. Individuals come seeking work. Immigration is huge and is 
massively labour migration. The figures show that migrants make up 12 per 
cent of the population registered with the local authorities. But migrants make 
up 10 per cent of all social-security contributors.  
 
I: Is there a figure for how many migrants are documented? 
 
MJ: No. That’s the million-dollar question. It will never be possible to find out. 
 
I: Why not?... 
 
Mj: The data from the “padrón” [municipal record on inhabitants] is blurry – not 
exact because it includes people living here or who lived here and have left. 
There can be duplications: people that have registered in two different towns. 
Town Halls are interested in keeping them on the register because it helps 
them receive grants from the central authorities, etc. People might have 
returned to their country, or gone to another EU country. People may have 
died. The padrón gives you an insight but not an exact one. Social-security 
contribution is, however, an exact indicator. And if they are registered with the 
Social Security, they are regular.  
 
I: Any idea of what proportion of migrants pay social security contributions? 
 
The vast majority of immigrants are wage earners. The Spanish model has 
been to attract wage earners. We didn’t want self-employed or professional 
persons. There has been a shift in this regard as a result of the crisis, 
particularly in construction, with immigrants starting up their own small 
refurbishment businesses when they lost their job. In the first phase 
individuals arrived clearly looking for a job. Now we are in the second phase 
in which these individuals bring their families or create a family here. Here the 
migratory mechanism is not going to be work but family reunification. The new 
regulations that came into effect on the 30th April regulate this [matter] in a 
much more sophisticated way. This is important because, like in other 
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European countries, now it is likely that the biggest source of entry will be 
through family reunification: not because labour migration has been 
consolidated but because we are in crisis. (…) The third phase that will be 
crucial is that these families will form communities and there we are talking 
about integration. This is already happening: in the ACs with a large 
[immigrant] population – Madrid and Catalonia – communities are already 
forming: in Madrid, Ecuadorean and Romanian; in Barcelona, Pakistani 
communities. Bear in mind that immigration in Spain is very [geographically] 
asymmetrical.  
 
I: … Does the fact that the reunification stage coincides with the crisis lead to 
any tensions? I understand that reunification was a controversial subject 
during the recent reform of the Aliens Law. 
 
MJ: That’s quite right. I’d like to say that for Comisiones Obreras, family 
reunification is a fundamental right, because article 36 of our constitution talks 
about how public powers shall promote the social, political and economic 
protection of “the family”. It doesn’t say “the Spanish family”; it says “the 
family” -in general. Article 36 is not a fundamental right. It is one of the so-
called “guiding principles” of the Spanish economy but not a fundamental 
right. But article 36 cannot be understood without article 18, which is a 
fundamental right and states that all persons have the right to privacy and a 
family life. So for us, reunification is a fundamental right. And, nearly as 
important, it is a fundamental factor in integration. So for us its importance is 
very clear. That said, we feel that the PSOE government made the following 
mistakes in its 2009 legislation. Firstly, it took a long time – four years – after 
taking office before it reformed the Aliens’ law. Work started on the new law in 
2008. A long time! Even though it had taken the previous law (8/2000) still in 
effect to the Court of Appeal. There is a bit of a contradiction there. 
 
I: Why did it appeal against the 8/2000 Law? 
 
MJ: Because it understood that the law was anti-constitutional…  
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I: Why? 
 
MJ: Because if ignored fundamental rights. In Spain we have had several laws 
[draws a pyramid]. We’ve had only two proper [Aliens’] Laws, because all of 
these are reforms of this Law [4/2000]. This law was the famous progressive 
and pro-integration law that lasted a few months until the PP won a [majority] 
in the elections and returned to the spirit of the 85 Law: a repressive police-
based law. What the 8/2000 Law does is establish between two types of 
foreigner: regular and irregular, and fundamental rights are only to be enjoyed 
by regular. The lack of constitutionality of this was obvious because the 
ombudsman had [successfully] appealed against this in 87, a decision in 
which the Constitutional Court confirmed that foreigners also enjoyed basic 
freedoms. 
 
I:  Is it possible that the second 2008 law also was a response to the strike in El 
Ejido? 
 
MJ: No because the El Ejido catastrophe took place in January 2000. And the 
4/2000 Law came into effect in February. I don’t think [El Ejido] was so 
relevant. At that time Spain wasn’t really a country of immigration. It started 
becoming country of immigration in 2002, when the Ecuadorian model was 
consolidated. Nearly 500,000 Ecuadorians came to Spain in those two years. 
There still wasn’t a migratory pressure. In the summer of 2000, the 
government, in order to justify changing a Fundamental Law –  which is 
important because it provides the basis for fundamental rights – filled the 
television news with images of immigrants arriving in “pateras” (small boats). 
The image of the small boat arriving began in the summer of 2000. The 
government was preparing public opinion in order to introduce the new law.  
 
I:  On state TV? 
 
MJ: On all of the channels. … The patera has never been the way of reaching 
Spain. It is a mere anecdote in terms of migration into Spain…  
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I: There are more immigrants arriving through airports… 
 
MJ: Right, Barajas (airport). So at that point I don’t think either the violence or the 
wildcat strikes in El Ejido was important in terms of the Law introduced. I call 
them wildcat strikes because [unclear].  
 
I: Obviously much of the immigration coming through airports is Latin 
American… 
 
MJ: Basically yes… 
 
I: Do you think there is interest in encouraging immigration from certain regions 
before others? Or is this not so? I’m asking because sometimes the view is 
shared that Latin Americans have a culture closer to ours… 
 
MJ: At a certain point in time, under the Aznar governments, a choice was made 
to focus on Latin American migrants instead of the traditional labour group 
brought here: Moroccans. This was when relations with Morocco got harder – 
the dispute over Parsley island3 –  and Morocco holds a lot of keys that affect 
us a great deal: among them control of clandestine immigration via patera. An 
image was created in which the Latin American immigrant was better than the 
African immigrant, which is a lie. However from a labour-market point of view 
Latino migrants did at that time offer a big advantage: they were totally new to 
the Spanish job market. They didn’t know the market or mechanisms, 
whereas the Moroccan immigrant, who was the first to reach Spain, already 
knew about collective agreements, unions, wage demands, industrial 
arbitration. The Latin American was totally new to these things. Their arrival 
was was justified according to certain parameters: religion, culture, language. 
The Latin American immigrant is easier immigrant for our society. (…) As a 
parenthesis, they tell us that the Spanish worker has no mobility. However in 
recent years thousands of Spaniards have done grape harvesting in Bordeaux 
(…) and gone to pick tulips and fresh flowers in Holland. How come a farm 
labourer goes from Granada to Holland but not to Huelva to pick 
strawberries? People are mobile when there is an incentive, where there are 
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good working conditions, where there is good knowledge of labour conditions. 
End of parenthesis. The first to come to do agricultural harvesting was the 
Moroccan, with a lot more in common with the Spanish worker than us 
Spaniards wish to recognise: the same idiosyncrasies, the same farming 
culture in certain segments, the same resistance to weather conditions, which 
are very similar, similar gastronomy even, and living only fourteen kilometres 
away. They represent our natural immigrant worker. What happened, 
however, was that the Moroccan immigrant became perceived as a ‘veteran’. 
They create their immigrants’ associations, their social networks, association 
networks, they join a union. Hundreds of our advisors in CITE are Moroccan 
and they are the most veteran.  
 
I: How many immigrants are there in CCOO? Are there figures on the different 
nationalities in the federation? 
 
MJ: We don’t have information on different nationalities. We have 1.2 million 
members, of which 6 per cent are foreigners. We are the Spanish 
organisation with the biggest number of foreign members. 
 
I: Are they normally organised through CITE? 
 
MJ: No. CITE is a specific union instrument for a new union scenario. Its initials 
stand for “Centro de Información para el Trabajador Extranjero” [Information 
Centre for the Foreign Worker]. CITE deals with issues related to the ‘e’ for 
‘extranjero’ [foreigner]. If the foreign worker – regular or irregular, member or 
non-member – comes with a labour problem, related to their payslips, the 
issue will be dealt with by the federation in the corresponding area of 
[economic] activity.  
 
I: Has that always been so? 
 
MJ: Yes, always. CITE is an instrument related to alien status: papers, residence, 
regularisations, deportations, family reunification, nationality, naturalisation, 
administration, training, information and advice in aliens’ issues. If the worker 
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has a problem with their payslip or not being paid overtime, and there is a 
recognised labour relationship, they have to go the branch of their economic 
area of activity. (…) We understand that the foreign worker is more vulnerable 
because their legal status conditions their labour status. (…) I was 
saying about the strawberry harvesting season. For this they started bringing 
in Ecuadorians. They said that they have the same culture, language, even 
that they are catholic. This is a unique aspect of Spain where exploitation has 
always been done to [other] catholics. It’s curious that religion is a factor that 
aids exploitation! The Aznar government signed a series of bilateral labour-
migration agreements with countries that are “naturally” providers of 
immigration: first, with Morocco, and then agreements  were signed with 
countries in the Americas… 
 
I: Did these bilateral agreements involve a series of issues – not just 
immigration? 
 
MJ: You have two types: those including everything or the poor type. You can 
have labour migration agreements which incorporate labour management but 
also admitting deportees. And you have the poor agreements, which is what 
have been signed with the black countries -African countries. These are 
repatriation agreements and only include the bad aspects. They say you take 
the foreigners which I understand are yours, and no problems are raised… 
 
I: Do the agreements not include labour quotas? 
 
MJ: No, these are for repatriation – of irregular migrants, of the deported. I send 
you back the immigrants I intercept in small boats or dinghies. There are no 
quotas agreed on or anything.  
 
I: What do the African countries get in return? 
 
MJ: They get cooperation and development aid. 
 
I: Is that part included in the agreement? 
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MJ: No, no, that is negotiated elsewhere. Bear in mind that Spain could not 
navegate in Africa. It has no consulates in much of it. Our consulates are 
spread out in Latin America, in particular, and North Africa. Black-African 
migration in small boats begins – but of an insignificant size. There are hardly 
any blacks in Spain. If you look at the statistics there is hardly any black 
population in Spain. But the image of the dinghy creates concerns, or it forces 
us to be concerned, rather.  One of the first measures carried out by [PSOE 
Foreign Minister] Moratinos was to create consular links in black Africa in 
order to establish surveillance points, and to obtain controls. They say that if 
you control your citizens, you will be able to access Cooperation and 
Development Aid. It is never put into writing as such. It discourages states 
from recognising that a person is their national subject if they are suspected to 
be such. Obviously if I do that I would expect to receive something in 
exchange. 
 
I: With Morocco are agreements on border control included within wider bilateral 
agreements on fishing rights and other aspects? 
 
MJ: That I don’t know about. It could be the case. When Morocco gets annoyed 
with Spain it drops its obligation to accept those that have been expelled or 
returned – which has been a problem for Spain. When Morocco is angry with 
Spain, it stops controlling its coasts, and that is a problem for Spain. We are 
therefore indispensable neighbours to each other. By the time Spain had 
signed agreements in Sub-Saharan Africa, it had already signed agreements 
with Morocco, first, and then the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Colombia. 
Agreements were signed with Poland and Bulgaria but these are not part of 
the EU. They are about to announce new agreements with African countries; 
probably Senegal and the Ivory Coast, but these have not been published. 
Some of these agreements have been concluded – such as with the 
Dominican Republic. At one point Ecuadorian immigration was promoted, and 
this was justified on the basis that it was an easier population for the labour 
market. No, it is a more inexperienced population with less social abilities for a 
labour market they don’t know about. They come conditioned by having to 
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borrow money in Ecuador to finance their migration project. Later, strawberry 
producers started requesting ‘polacas’ [Polish women], not ‘polacos’ [Polish 
men or Poles in general]. The supposed shared language, culture and religion 
of Ecuadorians was forgotten, because the polacas are European. We are 
talking about a process of substitution by a more contingent, greener and 
more exploitable labour force. 
 
(…) 
 
I: In Catalonia I have heard the opinion that Latin American migrants have been 
given a preference because they are native Spanish speakers and thus less 
likely to want to speak Catalan. Do you think such preferences could explain 
the recruitment policies of the central State? 
 
MJ: No, this is not the case. Not at all.  
 
I: I’m not saying it is my view… 
 
MJ: Because if we talk about the ability to integrate, which myself and CC.OO. 
don’t believe in, it could be said that people from other regions are not 
catholic, which would be a disadvantage, unlike the Latin American population 
which is strongly catholic. If you start from the premise that religion helps 
integration, which personally I don’t share, then Latin Americans would be 
seen as a less conflictive social group, because there is no building of 
mosques, for the clothing worn, because of discrimination against women that 
could supposedly take place. The Latin American community, although it is 
Spanish speaking, has shared cultural characteristics. But we don’t share the 
discourse described. 
 
I: What do you think have been the successes in immigration policy in recent 
years? 
 
MJ: To answer this question we are assuming that there has been an immigration 
policy. You are assuming that there have been immigration policies. (…) If by 
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policy we mean an analysis of the social situation, setting action objectives in 
relation to this reality, and providing the means to satisfy these goals, in Spain 
there has not been an immigration policy. This process has not been carried 
out.  
 
I: Not even with the current government? 
 
MJ: Of course there was a change after 2004, and it was fundamentally because 
of the new model of social dialogue introduced regarding immigration matters. 
 
I: What was that new model? 
 
MJ: You have Tripartite social dialogue, involving government, employers and 
unions, in which social and labour issues are dealt with (…). When Rodríguez 
Zapatero won the elections in 2004 his government reactivated social 
dialogue. Social dialogue is all well and good, and had taken place previously, 
but its success depends on the will for it in the government and the culture of 
dialogue that [the government] has. We have had governments uninterested 
in social dialogue. They give it token importance. In 2004 Zapatero created a 
national Round Table for Social Dialogue on labour-related issues with 
specific round tables on labour-market reform, discussions on Social Security, 
on pensions, and one on immigration. The round table on immigration 
produced Royal Decree 2000/393 that develops the Aliens Law, which was 
passed by consensus between the government, employers and the unions. 
The government even allowed taking the reform to Parliament, which it didn’t 
have to do, and all of the [parliamentary] groups voted in favour of it. The 
government was able to brag that it had enjoyed full backing to manage flows, 
thereby creating the basis for a policy.  
 
I: Are there never disagreements between employers and unions on 
[immigration] issues? 
 
MJ: Yes, of course. There is a class tension, which is logical and acceptable, let’s 
not kid ourselves, between the employers’ goal of increasing the labour 
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supply in order to be able to regulate working conditions more. As an 
employer I am always going to want to have available a larger stock of 
workers than I really need. This is common sense. It’s market economics. And 
there is tension from the unions that believe that immigrant workers [are 
needed], of course, but only those that are required by the labour market – in 
order to avoid substitutions. 
 
I: You were saying before that family rights were important also… 
  
MJ: Careful. Family reunification is not a labour route [of entry]. This is important 
because today some governments and some discourses maintain that family 
reunification should be treated as being the labour route. No. (…) There has 
even been talk of introducing a yearly quota for family reunification. If we had 
that, and there were not jobs, you would not be able to bring your child here. 
The Popular Party, if it gets back in office, could try to apply this.  
 
I: This is not the position of employers’ associations? 
 
MJ:  [Long pause]. Not in those terms. But in the 2009 reform of the Aliens’ Law 
carried out by the PSOE, employers managed to restrict reunification of 
parents, not children, which is a farce because grandparents don’t come to 
Spain, and have never done so. It was a message aimed at public opinion 
that we are going to stop reunification. During the negotiations on regulation 
employers did have a tougher stance regarding some requirements for 
reunification. It was our understanding they should be more flexible to aid the 
wellbeing of the foreigner. Employers were tougher and more unambiguous. 
The current regulations were approved by consensus. They came into effect 
on 30 June (Royal Decree 7.7/2011) and are just being tested out. […] They 
regulate everything!   
 
I: You mentioned that the government had acted [over reunification] based on 
public opinion. How would you describe the evolution of public opinion 
towards migrant labour? 
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MJ: Lorenzo Cachón [of the Permanent Observatory for Immigration] developed 
an interesting thesis. He said that the Spanish model of alien affairs was 
“ISA”: Irregularity – as an essential component of our model; Segmentation – 
in different jobs but also socially between Spaniards and immigrants and 
between regular and irregular immigrants; and “anti-pedagogy” (…) - a failure 
to explain things adequately. Cachón defends the idea, which I support, that 
the political, public and institutional discourse in Spain has been deeply anti-
pedagogical. That means the authorities have never spoken well of 
immigration. When they discuss the subject, they describe it negatively, in 
some cases linking it with crime, in other cases with unfair competition, in 
other cases as an abuse of the welfare state, in other cases as a loss of 
identity. They never talk about immigrants’ contributions to GDP, of their 
national insurance contributions, or their demographic contribution. The public 
discourse has always been negative. Why? Because electorally this discourse 
will go unpunished because foreigners do not vote. And I can pick up votes, 
as we have seen in some ACs in the latest elections, hardening [political] 
discourse [on immigration] in those ACs where foreigners cannot vote. If you 
notice, in the Madrid region, the discourse against immigration has been very 
soft because a large majority of foreigners in Madrid do have the right to vote 
– whether they exercise this right or not. 
 
I: Why exactly is Madrid different? 
 
MJ: Because the foreign population in Madrid is mostly from the EU. They are 
mainly Romanian and secondly latinos, who already have Spanish nationality, 
and can vote, or are from countries that have signed agreements allowing 
their citizens to vote in Spain in local elections. For that reason PP’s discourse 
in Madrid is completely different from the Catalan PP, because in Catalonia 
the [foreign] population is mainly Moroccan and is never going to vote 
because it can’t. (…) So there has been no attempt to explain the positive 
aspects of immigration. And this takes place in a country that has had no 
experience of large-scale foreign residence. If I hear a purely negative 
discourse on immigration, I perceive immigration negatively. The CIS monthly 
barometers show that the four main problems identified in Spain are now the 
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economic situation, unemployment, the politicians – which for me is a lack of 
political culture, befitting a country that has come out of dictatorship and that 
is lacking political culture. What is bad is not politicians and political parties 
but corruption, which is a different phenomenon. Finally, there is immigration.  
 
I: It’s gone down in the ranking… 
 
MJ: Mind that when ETA declared a ceasefire, immigration became the number 
one problem. It is always among the four horsemen of the apocalypse: 
terrorism, housing (…) and they all just change places… 
 
I: How would you account for the fact that immigration has slipped down the 
ranking with the crisis? 
 
MJ: It’s still in the top four. Obviously in a situation of crisis the economic situation 
and unemployment are much more important, but the worrying thing is that 
immigration is still there. All of macroeconomic, microeconomic and cultural 
factors, all of the economic studies by the government, by the Caixa de 
Catalunya and BBVA foundations4, tell us that immigration has been generally 
positive for Spain. However, Spaniards’ perception is negative. Why? 
Because of this political discourse, a discourse backed up by the media 
discourse. If you look at the CIS survey question about which factors have 
“affected you personally” immigration falls to [problem] number twelve. Javier 
De Lucas (…] the ex president of the Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid 
(CEAR) says there is “an abyss between reality and perception”. (…] The La 
Caixa report is crushing. Immigrants are perceived as “abusers” of public 
services. That is the view of the average Spaniard. The La Caixa report 
published in April is devastating in this respect.  
 
I: What is the perception of the grassroots of the union movement? Does it 
share these average views? 
 
MJ: I hope not. We are a reflection of the society that we live in. We are neither 
better nor worse. Obviously we have better methods of analysis that allow us 
 
 
288 
 
to see things more clearly, but it’s true that in some sectors among the rank 
and file we can see similarly negative attitudes to be honest. 
 
I: Are there internal tensions in the unions because of this? 
 
MJ: No. You hear comments like “foreigners get free meals and I don’t” – the 
typical urban myths. “Foreigners get council houses and I don’t”. No, they get 
council houses because their earnings are lower than yours. (…) The La 
Caixa foundation has shown clearly that this is not true. (…) You get more 
poorer layers in Spain because of immigration, and because benefit 
entitlements are calculated in relation to proportional income some 
autochthonous people stop being eligible for benefits, which go to newer 
groups of the poor [meaning foreigners]. Who do I see getting a free meal in 
the canteen? A Latin American girl? Who do I see getting free books at 
school? The Moroccan kid. At heart the failure is that of the social state, 
because in years of plenty we had a record number of national insurance 
contributors, we didn’t adjust benefits to the expanded population. In the 
Madrid Community there was an exponential growth in population and a 
ridiculously small increase in health and education spending. This led to 
saturation in schools and the identification made between schools with 
immigrants and being poor quality. Working class people made an effort to 
take their children into privately managed schools.  
 
I: A study I read on Ireland, which has a comparable immigration history to 
Spain, concluded that the neoliberal model encouraged the view that 
immigrants were a problem because there is more competition for services… 
 
MJ: Immigration has always been seen as a problem here. Always. First it was 
associated with crime. Here there was a regional representative of the 
government that issued a press statement saying Columbians “pickpockets’”, 
Peruvians “airport thieves”. He did a ranking of nationalities and associated 
crimes. It was disgraceful. Later the idea was that foreigners were unfair 
competition in the labour market. I remember that discourse perfectly. They 
said this was because immigrants earned less. That is not true. It is just that 
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they have worked in employment sectors where the average wage is lower. 
(…) Then “the foreigner attacks our identity”. In Catalonia this discourse can 
be seen clearly with CiU or Barrera, the historic leader of Esquerra 
Republicana who was particularly hard on immigrants (…). And now we are in 
a phase of perceiving the immigrant as someone who monopolises social 
services – a competitor for social services. Although immigration has always 
been seen negatively, but curiously immigration in Spain has always been a 
great success – both economically and socially. We have had a mass influx. 
The Spanish population has been incredibly sensible. This is not often pointed 
out. (…) We became the second biggest immigration destination in Europe in 
absolute terms after Germany, and the second in relative terms after 
Luxemburg – most of whose immigrants are from the EU, working in banking, 
etcetera (…) Migratory processes that in other countries have taken decades 
have taken place here in five or six years. The impact in Spain has been 
splendid. Here there have not been racist outbreaks. There were incidents in 
El Ejido, Terrassa. 
 
I: El Ejido was a dramatic outbreak, was it not? 
 
MJ: Yes, it was serious but fortunately it didn’t go beyond being a one-off event. 
Here the extreme right have not managed to articulate a political project using 
racism and xenophobia – as has happened in other European countries. 
There has not been one single racist incident in the workplace. Where are 
frictions emerging? In the public services, which are the authorities’ 
responsibility. That’s where there are frictions, where the immigrant is 
perceived negatively, as an unfair competitor.  
 
I: Is it not possible that the lack of strong far-right parties in Spain is because 
they are discredited after the experience of fascism in Spain? 
 
MJ: These are questions that go beyond my remit of analysis. I have my own 
personal opinion, which is that the ideological spectrum of the Popular Party is 
very wide. Its vote goes from the centre right to the extreme right, including 
the right and right extremists! So there is a ‘tactical vote’ that brings together a 
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spectacular mass of vote. I know of people in the PP that are clearly extreme 
right. There has been a row in the Madrid region, where extreme right groups 
got to dominate some local village branches of the PP. In a summer course 
on immigration I asked the first [Secretary of State for Immigration and Aliens 
Affairs] Fernández Mirando if his party had absorbed a section of the extreme 
right, and he said that that was “good”! I don’t know whether to think it is good 
or not. He said it was good because the PP decreased the impact of the far 
right. [But] that is why they give a nod to xenophobic discourses in certain 
geographical areas.
                                                        
1
 The Spanish term provided is “repesca”, which could also be translated as a “repeat exam” or 
“retrial”. 
2
 The crisis referred to is that which began in response to the revolution in this and other North African 
countries at the beginning of 2011.   
3
 In 2002 when Moroccan soldiers occupied a very small uninhabited island near to its mainland 
(“Perejil” in Spanish; “Leila Laila” in Arabic), Spain took the island by force, imprisoning the 
servicemen. 
4
 La Caixa de Catalunya and BBVA are large commercial banks. 
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IU: Izquierda Unida (United Left) 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NGO: Non-governmental organisation 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPI: Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración (Permanent Immigration Observatory) 
PCE: Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain) 
PECI: Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and 
Integration)  
PNV: Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) 
PP: Partido Popular (Popular Party) 
PPC: Partido Popular de Catalunya (Popular Party of Catalonia) 
PSC: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialists’ Party of Catalonia) 
PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) 
PxC: Plataforma per Catalunya (Platform for Catalonia) 
SFRII: Fondo de Apoyo a la Acogida y la Integracion de Inmigrantes (Support Fund for the 
Reception and Integration of Immigrants) 
SIS: Schengen Information System 
SIVE: Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior (Integrated System of External Surveillance) 
SMEs: Small and medium-sized enterprises 
UCFR: Unitat contra el Feixisme I el Racisme (Unite Against Fascism and Racism) 
UdP: Unió de Pagesos (Farmers’ Union) 
UGT: Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union) 
VIS: Visa Information System 
 
* IMSERSO  has been renamed the ‘Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales’ (Institute for 
the Elderly and Social Services)  
